HYPERBOREUS

STUDIA CLASSICA

ναυσὶ δ᾽ οὔτε πεζὸς ἰών κεν εὕροις
ἐς Ὑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν

(Pind. *Pyth*. 10. 29–30)

PETROPOLI

Vol. 18 2012 Fasc. 1

BIBLIOTHECA CLASSICA PETROPOLITANA
VERLAG C. H. BECK MÜNCHEN

HYPERBOREUS: Классическая филология и история

Выходит два раза в год

Редакция: Н. А. Алмазова (отв. ред. выпуска), А. Л. Верлинский, С. К. Егорова (отв. секр.), Д. В. Кейер, Д. В. Панченко

Консультанты: Михаэль фон Альбрехт, А. К. Гаврилов, Пэт Истерлинг, Карло Лукарини

Адрес редакции и издателя: 197198, С.-Петербург, ул. Красного Курсанта, д. 6/9
Античный кабинет (HYPERBOREUS)
Факс: (812) 274-3395, (812) 235-4267
E-mail: hyperbicl@gmail.com

По вопросам подписки обращаться по адресу редакции

HYPERBOREUS: Studia Classica

HYPERBOREUS wurde im Jahre 1994 durch die Bibliotheca Classica Petropolitana gegründet.

Der Vertrieb außerhalb Rußlands erfolgt durch den Verlag C. H. Beck (Oskar Beck), Wilhelmstr. 9, D-80801 München, Postfachadresse: Postfach 400340, D-80703 München.

Die Zeitschrift erscheint ab 1996 in zwei Halbjahresschriften. Abonnementpreis jährlich ab Vol. 2 € 34,90 (in diesem Betrag sind € 2,28 Mehrwertsteuer enthalten), für das Einzelheft € 19,50 (Mehrwertsteueranteil € 1,28), jeweils zuzüglich Vertriebsgebühren; die Kündigungsfrist des Abonnements beträgt sechs Wochen zum Jahresende. Preis für Vol. 1, 1994/5, auf Anfrage bei dem Verlag C. H. Beck.

Herausgeber: Nina Almazova (verantw.), Sofia Egorova, Denis Keyer, Dmitri Panchenko, Alexander Verlinsky

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat: Michael von Albrecht, P. E. Easterling, Alexander Gavrilov, Carlo M. Lucarini

Alle für die Redaktion bestimmten Manuskripte und Einsendungen sind zu richten an:
Bibliotheca Classica Petropolitana (HYPERBOREUS)
ul. Krasnogo Kursanta 6/9
197198 St. Petersburg, Russia
Fax: (812) 274-3395, (812) 235-4267
E-mail: hyperbicl@gmail.com

Die Publikationssprachen im HYPERBOREUS sind Russisch, Englisch, Französisch, Deutsch, Italienisch und Lateinisch; den Beiträgen wird jeweils eine Zusammenfassung auf Englisch und Russisch hinzugefügt.
Entgegnungen werden im HYPERBOREUS nur ausnahmsweise aufgenommen. Eingegangene Druckschriften werden nicht zurückgeschickt. Mit Namen gezeichnete Artikel geben die Auffassung des Verfassers, nicht der Redaktion wieder. Alle Nachrichten werden nach bestem Wissen, aber ohne Gewähr gegeben.

 ISSN 0949-2615

CONSPECTUS

Статьи сопровождаются резюме на русском и английском языке
Summary in Russian and English

DISPUTATIONES

SCANDINAVIAN BACKGROUND OF GREEK MYTHIC COSMOGRAPHY: THE SUN'S WATER TRANSPORT*

We know from a long passage in Athenaeus (469 c–470 d) that many Greek poets, including very early ones, referred to the sun's night journey in a cup-like device. Most of them spoke of the 'cup' (τὸ δέπας);[1] the poet of the *Titanomachia*, followed by other writers, called it the 'cauldron' (ὁ λέβης).[2] Heracles, who once borrowed his vehicle from Helios (Pisander, Panyassis, Pherecydes – all *apud* Athen., *loc. cit.* and Apollod. *Bibl.* 2. 5. 10), is also shown to sail in a cauldron on a cup from Vulci.[3] The cauldron apparently exemplified a particularly spacious and precious metal vessel. Mimnermus described the vehicle as a 'winged hollow bed',[4] but Athenaeus may be right in interpreting Mimnermus' words as a hint at the hollow shape of a cup.[5] An idea of associating the sun with a vessel is easy to account for. The round opening of a vessel fits with the shape of the sun's disc, and its hollow body provides the sun with a kind of container in which it can be hidden during the night.

As is clear from the citations in Athenaeus, Helios uses his vehicle to sail from the place of the sunset to the place of the sunrise. Homer does not mention such a journey. But since his sun sets into Okeanos and rises from Okeanos, there is no conflict between two pictures. A puzzle, however, emerges if we take a closer look at Helios' daily voyage. The only detailed exposition we have comes from Mimnermus:

---

* Research for this article was supported by Central European University ("CEU") Special and Extension Programs. The opinions expressed herein are the author's own and do not necessarily express the views of CEU.

[1] Stes. *PMGF* S 17 = 185; Pis. fr. 5 West; Aesch. fr. 69 Radt; Pherecydes fr. 18 a Fowler; Antim. fr. 86 Matthews.

[2] Fr. 8 Bernabé; Theolytus *FGrHist* 478 F 1.

[3] *ARV* 449, 2. See Jessen, "Helios", *RE* VIII (1912) 92. Cf. *LIMC* V (add.) Helios 101.

[4] Fr. 12. 5–6 West.

[5] Helios' bowl is a part of iconographic tradition – see *LIMC* V (add.) Helios 99–100.

> The Sun-god hath received the lot of toil all his days, nor ever cometh any surcease for his horses or for himself, when rosy-fingered Dawn hath left Oceanus and mounted the sky; for a lovely winged hollow couch of precious gold, made by the hands of Hephaestus, bears him lightly across the billow, on the top of the wave, while he sleeps; it carries him from the land of the Hesperides even to the country of the Aethiopians, where his swift chariot and steeds stand waiting until early-born Dawn shall come. Then the son of Hyperion mounts his car.[6]

The idea of the Sun's god changing vehicle is nontrivial. Why should Helios not keep traveling in a chariot? If the sun is no longer seen during the night, this is possibly because it is hidden by huge mountains in the north, as some Ionian compatriots of Mimnermus will in fact later assert, or because it entered an immense cave, as in the Gilgamesh epics, or because during the night the sun's disc is turned towards us by its dark side, as in early Indian cosmography. To be sure, Egyptian Re traveled in a boat, but he did not change his vehicle: during the day the solar bark sailed a celestial river and came back during the night along the subterranean waters. No Near Eastern parallel to the idea of the sun's changing vehicle has been identified.[7] One finds it, however, in Bronze Age Scandinavia.

Before citing the evidence, it is appropriate to recall that the amount of the metalwork found in Bronze Age Scandinavia clearly points to the region's wide and intense trade connections since every piece of both cooper and tin was imported;[8] that the Bronze Age 'Scandinavian culture' stretched into the eastern Netherlands, northern Germany, and also included major islands of the Baltic Sea and some outposts in southern Finland and Eastern Baltic countries;[9] and that the Late Bronze Age Europe witnessed a kind of cultural koine spread from the Atlantic shores to the Eastern Mediterranean.[10]

For the world of ideas, hundreds of representations on Danish bronze razors[11] and thousands of carvings on Swedish and Norwegian

---

[6] Transl. by C. B. Gulick.

[7] See M. L. West, *The East Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth* (Oxford 1997) 507 f.

[8] K. Kristiansen, T. B. Larsson, *The Rise of Bronze Age Society* (Cambridge 2005) 186.

[9] German scholars usually speak about 'nordischer Kreis'; the expression 'the Nordic culture' also appears in works published in English.

[10] See J. Bouzek, *The Aegean, Anatolia and Europe: Cultural Interrelations in the Second Millennium B. C.* (Praha 1985) and Kristiansen, Larsson (n. 8) Ch. 5–6.

[11] See now F. Kaul, *Ships on Bronzes. A Study in Bronze Age Religion and Iconography. Vol. 1: Text; Vol. 2: Catalogue of Danish Finds* (Copenhagen 1998). Similar bronze objects are also found in Sweden, Netherlands and northern Germany.

rocks[12] constitute a considerable body of evidence, though such evidence is not easy to interpret. The ship is among the most favorite subjects in these representations. It frequently appears in a close association with either the Sun or the horse or both. Many ships are shown to transport the sun; many are decorated with a horse's figurehead and are, in a sense, 'sea-horses'. The horse pulling the sun is also a well-known motif. Most importantly, there are several representations in which the horse pulling the sun appears along with the ship 'in such a way as to suggest that the horse is supposed to take the sun across the sky by day and then rendezvous with the ship'.[13] Thus, the horse standing on a ship with the Sun's disc in front of it is shown on a rock carving from Östergötland (Fig. 1).



Fig. 1. A carving from Östergötland

That the disc represents here the sun is confirmed by the fact that the ship is facing to the right, that is, moving in the direction in which the sun is seen to proceed across the sky.[14] In a rock carving from Kalleby, Bohuslän, either the horse (according to some scholars) or the stag (according to the others) pulling the Sun's wheel is shown just above the ship (Fig. 2). The idea of alternatively combining two vehicles is still there in any case.

Fig. 2. A carving from Bohuslän

[12] For excellent introduction see P. Gelling, H.E. Davidson, *The Chariot of the Sun* (London 1969) and J. Coles, *Shadows of a Northern Past. Rock Carvings of Bohuslän and Østfold* (Oxford 2005). The publications and scholarly literature have been significantly growing over recent decades. A beautiful archaeological park has been established in Vitlycke, Bohuslän.

[13] M.L. West, *Indo-European Poetry and Myth* (Oxford 2007) 207.

[14] For orientation of the ships in Scandinavian monuments see K.A. Larsen, "Solvogn og Solkult", *Kuml* (1955) 49, Fig. 4 a; Kaul (n. 11) (Text) 185–187.

The Sun's god can be sometimes recognized in Scandinavian monuments. He is riding a one-wheeled chariot drawn by one horse on a rock carving from Bohuslän.[15] The following description is given to a carving on the island of Tjörn (a few miles off the west coast of Sweden, near the famous rock-carving area in the district of Tanum, Bohuslän): "There is a horse placed in front of a sun cross and a man partly kneeling with a sword; the man is driving the horse with the help of its flying mane which acts as reins, and the whole picture is placed on a primitive sleigh-like ship"[16] (cf. Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. A carving from the island of Tjörn

The combination of a ship, sun and horse appears also on Scandinavian bronze razors.[17] The artist who decorated one of such razors seems to have hinted at the sun's horse taking off from the ship (Fig. 4).[18]

---

[15] Larsen 53, Fig. 7 c. For one-wheeled chariot of the Sun's (or a related) god in Indian, Iranian and Irish traditions see M.L. West, *Indo-European Poetry and Myth,* 205.

[16] J. Pettersson, G. Kristiansson, *Hällristningar på Tjörn* (Malung 1977) 116. The horse and the horseman seem to be shown at the moment of landing.

[17] Larsen (n. 14) 47, Fig. 2; 51, Fig. 5 b. Kaul (n. 11) no. 363 displays a horse landing in a ship, but that part of the razor which could have had the sun's disc is broken.

[18] Kaul (n. 11) no. 353 (p. 144; the horse can be identified by two characteristic short strokes). The other four discs with the rays seem to represent the sun taking rest in a ship, rising sun, culminating sun and declining sun respectively.



Fig. 4. Bronze razor from Denmark

One may note that the western part of Scandinavia provides a geographically adequate context for the idea of the Sun's god changing vehicle. The people dwelling on the shores which face an immense expanse of the sea in the west observe at the sunset how the sun touches the watery surface and subsequently disappears beneath it. To be sure, also in Ionia, on the eastern shores of the Aegean, the western horizon frequently coincides with the sea's surface, and the sun is accordingly seen to descend to the watery surface. But the Greeks of Ionia would have certainly known that the Greeks in Athens or Argos would have seen the sun rising from the sea, but never setting into it. The inhabitants of the western parts of Scandinavia were thus in a far better position than the inhabitants of the Aegean to conceive the idea of the sun's night journey by water. Before the recognition of the existence of America, the Atlantic Ocean could have been reasonably thought of to have been a body of water beyond the edge of the earth. And if the sun reappears every morning, it is not illogical to think of it traveling to the east by water. As a matter of fact, the idea of the sun's journeys in a boat or ship is well-documented in Bronze Age Scandinavia. It is represented in bronze and rock carvings. At the same time, it is obvious that during the day, when the sun is high in the sky, it does not travel by water; and if the sun changes its medium, it also changes vehicle. While the cycle presented by Mimnermus and implied by other Greek poets is strange within the geographical situation of the East Mediterranean, it is natural for the inhabitants of the Atlantic shores.[19] Historically, the combination of the boat and horse, both associated with the sun, seems to reflect two different cultural traditions that met in

[19] Very much the same can be said in respect to the Homeric idea of the stars bathing in waters of Okeanos. Scandinavia also provided the only favourable geographical context for an idea of the surrounding ocean. It is only here that the body of water stretched from the west to encompass the land also from the north (in accordance to the sun's boat night journey from the west to the east through the north). It is worth noting that in Snorri's *Edda* the surrounding ocean is known as the world serpent – an archaic feature that could not have borrowed from the tradition of classical geography.

Scandinavia: the tradition of the megalithic culture of Atlantic Europe (for the sun's boat) and that of the battle-axes culture brought by the Indo-Europeans from Eastern or Central Europe (for the sun's horse and chariot).

As for the sun's cup-like vehicle, its representation is found on a bronze vessel from Siem, Jutland (Fig. 5). This representation seems also to echo a particular detail given by Mimnermus. This poet presents the hollow bed of Helios as possessing wings.[20] But wings are appropriate to bear one across the sky, and not the sea. The solar cup-like boat of Siem is not depicted with wings, but it is itself in a way a water bird and therefore can be said to be winged.



Fig. 5. Detail of decoration of a bronze vessel from Siem, Jutland

It is further worth noting that Siem's vessel is a cauldron, and that representations of the sun's vehicle, both of Siem type and of somewhat different types, regularly appear on the Late Bronze Age cauldrons from Scandinavia, Hungary, and Italy.[21] The cauldrons with such decoration can be possibly seen as symbolic substitutes for the sun's cauldron. And we saw that the cauldron is a particularly well-attested version of the sun's vessel in early Greek tradition.

Some scholars believe that this type of decoration originated in the Danube region from where it radiated outward.[22] Whatever the truth concerning details of the decoration or the shape of such vessels, the idea behind the type was formed, I suggest, in a region where the sun was regularly observed to set into the sea; and this fits far better with the western shores of Jutland, Sweden, and Norway than with any part of Central Europe. The very association of the sun with the ship may also imply the experience of regularly seeing the sun descending into the sea.

A reference to the ship transporting the sun's vessel can probably be recognized in a remarkable object found in 1895 at Skallerup, Zeeland (Fig. 6). It was dated to the period III of the Scandinavian Bronze Age,[23] and dendrochronology suggests that in nearby Jutland period III began not

---

[20] The manuscript tradition presents Helios himself possessing wings. But then Helios does not need his horses. Editors rightly follow Heyne who proposed reading ὑπόπτερος instead of ὑπόπτερον.

[21] G. von Merhart, *Hallstatt und Italien. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Frühen Eisenzeit in Italien und Mitteleuropa*, ed. G. Kossack (Mainz 1969) pl. 44, 47, 48. Some specimens may belong to the Early Iron Age.

[22] Von Merhart (n. 21) 327–364.

[23] H.C. Broholm, *Danske Oldsager. Vol. 3: Ældre Bronzealder* (København 1952) 63 (N 335).

Fig. 6. Bronze cauldron from Skallerup

later than 1316 BC.[24] In the words of a prominent scholar, "this peculiar object … consists of a hammered cauldron sailing forward on two ships with swan-figures in the bow and stern, the whole mounted on a wheel frame with two pairs of four-spoked wheels".[25]

There is much to justify speaking of the ships in connection with the Skallerup cauldron. The ships decorated with bird's protomae at both prow and stern constitute a well-known type, commonly called *Vogelbarke*. It is well attested in the Danube region, Italy and especially in Scandinavia.[26] Double ships repeatedly appear on Scandinavian bronzes,[27] and combining

---

[24] K. Randsborg, "The Nordic Bronze Age: Chronological Dimensions", *Acta Archaeologica* 67 (1996 [= Suppl. 1: Absolute Chronology, ed. by K. Randsborg]) 66; K. Randsborg, K. Christiansen, "Bronze Age Oak-Coffin Graves: Archaeology and Dendro-Dating", *Acta Archaeologica* 77 (2006 [= Suppl. 7]).

[25] P. V. Glob, *The Mound People* (London 1974) 148. See also F. Kaul, "Kultwagen", *Reallexikon der germanischen Altertumskunde* 17 (Berlin – New York [2]2001) 463 – 478, esp. 473 f.

[26] W. Kimmig, "Seevölkerbewegung und Urnenfelderkultur", in: *Studien aus Alteuropa* (Bonn 1964) I, 224 identifies the type as "donauländische Vogelbarken". A similar approach was taken by H. Henken, *Tarquinia, Villanovans and Early Etruscans* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968) 2, 514–517, 537, 568–570. For the likely Scandinavian origin of the type see my "Mice Destroying an Army (Hdt. 2. 141) and a Solution of the Tocharian Problem", *Hyperboreus* 16/17 (2010/2011) 39–43 and "Викинги бронзового века и их наследие" ("The Vikings of the Bronze Age and their Legacy"), *Stratum plus* 2 (2012) 84–89.

[27] E. Sprockhoff, "Nordische Bronzezeit und frühes Griechentum", *JbRGZM* 1 (1954) 57, Abb. 14; Kaul (n. 11) no. 99; 168, etc.

two ships can be explained either as reflection of actual practice[28] or as the motif of twin ships related to the cult of divine Twins.[29] A ship put on wheels is something very well known from the tradition of European carnivals, and it appears already on a sixth-century Attic vase painting.[30]

Now, what is the function of the wheels? The famous Trundholm group (also from Zealand and from about the same epoch as the Skallerup cauldron) which consists of the horse pulling the sun's disc, both put on wheels, has an opening for the cord.[31] It is clear, then, that it was used for ceremonial processions. One may think of a similar use of the Skallerup cauldron – all the more so because it represents a certain type.[32] This suggests, in turn, that the vessel put on the ships and wheels (to be carried in a procession) had a symbolic meaning. Greek poetry, I propose, reveals this meaning: the vessel symbolized the sun's cauldron in which the sun was hidden during the night.

The suggestion that the Skallerup cauldron hints at the sun's vehicle agrees well with an iconographic motif of a disc combined with four bird protomae. This motif is attested in two regions that display a number of strikingly similar cultural elements, Scandinavia and Italy. It is probably worth noting that its version on a bronze shield from Denmark (Fig. 7)

Fig. 7. Bronze shield from Denmark

[28] G. Hallström, "Uritggade kanoter i Sverige?", *Fornvännen* (1925) 50–70.

[29] K. Kristiansen, "Rock Art and Religion. The Sun Journey in Indo-European Mythology and Bronze Age Rock Art", in: Å. Fredell, F. Criado, K. Kristiansen (eds.), *Representations and Communications* (Oxford 2010) 99 ff.

[30] See J. Boardman, "A Greek Vase from Egypt", *JHS* 78 (1958) 6, Fig. 3.

[31] Glob (n. 25) 103.

[32] G. Rausing, "The Wheeled Cauldrons and the Wine", *Antiquity* 71 (1997) 994–999.

involves seven concentric circles. As I argue elsewhere, the number seven was strongly connected with the sun, and especially with the sun's seasonal movement from solstice to solstice;[33] the concern with this movement fits very well with the involvement of such symbols as migratory birds (be those swans, wild geese or ducks). Further, the motif can be reasonably seen as a variant of the *Vogelbarke* type, while the latter derives in fact from that of the *Sonnen-Vogel-Barke*.[34]

To be sure, the cauldron put on a ship need not necessarily contain the sun. The Skallerup cauldron contained in fact burnt bones. Does this contradict the proposed interpretation? Even if one allows that the Skallerup cauldron was originally used for burnt bones, there is still a likely association of some cremation burials with the sun cult. Fire and the sun could have been easily related, and were indeed related in Europe of the very old, as so many European seasonal festivals prove. Now, it is plausibly suggested that the sun must have been to the Bronze Age Scandinavians 'the symbol of resurrection *par excellence*'.[35] One may, then, suppose a kind of wishful "logic" behind placing burnt bones in a vessel symbolizing the sun: just as the sun ever returns to new life, so will the deceased; or as the sun (with its fire) brings every spring new life, so fire will do to the deceased. There is some evidence to support the actual existence of such a train of thought. On the neck of a funerary urn from Øster Hierting, one may see a person with raised hands and outstretched fingers, an image analogies to which are also known from Scandinavian rock carvings. Knud A. Larsen seems to be right to interpret the raised hands and outstretched fingers as symbolizing sunrise and dawn (and he aptly recalls rosy-fingered Eos of Homer in this connection).[36] Then we have a combination of a funerary urn with an image of the god of the sun's light, and I see no other explanation for this combination than the hope for resurrection. Further, a house-urn from Vulci (said to be of the early eighth century) has a *Vogelbarke* on the roof and a typical *Sonnen-Vogel-*

[33] D. Panchenko, "Solar Light and the Symbolism of the Number Seven", *Hyperboreus* 12 (2006) 21–36.

[34] Von Merhart (n. 21) 327 interprets the motif of a disc combined with four bird protomae in terms of purely ornamental development, he proposes that it is just mirrored *Sonnen-Vogel-Barke* of a certain (Lavindsgaard) type. This train of thought thus deprives the combination of symbolic meaning and also neglects the independent existence of the double ship motif. Merhart is further prone to assume Hungarian provenance of the motif of a disc combined with four bird protomae, but he cites no example from the Danube region and explicitly notes that the Lavindsgaard type has no parallels there.

[35] Gelling, Davidson (n. 12) 58.

[36] Larsen (n. 14) esp. 54, Fig. 8.

Barke on its side surface.[37] Hence we have a clear reference to the sun in connection with cremation. It is also worth noting that house-urns belong to the cultural elements shared by Etruria and Scandinavia (in a specified, larger sense).[38]

It is thus likely that the Skallerup object represents the sun's cauldron.

It is appropriate to specify that wheeled cauldrons are known also from the Danube region, and according to an influential scholarly view the type originated there, which in turn may suggest that the idea of sun's journey in a bronze vessel originated there as well. However, the bronze vessel is to be transported by boat, and I already noted that Atlantic sea shores fit better with the corresponding assumption than the planes or mountains of Central Europe. Since I can imagine, nevertheless, that it was believed somewhere in what is modern Romania that the sun rose in the east from the sea (the Black Sea) and came back from the west, hidden during the night in a big bronze vessel, by sailing in a boat down such a long and east flowing river as the Danube, I do not deny categorically the possibility of Central European origin of the idea in question, even though I put in the title of this paper 'Scandinavian' rather than 'northern' background (of Greek mythic cosmography).[39]

One may venture suggesting that there is a reference to the sun's cauldron in an open circular outline drawn right above a ship, repeatedly found in rock carvings (Fig. 8 a).[40] Sometimes two such objects are shown above one ship (Fig. 8 b), but the same holds also for the sun's images. A carving from Bohuslän displays the same element in combination not only with a ship but also with horses (Fig. 8 c).[41] A pair of horses is a recurrent motif in Scandinavian rock carvings, and in the Eddic tradition the sun is carried by two horses, Arvak and Alsvin (*Grímnismál* 37 and also in Snorri Sturlusson's *Gylfaginning*). The combination of a ship with horses strongly suggests a reference to the sun's transport. This fits well with the idea that the element under discussion represents the sun's cauldron, though the corresponding conclusion remains of course hypothetical.

---

[37] *Die Etrusker und Europa* (Paris – Mainland 1992) 116 (N 35).

[38] See the map, *ibid*., 193.

[39] For the historical context see Panchenko (n. 25).

[40] See, for instance: Å. Fredsjö, *Hällristingar i Kville härad, Svenneby socken* (Göteborg 1971) 240 Pl. III and VIII, 242, 285 Pl. IV; idem, *Hällristingar i Kville härad, Bottna socken* (Göteborg 1975) 299 Pl. VI; idem, *Hällristingar i Kville härad, Kville socken* (Göteborg 1981) 167 Pl. II, 185 Pl. I, 186 Pl. II, cf. 172 Pl. XI.

[41] For the context see R. Bradley, "Danish Razors and Swedish rocks: Cosmology and the Bronze Age Landscape", *Antiquity* 80 (2006) 380, Fig. 5.



Fig. 8, a–c. Carvings from Bohuslän

In sum, it is possible to locate Scandinavian parallels for specific motifs of the sun's daily journey as it is represented in Mimnermus' poetry, such as a cup-like device (which is found on the cauldron from Siem) and the motif of changing a vehicle (which is repeatedly implied in representations found on both rocks and metalwork). Greek influence upon Scandinavia in the case in question is unlikely for the simple reason that the solar cult was marginal in Greece in both Mycenaean and later times, while it was central in Bronze Age Scandinavia. Moreover, it was Scandinavia and not the Aegean which provided a geographically adequate context for the emergence of the idea of the sun's changing vehicle. Furthermore, this idea recurs in the Latvian folk tradition (the Sun travels alternately in a chariot and in a boat),[42] while western, seaside Latvia may be said to have belonged in the Bronze Age to the realm of 'Scandinavian' (or 'Nordic') culture; in any case Latvia and Scandinavia are parts of the same Baltic region.

There remains a very odd idea of the sun's sailing in a cup or a cauldron. Likely Scandinavian parallels to Aegean poetry have it seen as a transformation of an initially more natural notion, according to which the cauldron itself is transported by a boat. But why, one may ask, does the boat not figure in the Greek tradition? It is absent even in Mimnermus, whether or not one follows Athenaeus in identifying the poet's 'hollow bed' with a cup-like vehicle. To answer this question we should take into account a characteristic feature of Greek mythology which has been emphasized by David Konstan: gods can represent the natural world, but

[42] See West (n. 13) 209.

they are never confused with particular elements of that world.[43] Let us imagine that early Greek poets were familiar with the notion of the vessel of Helios and they also heard of Helios' night journey by water. The same word means in Greek both the Sun as god and the object shining in the sky. Now, it would be strange for a Greek poet to think of Sun's god, Helios, getting into a vessel every night. "The vessel of Helios" would mean for such a poet something that Helios uses. For crossing the sky, the idea of riding a chariot was available, and the vessel used by Helios turned into his water transport. The very idea of the sun's vessel belongs in fact to a type of religion different from that recorded for the Greeks. The sun's vessel is meant to contain fire (because of which the sun shines and emits heat) and not a person. The idea belongs to a religion in which natural powers are not substituted for the strength, benevolence and anger of divine anthropomorphic characters in such a systematic way as in Greek religion. Accordingly, this idea may be seen as an intruder in Greek mythology, even as we have seen reasons to think of Scandinavian influence upon the corresponding element of Greek mythic cosmography.[44]

It is not easy, however, to specify the route and the time of the arrival of the idea at Greece. Particular cultural elements common to both Scandinavia and the Aegean are known from the Middle Helladic / Middle Minoan until early Archaic periods.[45] The motif of the *Sonnen-Vogel-Barke* is attested for Pylos shortly before its destruction (Fig. 9).[46]

---

[43] D. Konstan, "What is Greek about Greek Mythology?", *Kernos* 4 (1991) 11–30.

[44] Gisela Fuchs in her interesting study proposes a Near Eastern origin of the idea of the sun's cup – G. Fuchs, *Der Becher des Sonnengottes. Zur Entwicklund der Motivs "Becher des Zorn"* (Münster, etc. 2003). But in reality she is trying to recover the notion of the sun's cup in the Old Testament mainly on the basis of Greek poetry. It is true, she adduces an interesting report by Pausanias (9, 41, 1 f.) on an object in a Lycian temple which she plausibly interprets as pointing to the sun's cup. But in what sense does Lycia represent the East? There was significant movement of various ethnic and military groups from Europe to Asia Minor in the late second – early first millennia BC. The Phrygians, Mysians, Lydians and in all probability Carians came from Europe. The Lycians were among the Sea Peoples, and at least many of the Sea People were of European (including Scandinavian) background. After all, the cultural legacy of the Sea Peoples can be discerned in the Old Testament itself.

[45] See Bouzek (n. 10); Kristiansen, Larsson (n. 8); Panchenko (n. 25) 82 f., 106–109.

[46] C. W. Blegen et al., *The Palace of Nestor at Pylos in Western Messenia* (Cincinnati 1973) III, 16, Fig. 108. Parallels to other elements of the Pylos diadem decoration can be found in Denmark and Pomeranian – see: E. Sprockhoff, "Das bronzene Zierband von Kronshagen bei Kiel", *Offa* 14 (1955) 35, Fig. 13, 3; 4–5. The mushroom-like images (in my reproduction, the Pylos diadem is seen upside down) repeatedly occur in Scandinavian bronzes and rock carvings.



Fig. 9. Golden diadem from Pylos

It reappears somewhat later on a krater sherd from Tiryns (Fig. 10 a; cf. e. g. Fig. 10 b).



Fig. 10 a–b. A krater sherd from Tiryns; *Vogelbarke* from Emden (Lower Saxony)

A sherd from Kynos of about the same epoch displays a ship's figurehead remarkably similar to that seen on a Danish bronze razor (Fig. 11 a–b).



Fig. 11 a–b. A sherd from Kynos; bronze razor from Denmark

Another striking parallel appears much later, in a representation on an Attic geometric vase (Fig. 12). We see here a ship that in all probability transports the sun. Here it is self-sufficient subject matter – precisely as on Scandinavian rock carvings (Fig. 13 a–d).

Fig. 12. Attic geometric vase



Fig. 13 a–d. Carvings from Bohuslän and Östergötland

Moreover, the ship on the Attic vase has neither mast nor sail, and the team is indicated by vertical strokes – all elements characteristic of the representation of ships on Scandinavian petroglyphs. It is quite possible, after all, that Scandinavian influence, both direct and indirect, reached the Aegean in several waves. This is a matter for further investigation.*

Dmitri Panchenko
dmpanchenko@yahoo.com
St Petersburg State University and
Bibliotheca Classica Petropolitana

* I am grateful to Matthew Kendall for correcting my English.

Sources of illustrations:

Fig. 1: P. Gelling, H. E. Davidson, *The Chariot of the Sun* (London 1969) 28, Fig. 12 g
Fig. 2: *ibid.*, 93, Fig. 44 c.
Fig. 3: J. Pettersson, G. Kristiansson, *Hällristningar på Tjörn* (Malung 1977) 47, Fig. 28.
Fig. 4: F. Kaul, *Ships on Bronzes. Catalogue of Danish Finds* (Copenhagen 1998) 144, no. 353.
Fig. 5: J. Bouzek, *The Aegean, Anatolia and Europe: Cultural Interrelations in the Second Millennium B. C.* (Praha 1985) 180, Fig. 90: 16.
Fig. 6: H. C. Broholm, *Danske Oldsager. Vol. 3: Ældre Bronzealder* (København 1952) 63, Fig. 335 a.
Fig. 7: G. von Merhart, *Hallstatt und Italien. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Frühen Eisenzeit in Italien und Mitteleuropa*, ed. G. Kossack (Mainz 1969) pl. 14.1.
Fig. 8 a: Å. Fredsjö, *Hällristingar i Kville härad, Bottna socken* (Göteborg 1975) 299, Pl. VI.
Fig. 8 b: P. Gelling, H. E. Davidson, *The Chariot of the Sun* (London 1969) 44, Fig. 20 e.
Fig. 9: C. W. Blegen et al., *The Palace of Nestor at Pylos in Western Messenia* (Cincinnati 1973) III, 16, Fig. 108.
Fig. 10 a: S. Wachsmann, *Seagoing Ships and Seamanship in the Bronze Age* (London 1998) 181, Fig. 8: 32.
Fig. 10 b: J. Bouzek, *The Aegean, Anatolia and Europe: Cultural Interrelations in the Second Millennium B. C.* (Praha 1985) 180, Fig. 90: 1.
Fig. 11 a: S. Wachsmann, *Seagoing Ships and Seamanship in the Bronze Age* (London 1998) 134, Fig. 7: 15.
Fig. 11 b: F. Kaul, *Ships on Bronzes. Catalogue of Danish Finds* (Copenhagen 1998) no. 387.
Fig. 12: J. S. Morrison, R. T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* (Cambridge 1968) Pl. 6 c.
Fig. 13: P. Gelling, H. E. Davidson, *The Chariot of the Sun* (London 1969) 12, Fig. 4.

Благодаря Афинею (469 c – 470 d) нам известно, что многие греческие поэты, в том числе очень ранние, в своих стихах упоминали ночное плавание солнца в каком-то сосуде. Одни из них говорили о "чаше", другие – о "котле". У Мимнерма, в единственном сохранившемся развернутом описании такого рода, это "крылатое полое ложе", но Афиней, вероятно, прав, усматривая в словах и этого поэта отсылку к полой форме чаши. Примечательной чертой ежедневного путешествия Гелиоса=солнца, каким оно предстает у Мимнерма, является смена транспортного средства: колесницы, несущей днем солнечного

бога по воздуху, на своего рода ладью, в которой он перемещается ночью. В статье показывается, что оба мотива – и плавание солнца в сосуде, и смена солнечным богом транспортного средства – северного происхождения. Первый мотив зародился либо в Скандинавии, либо в нижнем Подунавье, второй – скорее всего, в Скандинавии, и оба мотива (первый – косвенно, второй – несомненно) засвидетельствованы в изобразительных памятниках скандинавского бронзового века.

Many Greek poets, including very early ones, referred to the sun's night journey in a cup-like device. Most of them spoke of the 'cup'; the poet of the *Titanomachia*, followed by other writers, called it the 'cauldron'. Mimnermus described it as a 'winged hollow bed', but Athenaeus may be right in interpreting Mimnermus' words as a hint at the hollow shape of a cup. The only detailed exposition of Helios' daily voyage comes from Mimnermus. It includes nontrivial idea of the Sun's god changing vehicle. During the day Helios travels in a chariot and during the night he uses a 'winged hollow bed' to sail from the place of the sunset to the place of the sunrise. It is argued in this paper that the motif of the sun's night journey in a cup-like device originated either in the Danube region or in Scandinavia and that the motif of the Sun's god changing vehicle is of Scandinavian provenance.

THE EDUCATION OF ARTISTS IN ANCIENT GREECE

Introductory Remarks

The aim of this article is to collect the written evidence which may help us to understand what type of education and training ancient Greek artists enjoyed throughout the different ages and in the most important artistic centres.

As I shall point out several documents may be also enlightening about the relations between masters and pupils and may indicate the influence of philosophical ideas on this phenomenon.

I believe that this topic has been little studied and that several relevant sources have not yet been fully used in order to enhance our knowledge of this issue.[1]

These considerations hopefully justify the present study of this topic.

Masters and pupils in the workshops of artists of archaic Greece

In archaic Greece the rivalry among craftsmen who work with the same materials and the same techniques was very harsh.

---

[1] I delivered lectures on the education of ancient Greek artists in the University of Pavia in March, 2007 as well as at Saint-Petersburg, in the *Bibliotheca Classica*, in September, 2007. I thank Prof. Harari, who invited me to deliver my lecture in Pavia, as well as Profs. Kazansky, Gavrilov, Verlinsky, who encouraged me to talk about the results of my research in Saint-Petersburg. About workshops in ancient Greece, see S. Nolte, *Steinbruch – Werkstatt – Skulptur* (Göttingen 2006) 9–303 who cites the most important previous bibliography. About workshops of painters see A. Anguissola, "La bottega dell'artista", in: C. Gallazzi and S. Settis (eds.), *Le tre vite del Papiro di Artemidoro* (Milan 2006) 124–131 with relevant previous bibliography. About workshops of sculptors, see G. Bejor, "Nella bottega del marmorario", in: G. Bejor (ed.), *Botteghe e artigiani* (Milan 2012) 1–26 and M. Castoldi, "Nella bottega del bronzista", *ibid.*, 23–63. The education of ancient artists as well as their social and economic status have been considered by K. Seaman, *Rhetoric and Innovation in the Art of the Hellenistic Courts* (Berkeley 2010) with good previous bibliography (the whole book is pertinent to this problem).

Hesiod, *Op*. 11–26 illustrated at length this phenomenon:

> So there was not just one birth of Strife after all, but upon the earth there are two Strifes. One of these a man would praise once he got to know it, but the other is blameworthy; and they have thoroughly opposed spirits. For the one forsters evil war and conflict – cruel one, no mortal loves that one, but it is by necessity that they honor the oppressive Strife, by the plans of the immortals. But the other one gloomy Night bore first; and Cronus' high-throned son, who dwells in the aether, set it in the roots of the earth, and it is much better for man. It rouses even the helpless man to work. For a man who is not working, but who looks at some other man, a rich one who is hastening to plow and plant and set his house in order, he envies him, one neighbor envying his neighbor who is hastening towards wealth: and this Strife is good for mortals. And potter is angry with potter, and builder with builder, and beggar begrudges beggar, and poet poet (transl. Loeb).[2]

The situation described by Hesiod is also the social background of an anecdote attributed to the father of the artists, Daedalus: this artist is told to have become the master of Talos or Perdix, the son of his sister. This boy was so skilled that very soon Daedalus became jealous of him and eventually killed his promising pupil (D. S. 4. 76; Hyg. *Fab*. 244; Schol. E. *Or.* 161).

This legend reveals already for the period which for us is the Orientalizing one a few aspects of the training of artists:

1) the relationship between masters and pupils;

2) the transmission of an art inside a specific family: Talos or Perdix was the son of Daedalus' sister;

3) the *artificis invidia* which may lead even to the slying of the rival – no matter if he is in fact the best pupil of the killer: this driving force – which Hesiod interprets as the negative Eris – is also one of the founding features of the life of artisans.[3]

For the archaic period the literary tradition gives emphasis to relations between masters and pupils: the latter are supposed to have been trained under the former and for this reason to have followed styles and techniques which characterized the oeuvre of their masters. In this way artistic schools, characterized by certain peculiarities (relations with patrons, subjects,

---

[2] See about the reference of this passage to the rivalry among craftsmen, B. Schweitzer, "Der bildende Künstler und der Begriff des Künstlerischen in der Antike", in: id., *Zur Kunst der Antike* 1 (Tübingen 1963) 18–40 and Seaman (n. 1).

[3] On Daedalus, see D. Vollkommer-Glökler, "Daidalos (I)", in: R. Vollkommer (ed.), *Künstlerlexikon der Antike* I (Munich 2001) 151–152.

styles, technical features) were formed and sometimes had a long existence spanning for several generations.[4]

In the field of bronze sculpture the tradition of schools begins with Rhoecus who educated in this art his sons Telecles and Theodoros: this tradition was then continued by the son of Telecles, another Theodorus (Hdt. 3. 41; D.S. 1. 98; Paus. 8. 14. 8; D.L. 2. 103).[5] This genealogy illustrates eloquently that the transmission of a specific τέχνη and style took place preferably within the same οἶκος.

In the field of marble sculpture the school of Chios was supposed to have began this activity, lasting for 4 generations with the sculptors Melas, Micciades, Archermus, Boupalus and Athenis (*IG*^{3} 683; *I. Delos* 9; *I. Pergamon* 46; *IG* 12. 5. 147; *CIG* 6141; Hor. *Epod.* 6. 13–14; Acron. Schol. Hor. *ad loc.*; Plin. *NH.* 36. 11; Paus. 4. 30. 6 and 9. 35. 6; Suid. s. v. Ἱππώναξ and schol. Ar. *Av.* 573).[6]

The school of Daedalus continues with Dipoenus and Scyllis from Gortys (Paus. 2. 15. 1): these two students are regarded to have been the sons of Daedalus.[7]

These sculptors had as students Theocles (Paus. 5. 17. 2),[8] Dontas (Paus. 6. 19. 12),[9] Dorycleidas and Medon, all from Sparta (Paus. 5. 17. 1).[10]

Clearchus from Rhegium was regarded student of Daedalus or of Dipoenus and Scyllis or of Euchirus from Corinth as well as of Chilon of Patras (Paus. 3. 17. 6 and Suid. s. v. Σώστρατος).[11] Euchirus had also been

---

[4] Concerning the flourishing of schools of artists in Greece throughout the archaic period the bibliography is of course extensive. Here I cite only C. Bol, *Frühgriechische Bilder* (Munich 2005) and P. Bol (ed.), *Frühgriechische Plastik* I (Mainz 2002) 71–269.

[5] See H. J. Kienast, "Rhoikos", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 351–352; S. Ebbinghaus, "Telekles", *ibid.*, 437–438 and "Theodoros (i)", 445–447; K. Kilinski, "Theodoros (ii)", 447–448.

[6] See R. Vollkommer, "Melas (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 60; A. Bohne, "Mikkiades", *ibid.* 82; R. Vollkommer, "Archermos", *ibid.*, I (2001) 76–77; V. Müller, "Bupalos", *ibid.* 125–126; G. Bröker, "Athenis", *ibid.*, 104–105. See also M. D'Acunto, "Ipponatte e Boupalos, e la dialettica tra poesia e scultura in età arcaica", *RA* (2007) 227–268.

[7] On Dipoenus, see A. Hermary, "Dipoinos", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 184–185; on Scyllis, id., "Skyllis", *ibid.*, II (2004) 398. While the historicity of the figure of Daedalus is controversial, the existence of Dipoenus and Scyllis and of the other students of this school is generally accepted.

[8] On Theocles see R. Vollkommer, "Theokles", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 455.

[9] On Dontas, see A. Herr, "Dontas", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 192.

[10] On Dorycleidas, see E. Raming, "Dorykleidas", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 193; On Medon, O. Gülcky, "Medon", *ibid.*, II (2004) 57.

[11] On Clearchus see D. Vollkommer-Glökler, "Klearchos", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 413.

a student of Dipoenus and Scyllis (Paus. 6. 4. 4).[12] Finally these two Cretan sculptors educated in the art of marble sculpture Tectaeus and Angelion (Paus. 2. 32. 5).[13]

The Athenian Endoeus was also thought to have been a student of Daedalus (Paus. 1. 26. 4 and Athenagoras, *Legatio pro Christianis* 14. 61).[14]

A relative of Daedalus, Eucheir, was supposed to have 'found' painting (Arist. in Plin. *NH* 7. 205).[15]

Thus the school of Daedalus was supposed to have trained both the first sculptors and the first painters: his school would have been the dominant one in the period which for us is the early archaic one and through its students it would have established its prestige on Crete (with Dipoenus and Scyllis), in Sparta (with Theocles, Dontas, Dorycleidas, Medon), in Corinth (with Euchirus), in Attica (with Endoeus), on the Cyclades (with Tectaeus and Angelion) and in southern Italy (with Clearchus).

In the late archaic period the process of learning the 'art' of making bronze statues from fathers is referred to the Argive sculptors Eutelidas and Chrysothemis in an inscription on the base of the statues of two Olympic winners (Olympia, inscription no. B 10471 and Paus. 6. 10. 5–6).[16]

From this inscription the transmission of the skills of making works of art according to a specific τέχνη inside the οἶκος, from fathers to sons, appears obvious and explains why the archaic sculpture is essentially a phenomenon characterized by schools.[17]

Another renowned archaic school in the art of making bronze statues is that of Sicyon: the two brothers Canachus and Aristocles are the founders of this tradition (Paus. 6. 9. 1).[18] Then Aristocles taught the art to the Aeginetan Synnoon who handed it down to his son Ptolichus.

---

[12] On Euchirus, see R. Vollkommer, "Eucheiros (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 221.

[13] On these two sculptors, see E. Paul, W. Müller, "Angelion und Tektaios", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 45.

[14] See P. A. Marx, "Acropolis 625", *Hesperia* 70 (2001) 221–254; A. K. Andreiomenou, "Zur Werkstatt des Endoios", *AM* 115 (2000) 83–113 and C. Keesling, "Endoios Painting from the Themistoklean Wall", *Hesperia* 68 (1999) 509–548.

[15] See N. J. Koch, *De picturae initiis* (Munich 1996) 7–185 and R. Vollkommer, "Eucheir (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 220.

[16] See the comment by C. Zizza, *Le iscrizioni nella Periegesi di Pausania* (Pisa 2006) 282–285, no. 33.

[17] See Bol, *Frühgriechische Plastik* (n. 4).

[18] About Canachus, see J. Meischner, *Späte Archaic und früher Strenger Stil* (Bremen 2009); V. M. Strocka, "Der Apollo des Kanachos", *JdI* 117 (2002) 81–125; P. Schollmeyer, "Kanachos (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 400–402. About Aristocles, see G. Bröker, "Aristokles (iii)", *ibid*., 86–87.

Later exponents of the same school were the Chian Sostratus and his son Pantias. Chanachus was also the master of Ascarus of Thebes according to Paus. 5. 24. 1 (see also Paus. 6. 3. 11 and 9. 3).[19] From this picture it is clear that a renowned school such as that of Sicyon attracted talents also from faraway: Aegina, Thebes and even Chius.

According to the ancient tradition there was a continuity from the Daedalic school to the most important school of sculptors in late archaic Greece: that of Aegina. Callon, the most important master of Aegina in the late 6th c. BC, was a student of Tectaeus and Angelion (Paus. 2. 32. 5).[20]

The ancient sources do not give evidence for the continuity of schools from the late archaic to the early classical period.

In fact only one master of the late 6th c. is said to have had a student who became important in the 5th c.: Clearchus of Rhegium, student of Euchirus from Corinth and, as I shall point out below, master of Pythagoras of Rhegium.

Thus it seems that the ancient tradition was fully aware that there had been a clear change of art and styles from the archaic to the classical period.[21]

The Early Classical Period

From the early 5th c. BC there are new and prestigious schools.

One is that established by the Aeginetan bronze sculptor Onatas, whose most important pupil probably had been Calamis (Paus. 6. 12. 1).[22]

A second school is that established at Athens by the bronze sculptor Hegias who had Phidias as his most important student (D. Chrys. 55. 1. 282).[23]

---

[19] About Synnoon, see E. Walter-Karydi, "Synnoon", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 430; about Ptolichus, see ead., "Ptolichos (i)", *ibid*., 329–330. About Sostratos, see A. Villing, "Sostratos (i)", *ibid*., 413–414; about Pantias, see U. W. Gottsche, "Pantias", *ibid*., 182. About Ascarus, see G. Bröker, "Askaros", *ibid*., 1 (2001) 98.

[20] On the Aeginetan school of sculpture see E. Walter Karydi, *Die Aeginetische Bildhauerschule* (Mainz am Rhein 1987) 13–18 on Callon. About this bronze sculptor, see also ead., "Kalon (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 397–399.

[21] About this change of art and styles see A. Stewart, "The Persian and Carthaginian Invasions of 480 B. C. E. and the Beginning of the Classical Style", *AJA* 112 (2008) 377–412 and 581–615.

[22] About Onatas, see E. Walter-Karydi, "Onatas (I)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 155–159. About Calamis, see P. Moreno, "Kalamis (i)", *ibid*., I (2001) 373–382.

[23] About Hegias, see D. Vollkommer-Glökler, "Hegias (I)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 289. Of course about Phidias see C. Cullen, *Pheidias* (London 2009) particularly 755 about his studentship under Hegias.

However the rise of strong personalities such as that of Phidias, which characterizes the art of the classical period, involves that the pupil does not always follow the artistic path of his master but establishes his own style, thus becoming "rival" (*aemulus*) of his master. Thus Phidias became rival of Hegias according to Pliny, *NH* 34. 49, although he had previously been a student of this master.

A third school was that founded also at Athens by the bronze sculptors Critius and Nesiotes.[24] The most important of the two was Critius who late in his career became also a rival of Phidias, as it is stated by Pliny, *NH* 34. 49: indeed the establishment in the same social environment of strong personalities must have exasperated the rivalry among schools and sculptors operating in the same field and for the same market.

The most important pupil of Critius had been Ptolichus from Corcyra, then Ptolichus had Amphion of Cnossus as his best student, then Amphion taught the art of bronze sculpture to Pison from Calauria and eventually Damocritus from Sicyon had been a student of Pison (Paus. 6. 3. 5).[25] Thus the school of Critius lasted for at least five generations spanning throughout most of the classical period.

Other students of Critius had been Diodorus and Skyninus (Plin. *NH* 34. 85).[26]

The fact that at least three bronze masters are recorded as having been students of Critius gives an idea of the importance of his school.

An old school descending from Daedalus which still flourished was that of Euchirus from Corinth who had as student Clearchus of Rhegium: the latter became the master of Pythagoras of Rhegium (Paus. 6. 4. 3 and Suid s. v. Σώστρατος).[27]

The most important school of bronze sculptors established in this period probably has been that of Hageladas from Argus: he became the master of Phidias (Suid. s. v. Γελάδας; Scholiast to Ar. *Ra.* 504; Tz. *H.* 7. 921–928),[28] Myron and Polycleitus (Plin. *NH* 34. 10. 55 and 57).[29] Thus

---

[24] About Critius, see C. Maderna, "Aristodikos und Kritios-Knabe", in: H. von Steuben *et alii* (eds.), *Mouseion* (Möhnesee 2007) 173–185.

[25] About Ptolichus, see R. Vollkommer, "Ptolichos (ii)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 330; about Amphion, see E. Paul, "Amphion", *ibid*., I (2001) 33–34; about Pison, see R. Vollkommer, "Pison", *ibid*., II (2004) 264; finally about Damocritus see id., "Damokritos (I)", *ibid*., 157.

[26] About Diodorus, see W. Müller, "Diodoros (I)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 171. About Skyninus, see D. Vollkommer-Glökler, "Skyninos", *ibid*., II (2004) 398.

[27] See n. 11.

[28] See Cullen (n. 23) 700–701 and 987–988. About Hageladas, see P. Moreno, "Hageladas (ii)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 276–280.

[29] See ns. 40 and 45.

his artistic research should be regarded as the basis of the passage from the severe style to the classical one.[30]

The students of Hageladas were all strong personalities which is why they became soon rivals according to Pliny, *NH* 34. 10: Myron and Polycleitus "were of the same age and students of the same master, but there had been rivalry between them".

In painting the school of Polygnotus is the most important of this period. It included members of the same family from Thasus (Aglaophon the Elder, Polygnotus, Aglaophon the Younger, Aristophon),[31] perhaps also Micon,[32] Panaenus – brother of Phidias,[33] – Plistaenetus – another brother of Phidias[34] – and the same Phidias when he was young (Plin. *NH* 35. 54).[35]

Despite the provenance from Thasus of the most important master of this school – Polygnotus – as well as of other exponents it is likely that for much of its activity span the school was based in Athens: this conclusion is suggested by the circumstances that several important paintings accomplished by these masters had been set up in Athens,[36] that Polygnotus had been honoured with the Athenian citizenship (Artemon, Περὶ ζωγράφων and Jubas, Περὶ γραφικῆς in Harp. Schol. Lycurg. 155 B = 254 D)[37] and finally that he enjoyed the protection of the political circle of Cimon, whose sister Elpinice became his lover (Plu. *Cim.* 4. 6–7):[38] the latter gossip implies that at least for some time this painter spent his daily life in this city. The probable settling of the Thasian school in Athens

---

[30] About the important function performed by Hageladas in preparing the art of the next generation, see P. Moreno, *Les bronzes de Riace. Le maitre d'Olympie et les sept a Thebes* (Paris 1999).

[31] See A. Reinach, *Textes grecs et latins relatifs a l'histoire de la peinture ancienne. Recueil Milliet* (Paris ²1985) 80–154, sources nos. 86–134. See also C. Roscino, *Polignoto di Taso* (Rome 2010).

[32] See Reinach (n. 31) 154–167, sources nos. 135–160.

[33] *Ibid*., 168–173, nos. 162–168.

[34] *Ibid*., 172–173, no. 169.

[35] About Phidias see the chapter about the middle classical times.

[36] The most noteworthy of these paintings are: a. the paintings in the *Stoa poikile*; b. those in the Theseion; c. those in the Anakeion; and d. those in the so-called Pinacotheque of the Propylaea to the Acropolis. See Roscino (n. 31). Moreover K. Kopanias, "Kimon, Mikon und die Datierung des Athener Theseion", in: W. Gauer (ed.), *Tekmeria* (Münster 2006) 155–163. See also U. Koch-Brinkmann, "Polygnotos (I)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 272–274; G. Bröker, "Aglaophon (i)", *ibid*., I (2001) 13; id., "Aristophon", *ibid.*, 93; R. Vollkommer, "Mikon", *ibid.*, II (2004) 82–84; id., "Pleistainetos", *ibid.*, 266.

[37] See n. 31.

[38] *Ibid*.

is perhaps due to the fact that this city from the Cimonian time onwards became the cradle of many enterprises in the field of visual arts as well as the most lively cultural centre of the Greek world. Since Polygnotus portrayed his beloved Elpinice in the Iliupersis of the *Stoa poikile* as the Trojan Laodice – the most beautiful among Priam's daughters –, with this school the art of painting acquires the licence of the artist to pour the feelings of his own personal life into his work. Moreover, since he painted gratis in the *Stoa poikile* and perhaps also in the Theseion and in the Anakeion of Athens (Melanthius in Plu. *Cim.* 4. 6–7), the profession of painter as it is now conceived in the environment of Polygnotus is no longer just money oriented but aims rather for the acquisition on the side of the painter of a social *status*.

The school of Polygnotus must have set the example of a large workshop where several artisans worked and which establishes itself in the market of artistic enterprises for a very long time.

The middle classical times

Very soon Myron will leave Argus, where he learned the art of bronze sculpture under Hageladas, and also will settle in Athens, where he worked for important commissions.[39]

At Athens he educated his son Lycius to the art of bronze sculpture (Plin. *NH* 34. 79).[40] Styppax from Cyprus[41] and the painter Philiscus[42] perhaps became also his pupils. The likely pupil of Lycius will be Strongylion.[43] The bronze sculptors of this school depicted young figures surprised by the viewer in the middle of their actions, whose pictures are enlarged on the sides.

Another famous pupil of Hageladas, Polycleitus, on the contrary settled at Argus and continued the work of his master. He also had several students whose activity will continue for at least four generations, until the third quarter of the 4th c.[44]

His school taught a conception of the human body standing but endowed with the power of moving, moreover advertised a concept of harmony of

---

[39] See P. Bol, "Myron", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 96–104 and A. Corso, "Mirone ovvero dell'arte animata", *NumAntCl* 35 (2006) 475–504.

[40] About Lycius, see A. Corso, *The Art of Praxiteles* I (Rome 2004) 44–54.

[41] See Corso (n. 40) 40–44.

[42] *Ibid*., 44.

[43] *Ibid*., 55–75.

[44] About the school of Polycleitus, see C. Maderna, "Die letzten Jahrzehnte der spätklassischen Plastik", in: P. Bol (ed.), *Klassische Plastik* (Mainz am Rhein 2004) 303–382, particularly 317–321.

the human body obtained thanks to many measures of the single parts of the body related among them. His large school which lasted for around a century (450–350 BC) testifies both to the emphasis which is being given in the middle and late classical times on the teaching of the arts and to the importance of the theoretical, philosophical background concerning the concept of human body and movement, which now is regarded an essential introduction to the art of making statues.[45]

The school of Polycleitus includes first of all Patrocles[46] and his sons Daedalus[47] and Naucydes:[48] Daedalus is declared the son of Patrocles by Paus. 6. 3. 4 as well as *I. Olympia* 161 and 635, in *I. Ephesos* 111 and in *F. Delphes* 3. 4. 202. Pausanias also specifies that he was a student of Patrocles. Naucydes is declared the son of Patrocles in *I. Olympia* 159. Since Naucydes is also said to have been the brother of Polycleitus (Paus. 2. 22. 7), this family may have been the same οἶκος of the great Argive master. The ethnic given to Naucydes is that of Argus (*IG* II^2 4172)[49] while that of Daedalus is Sicyon (Paus. 6. 3. 4; *I. Olympia* 161 and 635; *I. Ephesos* 111; *F. Delphes* 3. 4. 202):[50] this differentiation reflects the fact that Polycleitus was both Argive (*I. Olympia* 162–163; *IGUR* 1580; Paus. 6. 13. 7; Tz. *H.* 8. 319)[51] and Sicyonian (Plin. *NH* 34. 55).[52] According to Pliny *NH* 34. 50, other students of Polycleitus were Argius, Asopodorus, Alexis, Aristides, Phrynon, Athenodorus and Demeas. Most of these pupils were Argive, except for Aristides, who perhaps was an exponent of a famous school of artists from Thebes, as well as for Athenodorus and Demeas, who were from Cleitor.[53]

---

[45] On this issue see W. Sonntagbauer, "Kanon und rechter Winkel. Theoretische Überlegungen zum Kanon des Polyklet", in: *Temenos* (Vienna 2002) 123–130.

[46] See R. Vollkommer, "Patrokles (i)", in: id. (n. 2) II (2004) 196–197. The family relations among the single exponents of the school of Polycleitus are controversial in the modern scholarship. Here I refer only to the conclusions which appear to me the most likely.

[47] See R. Vollkommer, "Daidalos (ii)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2001) 153–154.

[48] About Naucydes, see P. C. Bol, "Naukydes (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 110–112.

[49] See n. 48.

[50] See n. 47.

[51] See n. 44.

[52] Paus. 2. 22. 7 declares Naucydes Μόθωνος: since the ethnic of Mothone is Μοθωναῖος, Μόθωνος should be the patronymic: of Mothon. Perhaps Naucydes, although he was the son of Patrocles (see *I. Olympia* 159), had been adopted at a later moment by a certain Mothon.

[53] About the analytical reconstruction of the school of Polycleitus, see A. Linfert, "Die Schule des Polyklet", in: P. C. Bol (ed.), *Polyklet* (Frankfurt am Main 1990) 240–297.

Another important student of Polycleitus was the Sicyonian Canachus, who learned the art of bronze sculpture from Polycleitus according to Paus. 6. 13. 7.

Another student was Periclytus, who became the master of the Argive Antiphanes, whose student was Cleon of Sicyon according to Paus. 5. 17. 3.

Naucydes had as students Alypus of Sicyon according to Paus. 6. 1. 3 and Polycleitus the Younger according to Paus. 6. 6. 2.

The importance of the school of Polycleitus (fig. 1), its great impact on the debate concerning making bronze statues and the problem of representing human figures, finally its prestige not only in the Peloponnese but also in Attica,[54] in western Greece[55] and in Asia Minor[56] explain the fact that the example of this school entered the debate, which is typical of the age of Sophists, whether knowledge can be taught or not.

In the *Dissoi Logoi* 6. 8 – a Sophistic essay of the late 5th c. – the circumstance that Polycleitus taught how to make bronze statues to his son is noticed.[57] Of course this observation lends support to the opinion that knowledge can be taught. Plato retorts to this opinion in the *Protagoras*: Socrates in this dialogue cites Phidias and Polycleitus as examples of ἀγαλματοποιοί who teach the art of sculpture upon payment (311 c). However Protagoras objects that the sons of Polycleitus are much inferior to their father. That is explained through the privilege accorded to the concept of φύσις which in the specific case is understood as natural talent: if the pupil has no talent for this learning, despite the greatness of the teacher he will be much inferior to him.

This skepticism about the possibility to hand down a given branch of knowledge leads to a crisis of the system of transmission of knowledge in the field of visual arts through schools. This teaching does not guarantee also the transmission of high quality.

This theoretical difficulty is coupled also by a more down to earth consideration which becomes clear by looking at the school of Phidias in Athens.

Phidias, as we have seen, had been the pupil of Hegias at Athens and then of Hageladas at Argus. However very soon the most famous bronze

---

[54] See A. Corso, "The Argive Masters at Athens from Pericles to Thrasybulus", *NumAntCl* 31 (2002) 91–112.

[55] See Polycleitus' Canephoroe carved for a private santuary in Messana (Cic. *Ver.* 2. 4. 2. 4 – 3. 6).

[56] Polycleitus reported a victory in the famous competition of the Amazons at Ephesus: Plin. *NH* 34. 53.

[57] See E. Ghisellini, "Note in margine a due fonti su Policleto", *Xenia* 20 (1990) 33–40.

sculptors of the previous generation became his rivals: Pliny *NH* 34. 49 informs that Critius, Nesiotes, Hegias, Hageladas, Callon and Gorgias became his *aemuli*.[58] Thus even his two masters, Hegias and Hageladas, developed a tense and conflictual relationship with him. This is certainly the result of the strong personality of Phidias, who could hardly have been a pupil docilely ready to follow the teaching of his masters.

He had been trained as a painter in his youth (Plin. *NH* 35. 54) as were his two brothers, Panaenus and Plistaenetus.[59]

During his maturity he took part to the competition of Ephesus for the best bronze statue of an Amazon: his rivals were Polycleitus, Cresilas, Phradmon, Cydon (Plin. *NH* 34. 53).[60] He lost to Polycleitus. These rivalries must have been made even more fearsome with the establishment of the habit to hold competitions among artists sharing the same specialization, which became trendy around the middle of the 5th c. BC.[61]

Phidias had also several important pupils. The older one was probably Alcamenes:[62] when he was young he had been a pupil of Phidias (Plin. *NH* 36. 16–17), but at a later moment he became his rival (Plin. *NH* 34. 49 and Tz. *H.* 8. 333–362). Alcamenes lost to Phidias in a competition for statues of Athena held at Athens (Tz. *H.* 8. 333–362), but prevailed against the beloved pupil of Phidias, Agoracritus, in the *agon* for making the statue of Aphrodite in the Gardens (Plin. *NH* 35. 17).

Again, the strong personality of Alcamenes could not be reconciled with his status of follower of his master. Thus the same concept of school and of transmission of teaching from master to pupil is troubled by the strength and originality of younger artists.

Probably at a later moment Agoracritus became the beloved pupil and lover of Phidias (Antig. in Zen. 5. 82; Plin. *NH* 36. 17; Paus. 9. 34. 1; Suid and Phot. s. vv. Ῥαμνουσία Νέμεσις; Tz. *H.* 7. 921–928 and *Epistulae* 21). His status at the same time of pupil and lover, which is

---

[58] About the youth of Phidias, see Cullen (n. 23) 617–622. Plin. *NH* 34. 49 mentions among the *aemuli* of Phidias also the less renowned Lacon (see R. Vollkommer, "Lakon", in: Vollkommer [n. 3] II [2004] 3).

[59] See W. Ehrhardt, "Panainos", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 180–181 and R. Vollkommer, "Pleistainetos", *ibid*., 266.

[60] R. Bol, *Amazones volneratae* (Mainz am Rhein 1998).

[61] Pliny informs that the competitions among painters had been instituted in the years 448–445 BC (Plin. *NH* 35. 58). About competitions among artists, see N. Kaltsas, "Art Competitions", in: id. (ed.), *Agon* (Athens 2004) 58–63 and M. Mattei, "Artistic Contests", *ibid.*, 312–314.

[62] He may have been active already around 460 BC, when he carved the west pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia (Paus. 5. 10. 8): see P. Moreno, *I bronzi di Riace, il maestro di Olimpia e i sette a Tebe* (Milan 1998).

handed down by a long tradition,[63] sheds light on the phenomenon of the paederastia between the older master and the younger student, which must have occurred quite a lot in classical workshops. It is not impossible that the privileged relationship of Phidias with Agoracritus contributed to the transformation of Alcamenes from pupil of the former to rival of both.

Phidias trained Colotes in the chryselephantine technique: the latter helped the former both at Olympia in the carving of the Olympian Zeus (Plin. *NH* 34. 87 and 35. 54)[64] and at Elis in the making of the Phidian chryselephantine Athena (Plin. *NH* 35. 54 and Paus. 6. 26. 3). The statue of Athena at Elis was the result of the collaboration among three artists, because Panaenus the painter, brother of Phidias, also took part to the enterprise by painting the internal side of the goddess' shield (Plin. 35. 54).

Finally he trained Theocosmus from Megara also in the chryselephantine technique, and the two artists made the statue of the Olympian Zeus at Megara together (Paus. 1. 40. 4).

What we know of the school of Phidias gives us an idea of the spreading power of the teaching of a very renowned classical master: the son of Charmides had students from Lemnus (Alcamenes), Parus (Agoracritus), Megara (Theocosmus), Heracleia, probably of Ionia (Colotes). This evidence is an eloquent testimony of the diffusion of the Phidian style everywhere in Greece.

The attitude of Phidias to his art is well illustrated by Tzetzes, *H.* 8. 344–345: he was totally concentrated in his art and could not stand the life in the Athenian agora. Tzetzes' depiction of Phidias' exclusive love for his art can be compared to Thucydides' information that Antiphon disliked to go to the assembly and to take part in public contexts (Th. 8. 68. 1) as well as to Euripides who disliked the Athenian population and preferred to spend his days in a cave on the island of Salamis (*Vita Euripidis* 4. 23 – 5. 1 and Gel. 15. 20. 5).[65]

These three cases speak about the sunset of the ideal of the citizen keen to take part to his political and social duties and of the rise of the figure of the expert who specialized in a specific τέχνη in which he reaches the

---

[63] The tradition was already codified by Antigonus from Carystus towards the end of the 3rd c. BC.

[64] See Cullen (n. 24).

[65] The archaeological discovery of the cave on Salamis where Euripides used to spend his time confirms this information handed down by the Life of Euripides: see Γ. Γ. Λώλος, "Σπήλαιον αναπνοήν έχον ες την θάλασσαν", *Δωδώνη* 26 (1997) 287–326.

highest possible level. While the civic ideal may have been still strong in important quarters of the Athenian society, the fact that important intellectuals as Phidias, Antiphon and Euripides preferred to stay clear of the masses suggests that a more disengaged life style was on the rise.

The evidence concerning Phidias who becomes a rival of his former masters Hegias and Hageladas as well as Alcamenes who also turns against his former teacher Phidias suggests that the transmission of learning and styles from teacher to pupil was no longer obvious because sometimes extremely talented pupils wanted to be the first and to impose themselves above everybody else including their own teachers. While episodes of rivalry between masters and pupils did happen even earlier (see above the story of Daedalus and his nephew), now the opposition of young artists to the 'old authorities' in their field looks more systematic and may have to do with the emergency of the exceptional individual which is typical of the age of Alcibiades.

In the field of painting, the teaching of this art was influenced by the new, higher status acquired by this art especially thanks to the strong personality of Polygnotus. The Thasian master painted gratis for Athens (Melanth. Hist. in Plu. *Cim.* 4. 6–7) and was lavished with the citizenship of this city (Harp. s. v. Πολύγνωτος), thus establishing the notion of the painter as a professional figure above those of the craftsmen (Plut. *Cim.* 4. 6–7).

This process ripened with the generation after Polygnotus. In the second half of the 5th c. Parrhasius learned the art of painting from his father Euenor (Plin. *NH* 35. 60 and Harp. s. v. Παρράσιος), but brought his wish for self-realization to an extreme.[66] He, Apollodorus and Zeuxis each think that they are the best painters who ever appeared, compose poems, are familiar with philosophers, criticize harshly one the other, become rich, show up their lavish cloths.[67]

Zeuxis was regarded student either of Damophilus from Himera or of Neseus of Thasus and was told to have followed the art of his masters (Plin. *NH* 35. 61–62). This fact, which in previous periods would have been regarded normal, became a fault in the criticism of Apollodorus – handed down by Pliny – who claimed that Zeuxis 'stole' his art from his teachers.

This observation leads to the following conclusion: that the transmission of instruction from master to pupil in painting knows a crisis

---

[66] About Parrhasios, see J. M. Blazquez, "Parrhasios", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 186–188.

[67] About Apollodorus, see W. Müller, "Apollodoros (ii)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 64–65. About Zeuxis, see U. Koch-Brinkmann, "Zeuxis (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 534–536.

because the originality becomes the primary value in the common opinion of the time. Another feature of this 'season' is the social admiration of the exceptional painter. This phenomenon can be appreciated especially in the public enthusiasm towards Zeuxis' original idea to paint a centauress (Lucian, *Zeux.* 3–8). Finally the above described behavioural patterns are coupled with contempt towards the evaluation of paintings expressed by the incompetent public. This feature becomes clear especially in the story of Zeuxis ordering his student Miccion to remove his picture with the Centauress from the exhibition area of his studio because people admired only the singularity of the subject and not the art of the painting (Lucian, *Zeux.* 7): of course this is also the result of the hyper-specialization reached in the single arts. As we have seen above, already Phidias was no longer spending his life together with his fellow citizens in the agora but preferred to live in his own world, filled by his artistic ideals.

The dialogue of Parrhasius with Socrates handed down by Xenophon (X. *Mem.* 3. 10) reveals that the exceptional painter was by now perceived worthy from an intellectual point of view to contribute important ideas to the discussion with a renowned philosopher such as Socrates.[68]

In this context of clear split between the exceptional artist and the general evaluation of works of art, the outcomes of the commissions deciding the winners in the competitions among artists begin to be regarded sometimes unfair and are no longer accepted: the comments of Parrhasius against the decision in an *agon* held on Samus to prefer a picture by Timanthes to his own painting on Ajax at the Award of the Arms became famous (Plin. *NH* 35. 72). It is perhaps not by chance that in the same period Euripides was usually defeated in the Athenian dramatic *agones* by obscure tragic poets (Βίος καὶ γένος Εὐριπίδου 3. 4 and Var. frg. 298 Funaioli).[69] Thus the last decades of the 5th c. see a growing gap between the value of the exceptional individual and the popular opinion. It goes without saying that this trend is coupled with the above mentioned phenomenon concerning the love of a few learned men for a life far from that of the masses.

Still in the second half of the 5th c., the marble sculptor Sophroniscus trained his young son Socrates in his own art, as it is known from a well represented literary tradition (Valerius Maximus 3. 4. *ext.* 1; Plin. *NH* 36. 32; Lucian *Somn.* 12; D. L. 2. 18–19; Paus. 1. 22. 8 and 9. 35. 3; Schol.

---

[68] See F. Preisshofen, "Sokrates im Gespräch mit Parrhasios und Kleiton", in: K. Döring (ed.), *Studia Platonica* (Amsterdam 1974) 21–40. While Socrates tended to speak with everybody, the wealth of ideas attributed to Parrhasius in Xenophon's dialogue is outstanding and implies the concept that the painter developed his own theory of this art.

[69] See also the *testimonia* collected by R. Kannicht, *TGF* 5 (Göttingen 2004) 80.

Ar. *Nub.* 773; Hsch s. v. Ἑρμῆς ἀμύητος and Suid s. v. Σωκράτης).[70] The likeliness that Socrates switched from sculptor to philosopher implies that the status of the best established marble sculptors was not so apart from that of philosophers and could be regarded a job with an intellectual component.

During the last phase of the Peloponnesian War one of the most important architectural enterprises which were accomplished is certainly that of the Erechtheum on the Acropolis of Athens. The accounts concerning the marble workers who carved the architectural sculpture of the building are relatively well preserved.

Early exponents of marble workshops which will be renowned for a very long time are mentioned in these reports (*IG* I^3 476 ll. 163–164): thus the Athenian Praxias is mentioned as one of the carvers of the frieze.[71] This Praxias is probably an ancestor – perhaps the grandfather – of the namesake who worked on the late classical pediments of the temple of Apollo at Delphi.[72]

Moreover a Phyromachus is also mentioned for the carving of the frieze (*IG* I^3 476 ll. 161–162; 168–169 and 176–177) and is also probably the first known exponent of a dynasty of Phyromachi which will be active until the middle Hellenistic times.[73]

Finally Micon the Younger – perhaps the grandson of Micon the collaborator of Polygnotus – also worked on the Erechtheum (*IG* I^3 476 l. 399). Perhaps he coincides with the painter with the same name who is recorded by Pliny 35. 59 and 147 because his daughter Timarete is the first Greek paintress we are aware of.[74]

This paintress appears first in a catalogue of paintresses which is handed down by Pliny *NH* 35. 147. Thus it is possible to argue that the art

---

[70] This tradition has been rejected and it has been suggested that Socrates the Philosopher is confused with an earlier Socrates from Thebes (see e. g. M. C. Monaco, "Atene, Museo dell'Acropoli 1341+2594. Ancora sui rilievi con le Charites di Sokrates", *Archeologia Classica* 51 [1999–2000] 85–104). However there is no serious reason to reject the ancient tradition (see O. Palagia, "A New Relief of the Graces and the Charites of Socrates", in: M. Geerard (ed.), *Opes Atticae* [The Hague 1990] 347–356). See also S. Ackermann, "Sokrates (ii)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 405.

[71] See *IG* I^3 476, ll. 163–164.

[72] See M. Flashar, "Praxias (i)" and "Praxias (ii)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 303–304.

[73] See A. Stewart, *Attika* (London 1979) 3–33 and 161; R. Vollkommer, "Phyromachos (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 258–259 and B. Andreae, "Phyromachos (ii)", *ibid.*, 259–263.

[74] See R. Vollkommer, "Mikon (iii)", "Mikon (v)", in: id. (ed.) II (2004) 84–85 and id., "Timarete", *ibid.*, 472.

of painting became accessible to women at least in some cases at the latest by 400 BC or earlier.

Many reasons explain why a few women practiced the painting but were not engaged in other visual arts:

a. Because the art of painting was perceived less heavy than making bronze statues or carving marble, thus probably it had been regarded more appropriate to women.

b. Because painting in the ancient art criticism was often compared to weaving (Plin. *NH* 35. 150) – a typically female art – and thus was for this reason recommended as essential in the education of girls who without this cultural background cannot be properly prepared in weaving and lacing (Var. *Cato vel de liberis educandis* in Non. 2 s. v. *plumarium*).

c. Because painting was also assimilated to poetry at least from the times of Simonides[75] because of the narrative content of both arts: thus since poetesses did exist, it must have been thought to be natural that paintresses could also work. It is noteworthy that, as a catalogue of the most important Greek poetesses has been constituted,[76] equally a catalogue of the most important Greek paintresses has been preserved by Pliny *NH* 35. 147.

d. Finally the fact that at least three paintresses are said to have been daughters of painters should be noticed:[77] this fact may be explained with the hypothesis that a girl could be encouraged to become a paintress when her father was a painter and had no sons, so she had to pick up and continue his business.

e. Besides these considerations, probably the establishment of the phenomenon of paintresses is partly influenced by the general revaluation of the importance of a few exceptional women which characterized late classical society: the heterosexual love is re-valuated when compared to homosexual love from the late 5th c. BC, priestesses and courtesans are admired and portrayed by important masters.[78]

---

[75] About the *ut pictura poesis* see Simonides, *testimonia* 47 a and b Campbell: see H. A. Shapiro, *Myth into Art* (London 1994) 7–10.

[76] See F. De Martino, *Poetesse greche* (Bari 2006) 48–89.

[77] I am referring to the cases of Timarete the daughter of Micon, of Irene the daughter of Cratinus as well as of Aristarete the daughter of Nearchus (see Plin. *NH* 35. 147).

[78] About the prevalence of heterosexual love *versus* homosexual love from the late 5th c. BC onwards, see A. Corso, "Love as Suffering", *BICS* 42 (1997–98) 63–91. About female portraits throughout late classical times, see J. B. Connelly, *Portrait of a Priestess* (Princeton 2007) 129–135 and 227–240 and S. Dillon, *The Female Portrait Statue in the Greek World* (Cambridge 2010) 9–52; 60–102; 126–134; 169–170. About the importance of women in cult activities, see N. Kaltsas (ed.), *Worshipping Women* (New York 2008) 31–37; 79–89; 97–101; 107–123; 187–212; 243–251; 289–305; 324–329.

The late classical times

The late classical times saw the establishment of two important schools of painting: the Sicyonian and the Theban / Attic one.

The former was founded by Eupompus probably at the beginning of the 4th c. BC.[79] Despite his institution of a school, he asserted that artists had to follow the nature and not the model embodied by a specific predecessor (Duris, *De toreutice frg.* 32 Jacoby in Plin. *NH* 34. 61).

This idea confines the function of the teacher of a visual art just to the technical training because any theoretical model which does not stem from natural observation is regarded inappropriate.

It is obvious that this concept is in keeping with new philosophical trends of the age, aiming to recommend a life adherent to the natural needs of humans: I refer to those of the Cynics as well as to hedonistic philosophers such as Aristippus and Eudoxus. Moreover this new notion of an art directly inspired by nature foreshadows the tendency towards the deep and analytical investigation of any realm of nature which will peak with Aristotle. Eupompus already had great authority as it is known from Pliny *NH* 35. 75 and imposed the Sicyonian tradition of painting as a specific branch of this art.[80]

The theory of the prevalence of φύσις upon νόμος which is implicit in Eupompus' theory, is similar to the widespread opinion about the superiority by nature of the nobles (ἀγαθοί) versus the commoners (κακοί) in the society: thus it is in keeping with the oligarchic philosophy and is perfectly understandable in the Peloponnese during the decades of the Spartan rule.

Eupompus, presumably when he was old, encouraged the young Lysippus to become a bronze sculptor by imitating nature itself and not a previous artist (Duris, cited above). He also taught painting to Pamphilus (Plin. *NH* 35. 75)[81] who flourished throughout the first half of the 4th c. BC.

He was a Macedonian from Amphipolis (Plin. *NH* 35. 76 and Suid. s. v. Πάμφιλος) and this fact reveals that, after Zeuxis' journey to that region when Archelaus was still the king (Ael. *VH* 14. 17), one of the greatest Greek painters of the time grew up there. His importance relies especially on the fact that the art of painting acquired a new, higher status with him.

---

[79] About Eupompus, see I. Scheibler, "Eupompos", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 236.

[80] About the Sicyonian school, see Σ. Λυδάκης, *Αρχαία ελληνική ζωγραφική* (Athens 2002) 139–145.

[81] About Pamphilus, see J. Scheibler, "Pamphilos (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 178–179.

His treatise Περὶ γραφικῆς καὶ ζωγράφων ἐνδόξων (Suid. s. v. Πάμφιλος)[82] is no longer just a book on his conception of the art as it had been used in the Polycleitan tradition. The mention in the title of the "famous painters" suggests that, probably for the first time, the most important painters of the past were illustrated in this work.

Moreover Pliny *NH* 35. 76 informs us that he was the first painter who was very learned in every field, especially in arithmetic and geometry. Thus we have here the beginning of the figure of the *artifex doctus*.

His focus on arithmetic and geometry and his specification that his art cannot be perfect without knowledge in these disciplines aligns him with Polycleitus and his tradition. As we have seen, the latter had also been rooted in Sicyon.

Finally he opened a school at Sicyon in which he charged his students a fee which was never smaller than a talent for each year (Polem. Hist. in Plu. *Arat.* 13. 1). He established the technique on the picture on wood in the first stage of the curriculum of studies for boys first of all at Sicyon, then in the rest of Greece. The teaching of this art was reserved to upper class people or at least to free citizens. Slaves were not accepted (Plin. *NH* 35. 77).

The high fee charged and the fact that this school targeted young people of high rank (the *honesti* of Pliny) are in keeping with the oligarchic orientation of this school. We cannot forget that this is the period of the Spartan hegemony!

The change of status of the renowned painter promoted by Pamphilus explains the great importance of painting during the following period: the 'Alexanderzeit' will see the great prestige of painters such as Apelles and Protogenes.

Pamphilus himself taught painting to Apelles, Melanthus and Pausias (Plin. *NH* 35. 76 and 123 and Suid. s. v. Ἀπέλλης). The latter had been initially pupil of his father Bryes (Plin *NH* 35. 123), but later learned encaustic painting from the most famous Pamphilus (fig. 2). This fact shows that the prestige of the Sicyonian school was such to overcome even the traditional rooting of artists inside their own οἶκοι.

The second important school of painting in late classical Greece was the Theban–Attic one:[83] it was established by Euxenidas in the late 5th c. BC (Plin. *NH* 35. 75) but it acquired renown especially thanks to the student of Euxenidas, Aristides the Elder.[84]

---

[82] See J. Tanner, *The Invention of Art History in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge 2006) 173–174.

[83] See Λυδάκης (n. 80) 137–138.

[84] G. Bröker, "Aristides (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) 81–82.

This Theban pupil had also been trained as a bronze sculptor in the school of Polycleitus (Plin. *NH* 34. 50 and 72; Paus. 6. 20. 14 and *IG* II^2 3018) and thus flourished around 400 BC.

His pupils included his sons Nicerus and Aristion the Elder, probably Aristiacus, moreover Antoridas and the Isthmian Euphranor, who is the most important exponent of this school throughout the second third of the 4th c. BC (fig. 3).[85] He inherited from his master the specialization in both bronze sculpture and painting. Moreover he derived from the Polycleitan tradition his interest in problems of symmetry and proportions, his search for a new canon of human body (Plin. *NH* 128), finally his need to publish a book on his new 'canon' of proportions (Euphranor, *De symmetria et coloribus* in Vitr. 7. *Praef.* 14 and Plin. *NH* 1. 35 and 35. 129).[86]

Since his most important works had been made for Athens (the paintings with the Twelve Gods, Theseus, Demos and Democracy, and the Battle of Mantinea for the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios in the Agora) (Valerius Maximus 8. 11. *ext.* 5; Plin. *NH* 35. 129; Plut. *De gloria Atheniensium* 2; Lucian. *Im.* 7–8; Paus. 1. 3. 3 and 8. 9. 8; Eust. *In Iliadem* 145. 11), and since he got the Athenian citizenship,[87] his workshop must have been based in Athens. Thus with him the Theban school became the best established school of painting in Athens.

These highly specialized schools – such as the Sicyonian and the Theban / Attic – were increasingly required by the tendency to the specialization of every τέχνη, which is by now conceived as an independent branch, which characterizes the age of Aristotle. Thus every 'art', in order to be practiced at the highest possible level, is felt to require a particular training and learning.

---

[85] See my own reconstruction of the development of the Theban / Attic school in A. Corso, "Libro trentacinquesimo. Introduzione e note", in: G. B. Conte (ed.), *Gaio Plinio Secondo. Storia Naturale* 5 (Turin 1988) 287–509, particularly 375. About Euphranor, see W. Müller, "Euphranor (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 229–230 and N. Humble, "Re-dating a Lost Painting: Euphranor's Battle of Mantineia", *Historia* 57 (2008) 347–366.

[86] Concerning his activity as painter, see Reinach (n. 31) 280–285, nos. 350–357. The evidence about his activity as sculptor has been collected by M. Muller-Dufeu, *La sculpture grecque* (Paris 2002) 558–563, nos. 1637–1650.

[87] He is defined Athenian by the Scholiast to Juv. 3. 217. Moreover his son Sostratus signed in Attica without ethnic and is given the affiliation to the *phile Oeneis*, what of course implies that he was an Athenian. It is likely that Euphranor was awarded the Athenian citizenship after he made his renowned paintings in the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios (evidence in A. Corso, *The Art of Praxiteles* II [Rome 2007] 247 n. 131).

On the contrary in sculpture throughout the late classical period the emphasis is still on single masters rather than on the schools they attended. However relationships between masters and pupils are known also in this field.

The Megaran expert in chryselephantine technique Theocosmus, who collaborated with Phidias, trained in bronze sculpture his own son, Callicles (Paus. 6. 7. 1). The latter taught bronze sculpture to his son Apellas who flourished in the early 4th c. BC (*I. Olympia* 160 and 634 and *Anth. Gr.* 13. 16).

Moreover another school of bronze sculptors flourished at Sicyon: Aristocles, the brother of the late classical bronze sculptor Canachus (Paus. 6. 7. 1), trained in his own art his son Cleoetias (Paus. 6. 20. 14) who also trained in his art his son Aristocles (Paus. 5. 24. 5).

Pythagoras of Rhegium instructed in his own art – bronze sculpture – Sostratus, the son of his sister (Plin. *NH* 34. 60). Towards the end of the 5th c. BC, the Athenian Strongylion, when he became old, collaborated with Cephisodotus the Elder, at the time a young master, as well as with Olympiosthenes (Paus. 9. 30. 1): thus it is likely that Cephisodotus and Olympiosthenes were pupils of Strongylion.

Cephisodotus trained in both bronze sculpture and marble carving Praxiteles, who probably was his son[88] and educated in marble sculpture also the Athenian Xenophon (Paus. 8. 30. 1). The latter worked at Thebes, where he enjoyed the collaboration of the Theban Callistonicus (Paus. 9. 16. 1).

Aristander of Parus probably educated in the art of carving Parian marble his son Scopas.[89]

Praxiteles trained in bronze sculpture Herodotus from Olynthus (Tatian 33. 35) who at a later moment worked alone.[90]

The wealth acquired by Praxiteles with his art is implied by his inclusion among the 300 or so Athenians who had to pay the public dues:[91] thus his case shows the social prestige which an exceptionally gifted sculptor

---

[88] This is argued by the circumstance that Praxiteles' elder son had also the name Cephisodotus.

[89] About Aristander see Paus. 3. 18. 7: he informs that this sculptor worked for a Spartan dedication for the victory at Aegospotami. About Scopas and his genealogy see G. Calcani, *Skopas of Paros* (Rome 2009) particularly 3–46.

[90] Evidence collected in A. Corso, *The Art of Praxiteles* I (Rome 2004) 308–317, no. 20.

[91] See Corso (n. 90) 111–114 and 175–185, no. 11. About the social and economic status of late classical sculptors, see P. Schultz, "Style and Agency in an Age of Transition", in: R. Osborne (ed.), *Debating the Athenian Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge 2007) 144–187.

could achieve in late classical Athens. The fact that – after Zeuxis and Parrhasius – he also composed at least one poem (Ath. 13. 591 a–b = *Anth. Gr.* 16. 204), his closeness to the environment of Plato,[92] finally his expression of his own loves and emotions through his art[93] reveal the acquisition thanks to him of the figure of the exceptional sculptor as an intellectual star: his love affairs as well as his scandalous statues[94] and the public show of his own condition as love slave of an exceptionally beautiful woman – of course Phryne[95] – are matter of gossip of the most learned quarter of his own society.

Thus single masters are felt more important than the schools in marble sculpture during late classical times, while in painting for the same period there are two clearly recognizable important schools and the bronze sculpture of the time is dominated by the Polycleitan school: probably this difference in perceiving schools and masters according to the different visual arts is due to the fact that the targets of painting and bronze sculpture are those of constructing something which previously did not exist: thus a training towards learning how to make these objects properly was felt of primary importance.

On the contrary marble sculpture was felt to be discovery of what already existed rather than creation of something new:[96] thus the itinerary of the single artist towards the knowledge of the true forms of gods and heroes kept inside the marble was regarded pre-eminent *versus* technical education.

The competitiveness among the most important late classical workshops of marble sculpture can be seen particularly in their fight in order to secure the generous commissions offered by the satraps of Asia Minor. Praxiteles, Scopas, Bryaxis, Leochares, Timotheus became "rivals" (*aemuli*: Plin. *NH* 36. 30–31; see also Vitr. 7. *praef.* 13) when they took part to the enterprise of the Mausoleum of Halicarnassus.

Praxiteles, Bryaxis and Scopas, perhaps also Leochares became rivals also in securing commissions of statues in Cnidus (Plin. *NH* 36. 20–22). Praxiteles and Scopas probably became rivals even in establishing their names and reputation in Troad and Mysia.[97]

---

[92] See Corso (n. 78) 63–91.

[93] *Ibid*.

[94] See A. Corso, "The Monument of Phryne at Delphi", *NumAntCl* 26 (1997) 123–149.

[95] See n. 92.

[96] On marble sculpture felt as discovery, see A. Corso, "Praxiteles and the Parian Marble", in: D. U. Schilardi (ed.), *Paria Lithos* (Paros ^{2}2010) 227–236.

[97] The evidence about this rivalry has been collected in A. Corso, "The Apollo Sauroctonus by Praxiteles", *NumAntCl* 38 (2009) 51–69.

Around the middle of the 4th c. BC a few changes are noteworthy. First of all the rise of Lysippus as first rate star in bronze sculpture must have established the previously mentioned theory – which this master took from Eupompus – that it is necessary to follow the nature and not a previous master. This conception is in keeping with the interest in the investigation of nature which prevails in the 'Zeitgeist' of Aristotle.

Moreover some of the best established workshops began producing works at an industrial pace: of course not any work made in these ateliers was by the hands of the main masters but often assistants did much of these products, while in other cases not all of their parts were properly finished.

For example Praxiteles in the late phase of his production used to leave unfinished parts of statues which were destined not to be visible.[98]

In bronze sculpture Lysippus is known to have made 1500 works (Plin. *NH* 34. 37). Of course a lot of them must have been made not by himself but by his assistants.

Finally the painter Nicomachus invented a particularly fast painting technique: the so called *pictura compendiaria*. He was an exponent of the Theban / Attic school of painting. Pliny, *NH* 35. 108 reports that he was the son of a painter, whose name in the best manuscript tradition (that of the *codex Bambergensis*) is given as Aristiacus but is often corrected as Aristides. His ideal of life as a continuous artistic research and improvement explains the fact that his most admired picture was also his last work, left unfinished by his death (Plin. *NH* 35. 145).[99]

Of course his fast technique was exactly what was needed by the contemporary increasing industrial pace of production of works of art.

As other exponents of his school he was both a painter and a bronze sculptor:[100] since he signed at Athens without ethnic, probably he was

---

[98] See Chor. *Declamationes* 8. 59 (about the unfinished bronze Aphrodite made by Praxiteles for the Spartans); see also *Codex Vaticanus Graecus* 989 (about the enthroned Leto of Myra carved by Praxiteles, which was left unfinished in her feet, in her back and on the throne); see also the Hermes of Olympia which was not finished in his back (see N. Σταμπολίδης, "Σύμπλεγμα Ερμή και μικρού Διονύσου", in: E. N. Κάλτσας, Γ. Δεσπίνης [eds.], *Πραξιτέλης* [Athens 2007] 90–97 no. 14). The quality of the baby Dionysus carried by the Hermes of Olympia is not outstanding and thus is hardly by the hand of such a renowned master as Praxiteles: very probably it had been carved by assistants (see A. Corso, "The Hermes of Praxiteles", *NumAntCl* 25 [1996] 131–153).

[99] About Nicomachus, see J. H. Oakley, "Nikomachos (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 139–140.

[100] See Muller-Dufeu (n. 86) 564–565 nos. 1664–1665.

an Athenian and his workshop was settled at least for a long time in this town.

He trained in the art of painting his brother Ariston, his son Aristides the Younger as well as Philoxenus of Eretria (Plin. *NH* 35. 110) and Coroebus (Plin. *NH* 35. 146): his several pupils reveal the importance of his school.

Philoxenus continued the research of his master by devising an even faster painting technique (Plin. *NH* 35. 110) which of course was demanded by the never ending need of new paintings of the royal courts (he worked for Cassander).

His son Aristides became also famous: he conceived of a pathetic style which met the demands of a market which was increasingly conditioned by the dominant theatrical mentality (Plin. *NH* 35. 98–100).[101]

Moreover his painting depicting a Persian battle included no fewer than 100 figures (Plin. *NH* 35. 99): probably his colossal paintings were meant to satisfy the grandeur of the new rulers (in the case of the Persian battle the grandeur of Mnason, the tyrant of Elatea, had to be pleased).

It is not surprising that a painter who tuned so well with his own 'Zeitgeist' was privileged by the early collectors of works of art: Alexander the Great brought to Pella Aristides' picture with a baby who is sucking from the breasts of his dying mother in a besieged city (Plin. *NH* 35. 98–99).[102]

Another exponent of the Theban / Attic school – Euphranor – trained in the art of painting Antidotus (Plin. *NH* 35. 130), his son Charmantides (Plin. *NH* 35. 146) and Leonidas (St. Byz. s. v. ᾽Ανθηδών and Eust. *In Iliadem* 271. 38). His other son Sostratus inherited Euphranor's specialization in bronze sculpture.[103]

The former of his four pupils is famous because he became the teacher of Nicias. The latter, when he was young, worked in the ἐργαστήριον of Praxiteles, painting his statues (Plin. *NH* 35. 133), and developed the interest of this sculptor towards representing female subjects (Plin. *NH* 35. 130–131). Moreover his picture of Homer's *Nekyia* (Antip. *Anth. Gr.* 9. 792; Plin. *NH* 35. 132; Plut. *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum* 11. 2) reflects the growing need to be faithful to literary texts, which accords well with the philological culture of the times.

Finally the story that the painter was so concentrated in his accomplishment of the *Nekyia*, that he forgot to eat (Plut. *Non posse suaviter vivi*

---

[101] G. Bröker, "Aristeides (ii)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 82–83.

[102] About the collections of works of art in late classical times see A. Corso, "Il collezionismo di scultura nell'antichita", in: A. Giuliano (ed.), *I Giustiniani e l'antico* (Rome 2001) 101–129, particularly 104–105.

[103] See Muller-Dufeu (n. 86) 564–565 nos. 1666–1667.

secundum Epicurum 11. 2), reveals the continuity of the ideal of the greatest artists to live just for their own research and artistic study which already characterized Phidias, as it has been reported above.

Nicias' refusal to sell his picture of the *Nekyia,* despite the high price which he was offered (Plin. *NH* 35. 132 and Plut. *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum* 11. 2) puts him in continuity with Praxiteles' gift of his Eros of Thespiae to Phryne (Praxiteles in Ath. 13. 591 a–b; Leon. *Anth. Gr.* 16. 206; Tull. Gem. *ibid.* 16. 205 and 6. 260; Paus. 1. 20. 1–2 and 9. 27. 3–5; Ath. 13. 591 a–b and Jul. Aegypt. *Anth. Gr.* 16. 203]: both masters conceived of their creations not just as workshop's products to sell, but having a value which was beyond the financial considerations.

The circumstance that Nicias' student Omphalion was also his lover (Paus. 4. 31. 11) testifies to the continuity of the phenomenon of masters having love affairs with their own pupils which is well known from the relationship between Phidias and Agoracritus.

In the same age, the personality of Cratinus is noteworthy: as other masters he is both a bronze sculptor (Paus. 6. 9. 4) and painter (Plin. *NH* 35. 140). The fact that he painted comic actors (Plin. *NH* 35. 140) lends support to his identification with Cratinus the Younger, a comic poet who flourished in the same period (Cratin Jun. *frgg.* 1–14 K–A).

Thus this case should be added to the dossier of artists who were also poets (such as Zeuxis, Parrhasius, Praxiteles) or thinkers (Socrates).

Cratinus is important also because his activity as painter was continued by his daughter Eirene (Plin. *NH* 35. 147): thus this case reveals the continuity of the activity of paintresses in the late 4th c. BC.

The Sicyonian school, in the second half of the 4th c., continues with the Sicyonian Melanthius, a student of Pamphilus: he is noteworthy for the issue of this essay because Polemon in Plutarch, *Aratus* 13. 1–2 testifies that he used to paint helped by all of his students, and that Apelles also used to collaborate with this group-enterprise. He continued the Sicyonian tradition of painters writing treatises on their own art with his treatise Περὶ ζωγραφικῆς (D. L. 4. 18).

Pausias trained in the encaust painting his son Aristolaus (Plin. *NH* 35. 137) as well as Nicophanes (Plin. *NH* 35. 137).

Other relations between masters and pupils of the same period are that of Athenion from Maroneia, a student of Glaucion from Corinth: his works listed by Pliny at Athens and Eleusis suggest that he had his workshop at Athens (Plin. *NH* 35. 134).

Asclepiodorus and Theomnestus are relevant because of the high prices paid by the tyrant Mnason to them (Plin. *NH* 35. 107): thus they should be considered in the dossier of artists who became wealthy through their own art.

After Euripides, who had been painter in his youth (*Vita Euripidis* and Suid s. v. Εὐριπίδης) and Socrates, who had been a marble sculptor in his youth, the philosopher Pyrrhon was trained as painter (Apollod. and Antig. in D. L. 9. 61) as well as the musician Polyeidos (D. S. 14. 46) and the same philosopher Plato (D. L. 3. 5 and Apul. *Pl.* 1. 568): these examples reveal that the painting and in a lesser degree sculpture were regarded not unworthy to be practiced by the best brains of these periods.

The Early Hellenistic Times

During the 'Alexanderzeit' the school of Praxiteles continued through his elder son Cephisodotus the Younger, who inherited his 'art' (Plin. *NH* 36. 24), his younger son Timarchus[104] as well as Papylus (Plin. *NH* 36. 33).

Among the relations between masters and pupils which are known in the sculpture of the period that between Silanion and his student Zeuxiades should be mentioned. Silanion, as Lysippus, became established without having been a pupil of a specific master (Plin. *NH* 35. 51).

The school of Calamis – probably the 5th c. BC sculptor – continued until around 330 BC when a late exponent of this tradition is known: Praxias who carved sculptures for the pediments of the late classical temple of Apollo at Delphi. His collaborator was Androsthenes, a student of Eucadmus. Praxias taught his art to his son with the same name (Paus. 10. 19. 4).[105]

With the personality of Lysippus the habit of handing down the expertise in a peculiar visual art from master to pupil reaches a point of crisis. This renowned bronze sculptor was in fact nobody's pupil because he followed Eupompus' advice to learn from nature rather than from a specific master (Duris in Plin. *NH* 34. 61). Moreover he elaborated a conception of human agency which was based on catching the flying moment rather than on being trained.[106] Thus the typically early Hellenistic concept of Tyche as the ruler of the world changes also the way of conceiving the visual arts. The best works of art are regarded the result of a passing by 'state of grace' of the master rather than of a disciplined learning of a peculiar technique.

---

[104] See B. Andreae, "Kephisodotos (ii)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 410–411 and id., "Timarchos (i)", *ibid.*, II (2004) 472.

[105] See E. Paul, "Androsthenes", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) I (2001) 45 and M. Flashar, "Praxias (ii) and (iii)", *ibid.*, II (2004) 303–304.

[106] See P. Moreno, "Lysippos (i)", in: Vollkommer (n. 3) II (2004) 27–39.

Despite that Lysippus had many pupils: his brother Lysistratus was renowned as inventor of exact casts (Plin. *NH* 35. 153) which were needed by the growing industriatization of the artistic production requiring serial products.

Other students were his sons Daeppus, Boedas and Euthycrates as well as Phanis, Euthychides and Chares. Second generation students were Tisicrates and Cantharus, pupils of Euthycrates.[107]

Needless to say, the large diffusion of the school of Lysippus and its long duration guaranteed the widespread impact of the Lysippan style throughout the early Hellenistic period.[108]

At the same time of the flourishing of Lysippus, the idea that someone can become an excellent artist through the learning and the teaching of a master is challenged also in painting.

Apelles, a pupil first of all of Ephorus at Ephesus, then of Pamphylus (Plin. *NH* 35. 76 and 123 and Suid s. v. ᾽Απέλλης) and school-fellow of Melanthius of Sicyon (Plut. *Arat*. 13), asserted that the essence of art relies in the χάρις or grace (Plin. *NH* 35. 79): a virtue which cannot be taught and learned but which arises from the natural talent of the artist.[109]

Apelles is important also because we have an idea of how his workshop looked like and how his young pupils were trained.

His workshop consisted of the area where the pictures were prepared and the young pupils made colours (Plin. *NH* 35. 85 and Plut. *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur* 15. 58 d–e) and of a lodge in front of the atelier and open to the street: there the painter exposed his pictures when he finished them and visitors or passersby observed his new works and commented on them (Plin. *NH* 35. 84).[110]

Already the young pupils who prepared the colours must have possessed a certain degree of knowledge about painting because they laughed when a visitor to the workshop spoke without any competence on the matter (Plin. *NH* 35. 85). Moreover Apelles corrected and criticized the first works of his students (Clem. Al. *Paed.* 2. 125. 246 P = 1. 232. 17 S). Finally a few students of Apelles became well established painters as well: Ctesilochus (Plin. *NH* 140) and Perseus. The latter dedicated his own treatise on painting to his teacher (Plin. *NH* 35. 111). The

---

[107] About the school of Lysippus see Muller-Dufeu (n. 86) 628–643 nos. 1854–1905.

[108] See P Moreno, *Scultura ellenistica* (Rome 1994) 70–167.

[109] On the concept of χάρις see J. J. Pollitt, *The Ancient View of Greek Art* (New Haven 1974) 297–301 and 380–381.

[110] See Anguissoila (n. 1) 124–131.

continuity of the practice by a student of Apelles to write a treatise on his own art may have been indebted to the Sicyonian education of Apelles because – as it has been stressed above – in the school of Sicyon the habit to combine artistic activity and reflection on visual arts was particularly strong.

The late 4th c. is characterized by the dominant thought that the world is ruled by Tyche: by consequence even excellence in art is now thought to be the result of luck rather than of a training towards competence in a specific art.

The case of the painter Protogenes is an eloquent example of this new attitude to visual arts.

He was trained as a painter by nobody (Plin. *NH* 35. 101), not differently from Silanion and Lysippus. His masterpiece was the picture of Ialysus who was represented accompanied by his dog: the painter was able to represent the foam on the dog's mouth with satisfying results only when moved by anger he flung his sponge full of colours exactly on that spot of the picture (Plin. *NH* 35. 103).

In the same way Apelles got a satisfactory painting of the foam on the mouth of a horse (D. Chr. 63. 4–5 and S. E. *P.* 1. 28) and again Nealces was able to obtain the lather of a horse in his picture of a boy who holds the horse (Val. Max. 8. 11. *ext.*; Plin. *NH* 35. 104; Plut. *De fortitudine* 2. 4).

The view of the highest accomplishments in art as being the result of luck is indebted to Aristotle's sentence (*EN* 6. 4) that fortune is complementary to skills in making products.

The theory that stone statues exist inside the blocks of stone and are 'discovered' by sculptors with the removal of the superfluous material (Carneades in Cic. *Div.* 1. 23 and 2. 48; Plin. *NH* 36. 14 and Quint. *Inst.* 2. 19. 3) may also depend on the conception that not only personal skills but also fortune is the basis of the best images.

Finally probably in the late 4th c. the bronze sculptor Mnasitimus opened on Rhodes a workshop of bronze sculpture which will be held by the same family until the early Roman imperial times (fig. 4)[111] and begins the tradition of the Hellenistic bronze sculpture of Rhodes, produced in workshops managed by well established families for long periods.[112]

During the Hellenistic times, the phenomenon of schools as places for education and learning takes stronger ground: the gymnasia become a well established institution.

---

[111] Evidence in G. Zimmer, Κ. Μπαιράμη, *Ροδιακά εργαστήρια χαλκοπλαστικής* (Athens 2008) 88–89.

[112] See Zimmer, Μπαιράμη (n. 111) 79–91.

Thus it is hardly surprising that schools of painters, bronze sculptors and marble sculptors are known to have been operating in all the most important centres of the ancient world: from Athens to Delus, from Rhodes to Pergamum, from Alexandria to Rome.[113]

Antonio Corso
antoniocorso@hotmail.com
Athens

Статья посвящена вопросам обучения античных художников, начиная с периода ранней архаики и вплоть до эпохи эллинизма. С учетом всех античных свидетельств на эту тему обсуждается влияние философской мысли и менталитета на обучение художников в каждый из рассматриваемых периодов. Таким образом, статья представляет собой обзор истории данного вопроса с VIII по III вв. до н. э., сопровождаемый материалом из всех доступных источников.

In this article, the issues concerning the education of ancient artists from the early archaic period until the early Hellenistic times are addressed. The whole corpus of passages of ancient authors concerning this topic is cited and discussed as well as the influence of philosophical ideas and of the mentality of different periods upon the training and learning of artists. Thus the history of this subject from the 8th c. BC until the early 3rd c. BC is attempted as far as it is allowed by the available surviving evidence.

[113] Evidence in Reinach (n. 31) 376–421 and Muller-Dufeu (n. 86) 78–1023. Moreover there are a lot of specific studies concerning families of Hellenistic artists: for example about the Boethoi, see A. Linfert, "Boethoi", in: G. Hellenkemper Salies (ed.), *Das Wrack* (Köln 1994) 831–847; about the Cleomenes' family see G. Bevilacqua, "La firma di Kleomenes", in: A. Romualdi (ed.), *Galleria degli Uffizi. Studi e restauri* (Florence 2006) 27–46; about most sculptors with an Attic education, see A. Stewart, *Attika* (London 1979) 101–174.

a)



Fig. 1 a–b. The genealogical tree of the school of Polycleitus according to two different reconstructions suggested by Linfert

b)



Fig. 1 a–b. The genealogical tree of the school of Polycleitus according to two different reconstructions suggested by Linfert



Fig. 2. The genealogical tree of the Sicyonian school of painters according to the reconstruction suggested by Reinach



Fig. 3. The genealogical tree of the Theban / Attic school of painters according to the reconstruction suggested by Corso



Fig. 4. The genealogical tree of the school of bronze sculptors of Mnasitimus on Rhodes according to the reconstruction suggested by Zimmer and Μπαιράμη

A LYRE ON THE GROUND

To Prof. Dr. Heinz Heinen

Among Attic red-figured vases from the Hermitage collection is a stemmed plate by the Dish Painter[1] dated to 470–460 BC. The painting in the interior (fig. 1a) represents a bare-footed short-haired girl wearing a short high-girdled chiton and a diadem or a leaved fillet. In a dance that resembles running she approaches a lyre lying on the ground and looks backwards. A ribbon is attached to the instrument; over the lyre there is an inscription in purple, all the letters of which are clearly visible: ΧΟΡΦΕΛΕΣ.

The content of this image has not been much discussed. The most detailed examination is that of Anna Peredolskaya in her Hermitage catalogue of red-figured Attic vases.[2] Peredolskaya argues that the musical instrument[3] decorated with a ribbon points rather to a cult dance with an accompaniment than to running. The glance of the girl is directed backwards, which makes it probable that she is being followed by someone; possibly, she is leading a chorus of young girls. The same explanation is implied by the inscription, which states clearly that the image deals with a chorus performance – though the translation given by Peredolskaya ('идущая во главе хора' – 'leading a chorus') is inadequate.[4] The girl's headgear which she calls "a golden diadem" points to a festive garment, according to Peredolskaya "a traditional garment of a young dancer".

Peredolskaya points out that the reason for placing the lyre on the ground is obscure. In 1961, together with Xenia Gorbunova, she attempted

---

[1] Acc. no. ГР-2007 (former Б-177; St. 1619; Waldhauer 823; Peredolskaya, *KAV* 149, pl. 103, 1; 177, 3; *ARV²* 787, 5; *M&M* 20; *BA* 209696).

[2] Peredolskaya, *KAV* 132.

[3] Erroneously called a cithara, though it is evidently a chelys-lyre: see e. g. M. Maas, J. M. Snyder, *Stringed instruments of Ancient Greece* (New Haven – London 1989) ch. 2, 3.

[4] Unfortunately the Hermitage catalogues of the last century are not free from errors in ancient Greek. In an attempt to motivate her translation Peredolskaya adduced the word χοραύλης as a parallel. As a result of misunderstanding χοραύλης occurs as if inscribed at the plate ГР-2007 in a catalogue of exhibition *M&M* 20, though such an inscription, if really placed at the image of the Dish painter, would have been as puzzling as, say, a picture of a boy with a lyre labeled "a flute-girl".

an explanation:[5] the lyre was described as having its strings torn, and the girl as looking surprised – probably before the accident she was heading a chorus of young girls, accompanying the ritual dance with her instrument. But since the torn strings are not mentioned in the catalogue of 1967, the scholar must have later rejected this version. In fact, all the five strings are depicted taut, though three lines are carelessly not brought to an end.

Ludolf Stefani[6] has not much to say on the subject of the image. He only acknowledges it to be a dance, and not running. Indeed, the lyre makes us consider the girl as a dancer and not as an athlete. Besides, her bent arms turn out to be a regular dancing posture, as can be proved by several parallels.[7] And even if we interpreted her movement as simple fast running, and thus herself as a musician who is late for a performance, that would not spare us the difficulties: why is the lyre not kept in her hands, but thrown aside?

Stefani[8] believes that the lyre was added to symbolize the music, which accompanied the girl's dance. A red-figured pelike by the Trophy Painter from the middle of the fifth century BC[9] serves as a parallel: a small figure of Eros flying over two women making music can indeed indicate a love song being performed[10] (though Erotes are anyway habitués of women's chambers in Classical vase-painting). But by showing just a lyre it is hardly possible to indicate any concrete characteristics of the melody; and a general indication of the music sounding (something like a newly invented symbol ♫) seems superfluous, for an unaccompanied dance would be hard to imagine in Greek culture.

It was Stefani[11] who proposed the reading of the inscription (fig. 1b): ΧΟΡ<Ο>ΦΕΛΕΣ, i. e. χορωφελής, 'useful for the chorus'. There is no literary evidence for this word, but it is formed after a model of other compounds meaning 'useful for something or someone'.[12] Besides,

---

[5] К. С. Горбунова, А. А. Передольская, *Мастера греческих расписных ваз* [K. S. Gorbunova, A. A. Peredolskaya, *Greek Vase-Painters*] (Leningrad 1961) 66.

[6] *ОАК за 1865 год* (St Petersburg 1866) 63–64.

[7] Parallels are adduced by G. Richter, "A Stemmed Plate and a Stele", *MDAI Ath*. 71 (1956) 141. For more examples see: crater Lecce 572 (below n. 25); skyphos Vienna 570 (*ARV²* 661, 93; *BA* 207752; *CVA Österreich* 1, *Wien* 1, 32, pl. 40, 1–2), the Painter of the Yale lekythos, 475–425 BC; white ground lekythos New York, MM 41.162.245 (*BA* 21634; M. C. Miller, *Athens and Persia in the fifth century BC. A study in cultural receptivity* [Cambridge 1997] fig. 92), ca. 470 BC.

[8] *ОАК за 1868 год* (St Petersburg 1870) 95 n. 4.

[9] Acc. no. 240 (St. 1676; Waldhauer 732; Peredolskaya *KAV* 187, pl. 129, 1–2; *ARV²* 857, 1; *M&M* 23; *BA* 212472).

[10] *ОАК за 1868 год* (n. 8) 93.

[11] *ОАК за 1865 год* (n. 6) 64.

[12] Such as βιωφελής, ψυχωφελής, κοινωφελής, ἰδιωφελής, δημωφελής (the later is explained by Hesychius, s. v.: δῆμον ὠφελῶν).

Aristophanes in *Lys*. 1319 mentions κρότος χορωφελέτας, 'the noise which is a helper to the chorus' (that is, clasping hands).

Stefani also indicated that the same inscription, ΧΟΡΦΕΛΕΣ (again without Ο), occurred once more (fig. 2a–b), on a red-figured Nolan amphora by the Painter of Leningrad 702 from the Hermitage collection, attributed to the third quarter of the fifth century BC.[13] In spite of various dates, shapes and artists, one can note a certain similarity of the subjects. On one side of the amphora a mantled youth with a taenia on his head steps to the right, looking backwards and stretching out his right hand to the left; in his left hand there is a chelys-lyre with eight strings decorated with a ribbon. The inscription is under the lyre. On the other side (fig. 2c) a youth, also wearing a mantle and a taenia, strides to the right stretching forward his right hand. As on the stemmed plate, purple is used, in particular for the ribbon on the lyre and the inscription.

John Beazley interpreted the first youth as Tithonos, who is indeed often depicted as a schoolboy with a lyre. But such an understanding leads the great scholar to consider the inscription "enigmatic" and to leave it without an explanation. Meanwhile, the identification of Tithonos by his attributes only is problematic, all the more that the figure of Eos pursuing him is absent.[14] Looking backwards is a pattern quite common for profile views of moving figures in vase-painting,[15] and it usually implies that someone follows the represented figure – but in this case it seems to be not Eos, but the second youth depicted on the reverse.[16] The inscription makes us think that they are both members of a chorus. A κύκλιος χορός can hardly be depicted *in corpore*, still less on small plates or Nolan amphoras, and it is seldom represented by numerous performers in vase-painting;[17] sometimes we are likely to find it indicated by one or two

---

[13] Acc. no. ГР-2023 (former Б-193; St. 1457; Waldhauer 706; *ARV²* 1193, 3; *BA* 215788).

[14] A. Kossatz-Deissmann, "Tithonos", *LIMC* VIII, 1 (1997) 34–36.

[15] See e. g. Peredolskaya, *KAV* no. 3. 11. 20. 28. 32. 41. 50. 55. 58. 91. 92. 108. 109. 113. 145. 168. 181. 194. 197 etc.

[16] I must admit that on the other amphorae of the Painter of Leningrad 702 the subject connection between the two sides is either lacking or not evident, see *ARV²*.

[17] See H. Frohning, *Dithyrambos und Vasenmalerei in Athen* (Würzburg 1971) 27–28 for two images of a dithyrambic chorus in performance (450–400 BC): on a bell-crater Kopenhagen NM 13817 (*ARV²* 1145, 35; 1703; *BA* 215175; K. Friis Johansen, *Eine Dithyrambos-Aufführung* [Copenhagen 1959] 20, pl. 1–6; *CVA Danemark* 8, *Copenhague* 8, 267–268, pl. 347–349; A. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* [Oxford ²1968] fig. 15; *ARFVcl* fig. 174), the Kleophon Painter, and on a cup New York, MM 27.74 (*ARV²* 407, 18; *BA* 204417), the Briseis Painter.

figures only.[18] This would confirm the assumption of Peredolskaya that the girl on the stemmed plate is also looking back at other chorus dancers.

ΧΟΡΦΕΛΕΣ without Ο repeated twice makes improbable an accidental omission of the letter the second time. It is hardly possible that both inscriptions are by the same hand and thus represent someone's personal notion of orthography, for the vase-paintings are attributed to different artists and dated to different decades. It seems equally incredible to think of an odd syncope of a long ω by the confluence of ο with ω beginning the second root of the compound.[19] Most probably the second painter copied the writing of the first: it is well known that not all the representatives of the Athenian potters' quarter were literate.[20] Despite publications of Stefani and Beazley, the mysterious word is still not taken into account in classical studies.[21]

Chelys-lyres are often represented in vase-painting among the objects hanging on the wall in the background. This is a realistic detail indicating a location, such as a school or a banqueting hall, and in the same time a way to show that the scene is taking place indoors.[22] The same must be the meaning of a lyre placed on a piece of furniture, such as a chest, which probably contains book-rolls.[23] Some *additional* symbolic meaning

---

[18] See Frohning (n. 17) 20–23: a bell-crater Agrigento 1583 (*BA* 2053; Froning, *op. cit*., pl. 7, 1; E. Csapo, "The Context of Choregic Dedications", in: O. Taplin, R. Wyles [eds.], *The Pronomos Vase and its Context* [Oxford 2010] App. B, no. 15), the Marlay Painter, 430–420 BC (youth playing pipes, dancing figure in chitoniskos), and a bell-crater Copenhagen Chr. VIII 939 (*BA* 9559; *CVA Danemark* 4, *Copenhague* 4, pl. 147; Froning, *op. cit*., pl. 6, 2; *LIMC* VI [1992], pl. 585, Nike 335; Csapo, *op. cit*., App. B, no. 22), ca. 420 BC (two youths, one with lyre, at a tripod, with Nike, a priest and an attendant).

[19] Ch. A. Lobeck, *Pathologiae Graeci sermonis elementa* I (Regimontii Borussorum 1853, repr. Hildesheim 1966) 303–304, adduces examples of syncope of a short ο, in particular in compounds after ρ: Χέρνησος and ἐναρφόρος. Still, as regards the syncope of the long ω (*ibid*., 333–335), he finds the only, and a disputable, case: σφέ instead of σφωέ.

[20] J. Boardman, *Athenian Black Figure Vases* (London 1974, ²1991) 200–201; id., *Athenian Red Figure Vases: The Archaic Period* (London 1975, repr. 1997) 213; B. A. Sparkes, *Greek Pottery. An Introduction* (Manchester – New York 1991) 112 and n. 46.

[21] For example, it is absent from LSJ and is not mentioned in the well-known work: L. Threatte, *The Grammar of Attic Inscriptions* (Berlin – New York 1980–1994).

[22] See e. g. P. Girard, *L'education athénienne au Ve et IVe siècle avant J.-C.* (Paris 1889) 104–108; Maas, Snyder (n. 3) 88.

[23] R/f cup, Erlangen 290 (*ARV²* 1259, 7; *BA* 217077; A. Queyrel, "Les Muses a l'école: images de quelques vases du peintre de Calliope", *Antike Kunst* 31 [1988] pl. 20, 2), the Calliope Painter, ca. 430 BC; for interpretation as a school scene see Queyrel, *op. cit*., 99.

of the objects in field cannot be excluded,[24] but to my mind it would occur to no Greek spectator to interpret an instrument hanging on the wall as producing sounds. There are many dancing scenes, in which the accompanying instrument is depicted actually played by some character, and some of them include other instruments hanging in field.[25] There are also images of a lyre being put on a stool[26] or taken down from a wall.[27]

If a scene is taking place outdoors, we sometimes find lyres on the ground at the characters' feet. This must be an equivalent to the objects hanging on the walls in indoor scenes, with one obvious difference: while indoors we can be dealing with a permanent location of an instrument, outdoors it must be brought with an intention to use it for a certain purpose.

A lyre on the ground occurs in a number of many-figured mythological scenes, next to the characters to whom it is a suitable attribute: it is obviously placed at hand to be picked up at a due time, and is not sounding.[28]

---

[24] E. g. Maas and Snyder (n. 3) 140–141 indicate that frequently in vase-paintings after 450 BC the phorminx (cradle cithara) is not played, but is hanging on the wall in the background, and suppose that it can be just an attribute of the Muses and thus the symbol of the Muses' favour.

[25] E. g. r/f column-crater Lecce 572 (*ARV²* 564, 21; *CVA Italia* 4, *Lecce* 1, III.I.C.4, pl. [154–155] 3, 1–3; 4, 1; *BA* 206449), the Pig Painter, 500–450 BC: cradle-cithara suspended, aulos sounding. R/f pelike Munich 2363 (*ARV²* 853, 1; 1574; *CVA Deutschland* 6, *München* 2, 16. pl. [272, 274] 76, 1–2; 78, 1. 4–5; *BA* 212445), name-vase of the Painter of Munich 2363, 475–425 BC: Eros dancing, chelys-lyre suspended, cradle-cithara sounding. R/f pelike Athens, NM 1187 (*BA* 43744; *GRBS* 31 [1990] 160 pl. 8B), ca. 410 BC: chelys-lyre suspended, aulos sounding.

[26] Chous Athens, Nat. Mus. 1230 (*ARV²* 782, 12; G. van Hoorn, *Choes and Anthesteria* [Leiden 1951] p. 63 no. 27, fig. 157; *BA* 209622), the Akestorides Painter, ca. 460 BC.

[27] Boeotian chous New York, MM 49.11.2 (van Hoorn [n. 26] p. 164 no. 766, fig. 155), 420–400 BC.

[28] R/f neck-amphora Boston, MFA 03.821 (*ARV²* 1186, 29; *BA* 215718; *LIMC* V [1990] pl. 309, Hippodameia I 1), the Kadmos Painter, ca. 400 BC: Hippodameia ("ΙΠΠΟΔΑΜΗ"), an exemplary bride, with her attendants at leisure in a garden. R/f calyx-crater, once Paris, market (*ARV²* 1165, 74; *BA* 215426; *LIMC* VI [1992], Marsyas I 23), the Painter of Munich 2335, the beginning of the 4th cent. BC: Apollo and Marsyas (aulos sounding). R/f calyx-crater, Erlangen 302 (*ARV²* 1418, 3; W. Grünhagen, *Archäologisches Institut der Universität Erlangen: Antike Originalarbeiten des Kunstsammlungs des Instituts* [Nürnberg 1948] 44, pl. 14; *BA* 260002), the Erbach Painter, ca. 400 BC: Apollo and Marsyas (? an old satyr) holding an aulos pipe in each hand. R/f bell-crater, Madrid 11074 (*ARV²* 1185, 17; *BA* 215705; *LIMC* III [1886], pl. 386, Dionysos 598 = *LIMC* VI [1992], Nike 223), the Kadmos Painter, 390–380 BC: Dionysos with his retinue and a Nike (aulos played by a satyr).

The context of several images on choes is more ambiguous.[29] Five of them are very close to each other:[30] two (fig. 3–4) depict a youth[31] and three (fig. 5–7) a satyr[32] approaching a lyre, which lies on the ground. While in two cases the character's dancing is very probable and in two other not excluded, the satyr on Piraeus 580 is bending down to reach for the lyre, which shows clearly that its actual use is yet to come. A more detailed scene[33] (fig. 8) shows, beside a lyre, one dancing and one probably singing figure (this is the only case with the dancer moving away from the lyre, which is leaning against a stone).

The only conventional meaning one could think of is that a lyre on the ground should help to distinguish dancing from running: it is significant that modern decoration descriptions often hesitate to indicate the figures'

---

[29] Since wine-jugs of this form are a distinctive feature of the Anthesteria, the scenes depicted on them are likely to relate to this festival, but we cannot rule out other possibilities. See T. B. L. Webster, *Potter and Patron in Classical Athens* (London 1972) 164; N. Robertson, "Athen's Festival of the New Wine", *HSCPh* 95 (1993) 198; R. F. Hamilton, *Choes and Anthesteria: Athenian Iconography and Ritual* (Ann Arbor 1992) 64–69.

[30] These choes belong to the series with the same manner of decoration, which is a cheap substitute of red-figure: red paint is applied directly over the black glaze, without incision and secondary colors, so the images are not very durable and not too discrete and intelligible. The homogeneity of the series makes probable an attribution to the same workshop (if not to the same hand) dated approximately to the second and the third quarters of the 5th cent. BC: J. R. Green, "A Series of Added Red-figure Choes", *Arch. Anz*. 85 (1970) 475–487. This means that the implied reason, why the lyre is on the ground, will have been the same for all these vases. Lack of inner marking for details caused a preference for single figures, moving in a lively manner with the limbs widely spread, and for open-shaped lyres, which provide a clear silhouette: van Hoorn [n. 26] 54; Green, *op. cit*., 480.

[31] Oxford 1945.45 (*BA* 23907; *Ashmolean Museum. Select Exhibition of Sir John and Lady Beazley's Gifts, 1912–1966* (Oxford 1967) pl. 46. 311; Green [n. 30] cat. no. 2). – Utrecht, University ARCH-23 (van Hoorn [n. 26] p. 190, no. 974, fig. 428; Green [n. 30] cat. no. 8).

[32] Vienna, University 509 (*CVA* Deutschland 5, Wien 1, pl. [216] 22, 13; van Hoorn [n. 26] p. 192 no. 991, fig. 429; Green [n. 30] cat. no. 6, fig. 4), ca. 430 BC. – Gela 73 (O. Benndorf, *Griechische und sicilische Vasenbilder* [Berlin 1883] 69, pl. 36, 3; L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* [Darmstadt 1932, Nachdr. 1956] 247; van Hoorn [n. 26] p. 186, no. 952; Green [n. 30] cat. no. 27, fig. 12; *CVA Italia* 56, *Gela* 4, 29, pl. [2510] 45, 6. 9; *BA* 2395), manner of the Haimon Painter, ca. 430 BC. – Piraeus, Archaeolog. Mus. 580 (*BA* 1340; Green [n. 30] cat. no. 17, fig. 7a–c).

[33] Once New York, market (van Hoorn [n. 26] p. 177, no. 886, fig. 174; *Sotheby-Parke-Bernet, New York, sale catalogue 7.12.2005,* 41, lot 42, right; *BA* 15816), ca. 425 BC.

movements.[34] If a dancing posture is not enough characteristic (or the painter's skill is lacking) and if there is not enough space to represent a musician who accompanies the dance, it could perhaps make sense to depict only a lyre.[35]

Still other explanations can be proposed. Let us make the stemmed plate representing the dancing girl our starting point, even though I am not sure that interpreting a lyre on this vase-painting can be applied to the rest of the images.

First, I do not think that the girl is entertaining at a symposion, rehearsing or seeking clients for it.[36] Indeed, in many cases dancing girls in vase-paintings are obviously hetaerae (as suggested by occasional presence of their mistress with a narthex and of male customers with purses).[37] But there is also a category of dance "of less obvious meaning"[38] performed probably in a religious context.

It should be noted that I do not exclude the participation of professional female entertainers in public religious ceremonies. For instance, if music-making was required at an all-female festival, probably professional musicians and dancers from women musical schools were engaged, such as Habrotonon, who, when still a virgin, played for the girls at the Tauropolia (Men. *Epitrep*. 477–479). In this sense, the girl could as well (but not necessarily) be a pupil of a "hetaerae school". But I argue that in

---

[34] The posture of the youth on Utrecht ARCH-23 is very close to that of the satyr on Vienna 509, but cf.: Utrecht ARCH-23 "boy approaching lyre" (van Hoorn) / Vienna 509 "tanzender Satyr" (*CVA*); "silen approaches lyre" (van Hoorn). The movement of the youth on Oxford 1945.45 and of the satyr on Gela 73 is nearly the same, but cf.: Gela 73 "silen running excitedly" (van Hoorn); "un satirello che corre a gambe levate e a braccia alzate" (*CVA*) [cf. "Ein bekränzter Satyr stösst in übermüthiger Laune, weit ausspringend, mit dem Fuss eine Leier bei Seite" (Benndorf)] / Oxford 1945.45 "youth running or dancing" (*BA*). See also below n. 53.

[35] Compare a late geometrical Laconian pyxis fr., Athens, Nat. Mus. 234 (J. Boardman, *Early Greek Vase Painting* [London 1998] fig. 131), 750–690 BC, with two phorminges (and a scorpion) inserted in the empty space between dancing figures.

[36] Webster (n. 29) 125 enumerates this dish among the images of solo performers at a symposion.

[37] For images of dancing girls see J. D. Beazley, "Narthex", *AJA* 37 (1933) 400–403; L. B. Lawler, *The Dance in Ancient Greece* (London 1964) 127–138; M. Robertson, "A Muffled Dancer and Others", in: A. Cambitoglou (ed.), *Studies in Honour of Arthur Dale Trendall* (Sydney 1979) 132 n. 12; L. Burn, *The Meidias Painter* (Oxford 1987) 84–86; Webster (n. 29) 124–125; Maas, Snyder (n. 3) 141–142; J. H. Oakley, *The Phiale Painter*, Kerameus 8 (Mainz 1990) 37–39; Miller (n. 7) 181 and n. 186; Sh. D. Bundrick, *Music and Image in Classical Athens* (Cambridge 2005) 89–90.

[38] Maas, Snyder (n. 3) 14. For examples, see below.

any case her performance takes place at a cult ceremony, and besides at one not restricted to the hetaerae.[39]

The festal attire of the girl on the plate Hermitage ГР-2007 is appropriate both for a feast and for a cult performance. In particular, there are many parallels for wearing head-bands with leaves thrust into them by the participants of state festivals.[40] Active dance may have required a shortened garment,[41] even when connected with a cult sphere.[42] Short

---

[39] A professional festival of hetaerae is likely to be the Aphrodisia: Deubner (n. 32) 216. Besides hetaerae played a prominent part at the Haloa: Deubner (n. 32) 62; 67, pl. 4.1. Cf. E. Simon, *Festivals of Attica. An Archaeological Commentary* (Wisconsin 1983) 35–37: "It was a women's festival and must have been celebrated in earlier times by married women as the Thesmophoria were. But from the fourth century BC onwards it was mainly a festival of the *hetairai*". – Robertson (n. 37) 131; id., *The Art of Vase Painting in Classical Athens* (Cambridge 1992) 206–207, followed by Burn (n. 37) 85–86, argues for ritual connotations of the Boston phiale representing hetaerae who practice their dance: Boston, MFA 97.371 (*ARV²* 1023, 146; *BA* 214328; *ARFVcl* fig. 128; Bundrick [n. 37] 89–90, fig. 56), name-vase of the Phiale Painter, 475–425 BC. But see *contra* A. Schäfer, *Unterhaltung beim griechischen Symposion* (Mainz 1997) 78; Bundrick, *op. cit*., 90 and 217 n. 189.

[40] Miller (n. 7) 181 and n. 187 (on the Hermitage vase). Frohning (n. 18) 20–23, pl. 6.1; 6.2; 7.1, interprets figures with a similar head-dress as performers of a dithyramb. G. van Hoorn (n. 26) 34, with n. 135 and 136, notes that the head-dress with spikes rising from it is worn by different characters involved in festive activities depicted on choes, for example by torch-racers.

[41] On some vases that could serve as parallels the dancing figure can be either a girl or a youth: (1) chous New York, market (n. 33, fig. 8; see below p. 71); (2) chous Paris, Louvre CA21 (fig. 13: *ARV²* 1335, 33; *BA* 217494; van Hoorn [n. 26] p. 168 no. 822, fig. 244), the Nikias Painter, ca. 410 BC – apparently dancing at the Anthesteria (Miller [n. 7] 181); (3) stemmed plate bought and published by G. Richter: Rome, Richter Coll. (Richter [n. 7], Beilage 74–75; *ARV* 1305, 1; Miller [n. 7] fig. 108), Class of Naples 2618, 430–425 BC. – The last vase is likely to indicate a dancer and not a runner, even in spite of a goal post (*meta*) depicted, for one foot is drawn in the tree-quarter view, indicating that the figure is about to turn; in this case the *meta* implies that the dancing is taking place outdoors, in a palaestra, at a dancing contest (Richter [n. 7] 141). It belongs, in its turn, to a group of four stemmed plates (Dresden 361: A. Furtwängler, "Erwerbungen der Antikensammlungen in Deutschland. Dresden", *Arch. Anz*. [1895] 225–226, fig. 25; Naples 2618 and 2626: Richter, *ibid*., Beilage 76, 77), probably produced in the same workshop, the other showing: a naked youth, his hand stretched out and his back to the goal post; a youth in the same posture, but without a *meta*; and a youth playing a lyre. The whole series may be connected to a single subject, most probably school competitions. In this case the dancer is rather a youth, and the context is different from that of the two Hermitage vases with the ΧΟΡΦΕΛΕΣ-inscription.

[42] The most famous example is the dance in καλαθίσκοι, basket-like head-dress, associated with the 'basket dance' in certain rituals of Demeter (Eustath. 1627, 46–50) and of Artemis in Lydia (Strab. 13, 5, p. 626) and often identified, in turn, with the dance performed by Laconian maidens at a festival of Artemis Karyatis (Paus. 3, 10,

hair, too, seems not to be an unequivocal sign of low social status. It is true that in the fifth century ladies on vase-paintings normally have long hair, whereas short-haired women are mostly slaves.[43] But we find a considerable number of long-haired hetaerae,[44] and probably some examples of short-haired ladies.[45] Besides, a lyre on the ground, as we have seen, is an indication of an outdoor event, which argues as well against a performance of a hetaera.[46]

Still the decisive argument against the convivial context of the girl's dance is of course the inscription that connects it with a chorus. There is no evidence for a chorus as a means of entertainment at a drinking party or for hetaerae formed in a chorus in Athens. On the contrary, choral performance seems an important civic activity sanctioned by the polis,[47] which could probably take place only at state public festivals and at some private ceremonies intended to gain the favour of the gods, such as weddings, children's school festivals, or celebrating a victory in a contest.

It seems that in Classical Athens a performance of a chorus of young girls is only thinkable on a religious occasion.[48]

---

7). See Stephani, *ОАК за 1865 год* (n. 6) 63–64; P. Wolters, "Karyatiden", *Zeitschrift für bildende Kunst*, N.F. 6 (1895) 42–43; A.B. Cook, *Zeus. A Study in Ancient Religion* III, 2 (1940) 990–1012; H. Metzger, "Lébès gamikos à figures rouges du Musée National d'Athènes", *BCH* 66–67 (1942–1943) 234–239; F. Brommer, "Antike Tänze", *Arch. Anz.* 1989, 485–486. – Besides, for dancing girls in short tunics see Hamilton (below n. 50) 453 cat. no. 30: cult of Artemis; lebes Athens, Nat. Mus. 1256 (below n. 61): wedding.

[43] H. Groß, "Haartracht, Haarschmuck", *KlP* (1967) 897; N. Himmelmann, "Archäologisches zum Problem der griechischen Sklaverei", *AbhMainz* 13 (1971) 16 n. 1. There is also literary evidence that short hair was worn by slaves: Arph. *Av*. 911; Olympiodor. *In Plat. Alcib*. 148–149.

[44] A study of hetaerae hairstyles shows that we cannot conclude with certainty on female social status judging on long and short hair: I. Peschel, *Die Hetäre bei Symposium und Komos in der attisch-rotfigurigen Vasenmalerei des 6–4 Jahrh. v. Chr.* (Frankfurt a. M. 1987) 358–359. S. Lewis, *The Athenian Woman. An Iconographical Handbook* (London – New York 2002) 105–106, points out that a hetaera was not expected to look like a slave, and the owner would hardly crop a girl's hair if she was to earn money in this way.

[45] V. Liventhal, "What Goes On among the Women? The Setting of Some Attic Vase Paintings of the Fifth Century B.C.", *Analecta Romana Instituti Danici* 14 (1985) 41 with n. 22.

[46] Burn (n. 37) 84 n. 6: "Brothel scenes are usually distinctively *inside* the house, as indicated by columns, couches, doors, or objects hanging on the walls".

[47] Hence an idea of its educational effect exaggerated by Plato: *Leg*. 2, 654 a–b. 664 b–d. 666 d. 672 e.

[48] See Burn (n. 37) 84–85.

It is acknowledged[49] that on the whole Athenian women did not play a prominent part at most of the state religious festivals, and those, at which they did, were often nocturnal, exclusively female, secret, so no wonder that they are seldom depicted in the visual arts. Our evidence on maiden choruses in Athens is rather scanty, but one can suppose that occasions were more numerous than those we are aware of. The poet coming to new-found Nephelokokkygia offers partheneia among other poetic productions that apparently no decent polis can do without (Arph. *Av*. 919) – this implies that they were a usual matter in Athens as well.[50]

Concrete known or supposed cases of Athenian women dancing and singing for religious occasions are:

1) worshipping Athena;[51]

2) a ceremony dedicated to Erechtheus;[52]

---

[49] E. g., J. Neils, "Adonia to Thesmophoria: Women and Athenian Festivals", in: N. Kaltsas, A. Shapiro (eds.), *Worshiping Women. Ritual and Reality in Classical Athens. Catalogue* (Athens – New York 2008) 243–244.

[50] R. Hamilton, "Alkman and the Athenian Arkteia", *Hesperia* 58 (1989): 4, 471 argues that our sources were not interested in girls' rituals just because they were too commonplace to offer anything unique and specific: "The traditional dances by girls were so widespread that they can appear in essentially the same form in a 7th-century Spartan poem or on a 5th-century Attic vase, and they were so ordinary as to go without remark in the extant sources".

[51] (1) Eur. *Heraclid.* 777–783; see A. Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen im Altertum* (Leipzig 1898) 105–106; Deubner (n. 32) 24; C. Calame, *Les choeurs de jeunes filles en Grèce archaïque* (Roma 1977) 151; 235–236 on singing a paean during a παννυχίς at the Panathenaia. – (2) B/f lekythos New York, MM 31.11.10 (*ABV* 154, 57; 688; *BA* 310485; D. von Bothmer, *The Amasis Painter and His World. Vase-Painting in the Sixth-century B.C. Athens* [New York – London 1985] 185–187, cat. no. 48), the Amasis Painter, 560–530 BC, with eight female dancers on the shoulder, is interpreted as a representation of weaving and bringing the peplos to Athena: S. Karousou, *The Amasis Painter* (Oxford 1966) 44; J. Neils, "Pride, Pomp, and Circumstance: The Iconography of Procession", in: ead. (ed.), *Worshipping Athena* (Madison 1996) 186 (still other interpretations connect it with a wedding: see M. H. Delavaud-Roux, *Les dances pacifiques in Greece antique* [Aix-en-Provence 1994] 95–96 no. 32). – (3) The participation of dancing girls at a New Year sacrifice can be inferred from an inscription dating from 196–217 AD: J. H. Oliver, "Iulia Domna as Athena Polias", in: *Athenian Studies Presented to W. S. Ferguson*, HSCPh Suppl. 1 (Cambridge, Mass. – London 1940) 521–530; J. et L. Robert, *Bull. ép.* 1946–1947, no. 101. L. 32–34: (?) χορεύειν τ[ὴν ἑορ]τήν. Probably the honours for Iulia Domna were included into a more ancient rite dedicated to Athena Polias: Deubner (n. 32) 236–237.

[52] Eur. *Erechtheus* (P. Sorb. 2328 col. VI, 77–79 and VII, 80): C. Austin, "De nouveaux fragments de l'Erechthée d'Euripide", *Recherches de papyrologie* IV (Paris 1967) 11–67; *TrGF* F 370: Athena prescribes the girls to form choruses annually in honour of Erechtheus and his daughters. N. Robertson, "The Origins of the Panathenaia", *RhM* 128 (1985) 235. 237. 254, connects these rites with the Scira.

3) the Arkteia in Brauron, Piraeus and Mounichia;[53]

4) a παννυχίς at the Tauropolia in Halai;[54]

5) a certain Dionysian festival,[55] sometimes identified with the Lenaia,[56] known from the representations on vases;[57]

6) worshipping Aphrodite;[58]

7) the Adonia;[59]

---

[53] Numerous votive krateriskoi found in Attic sanctuaries of Artemis show girls of various ages, nude and wearing short or long garments, in the act of processing, racing and dancing (it is worth noting that these activities are not always easily distinguishable): for dancing, see Hamilton (n. 50) 450–453 cat. no. 8. 10. 11. 12. 13. 16. 21. 22. 23. 26. 27. 30. Of the other shapes, see b/f dish or pyxis fr. Brauron 350213 (L. Ghali-Kahil, "Quelques vases du sanctuaire d'Artémis à Brauron", in: *Neue Ausgrabungen in Griechenland*, AntK Beiheft 1 [Basel 1963] p. 6 no. 3, pl. 1, 4; *BA* 350213), the Burgon Groupe, ca. 560 BC; r/f pyxis lid fr. Brauron (Ghali-Kahil, *op. cit*., p. 24 no. 50, pl. 13, 6; P. Truitt, "Attic White-Ground Pyxis and Phiale, ca. 450 B.C.", *Boston Museum Bulletin* vol. 67, no. 348 [1969] 90 fig. 23; *BA* 276053), the Painter of London B 12, 450–425 BC.

[54] Men. *Epitrep*. 477–478: Ταυροπολίοις· παισὶν γὰρ ἔψαλλον κόραις, / αὕτη θ' [ὁμοῦ συ]νέπαιζεν. Deubner (n. 32) 208: "Die Mädchen ehrten die Gottheit mit Musik und Reigentanz". Yet in this case the girls' music-making was not rehearsed, since Habrotonon met Pamphile for the first time there.

[55] Bundrick (n. 37) 157–158; Neils (n. 49) 247; S. Chryssoulaki, "The Participation of Women in the Worship and Festivals of Dionysos", *Worshiping Women* (n. 49) 267–275.

[56] A. Frickenhaus. *Lenäenvasen*, Programm zum Winkelmannsfeste der Archäologischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin 72 (Berlin 1912). M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* I (Munich 1955) 587–588, proposed the Anthesteria.

[57] See below n. 67. Besides see r/f cup Florence 3950 (*ARV²* 914, 142; *CVA Italia* 30, *Firenze* 3, III.I.18, III.I.19, pl. (1373) 109, 3; *BA* 211080), the Painter of Bologna 417, ca. 450 BC. – Many images of dancing maenads are supposed to depict Athenian women imitating maenads, but they perform an improvised ecstatic dance, intended to enable personal contact with a deity (Chryssoulaki [n. 55] 274), which cannot be classified as a chorus dance.

[58] Squat lekythos Paris, Louvre MNB2110 (*ARV²* 1314, 14; *LIMC* II [1984] pl. 134, Aphrodite 1360; Burn [n. 37] cat. M16, pl. 16 a–c; *BA* 220506), the Meidias Painter, 420–400 BC – Aphrodite with Eros and women dancing; for interpretation as a pannychis at a sanctuary of Aphrodite see Burn (n. 37) 29. 30. 86. Lekythos Paris, Louvre CA1890 (*ARV²* 1326, 68; Burn [n. 37] cat. MM 108, pl. 51 c; *BA* 220623): two women in short tunics, one with castanets, dance to the accompaniment of a piping Eros; "Festival of Aphrodite?" (Burn). Cf. squat lekythos New York, MM 1924.97.35 (*BA* 42131; *LIMC* III [1986] pl. 648, Eros 692; A. Lezzi-Hafter, *Der Eretria-Maler, Werke und Weggefahrten*, Kerameus 6 [Mainz 1988] cat. no. 244, pl. 159 c–d), the Painter of Athens 1729, 425–420 BC – a girl dancing to the tympanon played by Eros before an altar. Cf. also the next note. – According to R. Rosenzweig, *Worshipping Aphrodite. Art and Cult in Classical Athens* (Ann Arbor 2004) 77, "brides and hetairai worshipped Aphrodite in a similar manner". But see above n. 39.

[59] R/f kotyle Athens, New Akropolis Museum 1960-NAK222 (*Worshiping Women* [n. 49] cat. no. 121), ca. 350 BC. R/f squat lekythos Berlin, Antikensammlung 3248

8) worshipping Demeter;[60]

9) wedding ceremonies[61] (it can be doubted to what extant the wedding dances were rehearsed, for in most cases they were probably performed by the family and friends).

(*ARV²* 1482, 5; 1695; *ARFVcl* fig. 405; *BA* 230497), the 4th cent. BC. R/f hydria London, Br. Mus. E241 (*ARV²* 1482, 1; *CVA Great Britain* 8, *British Museum* 6, III.I.C, p. 8, pl. [371. 372] 96, 4; 97, 4; *LIMC* I [1981], Adonis 48b, pl. 170; *Worshiping Women* [n. 49] 246 fig. 3; Rosenzweig [n. 58] fig. 47; *BA* 230493), the 4th cent. BC. Ch. M. Edwards, "Aphrodite at a Ladder", *Hesperia* 53 (1984) 67–68, argues that Berlin 3248 and London E241 relate to the cult of Aphrodite Ourania and not Adonis. – Neils (n. 49) 245: "the festival never attained the status of a state cult". Isolated ecstatic dance is more probable here than a chorus performance.

[60] Plut. *Sol*. 8, 4–5: to imitate Athenian women worshipping Demeter, young soldiers must παίζειν καὶ χορεύειν. Arph. *Thesm*. 947–1000: it is emphasized in the text that the dance performed by the chorus is a ritual one (ἅπερ νόμος ἐνθάδε ταῖσι γυναιξίν etc.). B/f Siana cup London, Br. Mus. 1906.12-15.1 (*ABV* 90, 7; *CVA Great Britain* 2, *British Museum* 2, III He p. 4, pl. (68) 10.6A–B; *LIMC* IV, Demeter 417, pl. 595; *BA* 300834), the Burgon Group, 560–550 BC. See B. Ashmole, "Kalligeneia and Hieros Arotos", *JHS* 66 (1946) 8–10 with pl. 2–3; Simon (n. 58) 20–21; J. B. Connelly, *Portrait of a Priestess, Women and Ritual in Ancient Greece* (Princeton – Oxford 2007) pl. 10; p. 66 with fig. 3.2; M. Tiverios, "Women of Athens in the Worship of Demeter: Iconographic Evidence from Archaic and Classical Time", *Worshiping Women* (n. 49) 128–129 with fig. 4a.

[61] B/f lekythos New York, MM 56.11.1 (n. 66). R/f lebes Mykonos 970 (*ARV²* 261, 19; Ch. Dugas, *Exploration archéologique de Delos*. XXI. *Les vases attiques à figures rouges* (Paris 1952) 9–11, no. 12, pl. 7; *LIMC* II, Apollon 947, pl. 265; A. Kauffmann-Samaras, "Paroles et musique du marriage en Grèce. Sources écrits et images peintes", in: *Silence et fureur. La femme et le marriage en Gréce*. *Les antiquités grecques du Musèe Calvet, Avignon* [Paris 1996] 444; Bundrick [n. 37] 179–183, fig. 103; *BA* 202973), the Syriskos Painter, 470–450 BC (still interpreted as Apollo and the Muses or the Deliades by Beazley). R/f nuptial lebes stand Athens, Nat. Mus. 12894 (*BA* 9025012; Metzger [n. 42] 228–247, pl. XIII; *Worshiping Women* [n. 49] cat. no. 146), 370–360 BC (Metzger thinks it to be a ritual dance of Athenian hetaerae in honour of Aphrodite). R/f chous frr. Tübingen 1219 (C. Watzinger, *Griechische Vasen in Tübingen* [Reutlingen 1924] E 174, pl. 38; L. Séchan, *La danse grecque* antique [Paris 1930] 218 and pl. XII, 1; K. Schefold, *Untersuchungen zu den Kertscher Vasen* [Berlin – Leipzig 1934) no. 331, pl. 21; van Hoorn [n. 26] p. 189 no. 966; *CVA Deutschland* 52, *Tübingen* 4, pl. [2555] 38; *LIMC* IV [1988] pl. 302, Hélène 65; Kauffmann-Samaras, *op. cit.*, 444 n. 58; *BA* 11634), the Helen Painter, ca. 380 BC (still depicting dancing girls in kalathiskoi at the wedding of Menelaos may intend to lend a Laconian colour to the scene: E. Böhr, *CVA* p. 87; according to Metzger, *op. cit.*, 237, it is a cult dance worshipping Helen as a goddess). R/f nuptial lebes Athens, Nat. Mus. 1256 (*ARV²* 1506, 1; *BA* 230921; *Worshiping Women* [n. 49] cat. no. 145), name vase of the Painter of Athens 1256, ca. 340–320 BC. R/f loutrophoros frr. St Petersburg Гп 1881.168 (Schefold, *op. cit*., no. 284, pl. 50; Kauffmann-Samaras, *op. cit.*, 444 n. 58; *BA* 21460), the Painter of the Wedding Procession, 340–330 BC. Cf. Eur. *Tro*. 325–340 (cf. *IA* 1036–1037): there are no references to Athens, but Euripides will have reflected the rites familiar to himself and his audience.

Besides, there is evidence of vase-paintings representing maidens' choruses, which do not allow a definition of the occasion.[62]

So I believe that here we have an episode during a cult performance of a girl chorus. I would call what is being performed, a partheneion.

Since the girl moves towards the lyre, she is probably going to pick it up. Compare the χορωφελής youth *holding* a lyre: the Painter of Leningrad 702 who copied the inscription ΧΟΡΦΕΛΕΣ will have thought of his subject and his character as similar to that of the Dish painter. But the girl is moving in a dance – therefore the dance has begun; still the lyre does not sound yet. How can we explain this?

There is some evidence that the choruses, and especially partheneia, were accompanied both by stringed and by wind-instruments. Already in

---

[62] (1) B/f pyxis fr. Hamburg 1917.223 (*ABV* 90; *CVA Deutschland* 41, *Hamburg* 1, pp. 64–65, pl. [2013] 47, 5; *BA* 300836), the Burgon Groupe, ca. 550 BC.

(2) B/f lip cup, Tarquinia, Nat. Mus. RC 4194 (*CVA Italia* 26, *Tarquinia* 2, III.H, p. 3, pl. [1170] 21, 5. 6; *LIMC* VI [1992], Nereides 264, pl. 490; *BA* 397), 575–525 BC (interpreted as Nereids by J. D. Beazley, "Little-Master Cups", *JHS* 52 [1932] 178).

(3) R/f calyx-crater Rome, Villa Giulia 909 (A. Furtwängler, K. Reichhold [eds.], *Griechische Vasenmalerei. Auswahl hervorragender Vasen*. Serie I. Text [München 1904] 80–81; *ARV²* 618, 1; *CVA Italia* 2, *Mus. Naz. di Villa Giulia* 2, p. 12, pl. [60–61] 21–22; *BA* 207149; *ARFVcl* fig. 21), the Villa Giulia Painter, 460–450 BC.

(4) R/f astragalos-vase London, Br. Mus. E804 (*ARV²* 765, 20; *CVA Great Britain* 5, *British Museum* 4, III.Ic, p. 3, pl. [219, 220] 26, 1; 27, 1; *ARFVcl* fig. 105; M. Robertson, *The Art of Vase-painting in Classical Athens* [Cambridge 1992] 188–190, fig. 199–202; *BA* 209477), the Sotades Painter, 500–450 BC.

(5) White-ground phiale Boston, MFA 65.908 (Truitt [n. 53] 83–92; P. W. Lehmann, D. Spittle, *Samothrace. Excavations conducted by the Institute of Fine Arts of New York University.* 5. *The Temenos* [Princeton 1982] pl. 208; Connelly [n. 60] pl. 1; p. 29–31, fig. 2.1; Lewis [n. 44] 50 fig. 1.31; *BA* 4826), the Painter of London D 12, ca. 450 BC. P. Truitt connects it with the cult of Artemis.

(6) White-ground pyxis lid, once Basel, Art Market (Attische schwarzfigurige Vasen, Münzen und Medaillen A. G., Basel, Sonderliste G [November 1964] no. 49; Truitt, *op. cit.*, p. 90 fig. 22; *BA* 352012), workshop of the Haimon Painter, 525–475 BC.

(7) B/f pyxis lid Athens, Nat. Mus. 14909 (A. Dessenne, "Pyxis à figures noires du Musée National d'Athènes", *Revue archéologique* sér. 6, 36 [1950] 40–76; Lehmann, Spittle, *op. cit.*, pl. 209; *BA* 2660), ca. 440 BC.

(8–10) See below n. 66. 67. 70.

Women surrounding a Nike on the exterior of the cup in Palermo, inside of which there is a Nike and a youth with a lyre (Palermo 5514 [*ARV²* 918, 3; E. Paribeni et al., *La Collezione Casuccini, Ceramica Attica, Ceramica Etrusca, Ceramica Falisca* [Rome 1996] 76–78, fig. 49; *BA* 211156], the Painter of Bologna 417, 475–425 BC), are interpreted by Webster (n. 29) 169 as "a successful women's chorus for which the youth played the lyre", but they are rather the Muses: see Queyrel (n. 23).

Alcman[63] the chorus mentions both a citharist and an aulete, though it is not possible to conclude from the fragments, if they accompany the same song and whether they play together or in turn.[64]

A Protoattic hydria fragment depicts a chain of nine girls headed by an aulete and a citharist.[65]

A frieze on the shoulders of a lekythos by the Amasis Painter[66] shows nine girls in a circle chain dance, separated in threes by the handle of the vessel and by figures of sitting musicians, one playing an aulos and the other a chelys-lyre.

Stamnoi from the mid-fifth cent. BC (fig. 9a–b)[67] represent a row of girls processing or dancing in a stately manner, four on each side of the vessel. Thyrsoi and cups in their hands indicate a Dionysian rite. It is likely that here we have historical devotees of the god and not mythical companions of Dionysos, judging by the civilized and orderly mood of the scenes: the girls are calm and concentrated rather than ecstatic, they are imitating and not experiencing the ritual.[68] (Cf. Diod. Sic. 4, 3, 3: at the Dionysian feasts, whereas married women drive frenzy imitating maenads, the girls are supposed only to carry thyrsoi and to exclaim "εὖα".[69]) The girls play both an aulos and a barbiton, either on the same or on different sides of the stamnoi.

---

[63] ὅσσαι δὲ παῖδες ἁμέων / ἐντί, τὸν κιθαριστὰν / αἰνέοντι (fr. 38 Page = 20 Diehl = 66 Bergk); ἁμὶν δ' ὑπαυλησεῖ μέλος (fr. 37b Page = 21 Diehl = 78 Bergk).

[64] Cf. Pind. *Pyth*. 10, 38–39: παντᾷ δὲ χοροὶ παρθένων / λυρᾶν τε βοαὶ καναχαί τ' αὐλῶν δονέονται (by the Hyperboreans).

[65] Berlin, Antikensammlung A 1 (*CVA Deutschland* 2, *Berlin* 1, p. 9–10, pl. 1, 1–2; *BA* 1001701), 700–650 BC.

[66] B/f lekythos New York, MM 56.11.1 (*BA* 350478; Maas, Snyder [n. 3] 51 fig. 15 b; von Bothmer [n. 51] 182–184, cat. no. 47; Bundrick [n. 37] 181 fig. 105), the Amasis Painter, 560–530 BC. The scene is interpreted as a wedding dance by Lawler (n. 37) 116–117; Kauffmann-Samaras (n. 61) 444; M.H. Delavaud-Roux (n. 51) 91; Bundrick, *op. cit*., 182.

[67] St. Petersburg, Hermitage ГР-4517 (former Б-1588; St. 1714; Waldhauer 806; *ARV²* 620, 32; Peredolskaya *KAV* 182, pl. 122, 3–4; 123; *M&M* 22; *BA* 207186), the Villa Giulia Painter, ca. 460 BC. New York, MM 06.1021.178 (*ARV²* 1077, 1; 1682; *Worshiping Women* [n. 49] cat. no. 129; *BA* 214482), the Menelaos Painter, ca. 450 BC.

[68] Горбунова, Передольская (n. 5) 79–81; Peredolskaya, *KAV* 160; Chryssoulaki (n. 55) 273; V. Sapiranidi, *Worshiping Women* (n. 49) 282.

[69] διὸ καὶ παρὰ πολλαῖς τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων διὰ τριῶν ἐτῶν βακχεῖά τε γυναικῶν ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ ταῖς παρθένοις νόμιμον εἶναι θυρσοφορεῖν καὶ συνενθουσιάζειν εὐαζούσαις καὶ τιμώσαις τὸν θεόν· τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας κατὰ συστήματα θυσιάζειν τῷ θεῷ καὶ βακχεύειν καὶ καθόλου τὴν παρουσίαν ὑμνεῖν τοῦ Διονύσου, μιμουμένας τὰς ἱστορουμένας τὸ παλαιὸν παρεδρεύειν τῷ θεῷ μαινάδας.

On an Attic lekanis lid from the Hermitage (fig. 10)[70] five girls (each inscribed καλή) are dancing by an altar. Near the altar there are two musicians: the sitting auletris and the standing cithara-player; both are represented playing.

One can compare relief fragments from Samothrace, dating from ca. 340 BC, but carved in an archaizing manner, probably in order to underline the venerable antiquity of the represented rite:[71] three pieces depict female musicians among the rows of dancing girls, one playing a cithara, another an aulos and the third a tympanon.[72]

C. Calame notes that images of a chorus accompanied by both an aulete and a citharist are rare, and this combination occurs only in maidens' choruses and only in a processional context.[73]

There is also evidence of stringed and wind-instruments playing in turn. An Attic hydria by Polygnotos from Naples [74] seems, on the face of it, to have nothing in common with a partheneion: most probably, this is the training of dancers and acrobats entertaining at feasts (cf. Xen. *Symp*. 2, 1–2). Except an observing youth, all the figures are female: a sword-dancer with an auletris; an acrobat on a table; a girl dancing a pyrrhiche while another is playing krotala; finally, two girls, each with their own accompanist, are dancing in kalathiskoi. One of them (fig. 11) has taken a spectacular posture, appropriate for the end of a dance or for a short pause between its parts of different nature: she is kneeling slightly and stretching out her right hand. Her accompanist is holding the folded auloi in the left hand and a phorminx in the right. Probably she puts down the auloi and takes the phorminx, though it also may be that she holds the phorminx out to the dancer. For the most part of other representations of the dance

---

[70] Acc. no. П.1867–68.969 (*ОАК за 1869 год: Атлас* [СПб. 1870] pl. IV, no. 14 [a drawing]; *M&M* 27; *BA* 16209), 440–430 BC.

[71] Lehmann, Spittle (n. 62 [5]) 221. 244. 253.

[72] Samothrace 49.1043 A–B (Lehmann, Spittle [n. 62] p. 173–178 cat. no. F(S)1, fig. 147 and p. 256 fig. 210): cithara. Paris, Louvre MA698 (Lehmann, Spittle, *ibid.* p. 183–185 cat. no. F(S)10, fig. 157): tympanon. Paris, Louvre MA699 (Lehmann, Spittle, *ibid.* p. 185–187 cat. no. F(S)11, fig. 158): aulos.

[73] Calame (n. 51) 131–132; for examples he cites R. Crowhurst, *Representations of Performances of Choral Lyric on the Greek Monuments 800–350 B.C.* Diss., typescript (London 1963) [non vidi], who manages to adduce only four such cases.

[74] Naples 3232 (*Griechische Vasenmalerei. Auswahl hervorragender Vasenbilder*, hg. von A. Furtwängler, F. Hauser, C. Reichhold, nach deren Tode fortgeführt von E. Buschor, C. Watzinger, R. Zahn. Serie III. *Text* [München 1932] pl. 171; p. 319–324, fig. 151–154; *ARV²* 1032, 61; Schäfer [n. 39] 77; S. B. Matheson, *Polygnotos and Vase Painting in Classical Athens* [Madison 1995] 23–25, pl. 14 A–D; S. Lewis [n. 44] 34 fig. 1.18; *BA* 213444), ca. 450 BC.

in kalathiskoi, there are good reasons to connect it with cult,[75] though there is at least one more evidently convivial image.[76] Even becoming secular instead of (or alongside with) sacral, this dance probably retained its typical features, including perhaps the nature of accompaniment: an aulos took turns with a stringed instrument.

According to J.A. Haldane, in cult practice a stringed instrument was often added to an aulos when dance and song were part of a ceremony. Though it could be insufficient for the heavier type of procession, it suited well the graceful advance of a dancing group to an altar. In particular, in partheneion, that is, maidens' dance-hymn, an aulos could accompany livelier, more boisterous type of dance, and a cithara would enter in those parts, where the song was the more important element.[77]

Besides we have evidence by Proklos cited by Photios:[78] a prosodion was sung while approaching the altar and was accompanied by an aulos, whereas the main hymn was sung while standing and to the cithara accompaniment. Haldane disputes the validity of such a generalization, giving some examples of singing the main hymn to the aulos accompaniment,[79] but it can hardly be doubted that the practice described by Proklos did take place at least sometimes.

Thus, I suppose that the Dish Painter could depict a transitional point of the performance of a maidens' chorus: one of the girls is finishing, together with her companions, a dance accompanied by an aulos and is hurrying to pick up the lyre which has been placed near at hand in advance, so that she did not need to make a pause before accompanying the second part of the performance. It is hard to say, if she is going to continue her dance, though the possibility of combining dancing and playing a chelys-

---

[75] See above, n. 42. Athenian r/f oinochoe Moscow II 1b 987 (*CVA Russia* 6, *Moscow* 6, 39–40, pl. [279] 34, 1–3; *BA* 9008443), 375–350 BC: two girls in chitoniskoi and kalathiskoi at a tripod on column, two thuribles. According to K.V. Müller, *Der Polos: die griechische Götterkrone*. Diss. (Berlin 1915) 20, a polos, of which a kalathiskos is a variety, is a gods' crown, which could be worn by mortals only for cult occasions.

[76] Lucanian r/f bell-crater St. Petersburg, Hermitage Б-1667 (St. 1778; Waldhauer 781; Cook [n. 42] 1000 f., fig. 811; *CVA Russia* 8, *St Petersburg* 1, 1, 22–23, pl. (392, 393) 26, 1; 27, 1–2; *BA* 9018452), the Creusa Painter, 400–380 BC: a reclining youth and a female kalathiskos dancer at a kottabos stand. Besides see N.M. Contoléon, "Monuments a décoration gravée du Musée de Chios. I. Stèle des danseuses", *BCH* 71/72 (1947/48) 281–285.

[77] J.A. Haldane, "Musical Instruments in Greek Worship", *Greece and Rome* 13 (1966): 1, 100. 102. 104.

[78] Phot. *Bibl*., Cod. 239 Bekker, 320 a 18–20: ἐν τῷ προσιέναι ᾄδετο [sc. τὸ προσόδιον] πρὸς αὐλόν· ὁ δὲ κυρίως ὕμνος πρὸς κιθάραν ᾄδετο ἑστώτων.

[79] Haldane (n. 77) 102.

lyre (or a barbiton, still not a cithara) is attested: dancing Apollo in Homeric Hymn 3, 201 sqq.; Theseus in Callimach. *Hymn*. 4, 312–313; young Sophocles celebrating the victory at Salamine in Athen. 1, 20 e–f and *Vit. Soph*. 3; representations in vase-painting.[80] There are also no grounds to decide if she is the leader of a chorus, either in both or only in the second part of the performance.

I admit that an epithet χορωφελής can signify nothing more than a compliment to the characters represented, such as καλή repeated several times on a lekanis lid Π.1867–68.969 from the Hermitage (fig. 10). Still we should weigh another possibility. The meaning of the adjective ΧΟΡΦΕΛΕΣ is not restrictive: it suits both men and women, both the singing and dancing members of a chorus and the musicians accompanying them, and even musical instruments. Such a designation is hardly an invention of vase-painters. However its absence in all the other sources proves that the word χορωφελής did not become a generally accepted term in Greece. Perhaps in Athens in the fifth century BC this word was mainly applied to the members of a chorus who combined dancing and playing an instrument. The same meaning suits Aristophanes (*Lys*. 1319, 411 BC: κρότον δ᾽ ἁμᾶ ποίη χορωφελήταν): the Spartan calls on his women compatriots, who are glorifying their gods with a hymn and a dance, to clasp hands, which is partly the dance itself and partly its sound accompaniment. A substantive is preferred to an adjective either because of a modification of a known term in a poetic text,[81] or because χορωφελήτης was currently used alongside with χορωφελής.

Let us now return to the other images depicting a lyre on the ground.

As for isolated figures of youths on added red-figure choes, it is possible to treat them in the same vein, as chorus-members going to pick up the lyre. But we need not invent a complicated explanation for them, because a lyre is a typical attribute of a schoolboy in vase-painting,[82] and a youth could take it wherever he went. The setting of Utrecht ARCH-23 (fig. 4) is a palaestra, as is indicated by a sponge, a strigil and an aryballos. School competitions, including ἀγῶνες μουσικοί, probably did take place in

[80] E. g., b/f neck-amphora Paris Louvre E861 (*CVA France* 1, *Louvre* 1, III H d 6, pl. [36] 6; 12; Maas, Snyder [n. 3] 51, fig. 15c; *BA* 350214), the Omaha Painter, 600–550 BC; lebes stand Athens 12894 (n. 61); cyathos St Petersburg, Hermitage Б-4507 (Peredolskaya, *KAV* no. 11 pl. 8, 3), the Painter of Berlin 2268, ca. 515–510 BC.

[81] Cf. Pind. *Pyth*. 12, 23 κεφαλᾶν πολλᾶν νόμον instead of νόμον πολυκέφαλον: Н. А. Алмазова, “К характеристике инструментального нома” (N. Almazova, “Instrumental Nomos: Some Considerations”), *Hyperboreus* 7 (2001) 80–90.

[82] Maas, Snyder (n. 3) 87–89.

a palaestra,[83] but it is also probable that the character has just finished his exercises and goes now to take his lyre placed aside.[84] Merry-making at the Anthesteria provided enough occasions for music and dancing,[85] so the subject of Oxford 1945.45 (fig. 3) can be a chorus dance (note the glance of the youth directed backwards), but as well just an improvised outburst of joy: an unaccompanied dance, the hasty snatching of a lyre, and even running or racing, while the lyre is temporarily put aside.

As for the images of satyrs, also in this case general musicality of satyrs and in particular their connection with lyres[86] is enough for interpreting these scenes, whereas dancing is one of their most important occupations.[87] On the other hand, striking likeness between the images of the boys and of the satyrs suggests that mythical creatures could be substituted for human beings in typical Anthesteria scenes. Indeed we find some cases where Erotes and satyrs[88] evidently take the place of boys. (The same likeness, as well as lack of evidence for public dramatic performances at the Anthesteria in the fifth century,[89] prevents me from taking these images as illustrating a satyr play, dedicated for instance to the invention of a lyre.[90])

The scene on a chous from New York Market (fig. 8) may be a rehearsed performance, judging by the garments of both the dancer[91] and the singer.[92] It is tempting to suppose that the lyre is prepared for the second part of the chorus dance here. But we must acknowledge that the aulete is missing, though space would have been enough for depicting

---

[83] See above n. 41.

[84] Perhaps he is about to take part in a revel at the Anthesteria, cf. similar figures beside a still-life of aryballos, sponge and strigil: van Hoorn (n. 26) p. 167, no. 810, fig. 427 (youth holding mantle and lyre, interpreted as a komast by van Hoorn); p. 153, no. 707, fig. 110 (wreathed youth with a barbiton and a chous tied to it), see van Hoorn p. 32–33.

[85] See van Hoorn (n. 26) 36–39 and fig. 18. 96. 99. 109. 110. 154. 155–163. 171. 172. 180. 184. 186. 187. 195. 196. 200. 243. 244. 502.

[86] Maas, Snyder (n. 3) 38; 82 (cf. 56: cithara).

[87] B. Seidensticker, "Dance in Satyr Play", in: O. Taplin, R. Wyles (eds.), *The Pronomos Vase and its Context* (Oxford 2010) 213.

[88] Van Hoorn (n. 26) fig. 364. 367. 369. 372. 426 (Erotes); fig. 1. 2. 210. 211. 310. 365. 404. 430. 431 (satyrs). See also Deubner (n. 32) 245–247.

[89] Pickard-Cambridge (n. 17) 15–16.

[90] Cf. Deubner (n. 32) 247: on the chous Gela 73 "scheint ein Satyr erstaunt über den Fund einer Leier".

[91] Compare the embroidered garments of the dancers: above n. 41 (3) and below n. 93. On dancers wearing an ependytes, see Miller (n. 7) 181.

[92] E. g. the singer is always draped at the aulodic contests, see N. Almazova, "On the Meaning of αὐλῳδία, αὐλῳδός", *Hyperboreus* 14 (2008): 2, fig. 1–24.

him, and so the singing seems unaccompanied. There are no safe grounds to understand the two figures as a reduced image of singing and dancing semichoruses: compare the detailed scenes on the choes from London and Paris (fig. 12–13),[93] with single dancers surrounded by spectators, including even a slave with a bag. Several other scenes on choes depict dancing at the Anthesteria, some of them more likely a komos dance,[94] while two others (see n. 93) produce the same impression of a prepared performance, due to the hair-dress and the patterned clothes of the dancers. Yet, as regards the accompaniment, both representations are somewhat puzzling: on London E531 we have two lyres instead of one, but, it seems, neither of the youths is actually playing it, and on Paris CA21 there is no accompaniment at all. These images can be interpreted as school or domestic musical performances and contests appropriate for a children festival.[95] Dancing and singing without an instrumental accompaniment is unusual, but we can think of an indulgence making the task easier for schoolchildren.[96] Probably some of the two characters on a chous from New York Market is going to demonstrate his skill in lyre-playing later.

The examined images show that the intended purpose of depicting a lyre on the ground need not be always the same: we may deal with any case generally known from iconography of a chelys-lyre. But an explanation is always possible, which does not suggest that the instrument played by no one is implied to signify music accompanying the scene. In the Classical period, the symbolic meaning of a lyre, if any, seems still inseparable from its actual use.

Nina Almazova
nialm@inbox.ru
St Petersburg State University;
Bibliotheca classica Petropolitana

---

[93] London, Br. Mus. E531 (van Hoorn [n. 26] p. 143 no. 635, fig. 18; *BA* 15891), ca. 420–410 BC. Paris, Louvre CA21 (above n. 41).

[94] Van Hoorn (n. 26) p. 106 no. 337, fig. 171; p. 159 no. 754, fig. 172. The dancers are naked; the accompanying instrument is a lyre.

[95] Cf. H. Rühfel, *Kinderleben im klassischen Athen. Bilder auf klassischen Vasen* (Mainz 1984) 197 n. 173: "Private Wettstreite, die die Griechen sehr liebten, werden von innen auch an diesem Tag durchgeführt worden sein".

[96] Compare a scene of school competitions on a pyxis Vienna IV 1870 (*ABV* 671; *BA* 306451; Almazova [n. 92] fig. 6), ca. 520 BC: unlike the common practice, singing and lyre accompaniment are distributed between two youths.

Abbreviations:

ARV[2]	J. D. Beazley, *Attic Red-figure Vase-painters* (Oxford [2]1963)
ARFVcl	J. Boardman, *Athenian Red Figure Vases. The Classical Period* (London 1989, repr. 2001)
BA	*Beazley Archive Databases* (http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/databases/pottery.htm)
M&M	*Музы и маски. Театр и музыка в античности. Античный мир на петербургской сцене. Каталог выставки* [*Muses and Masks. Theatre and Music in Antiquity. Catalogue of Exhibition*] (St Petersburg 2005)
ОАК	*Отчет Императорской археологической комиссии* (*Compte-rendu de la Commission Impériale Archéologique*)
Peredolskaya, *KAV*	*Краснофигурные аттические вазы в Эрмитаже. Каталог*. [*Red-figure Attic Vases from the Hermitage. Catalogue*] Сост. А. А. Передольская (Leningrad 1967)
St.	L. Stephani, *Die Vasensammlung der Kaiserlichen Ermitage* (St Petersburg 1869)
Waldhauer	О. Вальдгауэр, *Императорский Эрмитаж. Краткое описание собрания античных расписных ваз [Antique Painted Vases in the Hermitage: A Short Description]* (St Petersburg 1914)

На аттической чаше без ручек (470–460 г. до н. э., см. прим. 1) танцующая девушка приближается к лежащей на земле лире. Надпись ΧΟΡΦΕΛΕΣ над лирой Л. Стефани интерпретирует как χορ<ω>φελής. То же слово (опять без О) встречается на амфоре (450–425 г. до н. э., см. прим. 13) с изображением юноши с лирой в руке. Надпись “полезный/-ая хору” позволяет заключить, что в обоих случаях перед нами участники хорового выступления. Хор девушек в Афинах, как представляется, мог выступать только в религиозной церемонии (в статье собраны известные случаи участия в аттических культах танцующих и музицирующих женщин).

Лира на земле в сценах под открытым небом (см. прим. 28; 31–33) служит эквивалентом лире, висящей на стене. Инструмент, на котором никто не играет, не мыслился как издающий звуки. Т. обр., в сцене на чаше, хотя танец уже начался, лира еще не зазвучала.

Ряд литературных (Alcman. fr. 37b, 38 Page; Pind. *Pyth*. 10, 38–39; Phot. *Bibl*. Cod. 239 Bekker, 320a 18–20) и иконографических (см. прим. 65–67, 70, 72, 74) свидетельств показывают, что хорам, и в частности девичьим, аккомпанировали как духовые, так и струнные инструменты – возможно, чередуясь. Можно предположить, что на чаше изображен переходный момент: заканчивая танец в сопровождении авла, одна из девушек торопится взять заранее положенную поблизости лиру, чтобы аккомпанировать на ней второй части выступления.

Для нескольких хусов с изображением лиры на земле подле бегущих и/или танцующих фигур интерпретация, связанная с выступлением хора, не исключена, но в ней нет необходимости: лира – обычный атрибут юношей и сатиров, чем бы они ни занимались, и скорее всего перед нами непосредственные проявления праздничного веселья или сцены школьных состязаний. Лиру на земле в вазовой живописи нельзя объяснить одинаково во всех случаях. Однако всегда возможна интерпретация, не предполагающая, что инструмент звучит. Если для лиры в искусстве классической эпохи и можно постулировать какое-либо "символическое" значение, оно еще неотделимо от ее реального применения.

On an Attic stemmed plate a dancing girl approaches a chelys-lyre that lies on the ground, whereas the inscription ΧΟΡΦΕΛΕΣ indicates a chorus performance. In Classical Athens, a maidens' chorus seems only thinkable on religious occasions (the paper lists known cases of Athenian women dancing and singing at the cult ceremonies).

Lyres lying on the ground (in outdoor scenes), as well as instruments hanging on the wall, cannot be interpreted as producing sounds. Therefore in the image under consideration, although the dance has already begun, the lyre does not sound yet – and this needs an explanation. There is evidence that the choruses were accompanied both by stringed and wind-instruments, sometimes in turns. Therefore I suggest that the girl is finishing a dance while being accompanied by an aulos and is hurrying to pick up the lyre to accompany the second part of the performance.

For a number of choes with a lyre on the ground and dancing or running figures nearby the same interpretation is possible, but it is not necessary, since we can interpret them as simple merry-making or as school competitions. The intended purpose of depicting a lyre on the ground may be various, but an explanation, which does not suggest that an instrument played by no one implies the music that accompanies the scene, is always possible. In the Classical period, symbolic meaning of a lyre is still inseparable from its actual use.

WHAT IS *POLYKOIRANIE*? ARISTOTLE AND ARISTARCHUS ON *IL.* 2, 204

1. The famous speech of *Iliad* 2 through which Odysseus, inspired by Athena and holding Agamemnon's sceptre, deters the Greek army from a disorderly flight, consists of two parts. In the first one (ll. 190–197) the Ithacan hero addresses his peers (l. 188 ὅν τινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κιχείη), urging them to an appropriate behaviour in order to prevent Agamemnon's wrath; in the second one (ll. 200–206), he addresses the private soldiers (l. 198 ὃν δ' αὖ δήμου ἄνδρα ἴδοι), recommending the advantages of obedience to one single ruler (l. 204 οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω).

The balance and imbalance of these two allocutions have been variously judged by modern critics: present-day consensus considers their combination as an ultimately convincing and consistent attempt at restoring Agamemnon's authority, carried out with a certain degree of rhetorical licence.[1] This opinion, however, was not shared by Aristarchus, who athetised ll. 193–197 as not adequately protreptic towards self-restraint (οὐ προτρεπτικοὶ εἰς καταστολήν: *schol*. AbT *Il*. 2, 193a)[2] and also – we are told by Aristonicus' *schol*. A(T) *Il.* 2, 192 a – suggested to transpose *ll*. 203–205 after the surviving l. 192:

> οὐ γάρ πω σάφα οἶσθ': τὸ ἀντίσιγμα, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦτον ἔδει τετάχθαι τοὺς ἑξῆς παρεστιγμένους τρεῖς στίχους [*scil.* 203–205]: εἰσὶ γὰρ πρὸς βασιλεῖς ἁρμόζοντες, οὐ πρὸς δημότας· "οὐ μέν πως πάντες βασιλεύσομεν ἐνθάδ' Ἀχαιοί· / οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη" καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς.[3]

---

[1] C. Brügger, M. Stoevesandt, E. Visser, J. Latacz, *Homers Ilias. Gesamtkommentar* II/2 (München – Leipzig 2003) 63–68; D. Hammer, *The Iliad as Politics* (Norman, Oklahoma 2002) 88; G. S. Kirk, *The Iliad. A Commentary* I (Cambridge 1985) 136. See also below p. 76.

[2] For speculation on why Socrates omitted the lines in Xen. *Mem*. 1, 2, 58 see below n. 33.

[3] On the critical signs accompanying lines 192 and 203–205 in ms. Venetus A see A. Ludwich, *Aristarchs Homerische Textkritik* I (Lipsiae 1884) 209 and H. Erbse's notes on the two Aristonicus scholia that anticipate and then pick up Aristarchus' proposal: *schol*. A *Il.* 2, 188 a: πρὸς τὴν τάξιν τῶν ἑξῆς τὸ ἀντίσιγμα, and *schol*. A *Il.* 2, 203 a

> *You do not yet know clearly [what is the mind of the son of Atreus]*: (this lined is marked with) the antisigma, because it should be followed by the three lines that below are marked by *stigmai* [i. e. 203–205]: for these lines are suitable for kings, not for privates: "we Achaeans shall not all be kings here: a multiplicity of rulers is no good" etc.

Aristarchus' textual choice, by virtue of which Odysseus would not qualify Agamemnon (l. 192) as a stern and irascible leader (ll. 195–196) but rather declare the leader's and his own support for monarchic regimes (l. 204), has met with wide disagreement in modern times: "a not very convincing remark" according to Leaf,[4] even "Aristarchus at his weakest and most subjective" in the words of Geoffrey Kirk,[5] who detected here an extreme product of the rationalising fashion so typical of Alexandrian criticism. As a matter of fact, already the *schol*. bT (ex.) *Il.* 2, 203 b singled out a good explanation for leaving the peculiar order of Odysseus' arguments untouched:

> οὐ μέν πως πάντες βασιλεύσομεν: οὐκ ἔσται δημοκρατία, φησίν. εἰ δὲ τοῖς μείζοσι ταῦτα ἔλεγεν, ἐξῆπτε τὴν στάσιν, σπουδαρχιδῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν τοσούτῳ θορύβῳ καθαπτόμενος.
>
> *We shall not all reign*: it will not be a democracy, he says. If he had spoken thus to the powerful, he would have stirred dissension, attacking ambitious men in such a tumultuous situation,

which is by and large Leaf's view. Whereas the reference to δημοκρατία might be a peculiar heritage of Aristotle's speculation (as we shall see in a minute), the idea that Odysseus employs the πρέπουσα παρρησία for each of the groups he sets out to persuade is espoused by Ps.-Plut. *De Hom*. 166, 3–4,[6] and seems to be implied already by Xenophon (*Mem*. 1, 2, 58–59; see also Max. Tyr. *Diss*. 26, 5 for the comparison on this ground between Socrates and Odysseus).

τούτῳ καὶ τοῖς μετ᾽ αὐτὸν δύο ἡ στιγμὴ παράκειται. It is clear that Aristarchus did not accept in his text *Il.* 2, 206 (see Erbse's note ad *schol. Il.* 2, 205), a poorly witnessed line that even modern editors (including M. L. West) normally excise from the text.

[4] W. Leaf (ed.), *The Iliad* I (London 1900 [repr. Amsterdam 1971]) 62 who believes that ll. 203–205 "gain in rhetorical significance if addressed to the multitude, to whom they can cause no offence". More extensively on the subject of Odysseus' clever adaptation of his speech to the audience, A. J. Karp, "Homeric Origins of Ancient Rhetoric", *Arethusa* 10 (1977) 244–247.

[5] Kirk (n. 1) 135.

[6] M. Hillgruber, *Die pseudo-plutarchische Schrift* De Homero II (Stuttgart–Leipzig 1999) 258–259.

Yet Aristarchus' main argument, taken at face value regardless of the overall rhetorical strategy pursued by Homer (through his character), is not absurd: why should Odysseus remind a group of simple privates the principles presiding over the sphere of political power, to which they will never have direct access (democracy remaining, even in *Iliad* II, conspicuously remote from Homer's political horizon)?

Ancient Homeric critics unanimously identified as monarchy the regime praised by *Iliad* 2, 204 οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη, εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω.[7] Modern interpreters are more sceptical, and view the line less as a celebration of autocracy (the Homeric βασιλεύς being only a *primus inter pares*) than as an "Aufruf zur (milit.) Disziplin", an exhortation to obey to one only commander-in-chief.[8] But – to address the real object of our inquiry – which is the negative or polemical pole implied by Odysseus' words, i. e. what exactly is πολυκοιρανίη? Is it just anarchy? The context of the passage in book II and Homeric ideology *tout court* point to the rule ot the few, oligarchy, a regime where power belongs to few aristocrats or high military leaders ("die 'Vielenherrschaft' mehrerer Adliger")[9] as opposed to a superior leader, as Eustathius of Thessalonica beautifully documented already many centuries ago;[10] this is also the dominant interpretation in ancient authors (especially when the Roman imperial ideal sets in),[11] and *Il.* 2, 200–205 can even interfere with other Homeric contexts where the ὁμόνοια among *principes* is at stake.[12]

---

[7] See e. g. Ps.-Plut. *De Hom.* 182, but the same idea underlies of course Philodemus' *De bono rege secundum Homerum* and Dio Chrysostom's *Orr*. 1–4: see Hillgruber (n. 6) 289–290, and esp. Dio Chr. *Or*. 3, 46. Cp. also Phil. *Leg. ad Cai.* 149.

[8] Brügger et alii (n. 1) 67; K. A. Raaflaub, "Homeric Society", in: I. Morris, B. Powell (eds.), *A New Companion to Homer* (Leiden – New York – Köln 1997) 663–665; P. G. Katzung, *Die Diapeira in der Iliashandlung* (diss. Frankfurt am Main 1960) 61–63. The idea of primacy in military rule also occurs in *schol. D Il.* 2, 204.

[9] Chr. Meier, "Macht und Herrschaft in der Antike", in: O. Brunner, R. Koselleck (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* III (Stuttgart 1972) 822.

[10] His commentary on these lines (*in Il.* 202, 12–34) is – as often – remarkably detailed, and spots an attack on democracy in l. 203 (οὐ μέν πως πάντες βασιλεύσομεν ἐνθάδ' Ἀχαιοί: see above the *schol. Il.* 2, 203 b) and one on aristocracy in l. 204.

[11] See e. g. Dio Chr. *Or*. 3, 45–46; Suet. *Calig.* 22, 2 (with negative overtones in depicting the despot) and *Domit.* 12, 7; Io. Lyd. *De mag.* 2, 7 (and 1, 36 on dictatorship); see also in particular the reference to aristocratic conspiracies in Corn. Nep. *Dion* 10, 6, 4 (a passage that earned our *gnome* its way into Erasmus' *Adagia* II, 7, 7) and – most famously – in Arius Didymus' parodical neologism πολυκαισαρίη, coined as a *caveat* against Caesarion's survival (Plut. *Anton*. 81, 5, later subsumed by C. Cavafy at the end of his poem *Caesarion*).

[12] The ἐν πολέμῳ of *Il.* 2, 202 creeps in the quotation of *Od.* 3, 127–129 (as a substitute for the correct εἰν ἀγορῇ in l. 128) in Ps.-Plut. *De Hom*. 145, 6 and

But the approach to this line rings on a different note in Aristotle: the purpose of this paper is to suggest that the controversy over the real purport of l. 204 may not be Aristarchus' own fanciful invention, and may somehow be related to a Peripatetic stance on the issue.

2. The line appears twice in Aristotle's works: we shall leave aside the most famous occurrence, at the end of *Metaphysics* Λ (1076 a 3–4),[13] where it metaphorically represents the natural tendency of all beings to be governed by a unitary principle – this passage contributed to the line's popularity in later centuries, both among philosophers[14] and in a Christian perspective, as soon as the invoked absolute κοίρανος becomes identical with God.[15]

Aristotle's other quotation of this line involves its programmatic value in the narrower terms of political doctrine – a self-evident fact,[16] which led someone, at some (probably very late) stage in history, to associate tentatively ll. 203–205, suspected by Aristarchus as we have seen, with the tyrant Pisistratus, the alleged author of an epoch-making *recensio Homerica*.[17] Be that as it may, Aristotle is the first to work a reference

---

Philod. *Bon. reg. sec. Hom*. XXIX, 26–30 Dorandi (hence probably in their common source). – I shall not consider here the occurrence of πολυκοιρανίη in Rhian. fr. 1, 10 Powell, where the term, albeit preserving a negative flavour, indicates the "rule over many" as opposed to the "rule by many" (see N. Hopkinson, *A Hellenistic Anthology* [Cambridge 1988] 228).

[13] See M. Sanz Morales, *El Homero de Aristóteles* (Amsterdam 1994) 156–157.

[14] Max. Tyr. *Diss*. 27, 7 and 33, 3; see also, with religious overtones, *schol*. bT [ex.] *Il.* 2, 205 a, and, interestingly, Boeth. *Cons. phil.* 1, prose 5.

[15] The process starts in Hebrew quarters (Phil. Jud. *Conf. ling*. 170) and soon becomes a commonplace in Christian authors: Tat. *Or. ad Gr*. 14, 1; Ps.-Just. *Coh. ad Gr*. 17, 2; Epiphan. *Ancor*. 104, 3; Eus. *Mart. Pal.* 1, 1 (Procopius' words during his martyrdom); Cyrill. *In Iul.* 7 (*PG* 76. 848 D); Theodoret. *Gr. aff. cur*. 3, 2. See N. Zeegers-Vander Vorst, *Les citations des poètes grecs chez les apologistes chrétiens du IIe siècle* (Louvain 1972) 230–232 (for a fuller list) and 237–239. I am indebted to Margherita Fantoli (Pisa).

[16] See *schol*. b T (ex.) *Il.* 2, 204 δογματίζει δὲ περὶ πολιτειῶν. And *Il.* 2, 204–205 open the section Περὶ μοναρχίας of Stobaeus' *Anthologion* (4, 6, 1).

[17] We owe this information – whose sources and reliability are open to all sorts of doubts – not to a scholium in ms. Venetus A, but solely to a note penned by the humanist Vettore Fausto in his copy of the *editio princeps* of the *Iliad* (now ms. Marc. gr. IX, 35: c. B iv recto): Ν ὁ Φ (the annotator's usual abbreviation for his own name Νικήτας ὁ Φαῦστος) ἔλεγεν ὅτι ταῦτα καλῶς εἰ ὡς ἀπὸ Πεισιστράτου: see H. Erbse, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem* I (Berolini 1969) 225; Guil. (Wilh.) Dindorf, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem ex codicibus aucta et emendata* I (Oxonii 1885) xxiv–xxvi; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Homerische Untersuchungen* (Berlin 1884) 260. On Fausto, his books, his studies and his handwriting, see in particular F. Vendruscolo,

to l. 204 in a systematic treatment of political regimes, namely *Politics* 4, 4, at the heart of an elaborate discussion about the various forms of democracy and its degeneration, demagogy (1292 a 7–15):[18]

> ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσιν ἐν προεδρίᾳ· ὅπου δ᾽ οἱ νόμοι μή εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. Μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοί εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες. Ὅμηρος δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἕκαστος, ἄδηλον.
>
> For in cities under democratic rule guided by law no demagogue can arise, but the best of citizens attain the foremost positions; wherever the laws are not sovereign, on the other hand, demagogues arise. For the populace becomes a monarch, a composite one made of many, since the many are not sovereign individually, but collectively. Which πολυκοιρανίη Homer presents as "no good", whether this one or the regime where there are several individual rulers, remains unclear.

Books 4–6 of the *Politics* contain an "empirical" analysis of existing constitutions which despite its Platonic flavour in terms of methodology has often led scholars to assume that they were composed after the more theoretical and "idealistic" books 7–8.[19] In particular, in our passage –

"Dall'ignoto Falconio all'immortal Fausto", *AION (filol.)* 27 (2005) 37–50, who also suggests a link between his Homeric studies and the teaching of Marcus Musurus (see the notes on c. V ii verso – c. V vii recto of Marc. gr. IX, 35).

[18] On the forms of constitution see e. g. E. Schütrumpf (– H. J. Gehrke), *Aristoteles. Politik. Buch IV–VI* (Darmstadt 1996) 130–140; M. H. Hansen, "Aristotle's Alternative to the Sixfold Model of Constitutions", in M. Piérart (ed.), *Aristote et Athènes* (Paris 1993) 91–101; Chr. Eucken, "Der aristotelische Demokratiebegriff und sein historisches Umfeld", in G. Patzig (ed.), *Aristoteles' "Politik"* (Göttingen 1990) 277–291; R. Mulgan, *Aristotle's Political Theory* (Oxford [2]1987); A. Rosenberg, "Aristoteles über Diktatur und Demokratie", *RhM* 82 (1933) 339–361.

[19] See E. Schütrumpf (transl., comm.), *Aristoteles. Politik. Buch VII–VIII* (Berlin 2005) 139–170; J. Roberts, *Aristotle and the* Politics (Abingdon – New York 2009) 105–130; M. P. Nichols, *Citizens and Statesmen* (Savage 1992) 90–100. On the structure and dating see also some of the papers collected in *La "Politique" d'Aristote*, Entretiens Fondation Hardt 11 (Vandoeuvres – Genève 1965; see especially R. Stark, "Der Gesamtaufbau der aristotelischen *Politik*", 3–51 [with discussion], somehow tuning down the rigid analytical approach of Werner Jaeger); an updated overview in D. Keyt, F. D. Miller Jr. (eds.), *A Companion to Aristotle's Politics* (Oxford – Cambridge 1991) 2–5 (book 5 has a reference to the assassination of Philip II in 336, see 5, 10, 1131 b 1–3).

rounding off an "astonishingly umethodical chapter"[20] – the philosopher analyses the fifth and last form of democracy, where the common people rule and not the law: he is describing a sort of assembleary regime where popular leaders flatter the mob and appeal to its passions, thus giving way to something much akin to a collective tyranny of the populace (conceived as one block: this is demagogy, or the monarchy of the mob).[21]

Aristotle's "philological" doubt concerns the real purport of *Il.* 2, 204, whether namely this line is directed by Homer against the demagogy just described or against a regime where power is held by a multiplicity of distinct (and distinguished) individuals *ut singuli*.[22] Which regime Aristotle is exactly alluding to here, is partly unclear: Eckhart Schütrumpf, the latest commentator, states openly that this is a reference to the aforementioned, milder and better form of democracy, where the law reigns and the βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν are in power (1292 a 8).

First of all, let us examine this *iunctura*: according to Newman, the βέλτιστοι correspond to "the upper class of citizens", rather than to ethically superior members of the *polis*:[23] in the cities κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατούμεναι, these are the only citizens who have access to office. This is a central issue: the main difference between the first four types of democracies (see esp. the third and fourth ones in *Pol.* 4, 1292 a 1–4) consists in the share of the *demos* having access to public office.[24] Aristotle praises and recommends a "Mischverfassung" based on democracy, provided "die Bekleidung der Ämter den Besten, die aus den höchsten

[20] R. Robinson (transl., comm.), *Aristotle. Politics Books III and IV* (Oxford 1995) 81. But see a different evaluation in E. Schütrumpf, *Die Analyse der Polis durch Aristoteles* (Amsterdam 1980) 90–108.

[21] See e. g. A. Rosler, *Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle* (Oxford 2005) 241; M. Davies, *The Politics of Philosophy* (Lanham 1996) 80–81; E. Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford 1946) 167–169. On the complicated and hotly debated issue of the relationship of this constitution with Athens' historical democratic regimes see Schütrumpf (n. 18) 298–305 and 155–163.

[22] J. Tricot (transl.), *Aristote*, *La Politique* I (Paris 1962) 279 n. 3. As the anonymous referee kindly points out to me, the ἄδηλον formula is not unknown to Aristotle when he discusses different philosophical interpretations of poetic works (see e. g. *Metaph*. 984 a 2; sim. 1000 a 9–23).

[23] W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle* IV (Oxford 1902 [repr. 1950]) 179, with many examples of this meaning in Hellenistic and later authors. In *Pol.* 1301 b 1–4 the "well born" citizens are nearly, but not entirely equated with the morally excellent: see J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton 1989) 249–250.

[24] See Newman (n. 23) xxxvi and xxxvii ("eligibility to the most important offices is confined to those who possess the requisite property-qualification, which increases with the importance of the office, or… to those who are capable of filling them").

Vermögensklassen stammen, überlassen *ist*":[25] it is thus clear that a good democracy necessarily embraces some elements of aristocratic/oligarchic nature, for even if the Stagirite does not regard exclusion from office for a more or less wide part of the *demos* as an obstacle towards the definition of a democratic regime,[26] it is nonetheless true that such a division of power (high offices to the notables, passive rights to the *demos*) appears in *Politics* 5 as the hallmark of a mixed constitution between δημοκρατία and ἀριστοκρατία (5, 8, 1308 b 38 – 1309 a 9) – and the same is true for the praise of "agricultural democracy" in book 6 (6, 4, 1318 b 6 – 1319 b 1).[27]

Let us now come back to the sentence of *Politics* 4, 4 concerning *Il.* 2, 204: it is clear that Aristotle's first alternative refers the line to degenerate democracy, to the anarchic mob that controls affairs, an interpretation which surfaces again in his pupil Theophrastus.[28] In modern times, Marxist critics have read the unfortunate appearance of Thersites shortly after Odysseus' speech precisely in this key, considering Thersites as a "proto-demagogue" or as a forerunner of democratic stances;[29] but in fact the Thersites episode enacts the humbling of the unruly military leader rather than the disparagement of the mob.[30]

Now to Aristotle's second alternative: according to Schütrumpf, as we said, the wording ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἕκαστος should apply to the "good" democratic systems as defined in the foregoing sentences. At face value, it could well refer broadly to any system "in which there are more rulers than one";[31] however, even if Schütrumpf is

---

[25] Schütrumpf (n. 18) 155–156.

[26] Schütrumpf (n. 18) 288; Newman (n. 23) xxxviii.

[27] Here, however, the "notables" (οἱ βέλτιστοι 1318 b 32) appear to be the worthiest rather than the richest men. See the succinct but very clear commentary by D. Keyt, *Aristotle. Politics. Books V and VI* (Oxford 1999) 208–211, who also tackles the problem whether this can indeed be called a democracy.

[28] Theophrastus is our sole other witness for the ancient interpretation of *Il.* 2, 204 as a critique of democracy: one of the first peculiarities of the ὀλιγαρχικός in *Characters* 26, 2 consists in his special *penchant* for this particular line – the rest of the epic, we are told, he ignores; see J. Diggle (ed.), *Theophrastus. Characters* (Cambridge 2004) 465–468.

[29] See A. Rosenberg, *Demokratie und Klassenkampf im Altertum* (Freiburg ^{2}2007 = ^{1}1921) 17; G. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London 1981) 413; L. Spina, "Oratoria di Tersite, retorica di Tersite", in: L. Calboli Montefusco (ed.), *Papers on Rhetoric* III (Bologna 2000) 260.

[30] This is also the way Aeschines (3, 231) alluded to it: see e. g. Ober (n. 23) 179–180. Illuminating remarks on the status of Thersites and on the authority of Odysseus can be found in B. Lincoln, *Authority: Construction and Corrosion* (Chicago 1994) 32–36.

[31] Newman (n. 23) 180, comparing passages (in Thucydides, Xenophon etc.) where the multiplicity of military leaders (not of private soldiers) is at stake.

right, it is apparent that Aristotle's focus cannot be on the actual, entire political frame of those democracies (it would be very anachronistic, almost clumsy to involve Homer in a debate over an Aristotelian classification of 4th-century constitutions),[32] but rather on their most characteristic feature, namely the "oligarchic" element they contain. This element is stressed by the specific addition ὡς ἕκαστος, well attested in another crucial passage about the separation between the masses sharing in deliberation and judgement and the βελτίονες having access to the highest offices: *Pol.* 3, 11, 1281 a 39 – b 37.

Thus, the Stagirite's second alternative implies the reading of πολυκοιρανίη as something else than pure democracy, as a regime where single βέλτιστοι are admitted to office, in other words as a democracy with a decisive oligarchic / aristocratic counterweight. Now, *Iliad* 2, 204 is spoken by Odysseus to the δήμου ἄνδρες (l. 198) as opposed to the ἔξοχοι ἄνδρες (l. 188) addressed in the first of his two speeches: it seems clear to me that a discourse about the role of the βέλτιστοι in politics is totally out of place in a harangue to private soldiers, and would fit in much better in an address to the ἔξοχοι. In other words, Aristotle's second alternative seems to proceed from an understanding of the text that implies the same tension between the line's meaning and its context which later prompted Aristarchus to his drastic textual choice.

I would not push the argument so far as to argue that the debate on the textual status of *Iliad* 2, 197–205 was current in pre-Alexandrian times:[33] Aristotle's observation might well represent just his own doubts, and does not affect his allusion to the *facies* of this passage. On the other hand, however, we have remarked how peculiar Aristotle's interpretation turns out to be as opposed to the general *consensus* of later sources who read πολυκοιρανίη as oligarchy; and we do know the Stagirite as a very attentive and reliable source of information about early philological debates on Homer's text.[34] Aristotle's interest for Homer's text and

[32] Schütrumpf (n.18) 157 and 294 explains this away by ascribing to Aristotle's treatment a total "Indifferenz für Zeitverhältnisse".

[33] A similar idea is maintained by M. Bandini ("PBerol 21108 e l'Omero di Senofonte", *Maia* 46 [1994] 19–21) on the basis of the omission of ll. 192–197 in Socrates' quotation of this passage (Xen. *Mem*. 1, 2, 58). However, this omission has neither a moralistic bias nor can it be justified on the basis of Xenophon's picture of the Athenian philosopher (see M. Bandini, in Xénophon, *Mémorables* I [Paris 2000] 119–120), and at any rate the Alexandrian philologist does not refer to any textual variance in earlier mss., and motivates his proposal in a different way

[34] See e. g. A. C. Cassio, "Early Editions of the Greek Epics and Homeric Textual Criticism in the Sixth and Fifth Century BC", in: F. Montanari, P. Ascheri (eds.), *Omero tremila anni dopo* (Roma 2002) 124–132.

interpretation comes as no surprise if we believe Plutarch's information that he actually edited the *Iliad* in his capacity as a tutor for Alexander the Great.[35]

In our case, Aristotle's ἄδηλον proceeds from his uncertainty about the exact meaning of the word πολυκοιρανίη – a word subsequent generations were to read in a purely oligarchic sense, i. e. relying more directly on his second interpretation. I venture the assumption that this very uncertainty prompted Aristarchus, who could hardly conceive of Homer's πολυκοιρανίη as democracy, to feel a certain uneasiness about the transmitted text and thus to suspect that ll. 203–205, if related to an aristocratic or semi-aristocratic regime, could be problematic within Odysseus' second speech to the army, and appear more at home in the first.

Actually, one might wonder if the detailed analysis of democracy and oligarchy in *Politics* 4 – an analysis designed to "help the statesman improve the government of his city"[36] – might have some connection with Alexander the Great's almost contemporary exploits.[37] The issue is of course very delicate, since we know very little about Aristotle's personal ideas on the Macedonian political system. Nevertheless, *Il.* 2, 204 appears to me as – to put it in Aristarchus' words – particularly ἁρμόζων πρὸς βασιλέας: one might surmise that the man who kept the *Iliad* under his pillow, chose *Il.* 3, 179 as his favourite line (see Plut. *Fort. Alex.* 331 c–d) and modelled his own life and deeds on those of the Homeric heroes,[38] had in mind precisely this line of Homer (and its reference to ὅταν πλείους

---

[35] See Plut. *Alex.* 8, 2, relying on Onesicritus, *FGrHist* 134 F 38. A strong case for the existence of this διόρθωσις (the famous Iliad ἐκ τοῦ νάρθηκος), and for its special design "al uso personal de Alejandro" is made by Sanz Morales (n. 13) 22–39. M. L. West, *Studies in the Text and Transmission of the Iliad* (München – Leipzig 2001) 25 and 72–73, more cautiously insists that we have no evidence that this "edition" played any role in the textual lucubrations of Alexandrian scholars.

[36] See R. Mulgan, "Aristotle's Analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy", in: Keyt, Miller (n. 19) 308.

[37] See H. Kelsen, "The Philosophy of Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy", *Int. Journ. of Ethics* 48 (1937) 1–64 (then in J. Barnes [ed.], *Articles on Aristotle* [London 1977] 170–194). For a different view see e. g. V. Ehrenberg, *Alexander and the Greeks* (Oxford 1938) 62–102; Robinson (n. 20) xii–xiii. More nuanced approaches e. g. in Ch. H. Kahn, "The Normative Structure of Aristotle's "Politics"", in: Patzig (n. 18) 378–381; R. G. Mulgan, "Aristotle and Absolute Rule", *Antichthon* 8 (1974) 21–28.

[38] See J. M. O'Brien, *Alexander the Great* (London 1994) 43–100; E. Carney, "Artifice and Alexander History", in: A. B. Bosworth, E. Baynham (eds.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction* (Oxford – New York 2000) 280–281 (with further bibliography).

ὦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἕκαστος, along perhaps with its cosmological interpretation in *Metaph.* 1076 a 4) when addressing to the Persian king Darius the famous maxim: "There cannot be two suns".[39]

3. The difficulty highlighted by Aristarchus (possibly in the wake of an Aristotelian input) left some traces also beyond philological debates. The *Techne rhetorike* falsely ascribed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus is actually a "disparate assemblage of essays on a variety of rhetorical themes", and its chapters 8–9 might be the partially unfinished work of an anonymous rhetorician of the early II century AD, perhaps Aelius Sarapion.[40] From § 8 of the second chapter of this work we learn that Odysseus' speeches in *Iliad* II had become the paradigm of a particular type of figured speech (or σχηματισμός), which consisted in criticising someone while attacking someone else, thus avoiding the offence that might arise from confrontational directness (p. 336, 11–15 Us.-Rad. = 98, 17–20 Dent. and 340, 6–8 Us.-Rad. = 102, 27–29 Dent.:

> τὸ ἑτέροις διαλεγόμενον ἑτέρων καθάπτεσθαι, τὸ ἀσφαλὲς τοῦ μὴ προσκρούειν τῇ ὑπαλλαγῇ τοῦ προσώπου ἐνδιοικούμενον).[41]

While quoting extensively *Il.* 2, 188–99 and 2, 203–205, the author of this chapter of the *Techne* observes that Odysseus spoke to the people

---

[39] For the anecdote see e. g. Diod. Sic. 17, 54, 5 (insisting precisely on the threat to ὁμόνοια among rulers: οὔθ᾽ ὁ κόσμος δυεῖν ἡλίων ὄντων τηρῆσαι δύναιτ᾽ ἂν τὴν ἰδίαν διακόσμησίν τε καὶ τάξιν οὔθ᾽ ἡ οἰκουμένη δύο βασιλέων ἐχόντων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀταράχως καὶ ἀστασιάστως διαμένειν ἂν δύναιτο); 30, 21, 4; Plut. *Reg. imp. apophth*. 180 b; Iustin. 11, 12.

[40] See M. Heath, "Pseudo-Dionysius *Art of Rhetoric* 8–11: Figured Speech, Declamation, and Criticism", *AJPh* 124 (2003) 86–93 for a discussion of ch. 9 and more generally for insights into the relationship of the treaty with Ps.-Hermogenes' *On Method*. The most detailed analysis of the work remains K. Schöpsdau, "Untersuchungen zur Anlage und Entstehung der beiden Pseudodionysianischen Traktate Περὶ ἐσχηματισμένων", *RhM* 118 (1975) 83–123. Some speculation on the function of examples in P. Chiron, "Quelques observations sur la théorie du discours figuré dans le Τέχνη du Ps.-Denys d'Halicarnasse", in Montefusco (n. 29) 75–94. A new edition with commentary is now provided by S. Dentice d'Accadia (ed.), *I discorsi figurati I e II dello Ps.-Dionisio di Alicarnasso* (Pisa – Roma 2010).

[41] The προσώπων ὑπαλλαγή is a well-known technique in Greek rhetoric: see e. g. Ps.-Herm. *Meth.* p. 442, 10–21 Rabe with a Demosthenic example (and, partly, Ps.-Demetr. *De eloc*. 292), with Schöpsdau (n. 40) 115 and n. 35 and Dentice d'Accadia (n. 40) 35 and 165. It is spotted by *schol. b T Il.* 2, 252–253 in Odysseus' harsh words to Thersites, actually designed to instruct the entire body of the Greek army: see on this topic R. Nünlist, *The Ancient Critic at Work* (Cambridge 2009) 321–322.

the reproaches he wanted to address to the kings, and vice versa (p. 341, 6–8 Us.-Rad. = 104, 17–19 Dent.: ἃ γὰρ ἐβούλετο καθάψασθαι τῶν βασιλέων, τῷ δήμῳ διελέγετο· ἃ δ᾽ ἐβούλετο ἐπιτιμῆσαι τῷ δήμῳ, τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν διελέγετο). Now, I am not sure that this interpretation should be taken as a contribution to the long-standing philosophical and political debate about the equity of Ulysses' treatment of leaders and privates in the Homeric scene, a debate witnessed since the times of Socrates (Xen. *Mem.* 1, 2, 58; Socrates fr. I.C.137 Giannantoni; Liban. *Decl.* 1, 93).[42] But it is clear to me that the rhetor's observation tackles the same problem already posed by Aristarchus (and probably implicit in Aristotle), and that this is one of the several instances of his confrontation with earlier Homeric exegesis: it is, in other words, a typical explanation by way of a σχηματισμός ("figured speech") of an apparent ἀτοπία ("problem, absurdity") in Homer's text: in so far, it represents an alternative solution if compared to Aristarchus' approach.[43]

Thus, whatever glimpses we get of the history of the ancient speculation on *Il.* 2, 204 provide an interesting test-case of the possible interplay between Aristotelian philosophy and Aristarchean philology (a connection that has been stressed in recent studies, partly modifying the more sceptical views of R. Pfeiffer),[44] and between the latter and Greek rhetorical studies of the Roman age.

Filippomaria Pontani
f.pontani@libero.it
University of Venice

Аристотель и Аристарх находят трудности в похвале монархии (и предостережении против πολυκοιρανίη) в *Il*. 2, 203–205. Аристотель пытался найти объяснение этому пассажу в *Политике*, а александрийский филолог

[42] So D.A. Russell, "Figured Speeches: "Dionysius", *Art of Rhetoric* VIII–IX", in: C.W. Wooten (ed.), *The Orator in Action and Theory in Greece and Rome (Fs. G.A. Kennedy)* (Leiden–Boston–Köln 2001) 164.

[43] See Dentice d'Accadia (n. 40) 35–37 and, for further examples, see Schöpsdau (n. 40) 110 n. 31. It is true that Ps.-Dionysius implicitly accepts the lines and that *schol. b T Il.* 2, 203 b (quoted above) defends them against Aristarchus' athetesis, but they do so on rather different grounds, which is why I cannot agree with H. Schrader, "Telephos der Pergamener", *Hermes* 37 (1902) 530–581 (541 n. 1), who postulates a common source.

[44] See most recently F. Schironi, "Theory into Practice: Aristotelian Principles in Aristarchean Philology", *CPh* 104 (2009) 279–316, with further bibliography.

(возможно, под влиянием аристотелевских сочинений) решительно предложил перенести эти строки после ст. 192. Автор статьи рассматривает различные аспекты ученой дискуссии вокруг гомеровского пассажа вплоть до эпохи Римской империи.

Both Aristotle and Aristarchus felt uneasy about Odysseus' praise of monarchy (and disparagement of *polykoiranie*) in *Iliad* 2, 203–205: the Stagirite tried to give a suitable philosophical explanation of the passage in his *Politics*, while the Alexandrian philologist (perhaps in the wake of Aristotle's doubts) decided *tout court* to transpose the lines. The present paper tries to follow the reasons and forms of this debate down to the imperial age.

HOMO AN LIBER? ZUR ETHIK DES SCHERZENS IN CICERO, *DE OFF.* 1, 103 f.

Am Ende der Einleitung des ersten Buches von *De officiis* (1, 15–17) gibt Cicero eine allgemeine Einführung in den Begriff des Ehrenhaften (*honestum*) und untergliedert es in vier Teilbereiche (*partes*) bzw. Tugenden (*virtutes*),[1] die er im Vorgriff auf den Hauptteil überblicksartig näher bestimmt: (a) *sapientia* und *prudentia* (Weisheit und Klugheit), die er als Durchschauen der Wahrheit (*perspicientia veri*) bzw. deren Aufspüren (*investigatio veri*) und ein daraus sich ergebendes sachgerechtes, geschicktes Verhalten (*sollertia*) auffaßt; (b) *iustitia* (Gerechtigkeit), unter welcher er den Schutz der menschlichen Gemeinschaft, die Zuteilung dessen, was einem jeden zukommt, und die Vertragstreue begreift; (c) *animi excellentia magnitudoque* (Größe und Erhabenheit des Geistes), die er als die Fertigkeit definiert, sich und den Seinen Vorteile zu verschaffen, und zugleich, diese Vorteile gering zu achten, also innerlich unabhängig von ihnen zu bleiben;[2] (d) *modestia* und *temperantia* (Bescheidenheit und Mäßigung), unter denen er die Ordnung und das Maß aller Handlungen und Äußerungen versteht.

In den sich anschließenden Einzeluntersuchungen der vier Tugenden, die den Hauptteil des ersten Buches ausmachen (1, 18–151), nimmt die Erörterung der *temperantia* den größten Raum ein (1, 93–151).[3] Im Kontext

---

[1] Vgl. E. Lefèvre, *Panaitios' und Ciceros Pflichtenlehre. Vom philosophischen Traktat zum politischen Lehrbuch* (Stuttgart 2001) 20 f.; zu den Tugenden im einzelnen 21–74.

[2] Lefèvre (o. Anm. 1) 20 hebt den für uns merkwürdig egoistisch klingenden ersten Teil dieser Bestimmung zu Recht hervor. Da sein Tenor grundsätzlich im Einklang mit der stoischen Oikeiosislehre steht, aus der einzelne Elemente als Hintergrund der Ausführungen bereits in 1, 11–14 in knapper, kulturhistorisch ausgerichteter Form gegeben werden, sehe ich jedoch anders als Lefèvre keinen Grund, der Äußerung "einen sehr römisch-egoistischen Anstrich" beizumessen und sie als Indikator einer Überarbeitung der panaitianischen Vorlage zu werten. Zur Oikeiosislehre in ihren Grundzügen vgl. M. Forschner, *Die stoische Ethik. Über den Zusammenhang von Natur-, Sprach- und Moralphilosophie im altstoischen System* (Darmstadt ^{2}1995) 142–159, 253–256; vgl. jetzt auch R. Bees, *Die Oikeiosislehre der Stoa* (Würzburg 2004).

[3] Vgl. Lefèvre (o. Anm. 1) 52–74.

dieser Untersuchung führt Cicero den Begriff des "Schicklichen" (*decorum* bzw. πρέπον) in 1, 93 ein und äußert sich, indem er diesen erläutert, auch über Scherzen und Spielen (1, 103) sowie die Unterscheidung zweier Arten des Scherzens, die zulässige und unzulässige (1, 104). Im folgenden soll dieser Textabschnitt interpretiert werden, wobei auch zwei textkritische Probleme besprochen werden.

Zunächst konstatiert Cicero, daß der Begriff des Schicklichen untrennbar mit dem des Ehrenhaften (*honestum*) verbunden sei (1, 94 f.).[4] Dann gibt er eine umschreibende Definition (*descriptio*)[5] des Schicklichen (1, 96), von der er sagt, daß sie aus zwei Blickwinkeln formuliert werden könne: Zum einen sei *decorum* allgemein das, was mit der erhabenen Position des Menschen in Übereinstimmung stehen müsse in Hinsicht auf die Punkte, in denen sich gerade die menschliche Natur von derjenigen aller übrigen Lebewesen unterscheide; dies könnte man *decorum generale* nennen. Zum anderen aber sei *decorum* das, was man so definiert, daß es nicht nur allgemein mit der menschlichen Natur in Einklang steht, sondern insbesondere Mäßigung (*moderatio*) und Selbstbeherrschung (*temperantia*) einschließt; man könnte dies *decorum speciale* nennen.[6]

Diese These veranschaulicht Cicero, indem er auf die Praxis der Dichter – er denkt vor allem an die von Tragödien[7] – verweist, die ebenfalls ein bestimmtes *decorum* beachten, und zwar dergestalt, daß die Handlungen und sprachlichen Äußerungen der Rolle (*persona*) derjenigen entsprechen müssen, die gerade handeln bzw. sprechen (1, 97).[8] In vergleichbarer Weise

---

[4] Vgl. Lefèvre (o. Anm. 1) 53 f. mit Hinweis auf A. R. Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De officiis* (Ann Arbor 1996) 259.

[5] Für diesen Gebrauch von *descriptio* vgl. z. B. Cic. *De or*. 1, 222. Für die Verwendung des Verbs *describere* in literarästhetischem Zusammenhang vgl. Hor. *Ars* 86 *descriptas servare vices operumque colores*; dazu G. Maurach, *Horaz. Werk und Leben* (Heidelberg 2001) 460 n. 24.

[6] Ich folge der griffigen Terminologie von Lefèvre (o. Anm. 1) 53.

[7] Den Schauspielervergleich nimmt Cicero ab 1, 126 wieder auf; vgl. Lefèvre (o. Anm. 1) 54 n. 297. Theatermetaphorik findet sich in der antiken Philosophie spätestens seit Platon; vgl. C. Langbehn, "Theater", in: R. Konersmann (Hg.), *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Metaphern* (Darmstadt 2007) 443–458.

[8] Ähnlich äußert sich Hor. *Ars* 114–118, über das Erfordernis, das Prinzip des Passenden beim Verfassen von Figurenreden in der Tragödie zu beachten: Es mache einen großen Unterschied, ob ein Gott oder ein Heros spreche, ein reifer älterer Mann oder ein hitzköpfiger in der Blüte seiner Jugend, ein umherreisender Kaufmann oder ein Pfleger seines kleinen grünenden Landguts, ein Kolcher oder Assyrer, ein in Theben oder ein in Argos erzogener Mensch. Zur Einordnung der Stelle vgl. Maurach (o. Anm. 5) 460–462; zur Frage, ob in V. 114 *divus* (Gott) oder das ebenfalls überlieferte *Davus* (typischer Sklavenname) gelesen werden sollte, vgl. B. Dunsch, "Il commerciante in scena: Temi e motivi mercantili nel *Mercator* plautino e nell'*Emporos* filemoniano", in:

aber, so der Analogieschluß, wie die Dichter bei der großen Vielfalt von Rollen jeweils das an Handlung und Sprache auswählen, was zur Rolle paßt und sich schickt, habe die Natur uns als Menschen – Cicero meint alle Menschen, nicht eine bestimmte soziale Gruppe – die Rolle charakterlicher Stärke, Selbstbeherrschung, Mäßigung und Zurückhaltung (*constantiae, moderationis, temperantiae, verecundiae partes*) zugewiesen. Die Natur lehrt uns ebenfalls, nicht zu vernachlässigen, wie wir uns gegenüber anderen Menschen aufführen. Nun wechselt Cicero das Bildfeld, um seine These von einer anderen Seite zu beleuchten (1, 98): Wie Körperteile, die einander harmonisch zugeordnet sind und in ihrer Betätigung "mit einer gewissen Anmut" zusammenwirken, dem Betrachter gefallen,[9] so findet auch das *decorum*, wenn es "durch Ordnung, Beständigkeit und Selbstbeherrschung" in Äußerungen und Taten sichtbar wird, die Billigung durch diejenigen, mit denen man lebt. Beide Bildbereiche sind mit Bedacht gewählt, ist doch in beiden, Schauspielrolle wie Körperbewegung, die äußere Wahrnehmung eines wohlgeordneten Ganzen entscheidend. Die Bilder dienen damit der Argumentation Ciceros, dem es um die Wahrnehmung und Beurteilung menschlichen Verhaltens in der Welt geht.

Insgesamt sollte man also, so Cicero in 1, 99, gegenüber seinen Mitmenschen (er wiederholt das gerade verwendete *adversus homines*) eine gewisse Rücksicht (*reverentia*) walten lassen, vor allem gegen die Besten, aber auch gegen die übrigen Menschen. Hier klingt zunächst eine potentiell sozial zu fassende Unterscheidung zwischen den den *optimi* ("Menschen des höchsten Standes") und den *reliqui* ("Menschen der übrigen Stände") an. Diese wird aber sogleich relativiert: Letztlich, so die Aussage, sollen wir allen Menschen gegenüber *reverentia* üben. Hierbei seien die Bewegungen des Körpers lange nicht so wichtig wie die der Seele, bei denen es ebenfalls gelte, auf das *decorum* zu achten (1, 100).

Um dies zu erreichen, sei es wichtig, daß das Seelenvermögen der Vernunft (*ratio*) das Seelenvermögen der Begierden oder die Strebekraft (*appetitus*) lenkt und in seine Schranken weist (1, 101). Um dies zu erreichen, müssen, so Cicero, die Begierden der Vernunft gehorchen. Wenn dies nicht der Fall ist, wie etwa bei den Zornigen oder den sonst durch irgendeine Leidenschaft Hingerissenen, werden Geist und Körper gleichermaßen in Unruhe versetzt (1, 102). Daraus ergibt sich, daß die

---

R. Raffaelli, A. Tontini (Hgg.), *Lecturae Plautinae Sarsinates XI: Mercator (Sarsina, 29 settembre 2007)* (Urbino 2008) 15 n. 14. Für den Tenor der horazischen Forderung macht dies hier keinen großen Unterschied.

[9] Körpermetaphorik ist ebenfalls spätestens seit Platon in der Philosophie sehr verbreitet; vgl. S. Lüdemann, "Körper, Organismus", in: Konersmann (o. Anm. 7) 169–182.

Begierden eingedämmt werden müssen, damit wir nicht unbedacht und aufs Geratewohl, ohne Überlegung und nachlässig handeln (*ne quid temere ac fortuito, inconsiderate neglegenterque agamus*). Dies gilt für alle Lebensbereiche, auch für Scherz und Spiel (1, 103):

> Neque enim ita generati a natura sumus, ut ad ludum et iocum facti esse videamur, ad severitatem potius et ad quaedam studia graviora atque maiora. ludo autem et ioco uti illo quidem licet, sed sicut somno et quietibus ceteris tum, cum gravibus seriisque rebus satis fecerimus. ipsumque genus iocandi non profusum nec immodestum, sed ingenuum et facetum esse debet. ut enim pueris non omnem ludendi licentiam damus, sed eam, quae ab honestatis actionibus non sit aliena, sic in ipso ioco aliquod probi ingenii lumen eluceat.

Cicero stellt fest, daß die Menschen[10] von Natur aus nicht zu Scherz und Spiel[11] gemacht zu sein scheinen, sondern zu Ernsthaftigkeit und um bedeutendere und wichtigere Aufgaben wahrzunehmen. Freilich hätten Spiel und Scherz dort ihren Platz, wo man sie, wie den Schlaf und andere Ruhepausen, zur Erholung zwischen denjenigen Zeiten nutzt, während derer man seinen bedeutenden und ernsten Aufgaben nachgeht.[12] Nachdem Cicero die Berechtigung des Scherzens im Grundsatz konzediert und ihm

---

[10] Cicero verwendet, sich selbst als Angehöriger der Gattung Mensch einschließend, die erste Person Plural, und bezieht sich dabei, wie aus dem Kontext deutlich wird, nicht auf eine bestimmte soziale Gruppe.

[11] Eine Diskussion von Belegen für die Wortpaarung *ludus* / *iocus* bzw. *ludere* / *iocari* und verwandter Ausdrücke bietet A. Nuti, *Ludus e iocus. Percorsi di ludicità nella lingua latina* (Treviso – Roma 1998) 158–175.

[12] Der Gedanke, daß Menschen sich ab und zu erholen müssen, um sich dann mit frischen Kräften wieder ernsten Dingen zuwenden zu können, findet sich zuerst bei den Vorsokratikern, dann bei Plat. *Leg*. 732 c; vgl. G. Luck, "Humor", in: *RAC* (= *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*) 16 (1994) 761. Er wird von Aristoteles aufgegriffen, so *Pol.* 1341 b 38 – 1342 a 2, wo es von der spielerischen und nicht professionellen Beschäftigung der Musik heißt, daß ihre gute und erwünschte Wirkung nicht zuletzt in ihrer Fähigkeit bestehe, uns Entspannung und Erholung von den Anstrengungen der Lebensführung zu verschaffen. Vgl. auch die Ausführungen zum Katharsis-Begriff in der aristotelischen *Politik* bei A. Schmitt, *Aristoteles Poetik* (Berlin 2008) 502–509, v. a. 504 f. Von Bedeutung ist auch *Eth. Nic.* 1127 b 31 – 1128 b 9, wo sich Aristoteles wie Cicero mit der Unterscheidung eines angemessenen von einem unangemessenen Lustigen beschäftigt; siehe auch die Bemerkungen *Rhet*. 1419 b 2–10 (mit Verweis auf die verlorenen Ausführungen im zweiten Buch der *Poetik*); vgl. S. Halliwell, *Greek Laughter. A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early Christianity* (Cambridge 2008) 307–331, v. a. 308–311, Schmitt (wie oben) 306 f., sowie E. Narducci, *Modelli etici e società. Un'idea di Cicerone* (Pisa 1989) 178 Anm. 56.

eine auf das menschliche Leben bezogene Nutzenfunktion zugewiesen hat, unterscheidet er zwei Arten des Scherzens. Das eine ist ein Scherzen, das schranken- und maßlos ist. Diesem stellt er eine Art des Scherzens gegenüber, die er als anständig und geistreich kennzeichnet (*ingenuum* und *facetum*). Im Anschluß illustriert Cicero diese Unterscheidung durch den Vergleich mit einem Kind, dem man auch nicht jede Art von Freiheit im Spielen erlaube, sondern nur diejenige, welche sich im Rahmen der geltenden Moral bewege: Genau wie beim Spiel des Kindes solle auch im Scherz "irgendein Licht eines anständigen Charakters aufleuchten".

Daran schließt Cicero, die soeben getroffene Unterscheidung zweier Arten des Scherzens aufgreifend und vertiefend, folgende Ausführungen an – hier in der üblichen Textvulgate, wie sie z. B. die Teubneriana bietet:

> Duplex omnino est iocandi genus, unum inliberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscenum, alterum elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum, quo genere non modo Plautus noster et Atticorum antiqua comoedia, sed etiam philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti sunt, multaque multorum facete dicta, ut ea, quae a sene Catone collecta sunt, quae vocantur ἀποφθέγματα. facilis igitur est distinctio ingenui et inliberalis ioci. alter est, si tempore fit, ut si remisso animo, <vel severissimo> homine dignus, alter ne libero quidem, si rerum turpitudo adhibetur aut verborum obscenitas.

Cicero setzt erneut mit der Unterscheidung der zwei Arten des Scherzens (*duplex ... iocandi genus*) ein,[13] die er diesmal ausführlicher gestaltet und durch Nennung von Beispielen konkretisiert. Die unzulässige Art charakterisiert er in langer Aufzählung als eines freien Mannes unwürdig (*inliberale*), frech (*petulans*), schändlich (*flagitiosum*) und unanständig (*obscenum*), die zulässige hingegen als geschmackvoll (*elegans*), raffiniert (*urbanum*), charaktervoll (*ingeniosum*) und geistreich (*facetum*).[14] Als Beispiele für die zulässige, anständige Art des Scherzens nennt er die Komödien des Plautus, den er an dieser Stelle mit gewissem Stolz und in vorweggenommener Abgrenzung gegen die griechische

[13] Mit *omnino* macht Cicero deutlich, daß es für ihn keine Grauzone gibt. Alles Scherzen läßt sich der einen oder anderen Art zuordnen.

[14] Die Begriffsreihen setzt H. Köhler, "Cicero, off. 1, 104 *homo*: ein ideologiekritisches Problem", in: A. Haltenhoff, F.-H. Mutschler (Hgg.), *HORTVS LITTERARVM ANTIQVARVM. Festschrift für Hans Armin Gärtner zum 70. Geburtstag* (Heidelberg 2000) 290, in zwei Kolumnen gegeneinander, wobei nicht hinreichend deutlich wird, daß es hier sich nicht um gereihte Konträrbegriffe handelt; dies wurde auch sonst mehrfach behauptet, z. B. von E. de Saint-Denis, *Essais sur le rire et le sourire des latins* (Paris 1965) 154.

Komödie als "unseren Plautus"[15] apostrophiert, dann die "alte Komödie der Attiker" (*Atticorum antiqua comoedia*),[16] die Bücher der "sokratischen Philosophen"[17] und die von Cato dem Älteren gesammelten witzigen Äußerungen, die *Apophthegmata* genannt würden.

Nach diesen zwei Ansätzen der Unterscheidung von zulässigem und unzulässigem Scherzen greift Cicero diese Zweiteilung nochmals auf und resümiert, daß die Unterscheidung (*distinctio*) zwischen diesen beiden Arten, der des anständigen und des unwürdigen Scherzes (*ingenui et inliberalis ioci*), leicht falle. Das Argument, das Cicero hier durch die Setzung des folgernden *igitur* nur andeutet, geht dahin, daß man angesichts der großen Menge autoritativer römischer wie griechischer Texte, denen man gute Beispiele für zulässiges Scherzen entnehmen könne, eigentlich keine Probleme haben dürfte, zulässiges von unzulässigem Scherzen zu unterscheiden. Wenn man sich nur an die Muster zulässigen Scherzens halte, so der unausgesprochene Gedanke, dann finde man durch eine an sich selbst vollzogene kritische *éducation sentimentale*, die sich an den akzeptierten und durch Tradition bewährten Autoritäten orientiert, durch Nachahmung leicht die empirischen Kriterien, welche man dieser Unterscheidung zugrunde legen kann.

An diesem Punkt der Erörterung findet sich im Text ein in der Forschung immer wieder diskutiertes Problem. Noch einmal bietet Cicero eine kontrastive Charakteristik der beiden Arten des Scherzens, diesmal

---

[15] Zur insgesamt positiven Beurteilung des Plautus durch Cicero vgl. jetzt die entsprechenden Abschnitte in B. Dunsch, "Die plautinische Komödie in republikanischer und kaiserzeitlicher Literaturkritik", in: B. Dunsch, A. Schmitt, T. Schmitz (Hgg.), *Epos – Lyrik – Drama. Zu Genese und Ausformung der Gattungen in Antike und Moderne. Festschrift für Ernst-Richard Schwinge zum 75. Geburtstag* (Heidelberg 2013) 229–291 (im Druck).

[16] Hier bliebe zu diskutieren, ob Cicero damit die so genannte "Alte Komödie" meint oder eher Stücke der "Mittleren" bzw. sogar der "Neuen Komödie". Zur Genese der Dreiteilung in hellenistischer Zeit vgl. H.-G. Nesselrath, *Die attische Mittlere Komödie. Ihre Stellung in der antiken Literaturkritik und Literaturgeschichte* (Berlin – New York 1990) 172–187. Die Bezeichnungen "alt" und "neu" wurden in der Antike nicht unbedingt so verwendet wie heute, wie z. B. der Umstand zeigt, daß im frühen 2. Jh. v. Chr. ein wiederaufgeführtes Menanderstück "alt" genannt werden konnte, vgl. C. P. Jones, "Greek Drama in the Roman Empire", in: R. Scodel (Hg.), *Theater and Society in the Classical World* (Ann Arbor 1993) 43. Jedenfalls scheint bei Cicero die Bewertung der attischen Alten Komödie zu schwanken. *De rep*. 4, 10 (= Aug. *De civ. Dei* 2, 9) kritisiert er ihre Aggressivität, doch an anderer Stelle nennt er Aristophanes *facetissimus* (*De leg*. 2, 37); vgl. A. Plebe, *La teoria del comico da Aristotele a Plutarco* (Turin 1952) 66.

[17] Hiermit sind, wenn man nach *Brut*. 292 geht, wo Cicero deren *ironia faceta et elegans* lobt, neben Platon wenigstens noch Xenophon und der Sokratiker Aischines gemeint; vgl. P. MacKendrick, *The Philosophical Books of Cicero* (London 1989) 236.

unter Verwendung des disjunktiven *alter ... alter*. Der Satz sei wegen seiner Bedeutung für die weitere Diskussion noch einmal zitiert:

> Alter est, si tempore fit, ut si remisso animo, <vel severissimo> homine dignus, alter ne libero quidem, si rerum turpitudo adhibetur aut verborum obscenitas.[18]

Die eine, zulässige, Art des Scherzes sei, so wird der Sinn der Stelle heute zumeist verstanden und ergänzt, wenn er zur richtigen Zeit (*tempore*) gemacht wird, wie zum Beispiel in gelöster, entspannter Stimmung (*ut si remisso animo*), <sogar eines sehr ernsthaften> Menschen würdig, so eine der zahlreichen für diese Stelle vorgeschlagenen Ergänzungen im Text; die andere, unzulässige, sei nicht einmal eines Freien würdig (*ne libero quidem*), wenn beim Scherzen die Häßlichkeit der Gegenstände und Unanständigkeit der Wörter zur Verwendung kommen (*si rerum turpitudo adhibetur aut verborum obscenitas*).

Es sei nämlich, so Cicero im verbleibenden Teil von 1, 104, auch im Spiel ein gewisses Maß (*ludendi ... quidam modus*) einzuhalten, damit uns nicht alle Dinge allzu sehr außer Kontrolle geraten (*ne nimis omnia profundamus*) und wir, hingerissen von einer Lust, in irgendeine Schändlichkeit abgleiten. Hier variiert Cicero also leicht das Thema und wechselt vom *ludus* hin zum *iocus*; er hatte beide ja bereits kurz zuvor zusammen genannt. Als Beispiele für anständige Spiele führt er dann das Marsfeld (*campus noster*), auf dem sich die Römer sportlich üben,[19] sowie die Jagd (*studia venandi*) an.

Das Supplement <*vel severissimo*> wurde von Atzert in den Text der Teubneriana gesetzt. Neben diesem Ergänzungsversuch, der Eingang in viele zweisprachige Leseausgaben[20] und einsprachige Übersetzungen[21] gefunden hat, finden sich weitere, der Bedeutung nach ähnliche Supplemente, z. B. Müllers <*gravissimo*>, das Fedeli und Winterbottom in den

---

[18] *M. Tulli Ciceronis De officiis*, quartum rec. C. Atzert, *De virtutibus*, post O. Plasberg et W. Ax tertium rec. C. Atzert (Leipzig 1963).

[19] Verschiedene dort betriebene Sportarten zählt Hor. *Carm*. 1, 8 auf (Diskus-, Speer-, Ballwurf, Fechten, Reiten).

[20] Es seien beispielshalber genannt: Marco Tullio Cicerone, *Dei doveri*, hg., übers. und erl. von D. Arfelli (Bologna 1987); Marcus Tullius Cicero*, De officiis / Vom pflichtgemäßen Handeln. Lateinisch und deutsch*, übers., komm. und hg. von H. Gunermann (Stuttgart 1992); Marcus Tullius Cicero*, De officiis / Vom pflichtgemäßen Handeln. Lateinisch-deutsch*, hg. und übers. von R. Nickel (Düsseldorf 2008).

[21] Zum Beispiel Cicero*, On Duties*, hg. von M. T. Griffin, E. M. Atkins (Cambridge 1991); Cicero, *On Obligations (De officiis)*, übers., mit Einl. und Anm. von P. G. Walsh (Oxford 2000).

Text genommen haben.[22] Weitere Versuche und Vermutungen dokumentiert Testard in seinem Apparat:[23] Heine hatte vor *homine* einen Textausfall angenommen und vorgeschlagen, "ein Adjectiv von der Bedeutung 'vornehm' oder 'gebildet', vielleicht *amplus* od. *ingenuus*" zu supplieren;[24] <*magno*> wurde als Ergänzung von Madvig proponiert,[25] <*liberali*> von Scheibe und <*maximo*> von Seyffert; frühneuzeitliche Gelehrte wie Aldus und Lambinus hatten die Reihenfolge der Wörter *homine* und *libero* gegeneinander vertauscht,[26] was aber angesichts einer eindeutigen Parallelüberlieferung bei Nonius, die *libero* als in der zweiten Alternative stehend bezeugt,[27] von vornherein unwahrscheinlich ist. Diese Vorschläge, so elegant sie teilweise sein mögen, zeugen von der großen Selbstgewißheit, mit der bis ins 19. und frühe 20. Jh. nicht selten mit den Texten umgegangen wurde, können jedoch weder methodisch noch der Sache nach befriedigen. Methodisch deshalb nicht, weil es kaum möglich ist, den Ausfall längerer Wörter oder Wortgruppen wie <*vel severissimo*> oder <*gravissimo*> überzeugend zu erklären.[28]

Wollte man eine solche Erklärung versuchen, so könnte man annehmen, ein Schreiber habe mit Blick auf *ut si remisso* ein dem oberflächlichen optischen Eindruck nach ähnliches im Text stehendes längeres Wort oder

---

[22] *M. Tulli Ciceronis De officiis libri tres*, hg. von P. Fedeli (Mailand 1965); *M. Tulli Ciceronis De officiis*, hg. von M. Winterbottom (Oxford 1996).

[23] Cicéron, *Les devoirs. Introduction, Livre I*, hg. und übers. von M. Testard (Paris 1965) 157; weitere Vermutungen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts bei Köhler (o. Anm. 14) 292–296.

[24] *M. Tullii Ciceronis De officiis ad Marcum filium libri tres*, erkl. von O. Heine (Berlin [1]1857) 76. In einer späteren Auflage ([Berlin [4]1871] 89) variiert Heine seinen Vorschlag ("*amplus* oder *magnus*").

[25] Nach G. F. Unger, *Zur Textkritik von Cicero's Schrift De officiis* (Göttingen 1878) 38 hatte Baiter bereits denselben Vorschlag gemacht.

[26] So Unger (o. Anm. 25) 38.

[27] Non. 356, 30 (s. v. *obscenum*), zitiert von Winterbottom (o. Anm. 22) 42 im Apparat.

[28] Auch keine der drei von Atzert (o. Anm. 18) im Apparat angegebenen Parallelen kann daran etwas ändern: Der Verweis auf Quint. *Inst. or*. 6, 6, 68 geht in die Irre; das sechste Buch umfaßt nur fünf Kapitel. Die beiden anderen, Cic. *De or.* 2, 228 und Plin. *Epist.* 8, 21, geben für die vorliegende Stelle nichts aus. Plinius stellt die *severitas* der *comitas* gegenüber und sagt, daß er seine ernsthafteren Werke durch Einlagen von *lusus* und *ioci* aufputzt (8, 21, 1 f.; *distinguo* hat nichts mit der *distinctio* zu tun, von der Cicero spricht). In *De oratore* lässt Cicero Antonius zwar davon sprechen, wie selten es vorkomme, daß jemand (hier Crassus) so äußerst liebenswürdig (*venustissimus*) und raffiniert (*urbanissimus*) sein könne, zugleich aber höchst gewichtig und ernst (*gravissimus* bzw. *severissimus*); dies ist in anderem Zusammenhang gesagt und passt, von den Wörtern selbst abgesehen, vom Gedankengang nicht auf den oben formulierten Gegensatz zweier Arten von Scherzen.

eine Wortgruppe wie *vel severissimo* schlicht überlesen; dann läge eine Art Haplographie vor. Eine weitere Möglichkeit wäre, die Annahme zu vertreten, daß das einmal[29] überlieferte *remissi animi* korrekt ist und als Genitivus qualitatis zu *homine* tritt, so daß es an der vorliegenden Stelle gar keinen Textausfall zu heilen gilt. Hiergegen steht allerdings sowohl der lateinische Sprachgebrauch, nach dem der Genitivus qualitatis klassisch fast ausschließlich mit gewissen Quantitätsadjektiven wie *magnus* und *summus*, Zahlangaben und Pronomina verwendet wird,[30] wie auch die Tatsache, daß es sich bei einer "entspannten Stimmung" um eine vorübergehende Gemütsstimmung handelt, die als modale adverbiale Bestimmung im Ablativ (*remisso animo*; vergleichbar *bono animo*, *aequo animo*),[31] nicht als Attribut im Genitiv (*remissi animi*) formuliert werden sollte.

Da nun die Überlieferung keine weiteren Anhaltspunkte für großflächigere Textverderbnis bietet, wie sie sich sonst in *De officiis* nicht selten findet, wenngleich wohl nicht so häufig wie früher vermutet,[32] kann nur eine gravierende inhaltliche Anstößigkeit als hinreichende Begründung für konjekturale Bemühungen dienen. Offenbar scheint der im überlieferten Text formulierte Gegensatz zwischen einem Scherz, der, wenn er zur rechten Zeit gemacht wird, *homine dignus* ist, und einem, der *ne libero quidem dignus* ist, wenn er auf der Sach- und Wortebene nicht akzeptiert werden kann, von den Interpreten dieses Textes nicht als echter Gegensatz wahrgenommen worden zu sein.[33]

So argumentiert 1996 Andrew Dyck in seinem Kommentar zur Stelle: "Contrasted with *liber* should be, not merely *homo*, since a *liber*, too, is a *homo*, but a specific type of *homo* […]".[34] Ähnlich argumentierte bereits

---

[29] Diese Lesart bietet *p* (= Palatinus 1531; 13. Jh.).

[30] Vgl. J. B. Hofmann, A. Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik. Mit dem allgemeinen Teil der lateinischen Grammatik* (München 1972) 68; R. Kühner, C. Stegmann, *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache. Zweiter Teil: Satzlehre*, neubearb. und ber. von A. Thierfelder I (Hannover 1976) 455 f. Vgl. aber immerhin Belege wie Plaut. *Men*. 269 *homo iracundus, animi perditi*, angeführt von E. C. Woodcock, *A New Latin Syntax* (London 1959) 66.

[31] Vgl. Hofmann, Szantyr (o. Anm. 30) 69; dort aber immerhin Verweis auf Ov. *Fast.* 2, 847 *animi matrona virilis*.

[32] Vgl. K. B. Thomas, *Textkritische Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Schrift De officiis* (Münster 1971) 1–14.

[33] Vgl. Köhler (o. Anm. 14) 289: "Es gibt aber auch […] Emendationen, die nicht auf ein textkritisches Problem zurückzuführen sind, sondern allein dem Willen des Editors entspringen, einer an sich unverdächtigen Textstelle Sinn zu verleihen bzw. den Text dem eigenen Verständnis anzupassen. Eine solche Konjektur […] entwickelt ihre eigene Geschichte, die eher in den Bereich der Ideologie als der Textkritik gehört, aber nicht weniger interessant ist. Auch sie gehört zur Rezeption eines Werkes".

[34] Dyck (o. Anm. 4) 266.

G. F. Unger, der 1878 die bislang ausführlichste Diskussion dieser Textstelle vorgelegt hat: "Die hauptschwierigkeit der stelle liegt in dem sonderbaren gegensatz alter *est homine dignus, alter ne libero quidem*: da *ne – quidem* ein geringeres anzeigt, der freie mann aber weder einen gegensatz zum manne überhaupt bildet, da er die species, dieser das genus ist, noch den übrigen species gegenüber einen minderen werth hat. Umgekehrt ist es: nach antiker anschauung ist der freie stand der höchste, nur unfreie und unselbständige stehen ihm entgegen".[35] Diese Argumentation beruht darauf, daß sich alleinstehendes *homine* und *libero* nicht gegensätzlich, sondern komplementär zueinander verhalten. Insbesondere scheint, will man dieser Argumentation folgen, *homo* ein erklärendes Attribut zu fehlen, um eine Balance zwischen *homine* und nachfolgendem *libero* herzustellen, das als auf *homine* bezogen gedacht zu sein scheint.[36]

Nun ist allerdings unzweifelhaft, daß bei Cicero und anderen Autoren alleinstehendes *liber* auch im Sinne von *liber homo* verwendet werden kann.[37] Steht aber *libero* in diesem Fall allein für sich, und dies sei hier zunächst einmal angenommen, so kann *homine* dies auch, und zwar entweder im generellen Sinn, "ein jegliches menschliches Wesen", also wie *quovis homine*, was alle Menschen einschließt (jeder Altersstufe, beiderlei Geschlechts, Freie wie Unfreie, im Gegensatz zu Tieren und Göttern),[38] oder aber prägnant[39] im Sinne eines "echten Menschen", was sowohl einen Menschen mit Geschmack, stark entwickelten menschlichen Gefühlen oder guter Vernunft als auch einen Ehrenmann bezeichnen kann, wobei auch die Markierung sozialer Distinktionen im Einzelfall nicht ausgeschlossen ist.[40]

---

[35] Unger (o. Anm. 25) 38.

[36] Griffin, Atkins (o. Anm. 21) 41 mit Anm. 3 erkennen, wie schon der weiter oben erwähnte Heine, "an obvious gap" im Text, und folgen der Ergänzung Atzerts ("even the most serious man").

[37] Vgl. J. Ph. Krebs, J. H. Schmalz, *Antibarbarus der lateinischen Sprache. Nebst einem kurzen Abriss der Geschichte der lateinischen Sprache und Vorbemerkungen über reine Latinität* II (Basel 1907) 18 (s. v. *liber*) mit Verweis z. B. auf Cic. *De har. resp*. 34, *Verr*. 2, 58, *Pis*. 57, *Flacc*. 97.

[38] Vgl. z. B. Plaut. *Amph.* 1048–1050: *Ubi quemque hominem aspexero, / si ancillam seu servom sive uxorem sive adulterum / seu patrem sive avom videbo, obtruncabo in aedibus*.

[39] Zur Prägnanz von Substantiven vgl. G. Maurach, *Lateinische Dichtersprache* (Darmstadt 1995) 103–106.

[40] Vgl. z. B. Cic. *Att*. 13, 52, 2: *homines visi sumus* (Geschmack); Cic. *Phil*. 2, 39: *si modo homines sunt* (menschliche Gefühle); Cic. *Att*. 2, 2, 2: ῾Ηρώδης*, si homo esset, eum potius legeret quam unam litteram scriberet* (Vernunft); Cic. *Att.* 4, 15, 2: *si vis homo esse* (Ehrenmann).

Von den modernen Herausgebern hat sich, wohl von ähnlichen Überlegungen geleitet, einzig M. Testard dafür entschieden, den überlieferten Text unverändert zu lassen und übersetzt die Stelle folgendermaßen: "L'une, si elle vient en son temps – de même si c'est par délassement de l'esprit – est digne de l'homme, mais l'autre n'est pas digne, même de l'homme émancipé, si pour des sujets honteux elle emploie des termes grossiers".[41] Ohne das Supplement lautet der lateinische Text bei Testard: *Alter est, si tempore fit, ut si remisso animo, homine dignus*.

Dies wäre mit Testard wohl so zu verstehen: Die eine Art von Scherz ist, sagt Cicero, wenn sie zur richtigen Zeit kommt, ebenso wie / wie zum Beispiel in gelöster Stimmung, jedes Menschen würdig, d. h. jeder Mensch kann, wenn er den richtigen Zeitpunkt trifft, den καιρός,[42] einen Scherz machen, der zulässig und akzeptabel ist; *alter ne libero quidem, si rerum turpitudo adhibetur aut verborum obscenitas* – die andere Art von Scherz ist nicht einmal des Freigelassenen ("l'homme émancipé") würdig, nämlich wenn entweder Inhalt oder Formulierung anstößig sind, d. h. nicht einmal ein Freigelassener, der wegen seiner mangelnden Erfahrung in galanter Konversation und korrekten Manieren grundsätzlich mit größerer Nachsicht bei seinen Äußerungen, auch scherzhaften, rechnen kann als andere, nicht einmal der darf einen unzulässigen und inakzeptablen Scherz äußern. Gegen diese Auffassung Testards spricht nun nicht so sehr, daß der Gegensatz *homo* "(jeder) Mensch" – *liber* "Freigelassener" nicht besonders griffig ist, als vielmehr daß *liber* in der Bedeutung "Freigelassener", also als Synonym von *libertus*, sich für Cicero nicht belegen läßt und überhaupt in der gesamten Latinität schwer denkbar ist.[43]

Man könnte *liber*, wenn es nicht den Freien bezeichnen soll, auch im Sinne von "freizügig", "zügellos" verstehen[44] und in diesem Sinne *ne ... quidem* als Steigerung deuten: Die andere Art von Scherz, so wäre der Satz dann zu verstehen, ist nicht einmal eines Zügellosen würdig, von dem man ja in Sachen Benehmen ohnehin nicht viel erwartet – aber doch soviel, daß auch er nicht auf diese Weise scherzen darf. Beide Deutungen haben gemeinsam, daß *liber* gegenüber *homo* als die Beschreibung eines

---

[41] Testard (o. Anm. 23) 157 f.

[42] Zu Begriff und Geschichte von καιρός bzw. *occasio* vgl. B. Dunsch, "Topisch (oder) ephemer? Zur Ambivalenz der Gelegenheit in der Gelegenheitsdichtung", in: S. Fielitz, C. Uhlig, W. Keller (Hgg.), *Die Entdeckung der Antike durch die Moderne* (Heidelberg 2013) (im Druck); R. Nickel, *Besitzen und Gebrauchen. Spielarten einer Gedankenfigur vor und bei Aristoteles* (Marburg 2012) 175–183.

[43] Vgl. Köhler (o. Anm. 14) 293 f.

[44] Vgl. *OLD* 1023 s. v. *liber* 1, 11 b ("not practising restraint", "licentious", "free"), wo u. a. auf Cic. *Fam.* 12, 28, 1 verwiesen wird (*ne nimis liber in ulciscendo viderere*).

geringerwertigen sozialen Status verstanden wird.[45] Dies gilt auch für die Deutung von H. Köhler, die unter *homo* den "Mann des höchsten Standes", also einen Angehörigen der Nobilität, und unter *liber* den "freien Bürger", den *civis*, der freilich unterhalb des *nobilis* steht, "den undifferenzierten Vertreter der Menge", verstehen möchte.[46] Auch wenn Köhler an keiner Stelle ihrer Untersuchung explizit sagt, wie die Textstelle, so interpretiert, insgesamt verstanden werden soll, versuche ich eine Deutung im Sinne Köhlers: Die eine Art von Scherz ist, so soll hier gesagt sein, wenn sie zur richtigen Zeit kommt, wie zum Beispiel in gelöster Stimmung, jedes Mannes aus dem höchsten Stand würdig, aber die andere Art von Scherz ist nicht einmal eines Durchschnittsbürgers würdig, nämlich wenn entweder Inhalt oder Formulierung geeignet sind, Anstoß zu erregen.

Überdies wäre noch zu erwägen, ob *liber* wie *otiosus* gemeint sein könnte, "frei von Pflicht".[47] Dann müsste jedoch *remisso animo* ebenfalls, in abgeschwächtem Sinn, "nach Erledigung der Pflichten" bedeuten, was nicht unproblematisch ist.[48] Überdies würde nicht recht deutlich werden, worin der genaue Unterschied zwischen beiden besteht.[49]

Die Stellen aus *De officiis*, die Köhler für das Vorkommen und Spektrum der Bedeutungen von attributlosem *homo* anführt, sind zahlreich.[50] Zunächst erwähnt sie *homines* = "Mitmenschen" (2, 17) und *homines* = "Landsleute" (2, 55). Ist erstere Bedeutungsgleichung unstrittig (vgl. aber schon 2, 16 *deleti sint homines hominum impetu*), so ist bei der zweiten Vorsicht angezeigt: Bloßes *homines* kann kaum "Landsleute" heißen und steht auch in 2, 55 mit Attribut (*a nostris hominibus*). Die im weiteren von ihr angeführten Gleichungen *homines* = "Leute, man" sowie *hominem* = "ihn" (verwendet wie ein Personalpronomen der dritten Person Singular) und *homo* = "Mann"

---

[45] Unter Berufung auf Ciceros Formulierung mit *ne ... quidem* schreibt Köhler (o. Anm. 14) 296, daß "die Stelle […] so angelegt ist, daß am Ende ein geringerwertiger Begriff stehen muß". Daher sei es erforderlich, *homo* "über die allgemeine Bedeutung 'Mensch' hinauszuheben".

[46] Vgl. Köhler (o. Anm. 14) 300.

[47] Diesen Vorschlag verdanke ich dem anonymen Gutachter des *Hyperboreus*, ebenso den Hinweis auf Cic. *De sen*. 81, wo *remissus* und *liber* in Junktur auftreten: *dormientium animi … multa enim, cum remissi et liberi sunt, futura prospiciunt*. Doch dort bezieht sich *liber* nicht auf die Freiheit von Verpflichtungen, sondern auf das physische Losgelöstsein der Seele vom Körper, wie z. B. auch *De div*. 1, 129 (*animi hominum … per se ipsi liberi incitati moventur*).

[48] In übertragenem Sinn kann sich *remissus* auf affektive Zustände beziehen, aber nicht auf konkrete Umstände, in denen man sich befindet, vgl. die Belege in *OLD* (o. Anm. 44) 1611, s. v. 2.

[49] Auch wäre der Bezug zwischen *remisso animo* und *libero* (scil. *animo*?) nicht so klar wie man es in der Prosa Ciceros erwarten darf.

[50] Vgl. Köhler (o. Anm. 14) 296–298.

sind semantisch unproblematisch und in der Latinität gut belegt.[51] Für die Gleichung *homo* = "der Mann aus dem höchsten Stand, Herr" führt Köhler 2, 21 an. Hier sehe ich nicht, wie die Formulierung *quaecumque* […] *homines homini tribuunt ad eum augendum atque honestandum* usw. darauf schließen lassen könne, es gebe eine isolierbare Bedeutung *homo* = "Mann aus höchstem Stand". Vielmehr handelt es sich, wie die Junktur *homines homini* zeigt,[52] um den sprachlichen Ausdruck eines Kontrastes zwischen einem einzelnen und einer Gruppe. Solche sprachlichen Kontrastierungen sind nicht zwangsläufig sozialtheoretisch deutbar.

Dies wird noch deutlicher, wenn man die Textstellen betrachtet, die Köhler im folgenden als Belege für die von ihr vorgeschlagene spezifische Bedeutung *homo* = "Mann aus höchstem Stand" beibringt. Die erste dieser Stellen, *De or*. 2, 252 (*obscenitas non solum non foro digna, sed vix convivio liberorum*), ist wenig einschlägig. Es geht nicht um den Unterschied zweier Orte "verschiedener sozialer Wertigkeit",[53] wobei das *forum* als Ort hoher, das *convivium* als Ort geringer Wertigkeit aufgefaßt wird, sondern um die Frage von mehr oder weniger Öffentlichkeit, mehr oder weniger Publikum, wenn man obszön scherzt. Insofern sind die *liberi* hier keinesfalls als "Jedermänner"[54] zu verstehen. In *De off*. 1, 151 (*nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine, nihil libero dignius*)[55] geht es, wie in 1, 150 deutlich wird, um die Frage, welche Beschäftigungen eines Freien würdig bzw. unwürdig (*inliberales*) sind. Die Antwort gipfelt, für einen Römer wie Cicero nicht überraschend, in der Feststellung, der Landbau sei die dem Freien angemessenste Form der Beschäftigung. Den Satz schließt daher die Erwähnung des Freien (*libero*) ab, die zu der Bemerkung, der Landbau zieme sich überhaupt für jeden

[51] Bei einigen Stellen, die Köhler (o. Anm. 14) 297 für *homo* = Mann (statt *homo* = Mensch) anführt, frage ich mich allerdings, ob das Problem überhaupt ein sprachliches ist, wenn die Akteure, über die Cicero spricht und die nun einmal aufgrund der damaligen sozialen Verhältnisse in aller Regel Männer waren, vor allem wenn es um das Auftreten im öffentlichen Raum ging, von ihm aber nicht als "Männer", sondern "Menschen" bezeichnet werden. Prinzipiell ändert dies nichts an der Verallgemeinerbarkeit seiner dort getroffenen Aussagen.

[52] Solche polyptotischen Verbindungen sind im Lateinischen zu allen Zeiten beliebt, vgl. z. B. *amicus amico* (Plaut. *Merc*. 499).

[53] Köhler (o. Anm. 14) 298.

[54] *Ebd*., 298.

[55] Atzert folgt hier dem Vaticanus Borgia 326 (f) gegen die restliche Überlieferung und athetiert *nihil* vor *libero*. Abgesehen davon, daß auf diese Weise der ausgewogene Parallelismus und die begriffliche Steigerung gestört würden, setzt dieser Eingriff in den Text voraus, daß *homo* und *liber* eben keinen echten Gegensatz bilden, was zu beweisen wäre. Der Verweis auf 1, 104 in Atzerts Apparat führt zu einem Zirkelschluß; der auf *Phil*. 3, 12 läßt sich nicht verifizieren.

Menschen (*homine*) am meisten, noch eine Steigerung darstellt, freilich keine "Steigerung ins Allgemeine", wie Köhler glaubt.[56] Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, daß *homo* zwar in der Tat auch einmal "Mann des höchsten Standes" heißen kann – nicht zuletzt in der Junktur *homo novus*, "neuer Mann höchsten Standes", die freilich oft negativ konnotiert ist ("Emporkömmling")[57] –, daß es aber im Einzelfall sehr schwer ist, das am Begriff durch prägnante Ausdrucksweise vom Autor bewußt Versparte durch "Ideologiekritik"[58] zu re-konstruieren.

Versteht man unter *liber* jedoch den freien Mann (im Gegensatz zu jedem beliebigen Menschen, *homo*), ergibt 1, 104 einen guten Sinn und fügt sich auch gut in den weiteren Argumentationszusammenhang. Es war nämlich im voraufgegangenen Text nirgends von einem Gegensatz zwischen äußerst ernsthaften Menschen und solchen, die nicht äußerst ernsthaft sind, die Rede. Insofern lägen *<vel severissimo> homine* oder jede andere weiter oben genannte Form der Ergänzung und *libero* auf zwei verschiedenen semantischen Ebenen: Der intendierte Gegensatz ist nicht formuliert als einer zwischen sehr ernsthaften (oder bedeutenden, sozial distinkten o. ä.) Menschen, die offenbar als Freie gedacht sind, und solchen, die frei, aber nicht so ernsthaft sind. Dasselbe gilt auch für die von Köhler vorgeschlagene Deutung von *homo* als "Angehöriger des höchsten Standes", was letztlich daraus hinausläuft, ein Distinktion schaffendes Adjektivattribut, wie es viele andere suppliert haben, durch semantische Engführung des Bezugswortes zu versparen.

Dies kann aber nicht die Lösung sein. Vielmehr sind nach Ciceros kurz vorher geäußerter Ansicht ja alle Menschen generell eher zur Ernsthaftigkeit (*ad severitatem*) geschaffen. Also wird in 1, 104 wahrscheinlich ein Unterschied konstatiert zwischen den Menschen überhaupt, die alle zumindest

---

[56] Köhler (o. Anm. 14) 299; auch *Verr*. 2, 58 und *Lael*. 89, die Köhler im folgenden noch anführt, vermögen nicht zu überzeugen. Es ist ja gar nicht zu bestreiten, daß in Rom zwischen Angehörigen des Ritterstandes und einfachen freien Bürgern Unterschiede bestanden haben, wie sie Cicero auch immer wieder sprachlich formuliert, aber eine "geringere Wertschätzung" des *liber* durch Cicero, wie sie Köhler, *ebd*., 300 aus den Belegen erkennen will, vermag ich nicht zu sehen.

[57] *Homo novus* wird in der späten Republik überwiegend pejorativ verwendet (*novitas* als Gegenbegriff zur *nobilitas*); Cicero hat ihn im Laufe seiner eigenen Karriere aufgewertet und in einen positiv konnotierten politischen Slogan umgemünzt; vgl. F. Goldmann, "*Nobilitas* als Status und Gruppe. Überlegungen zum Nobilitätsbegriff der römischen Republik", in: J. Spielvogel (Hg.), *Res publica reperta. Zur Verfassung und Gesellschaft der römischen Republik und des frühen Prinzipats. Festschrift für Jochen Bleicken zum 75. Geburtstag* (Stuttgart 2002) 56 Anm. 70.

[58] Dies ist das methodische Prinzip von Köhler (o. Anm. 14), wie schon aus dem Titel ihrer Studie deutlich wird.

zulässige Scherze machen dürfen, und den Freien, die genauso wenig unzulässige Scherze machen dürfen wie alle anderen, sondern allenfalls – dies ergibt sich implizit aus dem zuvor Gesagten – auch einmal einen zulässigen Scherz, der nicht ganz zur richtigen Zeit (*tempore*) fällt.[59]

Der hohe Generalisierungsgrad dieser Aussagen passt vorzüglich zur großen Allgemeinheit des bereits zuvor Gesagten (1, 103: *ita generati a natura sumus, ut ...*). Im folgenden Abschnitt (1, 105 f.) hebt Cicero dann auch, zu dieser Argumentation passend, allgemein auf den Gegensatz Mensch – Tier ab (*homo – pecudes*, *reliquae bestia*);[60] ein nicht ebenso genereller oder auch ein prägnanter Gebrauch von *homo* in 1, 104 würde hierzu nicht gut passen. Erst danach kommt Cicero auf einzelne Beispiele zu sprechen; die menschliche Natur hat eben ihre allgemeinen und ihre individuellen Aspekte (1, 107–109).[61] Es läßt sich, wenn man unseren Textabschnitt in seinen argumentativen Kontext einordnet, ein weiter Bogen spannen, der von den bereits am Anfang dieser Untersuchung erwähnten Ausführungen Ciceros zur hervorgehobenen Position des Menschen gegenüber den Tieren (1, 96) über die Vielfalt der Rollen, die Menschen einnehmen können (1, 97), über die Frage, wie wir uns den Mitmenschen gegenüber verhalten (1, 98), ferner über die Forderung, daß wir allen gegenüber Rücksicht nehmen sollen, egal welchem Stand sie angehören (1, 99), bis hin zur Forderung reicht, daß die unvernünftigen Strebekräfte der Seele der Vernunft gehorchen sollen (1, 101 f.). Alles, was in diesen Abschnitten gesagt wird ist, teils explizit, teils implizit, anthropologisch-allgemein gesagt und nicht primär auf Angehörige einer bestimmten sozialen Gruppe, z. B. der Nobilität, bezogen. Dies gilt auch für 1, 103 f. sowie 105 f.

Es ist hoffentlich deutlich geworden, daß der in 1, 104 überlieferte Text nicht lückenhaft ist und ohne Supplement gehalten werden kann, auch ohne in Interpretationsnot zu geraten und ohne auf eine ideologiekritische

---

[59] Abwegig ist die Erklärung von Unger (o. Anm. 25) 39 f., der vorschlägt, *homine dignus* und *libero dignus* lägen auf derselben Ebene, wären also nichts als eine variatio im Ausdruck, und mithin synonym; der Gegensatz wäre daher vielmehr zu finden, "indem wir *si tempore fit*, *ut si remisso animo* und *si libero* auf einander beziehen und durch ergänzung von *animo* zu *libero* erklären: *alter est si tempore fit, ut si remisso animo fit, homine dignus; alter ne si remisso quidem animo fit, homine est dignus*."

[60] In 1, 106 verwendet er dann *homo* noch einmal im allgemeinen Sinne von "jedes menschliche Wesen". Wie Köhler (o. Anm. 14) 300 f. zutreffend feststellt, ist es wahrscheinlich, daß *homo* "in seiner anthropologischen Bedeutung als das Gattungswesen Mensch gebraucht" wird, wenn "an solchen Stellen entweder expressis verbis auf den generellen Unterschied Mensch-Tier abgehoben wird" oder "diese Unterscheidung im Hintergrund steht". Dies ist nun aber, anders als Köhler zu glauben scheint, in 1, 103–106 der Fall.

[61] Vgl. MacKendrick (o. Anm. 17) 236.

Umsemantisierung des prägnant verwendeten Wortes *homo* Rekurs nehmen zu müssen.

Jedoch sollte der Text an einer anderen, bisher weniger beachteten Stelle im selben Satz geringfügig geändert werden. Es handelt sich um den problematischen Ausdruck *ut si remisso animo*, den alle modernen Herausgeber, auch Testard, akzeptiert haben.[62] Hier sollte man, gestützt auf eine Variante in der Überlieferung, *et si remisso animo* in den Text setzen. Die Ausdrücke *tempore*, "zur richtigen Zeit", und *remisso animo*, "in gelöster Stimmung", liegen nämlich nicht auf ein und derselben semantischen Ebene: Vielmehr darf ein Scherz dann "in gelöster Stimmung" gemacht werden, wenn es zur rechten Zeit geschieht – d. h. wenn die Zeit nicht richtig ist, dann darf man sich auch beim Scherzen nicht gehenlassen. Der entscheidende Faktor ist, so der Sinn des Textes, der richtige Zeitpunkt, zu dem, und nicht der geistige Zustand, in dem man einen Scherz äußert. Oder deutlicher formuliert: Wenn der Zeitpunkt nicht richtig ist, sind alle anderen Umstände nebensächlich.[63] Dies aber kann mit *ut si* nicht ausgedrückt werden. Mit *ut si* würde *remisso animo* erläuternd und fortführend an *tempore* angeschlossen;[64] diese Funktion hat es auch in

---

[62] Ungenau formuliert Köhler (o. Anm. 14) 290, die schreibt, daß die Worte "*ut si remisso animo* so nicht in den Handschriften stehen", sondern "ein Lösungsvorschlag aufgrund einer disparaten Überlieferung" seien. Nach dem Apparat von, um ein Beispiel zu nennen, Atzerts Teubneriana findet sich *ut si remisso animo* zumindest in zwei Handschriften, a (= Avranches, Bibl. mun. 225; 12. Jh.) und T (= Tricassensis 552; 14. Jh.).

[63] Ein gutes Beispiel für einen solchen Scherz zur Unzeit stellt eine Anekdote über einen P. Scipio Nasica dar, wahrscheinlich den Konsul von 138 v. Chr., der im Wahlkampf um die Ädilität einem Bauern die schwielige Hand schüttelte und fragte, ob er auf den Händen herumzulaufen pflege (Val. Max. 7, 5, 2); vgl. M. Jehne, "Jovialität und Freiheit. Zur Institutionalität der Beziehungen zwischen Ober- und Unterschichten in der römischen Republik", in: B. Linke, M. Stemmler (Hgg.), *Mos Maiorum. Untersuchungen zu den Formen der Identitätsstiftung und Stabilisierung in der römischen Republik* (Stuttgart 2000) 216: "Scipio hatte sich in einem Zusammenhang, indem von ihm in besonderem Maße Jovialität gefordert war, einen Spaß auf Kosten eines einfachen Bürgers erlaubt und so die unstrittige Distanz zwischen ihnen betont, statt sie zu überspielen. Daß er bei der Wahl durchfiel, war die logische Konsequenz eines solchen Verstoßes gegen das Jovialitätsgebot".

[64] Es wäre noch zu erwägen, wie mir Jochim Effland vorgeschlagen hat, ob *remisso animo* vom Gemütszustand des Publikums und nicht des Scherzenden gesagt werden könnte. Der Duktus des Textes scheint mir nicht dafür zu sprechen – doch gesetzt, es wäre möglich: Dann wäre es auch möglich, *ut si* im Text zu belassen, da es in diesem Fall nur eine Erklärung des vorangehenden *tempore* einleiten würde, und wie folgt zu übersetzen: "Der eine, wenn er zur richtigen Zeit gemacht wird, zum Beispiel wenn die Stimmung (der Zuhörer) gelockert ist, schickt sich für jeden Menschen, der andere …".

der von Winterbottom im Apparat angeführten Parallele Quint. *Inst. or*. 5, 10, 55: *Praeterea finimus aut vi, sicut superiora, aut* ἐτυμολογίᾳ*, ut si assiduum ab aere dando et locupletem a locorum, pecuniosum a pecorum copia*. An der vorliegenden Stelle in *De officiis* jedoch sollte *remisso animo* vielmehr als Ausnahmetatbestand gekennzeichnet werden; daher ist die Quintilian-Stelle nicht einschlägig. Dies leistet aber das, den Apparaten Winterbottoms und Testards zufolge, in zwei Handschriften[65] überlieferte *et si* (bzw. *etsi*) *remisso animo*, oder noch deutlicher, freilich mit geringer Ergänzung, *et<iam>si remisso animo*, "wenn auch in gelöster Stimmung". Damit ergäbe sich folgender Text:

> Alter est, si tempore fit, et<iam>si remisso animo, homine dignus, alter ne libero quidem, si rerum turpitudo adhibetur aut verborum obscenitas.

Dies wäre so zu verstehen: "Der eine (Scherz) ist, wenn er zur richtigen Zeit gemacht wird, wenn auch in gelöster Stimmung, eines jeden Menschen würdig (= schickt sich für jeden Menschen), der andere nicht einmal (oder: wenigstens nicht / gerade nicht)[66] eines Freien, wenn (nämlich) die Hässlichkeit der Gegenstände und die Unanständigkeit der Wörter herangezogen werden".

Cicero mag bei der Abfassung dieses Passus[67] an einen der zahlreichen Vorwürfe gedacht haben, die ihm kurz zuvor, am 19. September 44 v. Chr., in einer nicht mehr erhaltenen, aber aus Ciceros

---

[65] *L* (Harleianus 2716; 9./10. Jh.) und c (Bernensis 104; 12./13. Jh.); *p* (Palatinus 1531; 13. Jh.) überliefert *et sit*; die jüngere Überlieferung bietet zudem noch *aut*, das wohl nur den Status einer Konjektur beanspruchen kann.

[66] Für diese Bedeutung von *ne ... quidem* vgl. F. Hand, *Tursellinus seu De particulis Latinis commentarii* IV (Leipzig 1845) 65 mit Verweis auf *De nat. deor*. 3, 24, wo die Vulgatausgaben allerdings *quoque* statt überliefertem *quidem* lesen, und *De fin*. 1, 70, wo der Text ebenfalls unsicher ist (*quam* oder *quidem*). Der sicherste Beleg bei Hand ist nachklassisch, Plin. *Pan*. 43, 5: *quotusquisque principum ne id quidem in patrimoniis nostris suum duxit, quod esset de suo*.

[67] *De officiis* wurde wahrscheinlich zwischen Oktober, vielleicht September, und Dezember 44 v. Chr. verfaßt. Das erste und zweite Buch waren am 5. November fertiggestellt; vgl. Dyck (o. Anm. 4) 8 f., Lefèvre (o. Anm. 1) 12 mit weiterer Literatur in Anm. 19. Die zweite *Philippische Rede* verfaßte Cicero wohl bald nach dem 19. September in direkter Reaktion auf die Angriffe des Antonius. Am 25. Oktober war die Rede schon geschrieben, veröffentlichen wollte Cicero sie aber mit Rücksicht auf die politische Situation erst später, wie er Atticus gegenüber äußert; vgl. G. Manuwald, *Cicero, Philippics 3–9. Volume 1: Introduction, Text and Translation, References and Indexes* (Berlin – New York 2007) 20 und 57–59. Ob sie ab den frühen Novembertagen als politische Flugschrift in Rom zirkulierte, wie oft vermutet wird, ist fraglich, vgl. *ebd*., 59 Anm. 156.

Reaktionen einigermaßen rekonstruierbaren Senatsrede von M. Antonius gemacht worden waren.[68] Hier geht es um den Vorwurf, daß Cicero, den Antonius als geltungssüchtigen Parvenu unter den Konsularen darstellte, der für einen großen Teil der politische Misere der vergangenen zwanzig Jahre verantwortlich sei, sich im Lager des Pompeius durch unpassende Witzeleien unbeliebt gemacht habe. Darauf reagiert Cicero in seiner zweiten *Philippischen Rede* (2, 39) brüsk:

> Ne <de>[69] iocis quidem respondebo, quibus me in castris usum esse dixisti: erant quidem illa castra plena curae; verum tamen homines, quamvis in turbidis rebus sint, tamen, si modo homines sunt, interdum animis relaxantur.

Hier verteidigt er sich in Form einer *praeteritio* gegen den Vorwurf, zur Unzeit und in einer falschen Situation (im Feldlager), mithin auf unschickliche Weise, gescherzt zu haben. Eine gewisse *libertas laedendi* gehört zwar zum Gepräge der Witzkultur, die in der Oberschicht der späten Republik ganz selbstverständlich praktiziert wurde,[70] doch zeigt die komplizierte Aushandlung der konkreten Grenzen solcher *libertas*, daß es viel Konfliktpotential in der Praxis gab und echte oder nur vermeintliche Verstöße gegen das *decorum* entsprechend propagandistisch genutzt werden konnten; so auch hier. Vom Inhalt speziell dieser *ioci* Ciceros vermitteln uns Plutarch und Macrobius eine Vorstellung.[71]

Bemerkenswert ist, daß Cicero hier gar nicht bestreitet, überhaupt solche Scherze gemacht zu haben; sie waren also zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung der Rede wohl schon weiteren Kreisen bekannt.[72] Ihr Inhalt muß in den Augen des Antonius unangemessenen genug gewesen sein, um als Vorwurf gegen Cicero genutzt werden zu können. Hierzu paßt das

---

[68] Vgl. Manuwald (o. Anm. 67) 20.

[69] Die Hinzufügung von *de* ist Konjektur von Wesenberg; überliefert sind *iocis* (*D*) und *totis* (*V*).

[70] Vgl. G. Vogt-Spira, "Das satirische Lachen der Römer und die Witzkultur der Oberschicht", in: S. Jäkel, A. Timonen, V.-M. Rissanen (Hgg.), *Laughter down the Centuries* III (Turku 1997) 127.

[71] Im Kontext der *ioca Ciceronis* führt Macrobius Beispiele für Ciceros witzig-bissige Bemerkungen über Pompeius an (Macr. *Sat*. 2, 3, 7 f.); er vermerkt auch dessen Unwillen (*facetiarum impatiens fuit*). So soll Cicero, als er verspätet bei ihm eintraf und darauf angesprochen wurde, gesagt haben: *Minime sero veni, nam nihil hic paratum video*. Pompeius wiederum soll über Cicero gesagt haben: *Cupio ad hostes Cicero transeat, ut nos timeat*. Vgl. Plut. *Cic*. 38, dessen Bonmots auffälligerweise nicht mit denen bei Macrobius übereinstimmen; Plutarchs Bericht kennzeichnet Ciceros Verhalten im Feldlager deutlich als destruktiv.

[72] Vgl. J. T. Ramsay, *Cicero. Philippics I–II* (Cambridge 2003) 219.

bei Quintilian (ohne Zustimmung) referierte und weit verbreitete Urteil, Cicero habe innerhalb wie außerhalb des Gerichts zu sehr nach dem Erregen von Lachen gegiert (*non solum extra iudicia, sed in ipsis etiam orationibus ... nimius risus adfectator*); der Cicero-Bewunderer Quintilian sieht in Ciceros Witzen allerdings eher ein Zeichen von *mira urbanitas*.[73] Andere Feinde (*inimici*) Ciceros waren hingegen sogar so weit gegangen, ihn als "Clown" (*scurra*) zu bezeichnen, wie wir wiederum bei Macrobius erfahren.[74]

Cicero macht gegen den spezifischen Vorwurf des Antonius als Ausnahmetatbestand geltend, daß zwar die Situation im Feldlager aufgeregt gewesen war (*in turbidis rebus*), daß aber *homines*, "Menschen", wenn sie denn *homines* sind, also "wirkliche Menschen",[75] bisweilen den Geist entspannen dürfen (*animis relaxantur*). Dies, ebenso wie der prägnante Gebrauch von *homo*, erinnert sehr an die in *De officiis* gewählte Formulierung *remisso animo*. Diese inhaltliche und sprachliche Parallele ist nicht die einzige zwischen *De officiis* und den *Philippicae*. Auf einige andere Berührungspunkte zwischen diesen beiden Werken, die auf je eigene Weise in höchst bedrängter Zeit das politische Credo Ciceros zum Ausdruck bringen,[76] hat die Forschung bereits früher hingewiesen.[77] Weitere, vor allem in der zweiten Philippischen Rede, sind noch zu entdecken.[78]

Boris Dunsch
dunsch@staff.uni-marburg.de
Marburg

---

[73] Siehe Quint. *Inst. or*. 6, 3, 3; vgl. E. A. Schmidt, "Römisches Lachen", in: G. Alföldy et al. (Hgg.), *Römische Lebenskunst. Interdisziplinäres Kolloquium zum 85. Geburtstag von Viktor Pöschl. Heidelberg, 2.–4. Februar 1995* (Heidelberg 1995) 82.

[74] Macr. *Sat*. 2, 1, 12; vgl. F. Graf, "Cicero, Plautus und das römische Lachen", in: J. Bremmer, H. Roodenburg (Hgg.), *Kulturgeschichte des Humors. Von der Antike bis heute* (Darmstadt 1999) 33. Wahrscheinlich ist Antonius zu diesen *inimici* zu rechnen.

[75] Die *distinctio* (*homines ... homines*) unterstreicht die prägnante, semantisch verdichtete Verwendung des Wortes bei seiner zweiten Setzung.

[76] Zum politischen Charakter von *De officiis* vgl. Dyck (o. Anm. 4) 29–36; Lefèvre (o. Anm. 1) 197–204.

[77] Vgl. Manuwald (o. Anm. 67) 138–140, die u. a. auf die parallele Darstellung der Rolle von Massilia in beiden Werken verweist (Cic. *Phil*. 8, 18 und *De off*. 2, 28); gute weitere Ansätze bei A. M. Stone, "Greek Ethics and Roman Statesmen: *De officiis* and the *Philippics*", in: T. Stevenson, M. Wilson (Hgg.), *Cicero's Philippics. History, Rhetoric and Ideology* (Auckland 2008) 214–239.

[78] Ich danke Michael von Albrecht, Jochim Effland, Adolf Johann Heß, Gregor Maurach, Rainer Nickel und dem anonymen Gutachter des *Hyperboreus* für interessante Hinweise und Anregungen.

In his treatment of *temperantia* (*De off*. 1, 93–151), Cicero discusses the self-evident natural principle of *decorum*, closely linked with that of *honestum*. Cicero illustrates it by an analogy from drama, where a person's utterance should suit his/her character. Thus *decorum* requires us to control, among other things, our wit and jest. There are two kinds of them, one in accordance with *decorum*, the other not. The vulgate reading of a central statement about *iocus* is: *Alter est, si tempore fit, ut si remisso animo, <vel severissimo> homine dignus, alter ne libero quidem, si rerum turpitudo adhibetur aut verborum obscenitas*. In the context of Cicero's argument, it makes better sense to abstain from the insertion *<vel severissimo>* and read: *et<iam>si remisso animo, homine dignus*, where *homo* refers to all human beings (including slaves) and *liber* to all free human beings. A biographical cause for Cicero's discussion can be found in an attack waged on him by Antonius, accusing him of undue joking while he stayed at Pompey's camp (*Phil*. 2, 39).

Цицерон в *рассуждении* о *temperantia* (*De off*. I, 93) останавливается на понятии *decorum*, тесно связанном с *honestum*. Цицерон иллюстрирует его аналогией, заимствованной из области драмы: реплика персонажа должна соответствовать его характеру. Подобным же образом *decorum* требует контролировать, помимо прочего, наш шутки: некоторые из них соответствуют *decorum*, другие же – нет. Центральное утверждение относительно *iocus* в варианте, принятом в вульгате выглядит следующим образом: *Alter est, si tempore fit, ut si remisso animo, <vel severissimo> homine dignus, alter ne libero quidem, si rerum turpitudo adhibetur aut verborum obscenitas*. Более предпочтительно, однако, с точки зрения логики цицероновского высказывания, отказаться от добавления <vel severissimo> и читать: *et <iam> si remisso animo, homine dignus*, где *homo* относится ко всем людям (включая рабов), и *liber* ко всем свободным людям. Биографической подоплекой этих замечаний Цицерона могли быть нападки со стороны Антония, который обвинял его в неуместных шутках во время пребывания в лагере Помпея (*Phil*. II, 39).

CAESAR, THE GERMANI, AND ROME: ETHNOGRAPHY AND POLITICS IN THE *DE BELLO GALLICO*

At the opening of *De bello Gallico* Caesar gives a description of hostile tribes which is surprisingly positive. They are said to be uncivilized and restless, as we might expect. But he does not judge these characteristics negatively. Rather, he contrasts them favourably with the 'effeminacy' of Gaul allies (1, 1):

> Horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae, propterea quod a cultu atque humanitate provinciae longissime absunt, minimeque ad eos mercatores saepe commeant atque ea quae ad effeminandos animos pertinent important, proximique sunt Germanis, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, quibuscum continenter bellum gerunt. Qua de causa Helvetii quoque reliquos Gallos virtute praecedunt, quod fere cotidianis proeliis cum Germanis contendunt.
>
> Of all these people [the inhabitants of Gaul] the Belgae are the most courageous, because they are farthest removed from the refinement and civilization of [our] province, and are least often visited by merchants introducing those goods that make men's spirits effeminate, and also because they are the nearest to the Germani dwelling beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continuously at war. For the same reason the Helvetii too excel the rest of the Gauls in manliness, since they contend with the Germani in almost daily battles.

At first glance, we might suppose that we can make short work of this passage. Caesar is simply saying that the hostile tribes are a powerful threat that the Gaul allies could not handle on their own, and a suitably glorious enemy for him.

However, things are not so simple. Caesar also gives an explanation of the putative state of affairs he describes, and says that the enemy's manliness (*virtus*) is due to their lack of contact with Roman civilization. By giving this explanation, which is not required either by his goal of justifying Roman intervention or enhancing his own glory, Caesar seems to be making a general claim about civilization. What is the point of this addition and the criticism of civilization it implies?

This paper will try to answer this question. I will argue that this passage and others like it throw light on Caesar's views concerning society and civilization. Here, in fact, Caesar is using his enemies as a way of reflecting on an alternative and more valuable model for Rome itself.

* * *

As indicated in my introduction, commentators have tended to think that the opening of the work says nothing of particular interest about Caesar. Two arguments have been put forward to the effect that it does not. The first argument is that Caesar's point about civilization being a source of corruption is not Caesar's, but an ethnographic *topos*, that of the so-called noble savage, which he takes over from Greek sources without thought.[1] The second argument is that Caesar's point, though perhaps not just a careless borrowing from his sources, merely serves the purpose of playing up the threat posed by his enemies.[2]

The first argument does not bear scrutiny. To begin with, it rests on the assumption that Latin authors are unintelligent translators of the Greeks. This assumption is both implausible in general and still more in this particular case. Caesar is the first author known to identify the Germani as an ethnic group distinct from the Gauls.[3] While the idea that savages are noble is not new, it is Caesar's choice to employ it in his representation of the Germani, and we need to explain why he made this choice. Indeed, more than this, as I will show in the next section, Caesar develops the

---

[1] G. Walser, *Caesar und die Germanen: Studien zur politischen Tendenz römischer Feldszugsberichte* (Wiesbaden 1956) 334–339; J. J. Tierney, "The Celtic Ethnography of Posidonius", *Proc. Royal Irish Academy* 60 (1969) 212–217; A. Lund, *Zum Germanenbild der Römer: eine Einführung in die antike Ethnographie* (Heidelberg 1990) 63–66. They identify Posidonius as a source. A. O. Lovejoy, G. Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (New York ²1965) provide a sample of ancient 'primitivistic' texts.

[2] E. Polomé, "César et les croyances germaniques", in: D. Poli (ed.), *La cultura in Cesare* (Rome 1993) 3–16; J. Barlow, "Noble Gauls and their Other in Caesar's Propaganda", in: K. Welch, A. Powell (eds.), *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter* (London 1998) 157–158; C. Torigian, "The Logos of Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum*", in: Welch, Powell, *op.cit*., 49–50.

[3] Posidonius is the only known earlier author who talks of Germani, but he failed to distinguish them from the Gauls: D. Timpe, "Die germanische Agrarverfassung nach den Berichten Caesars und Tacitus", in: V. H. Beck (ed.), *Untersuchung zur eisenzeitlichen und frühmittelalterlichen Flur in Mitteleuropa und ihrer Nutzung* (Göttingen 1979) 20–21; I. G. Kidd, *Posidonius, 2nd volume: the Commentary* (Cambridge 1988) 323–326; A. M. Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome* (Austin, Texas 2006) 50–51.

noble-savage idea in a new and creative way, well beyond any pre-existing literary *topos*, and this calls out for explanation.

Moreover, the source-critical argument neglects to take account of an important feature of our text. Caesar's words imply a criticism not of civilization in general, but of Roman civilization in particular, in a way that jars in several respects with what a Roman audience might have expected him to write.

Caesar lists three factors that make hostile tribes better warriors than Roman allies: (1) They are distant from the 'refinement and civilization' (*cultus atque humanitas*) of '[our] province'. (2) They are not visited by merchants who bring wares that 'make men's spirits effeminate' (*effeminare animos*). (3) They absorb *virtus* through interaction with the Germani dwelling east of the Rhine.

As regards (1), Caesar does not just say that hostile tribes are distant from Gallia Narbonensis. He says that they are distant from its *cultus atque humanitas*. Caesar's prose is usually poor of rhetorical figures, and his making use of a metonymy here suggests deliberate emphasis. By his day *humanitas* has an unambiguously positive connotation: one is not properly human if one does not have a certain standard of good breeding.[4] Yet Caesar has *cultus atque humanitas* responsible for his Gaul allies' inaptness to fight, thus using these terms in a derogatory way.[5] This interpretation gains support from his asymmetric use of language. The antonym of *humanitas* is *feritas*. However, when Caesar is to refer to the tribes that do not possess *humanitas*, he does not attribute *feritas* to them, but rather *fortitudo* (in the adjectival form *fortissimi*) and *virtus*.[6] Both terms are positive in their connotations. This is the first way in which what Caesar has written is jarring.

Next note that the expression 'make men's spirit effeminate', once again a rhetorical figure, in (2). By 'effeminacy', the antonym of *virtus*,

---

[4] I. Heinemann, "Humanitas", *RE* Supplb. 5 (1931) 282–310; D. Gagliardi, "Il concetto di *humanitas* da Terenzio a Cicerone. Appunti per una storia dell'umanesimo romano", *P&I* 7 (1965) 187–198; V. R. Giustiniani, "Homo, Humanus, and the Meanings of 'Humanism'", *JHI* 46 (1985) 167–195.

[5] A comparable criticism of *humanitas* is in Tacitus, *Agr*. 21. The term has a positive connotation in Caesar's presentation of one of his legate as *adulescens summa virtute et humanitate* at 1, 47, but the expression is formulaic. A closer parallel is, then, at 4, 3: the Ubii, a German tribe settled nearby Gaul and more exposed to trade, are *humaniores* than the rest of the Germani. Similarly at 5, 14 Britons settled near the coast are *humanissimi*.

[6] The Germani are *homines feri ac barbari* at 1, 33, but see below my observation concerning the difference portraits Caesar offers of the Germani in the ethnographic parts and the narrative respectively.

Caesar indicates a physical and moral softening which he ties to *luxuria*, self-indulgence,[7] and which, as it happens, goes together with the *cultus atque humanitas* previously attributed to Romanised Gauls. Foreign merchants are held to be responsible. But the ultimate responsibility lies with the Romans, who opened up Gaul to civilization, and who had already undergone this softening. As M. Griffin puts it: "When Caesar writes,'The Belgae […] effeminacy', we know that he is thinking of the effect of those amenities and luxuries on the Romans themselves".[8] Thus the antonomasia 'Province' (*provincia*) for Gallia Narbonensis is not just a variant for the plain geographical indication, but is intended to emphasise the role of Romanization as a source of decadence.

The 'effeminacy' of civilized Gauls is contrasted with the *fortitudo* of hostile tribes, who are neither neighbouring Gallia Narbonensis nor visited by merchants. In (3) Caesar gives a positive reason for their being superior to Romanised Gauls, namely their proximity to the Germani's tribes dwelling east of the Rhine. Thus Germania provides a second pole, equal but opposite to Rome. Rome spreads 'effeminacy', while Germania spreads *virtus* by forcing its neighbours to permanent warfare. Caesar is not the first Latin author to attribute *virtus* to non-Romans,[9] but no one else has gone so far as to imply that barbarians might be superior to the Romans in respect of it.

In the opening of the work Caesar does not tell us why the Germani are such remarkable champions of *virtus*. He will do so in a later digression (6, 21–24 *passim*). Here he says that they are trained from boyhood to endure toil and hardship (*student labori et duritiae*), and that they abide in a condition of want, poverty and suffering (*inopia, egestas, patientia*).

At the end of this digression he adds that the Gauls also possessed *virtus* before they came into contact with Rome, and that those of them who

---

[7] See 4, 2 and Caesar's paraphrase of the same idea at 2, 15.

[8] M. Griffin, "*Iure Plectimur*: The Roman Critique of Roman Imperialism", in: T. C. Brennan, H. I. Flower (eds.), *East and West* (Cambridge, Mass. 2008) 85–111. Could Caesar be saying that Rome is a source of other people's corruption, without being itself corrupt? After all, this is what Tacitus says in the passage referred to in note 5. But, first, Tacitus does think that Rome is itself corrupt. Secondly, there is plenty of evidence that first-century BC Rome was seen as corrupt by the Latin authors themselves (e. g. Sallust).

[9] M. A. McDonnell, *Roman Manliness: Virtus and the Roman Republic* (Cambridge 2006) 160–161; see also W. V. Harris, "Can Enemies too Be Brave?", in: M. G. Angeli Bertinelli, A. Donati (eds.) *Il cittadino, lo straniero, il barbaro, fra integrazione ed emarginazione nell'antichità* (Rome 2005) 465–472. Caesar in *BG* attributes *virtus* thirty-one times to individual barbarians or groups of them, still more often than to Romans (figures from McDonnell, *op. cit*., 302 n. 28).

have been spared from the contamination, a tribe called Volcae Tectosages, still do. Furthermore, the frugal lifestyle of these Volcae Tectosages not only enable them to excel in *virtus*, but also in civic virtue, *iustitia*. To the extent that their lifestyle is the same as the Germani's, it follows that the Germani too excel in *iustitia*. Indeed justice, in the form of social justice, is an essential ingredient of the picture Caesar has just drawn of their system in a part of the digression on which I will comment shortly.

Thus Caesar's description of the Germani in this ethnographic digression is unconditionally favourable. It is not so if we look at the *De bello Gallico* as a whole, including the narrative. But this consideration only makes it all the more remarkable that no reference to negative features is found in the ethnography.[10]

This unconditionally favourable character, together with the fact that the subject is an entire *natio*, not an individual, sharply distinguishes Caesar's picture of the Germani from the 'mixed' portraits that combine negative and positive features, which Latin historians are sometimes found giving of negative heroes, both Roman (e. g. Sulla or Catilina) and Barbarian (Hannibal).[11]

In fact, the description Caesar gives of the Germani is not only favourable, but also idealized. This has induced scholars to explain it away as voicing a *topos* concerning primitive societies, to which Caesar conforms without thought and conviction. From my examination of the opening of the work, however, it has emerged that Caesar's use of this *topos* is actually carefully thought over and perhaps even deliberately provocative. I shall explore the possibility that he appropriates it and, as we shall see, develops it in a creative way, for conveying his idea of what a well-functioning society ought to be like.

What, then, of the rhetorical argument? This can be dealt with much more briefly. According to this argument, since Caesar's goal is to defend his campaign and to magnify his army and himself, his portrait of hostile

---

[10] There is no hint that Caesar condemns the Germani's practice of training the youth by having them pillage neighbouring villages (6, 23). Comparable practices in Sparta provide an antecedent. Tacitus' picture of the Germani is more nuanced (*Germ*. 4, 3; cf. 26, 2; 45, 4), and yet Tacitus too identifies them as bearers of positive values (E. O'Gorman, "No Place like Rome: Identity and Difference in the *Germania* of Tacitus", *Ramus* 22 [1993] 146–149). Caesar's attribution of fierceness and treachery to the Germani in the narrative at 1, 33 is instrumental and required to justify controversial aspects of his campaign.

[11] A. La Penna, "II ritratto 'paradossale' da Silla a Petronio", *RFIC* 104 (1976) 270–293, discusses this style of portraying individual enemies, which he describes as 'paradoxical'.

tribes as noble savages should not be read in isolation, but rather as contributing to his representation of them as formidable enemies.[12] I have already admitted that Caesar might have this kind of agenda in mind. But did he need to have them noble in order to have them dangerous?

Caesar wrote a treatise *De analogia*, in which he argued the thesis that "the choice of words is the fountain-head of eloquence" (Cic. *Brut*. 153). If he had meant to say that his enemies are *iracundi*, *furiosi*, *temerarii* or the like due to their *feritas*, he would have used these words. Seneca, *De ira* 2, 15, for one, sharply distinguishes *fortitudo*, which he denies to the Germani, from *audacia* and *temeritas*, which in his view they have in common with animals.

The reason why commentators are reluctant to allow that Caesar actually meant what he writes is perhaps the following. The noble savage is a nice subject to write verses about or to provide intellectual fodder, but Caesar is neither poet nor philosopher, but politician. So, the line of thought goes, he cannot seriously claim, let alone believe, that.

But Caesar is, after all, to all appearances, fond of his Germani. He praises not only their *virtus*, but their life system as a whole. And in fact this commitment to use of the idea of the noble savage need not be 'philosophical' or 'poetic'. To start with, there are laudatory references to endurance of hardship (*duritia*) and commitment to toil (*labor*) elsewhere in Caesar's own *oeuvre* and in anecdotes about him (Plut. *Caes*. 17; Athen. 6, 273 b). Further, endurance of hardship is characteristic of Marius, his military and political hero (Sall. *Iug*. 100).

Indeed, these values are hardly idiosyncratically Caesarian. They are an integral part of the ideology of an influential tradition stemming from Cato the Elder, who identified *duritia* and *industria* (= *labor*), together with *parsimonia* (somewhat comparable with the Germani's *inopia, egestas, patientia*) as the cornerstones of a healthy education (Cat. F. 128 and F. 17 on *labor*). In this sense, then, Caesar's Germani provide a living *exemplum* of a character type that embodies widely endorsed virtues, and his admiration for their system of life can be regarded as a variant of Cato's *laus temporis acti*.

We are entitled, then, at least to see how far we can get if we seek a reflection of Caesarian themes in his use of the idea of the Germani. For the remainder of this paper, then, I will set myself to reconstructing these themes.

---

[12] McDonnell (n. 9) 303; Harris (n. 9); Barlow (n. 2) 158. See also Riggsby (n. 3) 68–70, whose interpretation is, however, more elaborate.

Farming is anti-social

I have suggested that Caesar's Germani provide a living *exemplum* of the same character type of ideal man as Cato's warrior-farmers. There is, however, a substantial difference between Caesar's and Cato's instantiations of this character type of ideal man. Not only do these instantiations carry so to speak a different passport, but also, above all, they have a different job. Cato's ideal type works the land. Caesar's Germani, by contrast, fight and hunt, but go in for agriculture very little, if at all.

If Caesar had wished to hint at a parallelism between his Germani and Cato's warrior-farmers, we would have expected him to play down this difference. But in fact he is keen to emphasise it, with the sentence *agri culturae non student* opening his account of the economy of the Germani (6, 22 *init*.):

> Agri culturae non student, maiorque pars eorum victus in lacte, caseo, carne consistit. Neque quisquam agri modum certum aut fines habet proprios; sed magistratus ac principes in annos singulos gentibus cognationibusque hominum, qui una coierunt, quantum et quo loco visum est agri attribuunt atque anno post alio transire cogunt.
>
> They show no interest in agriculture, and the greater part of their food consists of milk, cheese, and meat; nor has any one a fixed quantity of land or his own individual limits; but the magistrates and the chiefs (*magistratus ac principes*) each year assign to the clans and the groups of kinsmen who have assembled together as much land as, and in the place in which, they think proper, and the year after compel them to move elsewhere.

In addition to lack of interest in farming, Caesar says that the Germani have implemented a form of communal land-ownership. Archaeology lends no support to his report of a difference in the economies west and east of the Rhine,[13] and while there was indeed a less developed civilization to the north, the so-called Jastorf culture,[14] there is no evidence that this other civilization had a social organisation of the sort Caesar reports.

The picture he draws is, rather, a generalization from his account of the war-economy system of the Suebi at 4, 1.[15] However, there is a difference here too. The Suebi are "the most warlike tribe of all the Germani" (*ibidem*),

---

[13] M. Rambaud, *L'art de la deformation historique dans les commentaires de Cesar* (Paris 1953) 335; Timpe (n. 3) 13; P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak* (Princeton 1999) 113–114.

[14] Wells (n. 13) 114.

[15] Rambaud (n. 13) 335; Timpe (n. 3) 18; Lund (n. 1) 63; Riggsby (n. 3) 60.

and hence, we would think, the least fond of farming. Yet according to Caesar they do not neglect this activity even in wartime. We would assume that less warlike Germani tribes would pursue it on a larger scale. By contrast, Caesar does not only extend the Suebi's system to the Germani as a whole, regardless of any ongoing war in which they might be engaged, but he also emphatically states that they show no interest in agriculture, which is not said of the Suebi themselves.

According to the mainstream interpretation, there is nothing remarkable here: the system Caesar attributes to the Germani as a whole is the reflection of the stereotype of a primitive society, and, therefore, he cannot but have them unfamiliar with the economy characteristic of civilization.[16] But there is a difference between Caesar's Germani and the stereotypical noble savage. To start with, the noble savage does not usually choose to be such. Naivety and simple-mindness are a part of the cliché. Accordingly, as soon as the savage comes in contact with civilization, he loses his nobility at once.[17] Caesar's Germani, by contrast, do not only choose to live in the way they live (as the Nervii and the Suebes also do in *BG*, albeit with reference to individual items only), but, still more than this, give an elaborate argument to the effect that it is only by adopting their system that *virtus* can be preserved (6, 22 *fin*.):

> Eius re multas adferunt causas: ne adsidua consuetudine capti studium belli gerendi agri cultura commutent; ne latos fines parare studeant potentioresque humiliores possessionibus expellant; ne accuratius ad frigora atque aestus vitandos aedificent; ne qua oriatur pecuniae cupiditas, qua ex re factiones dissensionesque nascuntur; ut animi aequitate plebem contineant, cum suas quisque opes cum potentissimis aequari videat.
>
> For this enactment [of communal land ownership and annual rotation] they put forward many reasons: the fear that they may be tempted by continuous association to substitute agriculture for their warrior zeal; that they may become zealous for the acquisition of broader estates, and so the more powerful may drive the lower sort from their possessions; that they may construct their houses with too great a desire to avoid cold and heat; that some passion for wealth may spring up, from which cause divisions and discords arise; it is their aim to keep common people under control by being fair to them, when each man sees his own conditions made equal to those of the more wealthy.[18]

---

[16] Lund (n. 1) 63–66.

[17] Strabo 7, 301, referring to the Scythians. The Medians at Hdt. 9, 122 choose to avoid a comfortable life, but they are neither noble savages nor in a state of primitiveness.

[18] There is a word play between *aequitate animi* as indicating the people's contented state of mind, and the fairness by which their *magistratus ac principes* achieve this goal by making the conditions of life of both the rich and the poor equal (*aequari*).

As the argument goes, agriculture and private property bring about socially negative consequences that wise political leadership would wish to prevent.

There is no parallel for such argument in the ethnographic tradition,[19] and the list of consequences mentioned (concentration of land in the hands of a few people, greed of the *potentiores*, civil discord, social pressure of the *plebs* for a redistribution of wealth) recalls the situation of contemporary Rome so closely that none of Caesar's Roman readers could fail to spot an allusion.[20]

Of course, the Germani themselves hardly bothered about, or even knew of, the social problems of contemporary Rome. They are hardly the authors of the argument Caesar attributes to them. Caesar himself is, and his alluding to the situation in Rome provides yet another argument against the hypothesis that he is merely restating, without thought, a literary *topos*. He did think about it. But what is the point of this allusion?

Key is the fact that Caesar's allusive description of the crisis of contemporary Rome is not a neutral description, but a politically oriented interpretation: this crisis is due to the greed of large land-owners and to the incapability, or unwillingness, of the political leadership to restrain them. Could it be that he thereby intended to contribute to an ongoing debate?

The agrarian question was a major issue in Caesar's day, with the politicians conventionally labelled as *populares* (henceforth simply *populares*) urging a redistribution of land, and the *optimates* defending the *status quo*. The goal Caesar's Germani pursue, that of social and economic justice, agrees with that which the *populares* claimed to be pursuing. However, while the *populares* proposed to achieve this goal by returning to the old system of small land-ownership, it is a corollary of the Germani argument that the crisis Rome faces is the actualisation of latent potentialities that Rome's agricultural model carried from the beginning. It follows that the *popularis* proposal of returning to small land-ownership is not a remedy, but a way of perpetuating problems.

It is tempting, then, to interpret this argument as signalling Caesar's dissatisfaction with the policy of the *popularis* tradition, and, beyond that, with Cato's ideology of farming. Cato at *Pr*. 3–4 claims that farming and nothing else produces good citizens and soldiers, and that profit from agriculture is legitimate and causes no social resentment, whereas the

---

[19] Riggsby (n. 3) 68.

[20] Nor, for that matter, have at least some commentators failed to spot the allusion; cf. R. von Pöhlmann, *Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt* II (Munich 1925) 451; Walser (n. 1) 60; Timpe (n. 3) 25. It is unfortunate that no one of them went further.

merchant is greedy, and hence a threat to society.[21] Caesar's Germani do not only make the opposite point that farming undermines one's warlike attitude, but also that it encourages greed and thereby civil discord, just like trading in Cato's view. The polemical echo is hardly a matter of coincidence.

While it is easy to detect a criticism of established patterns of Roman political thought, it is, by contrast, less easy to assess what positive point Caesar is getting at. Caesar himself was a leading *popularis*, and, as a consul, introduced an agrarian bill in line with the traditional policy of this tradition. Neither abolition of agriculture nor of land-ownership were items on his agenda. Thus there is a gap between his construal of this fictional society and his actual policy. How shall we deal with it?

In the remainder of this paper I will first take a closer look at the Germani fictional society, and then argue that Caesar's construal of this society is in keeping with aspects of his own policy and/or political rhetoric.

The Germani society reassessed

The system that Caesar attributes to the Germani is usually interpreted as a form of nomadic communism. This is not right. There is no private land-ownership among them, and yet they are annually assigned a portion of land for private use. Private use of land, even if it is by clans rather than individuals, constitutes a departure from the *topos* of primitive communism, which envisages no boundaries whatsoever. Relatedly, there is also a departure from the idea of nomadism. Caesar does not say that the Germani have no stable territory, but, rather, that they annually rotate from one to another estate, one understands, within one and the same territory. So much so that they are said to take pride in the fact that neighbours do not dare to settle but at a certain distance.

It follows that Caesar's Germani do practise *some* agriculture. He says that they 'show no interest' in it,[22] and attributes to them a distinctively pastoral diet based on diary products and meat.[23] Yet, at the same time, he says that rotation serves the purpose of preventing people from taking excessive care of their land. This concern presupposes that they do take

---

[21] The adjectives *periculosus et calamitosus* are usually understood as indicating the danger that traders themselves face, but the context suggests that the danger too that they pose to society is in view.

[22] The verb *studere* at 6, 22 is ambiguous between 'practising' and 'being fond of'. I adopt the second meaning because, as a matter of fact, the Germani do practice some agriculture, as Caesar himself goes on to say.

[23] B. D. Shaw, "Eaters of Flesh, Drinkers of Milk", *Ancient Society* 13 (1982) 5–31, discusses the polarity between civilization and savagery in connection with diet.

at least some care of it. Caesar calls their farms *possessiones*. The term does not indicate actual ownership (*dominium*), but it does entail a certain degree of control, at least a temporary one.

Thus Caesar's Germani practise a form of *unsettled* agriculture. This is not because they do not own the land. (Ordinary tenants are not owners, and yet they take care of their estates no less than owners would do.) Rather, this is because they are forced to move annually from one to another estate. Absence of private ownership is a part of the picture insofar as it provides the legal framework that entitles their leaders to make them rotate.

On closer inspection the land in Caesar's fictional Germani society is not so much communally owned, as in a primitive society, as state-controlled: the *magistratus ac principes* decide the size and the location of the land to be assigned to clans 'as they think proper', and the *magistratus ac principes* again 'compel' (*cogunt*) people to rotate annually from one to another estate. Caesar might have said, but does not, that the Germani as an unqualified whole organise themselves in such and such a way. Rather, he emphasises the role of their leaders from the very outset. It is these people who redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor in order to make them equal, and it is these very same people, not the Germani as a whole, to whom Caesar attributes the argument to the effect that settled agriculture is bad.

Thus the Germani system is in fact quite elaborate. Its essence is permanent military engagement, affirmative action against social inequality, control by the political leadership over society including the upper classes.[24] The way in which Caesar conveys his idea of society in describing this putative system is not, I suggest, to be sought in the minutiae of this description, which perhaps elaborate on second-hand reports. Rather, we should attend to the core idea of a militarised, egalitarian, and authoritarian society. It is in these respects that the Germani society reflects his idea of what a well-functioning society ought to be like. First, then, the military.

The Military

That a Roman author, and Caesar in particular, should be fond of a warlike society is not surprising. There was not another ancient society arguably as engaged in warfare as Rome was, and Caesar himself, a 'man of the army' in his own words (Plut. *Caes.* 3), was planning a major campaign against the Parthians after the Gallic and the civil war. Thus both Rome as such and Caesar's Rome can be said to be in a state of permanent warfare.

[24] I disagree with Riggsby (n. 3) 61, that the Germani society is politically not organized.

To be in such a state requires that a large part of the active male population be constantly ready to man the army and fight. However, the system of small land-ownership advocated by Cato was not suited to this. For Cato's warrior-farmers are professional farmers whose job is to take care of their land. Cato does claim that they provide *milites strenuissimi* to the army. However, the historical counterparts of these characters were different from Cato's representation of them, and they actually resented the levy.[25]

These people's lack of enthusiasm for the army was justified. If ancient sources are to be trusted, the long and distant campaigns in which Rome became more and more engaged, although victorious, resulted in the loss of the properties of several small land-owners, which in turn brought about a dramatic decrease in the number of citizens meeting the income requirements for joining the army. Marius addressed the problem by extending conscription to the poorest citizens. While this reform changed the rules for raising an army, it did nothing to change the 'rules' of society as such, which remained those of an agricultural society. So much so that the expectation of the new soldiers was to be allotted land as the reward for their service.[26]

It is precisely this situation – everybody wanting to be a farmer and the larger the farm the better – that the Germani leaders represent as a danger to be averted. Their solution is straightforward: ban both land-ownership and settled agriculture, so as to turn Cato's warrior-farmers into pure warriors. There is no evidence nor reason to suppose that Caesar ever thought of implementing in Rome the specific measures he attributes to the Germani. However, the idea as such that farming, whatever the status of ownership and/or the length of tenancy, ought to be subsidiary to military service, with war being the primary occupation of the active male population, does nothing more than to formalise the facts on the ground: by Caesar's day, war booty and tributes had become a major source of income for Rome, and Roman agriculture itself was heavily relying on slave labour captured in war.[27]

---

[25] P. A. Brunt, "The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution", *JRS* 52 (1962) 75 n. 66.

[26] Brunt (n. 25) 80–84. But there are exceptions (e. g. App. *BCiv* 5, 3; Dio 48, 2, 3: cf. *ibid*. 81).

[27] It is interesting to observe that Caesar in a speech to his soldiers reported by App. *BCiv* 2, 93–94 expresses contempt for their expectation to be released from service and allotted land. The speech is of course faked, but as any fake speech in ancient historiography is intended to reflect the speaker's views.

To make warfare the primary activity of the male population does not of course entail that agriculture should be abolished altogether. Not even Caesar's Germani do so. The distinctive feature of their system, as Caesar construes it, is, rather, absence of private ownership. Neither Caesar nor any other *popularis* is found advocating abolition of land-ownership,[28] but it would be wrong to explain this theme away as a purely literary *topos*. For the *populares* did claim the right for the magistrates to expropriate the land and to redistribute it, should social welfare require it.

Expropriation of land was anathema to the *optimates* on the ground that ownership is a natural and inviolable right. According to Cicero *Off*. 2, 85, it is the job of the political leadership to defend it. Now, the Germani society is, for Caesar, just and unspoiled by civilization and therefore more 'natural' than Rome. We may think that, by emphasising their magistrates' control over the land, he is thereby defending the principle that private property is neither natural nor inviolable. As it happens, in the very same context in which Cicero advocates private property, he presents Caesar as a threat to it and a promoter of revolutionary measures (*Off*. 2, 84; see also *Att*. 7, 18, 2).

Thus we have come to my second topic of discussion, whether aspects of Caesar's description of the Germani reflects aspects of his rhetoric as a leading *popularis*. I have already observed that the argument he attributes to their *magistratus ac principes* picks up a theme distinctive of the *popularis* propaganda: that a fair political leadership will prevent the *potentiores* from increasing their properties at the expenses of the *humiliores*, and will redistribute wealth from the former to the latter. In what follows I will focus on another aspect of this topic, namely Caesar's admiring description of a human type trained to hardship and unspoiled by self-indulgence. This features in his ethnography of the Germani, and I will suggest that its presence reflects his allegiance to the rhetoric of the *popularis* tradition.

The People

Militarism was an integral part of the Roman ideology over and above any political division. However, 'militarism' is not immune to qualification: exactly what one's commitment to militarism consists in may vary

[28] Yet Tiberius Gracchus was friend of the philosopher Bloxius of Cuma, a upholder of communal property, so perhaps he had some interest in such theories; cf. F. La Greca, "Blossio di Cuma: stoicismo e politica nella Roma dei Gracchi", *Quaderni del Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Educazione dell'Università di Salerno* 5 (1995) 141–177.

with political allegiance. Caesar's praise of his private soldiers and his criticism of high-ranking officers suggests a link to his political agenda. Not only are his soldiers the same common people who had provided earlier *populares* with their social basis of consensus, but also the positive values that he praises in both the Germani and in his own soldiers, i. e. endurance of hardship and commitment to toil, are features of the lifestyle of Roman common people.[29]

By contrast, the members of the élite are, according to the rhetoric of the *populares*, indolent and self-indulgent, and hence unfit to lead a military life.[30] Caesar echoes this motif in the anecdote concerning the cowardice of his high-ranking officers, a cowardice which he contrasts with the *virtus* of his soldiers, whom he judges more worthy of the equestrian rank than those who actually have it.[31] As Plutarch (*Caes*. 9) narrates it:

> Seeing that his officers were inclined to be afraid, and particularly all the young men of high rank who had come out intending to make the campaign with Caesar an opportunity for high living (τρυφή = *luxuria*) and money-making, he called them together and bade them be off, since they were so unmanly and effeminate.[32]

Remarkably, Plutarch has Caesar accuse his high-ranking officers alone of joining the army for profit, as if his soldiers had a less material motivation. Perhaps Caesar thought that for his soldiers the choice was a matter of bare survival. Even so, his implicit positing two different orders of motivations conveys an antipathy toward the élite and a sympathy with common people.

Further, Plutarch has Caesar allege his high-ranking officers to be not only greedy, but also 'effeminate'. Thus 'effeminacy', as Caesar understands it, is a feature common to both Roman aristocrats and Romanised Gauls. The opposite feature is the *virtus* of both the Germani and his own soldiers, which he ties to *duritia* and other comparable characteristics.

---

[29] H. Mouritsen, *Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge 2001) 4 and 133–140. The conditions of life of rural common people were even tougher (Cic. *Leg. agr.* 2, 26–27 / 70–71).

[30] Sallust's *Bellum Iugurthinum* provides an instance of this *topos*. See also [Sall.] *Ep. ad Caes*. 10, 9; and Sall. *Cat*. 20.

[31] Caes. 1, 39; cf., T. P. Wiseman, "The Publication of the *De bello Gallico*", in: Welch, Powell (n. 2) 2–3. Riggsby (n. 3) 12–14 disagrees.

[32] Plut. *Caes*. 19. Caesar himself at 1, 39–40 does not explicitly speak of 'effeminacy'. Presumably Plutarch is expanding the original report in the light of Caesarian themes that he has found elsewhere.

Cicero enables us to appreciate the social implications of this kind of talk. Cicero does not advocate effeminacy as such, a term which has an intrinsically negative connotation. Yet he puts it on a par with *duritia* as two opposite but equally negative features (*Off*. 1, 129): "two things are to be avoided by all means: effeminacy or softness on the one hand, and toughness or rusticity on the other". Toughness is not the same thing as endurance of hardship, but the Latin *duritia* does not distinguish between the two, and toughness itself can be seen as the result of being trained to endure hardship.

Cicero's tying *duritia* with rusticity suggests that the reference is to the way of life of peasants. This interpretation gains support from Cato's identification of *duritia* as a cornerstone of a rural education, as well as from Marius' proud claim of *duritia* in connection with his allegedly humble origins from the countryside.[33]

This reference is important because, according to Brunt (n. 25), the 'rural proletariat' provides the core of the Roman army in Caesar's day. Indeed Cicero describes his soldiers as *homines rusticos* (*Ad fam*. 9, 7, 2). When he is in a complimentary mood they are said to be *fortissimos viros civisque optimos* (*ibid*.), but when they take Antonius' side, they become *homines agrestes, si homines illi ac non pecudes potius* (*Phil*. 7, 9).

These considerations demand a qualification of the 'wide agreement' concerning the features that the Germani embody, of which I spoke at the beginning: some of these features, such as *duritia* and, still more, *egestas*, capture distinctive aspects of the life of common people, and were judged in a negative way by members of the élite – *egestas*, far from being a condition of *virtus* as it is for Caesar at 6, 24, induces wickedness (*improbitas*) according to Cicero.[34] But even those features, such as *labor*, that are acknowledged as positive by everyone have different degrees of importance, depending on one's social pedigree and/or political allegiance. For one, *labor* finds in Cicero little or no recognition.

Thus the Germani way of life, as Caesar represents it, would not be regarded as commendable by just any Roman reader, and Caesar presumably would not expect this. Rather, his praise of hardship and toil, stereotypical as it might seem, can best be explained as contributing to his celebration of common people and attack on the élite.

This explanation gains additional support from the fact that, on closer consideration, Caesar's point concerning the effeminacy of Romanised

[33] Sall. *Iug* 100. The theme of *duritia* is evoked in Marius' self-portrait at *Iug*. 85.
[34] Mouritsen (n. 29) 139–141.

Gauls does not target all Romanised Gauls alike. At 6, 13 he tells us that *plebei* are kept in a state of slavery and vexed by debts and tributes. They could hardly be deemed to afford the luxury goods that he cites as inducing effeminacy. Moreover, a large number of Caesar's private soldiers were Gauls, and we cannot attribute to him the claim, even in implicit form, that his own soldiers are effeminate. Thus his point is likely to apply to the Gaul élite alone, which, I suggest, we can, and should, understand as a projection of the Roman one.

Another element about Gallia Narbonensis integrates the picture. The most important urban centre was the Greek town of Massalia, and Greek traders were active along the river Rhône.[35] Since Caesar ties the decadence of Romanised Gauls to the activity of foreign traders, and since the self-indulgence of the Greeks was a *topos* in Latin literature, it is possible that his reference to *cultus atque humanitas* is an allusion to this Greek influence too.[36]

This hypothesis squares well with my suggestion that Caesar's ultimate polemical target is the Roman élite, since an influential tradition stemming from Cato the Elder tended to present their decadence as running in parallel with their Hellenization. The idea of *humanitas* itself goes back to the philhellenic lobby of the Roman élite in the second century BC, the so-called Scipionic circle.

Caesar's opposition to philhellenism is by now an established theme in secondary literature.[37] However, it would be wrong to explain this opposition away as a token of nationalism. The refinement and elitism of Greek culture were bound to make it intrinsically unsuitable to Caesar's militaristic and populist rhetoric, over and above its foreign origin. Even if we leave aside these unsuitable characteristics, Greek education was an element of differentiation between the élite and those who neither spoke Greek nor could afford to study it. At least this was Marius' rationale for despising Greek education, which he dismissed as a useless pastime of the aristocracy.[38]

---

[35] A. Tchernia, "Italian Wine in Gaul", in: P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, C. R. Whittaker (eds.), *Trade in Ancient Economy* (London 1983) 87–104; R. L. B. Morris, "Mercatores and the *Bellum Gallicum*", *CB* 66 (1990) 83–85.

[36] F. Kraner, W. Dittenberger, H. Meusel (eds.), *C. Iulii Caesaris commentarii de bello Gallico* (Berlin 1960) 1, 81. Pompeius Trogus 43, 4, 1–2 praises the civilizing effects of Massalia on the Gauls.

[37] L. G. H. Hall, "*Ratio* and *Romanitas* in the *Bellum Gallicum*", in: Welch, Powell (n. 2) 25–29; see also McDonnell (n. 9) 300–301. Caesar's self-representation as a Hellenistic monarch is later.

[38] Sall. *Iug*. 85, 31; see also 63.

Thus Caesar's opposition to philhellenism can be seen as a part of his attack on the élite and, to this extent, complementary to his favourable attitude to the Germani. It is a conjecture, but a plausible one, that Caesar is alluding to the negative influence of Greek refinement and civilization in the *De bello Gallico* as well.

It is perhaps possible to go even further in this political reading of the opening of the work. The Romanization of Gallia Transalpina dates long before Caesar, as far back as the late second century BC, with Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus. Following the usual pattern of Roman conquest, local élites were forced to enter a special association, in the form of *clientela*, with the conqueror and his descendants. One of these descendants was Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, a leading *optimas* in Caesar's day. Whatever the actual degree of 'manhood' of Romanised Gaul élites, it is tempting to think that their unwillingness to help Caesar followed from input received from his domestic enemies at Rome, just as his high-ranking officers' mutiny at Vesontio almost certainly did.[39] The Greek town Massalia itself was to become one of his enemies' strongholds during the civil war, thus confirming the existence of ties between local élites and Caesar's domestic opponents.

Whatever the precise connections making up the web of allusions, Caesar's point concerning the effeminacy of Romanised Gauls induced by civilization and, as it were, consumerism, which at first sight might seem a bare echo of ethnographic stereotypes and peripheral to Caesar's own agenda, takes on a different meaning if read against the political situation at Rome.

Caesar's agenda

I have suggested that Caesar's description of the Germani reflects features of his views concerning Roman militarism, society and power structures. It is not surprising that Caesar as a politician should want to express a view on these topics as he returns to the political struggle at Rome. But why would he be doing this in a digression of the *De bello Gallico*, which is not a political manifesto, but a bare account of military deeds? We must, then, take a closer look at both the target audience and the agenda of this work.

It has often been assumed that the *De bello Gallico* is addressed to the élite, and that Caesar's agenda is to advertise himself as a worthy

[39] H. Hagendahl, "The Mutiny of Vesontio", *Classica et Mediaevalia* 6 (1944) 1–40.

member of the club. However, Wiseman casts doubt on this identification of Caesar's target audience. In Wiseman's view, the work, to be read out in public squares, addressed a popular audience, and was intended to sing the praises not of *Romanitas* as such, but rather of that sector of Roman society, the 'People', which both manned his army and formed the basis of his political clientele as a *popularis* leader.[40]

If indeed Caesar's agenda in this work was not, or not primarily, to defend a past campaign or to magnify his military skills, but rather, above all, to enhance his appeal as a *popularis* leader, it is not difficult to see how his ethnographic points fit in it. Indeed my reconstruction of these points has the merit of enabling us to go further and to refine this interpretation as follows.

Caesar's account of the Germani's system does not only convey the idea that a life of toil and hardship deserves respect, but also that it ought to be pursued. But for all that his glorification of these characteristics may strike a sensitive chord with the social pride of his audience, one would assume that these people aimed at improving their life standard, and not at struggling with poverty endlessly. The politicians conventionally labelled as *populares* traditionally met this expectation by pledging land, but this is precisely the kind of policy the Germani's leaders oppose. What they recommend us to do is, rather, to put up with poverty. Caesar does not make this recommendation *in propria persona*, and yet he is, to all appearances, sympathetic with it. What is the point of this?

Leges sumptuariae, prohibiting excessive use of jewellery and prodigality in feasts and banquets, were a constant refrain in Rome in connection with wars. Now war for Caesar was not a special event, but a permanent state of affairs to which to prepare ourselves, and indeed the poverty he attributes to the Germani is no religious or ethical dogma, but an integral part of their preparation to war.

As it happens, it is a recurrent theme of the *De bello Gallico* that the tribes that have lost their *virtus* are invariably the prey of those that have preserved it. The Germani are one of these latter and dominant tribes (6, 24):

---

[40] Wiseman (n. 31). The idea of a popular audience goes as far back as T. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte* III (Berlin ^{9}1903) 615, who describes Caesar as a democratic general addressing the people. J. Harmand, *L'armée et le soldat à Rome: de 107 à 5 avant notre ère* (Paris 1967) 493, goes so far as to speak of 'military socialism'. Against Wiseman's hypothesis Riggsby (see above note 31) and e. g. J.H. Collins, "Caesar as a Political Propagandist", *ANRW* 1.1 (1972) 939, who speaks of 'posterity'. This line of interpreting the *De belllo Gallico* as a purely literary work is also defended by N. DeWitt, "The Non-Political Nature of Caesar's Commentaries", *TAPhA* 73 (1942) 341–352.

> Upon the Gauls the neighbourhood of our provinces and acquaintance with overseas commodities lavishes many articles of use or luxury; little by little they have grown accustomed to defeat, and after being conquered in many battles they do not even compare themselves in point of *virtus* with the Germani.

So are the Roman legions themselves.

The rule at which Caesar hints as concerns the microcosm of Gaul, that no middle way is given between enslaving others and being enslaved, is the same rule that the Romans have long been invoking as a justification for their imperialism. As Tiberius Gracchus puts it in a speech he gave in support of his agrarian bill (App. *BCiv* 1, 11):

> The Romans possessed most of their territory by conquest, and they had hopes of occupying the rest of the habitable world; but now the question of greatest hazard was whether they should gain the rest by having plenty of brave men, or whether, through their weakness and mutual jealousy, their enemies should take away what they already possessed.

Tiberius, a leading *popularis* just like Caesar, ties the task of reforming society to that of preserving military efficiency. Caesar too in the argument he attributes to the Germani's leaders establishes the same link between their job of social engineering and securing military efficiency. Tiberius and Caesar's Germani (that is, I suggest, Caesar himself) disagree as to whether an army of farmers or a professional one best secures military efficiency, but military efficiency is at the top of the agenda of both. It is against the background of this shared concern that we should understand Caesar's praise of a life of toil and hardship. This is more than a literary *topos*. It is a matter of survival.

Conclusion

Caesar's *De bello Gallico* is not a piece of literature addressed to an unqualified posterity, but a celebration of the army and the people, addressed to his political audience. Caesar's admiring description of the Germani system, far from being a diversion for the sake of entertaining the reader (Riggbsy), is an integral part of this celebration.

This description picks up primitivistic themes from the ethnographic tradition. But there is no endorsement of primitivism as such. The dichotomy Caesar hints at, here and throughout the rest of the work, is not between developed and primitive societies, but rather between the *feminitas* of the aristocrats dwelling in their luxurious villas and the *virtus* of common people defending their country as it were in uniform.

This description entails admiration not for the Germani as such, but for the system they have implemented. For Caesar is not interested in what passport the bearer of *virtus* carries, but rather in what conditions allow us to preserve or to restore our *virtus*. The Germani's social and economic system is suited to this task, whereas Rome, as Caesar sees it, is ruled by a small group of aristocrats whose self-indulgence is a source of corruption for the entire society, and whose greed jeopardises civil concord and thereby military efficiency. Hence comes the need of a radical change of political leadership.

Roberto Polito
Milan

At the opening of *De bello Gallico* Caesar gives a description of hostile tribes which is surprisingly positive. They are said to be uncivilized and restless, as we might expect. But he does not judge these characteristics negatively. Rather, he contrasts them favourably with the 'effeminacy' of Gaul allies, whom he deems to have been spoiled by contact with Roman civilization. I suggest that this passage and others like it throw light on Caesar's views concerning society and civilization. Here, in fact, Caesar is using his enemies as a way of reflecting on an alternative and more valuable model for Rome itself.

Описание враждебных племен в "Записках о Галльской войне" неожиданным образом предстает весьма позитивным, причем враги противопоставляются "изнеженным" галльским союзникам, на которых, по мнению Цезаря, негативно влияет соседство с римской цивилизацией. Такого рода пассажи проливают свет на социальные и политические взгляды Цезаря. Описание врагов отражает его размышления об альтернативной модели общества – лучшего, чем римское.

‘TENEBRICOSUS’ AND IRONY IN CATULL. 3*

Understanding of mood is very important for the correct interpretation of a literary text, especially a lyrical one. Meanwhile, this aspect is especially difficult to share with a multicultural audience: emotional hints expressed by certain words and references to some texts and events are naturally grasped by contemporaries, but are obscure for later readers. To a considerable degree it is the case also for irony.[1]

Scholars find irony in Catullus far more often than in other Roman poets; specific language of his polymetra – with its multiple use of diminutives, superlatives, exclamations and repetition – makes them, in the opinion of a modern reader, *too* affective; therefore, scholars often prefer to interpret it as irony.[2] In fact it is often difficult to solve the problem if there is irony in one or another text or not in general, because the idea of irony is complicated and everyone perceives it subjectively; more attainable is to find out whether the word/expression in question adds ironical tone to the whole text or to its part, and the best way to do it is to examine semantics and stylistic nuances of the word/expression in a variety of other contexts.

The subject of my interest is the mood of Catullus’ *carm.* 3.[3] There is no single view on it among scholars: sometimes it is defined as a mock

* I would like to thank V. Zelchenko for fruitful discussions, active help and constant support during my work on this article.

[1] The term ‘irony’ is used in the wide sense.

[2] A striking example of such debates is *carm.* 49: does Catullus give these praises to Cicero sincerely, or should we interpret them cum grano salis, or, after all, is there pure derision behind hyperbolical glorification? Each of these views has its followers. For the history of the question see: E. V. Slugin, *“*Gratias tibi maximas Catullus agit (Cat. 49)”, *Hyperboreus* 2 (1996) 194–200.

[3] It is necessary to say that by ‘passer’ I mean a bird, and I do not see any obscene implication here. The problem of ‘passer’-meaning is secondary in this case but worth being briefly discussed. To begin with, though ‘passer’ is often thought to be a sparrow (e. g. W. G. Arnott, *Birds in the Ancient World from A to Z* [London – New York 2007] 228), it can’t be so, because, firstly, sparrows are distrustful of people and it is difficult to handle them; secondly, they do not have a beautiful appearance or sing charmingly (s. M. Schuster, “Valerius 123”, in: *RE* 7A [1948] 2368–2369; C. J. Fordyce [ed., comm.], *Catullus* [Oxford 1961] 88). M. Schuster and O. Keller think that ‘passer’ is a blue rock thrush (M. Schuster [n. 4]; O. Keller, *Die antike Tierwelt* II [Leipzig

dirge,[4] sometimes as an ironic pastiche,[5] sometimes as a love poem.[6] They often find irony in *carm.* 3 because, in their opinion, it is impossible to mourn *so* for a little bird. Only one argument is concrete: D. F. S. Thomson adduces 'tenebricosus' ("qui nunc it per iter tenebricosum / illuc, unde negant redire quemquam") as a strong reason for some kind of irony saying that it is "a colloquial, even somewhat vulgar form, which lightens the tone and firmly identifies it as mock-heroic".[7] However, it is disputable.

1913] 80; s. also *OLD*, s. v. 1). I disagree with them because blue thrushes have such evident qualities (bright feathering and melodious singing), that Catullus would have mentioned them in his praise to the nestling. So, I think, 'passer' is a little bird which kind the author himself did not consider necessary to define (s. В. П. Смышляева, *Римский поэтический авиарий* (V. P. Smyschljaeva, *Roman poetic aviarium)* [Ufa 2005] 117; cf. also W. D'Arcy Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds* [London – Oxford 1936] 268: "Στρουθός is very often used generically, like Lat. *passer*, <…> of any small bird"). Therewith, in modern Romanic languages words, that originate in 'passer' (Rom. pasăre, Sp. pájaro, Port. passaro), mean simply a bird (W. Meyer-Lübke, *Romanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* [Heidelberg 1911] 464–465).

[4] А. И. Пиотровский (пер., комм.), *Катулл, Книга лирики* (A. I. Piotrovsky [tr., comm.], *Catullus, Book of Lyrics*) (Leningrad 1929) 140; P. Y. Forsyth (ed.), *The Poems of Catullus: a teaching text* (Lanham, MD 1986) 110–111; С. В. Шервинский, М. Л. Гаспаров, *Катулл, Книга стихотворений* (S. V. Shervinsky, M. L. Gasparov [ed.], *Catullus, Book of Poems*) (Moscow 1986) 214.

[5] F. G. Doering (ed.), *C. Valerii Catulli Veronensis Carmina* (Altonae 1834) 3: "In hoc carmine vere ludicro poeta de melliti Lesbiae passeris morte luctum indicit"; G. P. Goold, "Catullus 3. 16", *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 200: "The tone of the hendecasyllable is light, facetious, playful, bantering, satirical. The poem is a mock-elegy"; K. R. Walters, "Catullan Echoes in the Second Century A. D.: CEL 1512", *CW* 69 (1976) 353–359; D. F. S. Thomson (ed., comm.), *Catullus* (Toronto etc. 2003) 207. Cf. Grimaldi: "We have, then, at the referential level two poems on Lesbia's pet sparrow. Beneath this level there are the poems of reflective, ironic comment by the poet on himself and his love affair. <…> Indeed if a parallel is to be drawn with Meleager's poem it will be: As Phanion killed the young hare so Lesbia killed Catullus' love not by overaffection but by toying with it. <…> *C.* 2. 2–6 lends new meaning to *c.* 3. The presence of this rather bitter comment in these poems is further strengthened by the fact that even at the referential level their tone was very likely openly parodic as a comparison with *Anth. Pal.* 7. 199, 203 might indicate" (W. M. A. Grimaldi, "The Lesbia Love Lyrics", *CPh* 60 [1965] 92).

[6] Fordyce (n. 3) 92: "…the simple emotion which turns the lament for the dead pet into a love-lyric, and makes commonplace and colloquial language into poetry, owes nothing to any predecessor"; K. Quinn (ed., comm.), *Catullus, The Poems* (London 1973) 96: "Poem 3 is a delicately ironical, graceful love poem…", though it "follows closely the traditional pattern of a dirge"; Forsyth (n. 4) 111: "The delicate charm of the poem becomes most apparent at its conclusion, where the mock dirge is transformed into an understated love poem: while the ostensible subject of the piece is the bird, its true focal point is Lesbia".

[7] Thomson (n. 5) 209. Thomson also notices (207): "In lines 11 and 12, both the sounds (*it per iter*) and the language, with the off-hand colloquialism of *tenebricosum*

According to *DELL*, ‘tenebricosus’ is formed from archaic ‘tenebricus’, the traces of which are found in Old French; moreover, Romanic languages give ground for reconstruction of the form ‘*intenebricus’.[8] Along with ‘tenebricus’, ‘tenebrosus’[9] is also formed from ‘tenebrae’–A. Vaníček considers it a full synonym to ‘tenebricus’ and ‘tenebricosus’.[10]

P. E. Knox, an author of a classical article about adjectives in *-osus*,[11] shows how contradictory generally recognized views on this problem are: some words in *-osus* are traditionally defined by commentators of Latin authors as poetic (according to a popular statement, this suffix “substitutes” Greek -όεις and πολυ- in poetry), some, on the contrary, as colloquial (‘formosus’).[12] But we should also take into account the third sphere of use–prosaic (or “scientific and technical”).[13]

Knox shows that all these descriptions are exaggerated (many “poetic” epithets appear in technical writers–medics, geographers etc.; ‘clivosus’, ‘muscosus’, ‘squamosus’, ‘frondosus’, ‘nimbosus’ etc. do not have Greek analogs) and demonstratively proves that stylistic connotations of each word should be defined separately and, what is more, sometimes the same epithet has different shades in different contexts. In Laberius, who used ‘annosus’ first (“non mammosa, non *annosa*, non bibosa, non procax”, *Mim.* 99

---

and *negant* (continued in *male sit*, and in the use in poetry of *bellus*), render the tone by degrees more and more quasi-comical and almost flippant, so that the threatening shades of Orcus, and of solemnity, are kept at arm’s length”. Fordyce notes that “the word [sc. tenebricosus] has no pathetic or romantic associations in Catullus’ contemporaries” (Fordyce [n. 3] 94). S. also Quinn (n. 6) 99. W. Kroll does not mention connotations of *tenebricosus* but notes in the commentary: “die ernsten Töne wirklicher Grabgedichte klingen hier parodistisch” (W. Kroll [ed., comm.], *C. Valerius Catullus* [Leipzig–Berlin ^{2}1929] 6).

[8] A. Ernout, A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine: Histoire des mots* (Paris ^{4}1967) 1206; Meyer-Lübke (n. 3) 324.

[9] There is unmetrical ‘tenebrosum’ instead of ‘tenebricosum’ in **V**–an obvious replacement of the quite rare word by a more usual one. The emendation ‘tenebricosum’ was proposed by Veronese humanist Antonius Parthenius who published a commentary to Catullus in 1485.

[10] A. Vaníček, *Griechisch-lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Leipzig 1877) 285.

[11] P. E. Knox, “Adjectives in -osus and Latin Poetic Dictionary”, *Glotta* 64 (1986) 90–101.

[12] The fact that “a variety of semantic content may be found in one suffix [sc. -oso- / -lento-] according to its context” noted E. W. Nichols (E. W. Nichols, *The semantic Variability and semantic Equivalence of -ōso- and -lento-*, Diss. [Yale 1914] 19). According to Leumann, the origin of *-osus* is controversial; semantically such adjectives correspond to Greek ones in -όεις and -ώδης. Leumann also spoke against one-sided conclusions about semantics of adjectives in *-osus* (M. Leumann, *Lateinische Laut- und Formenlehre (Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft*, Abt. II, Tl. 2, Bd. I) [München 1977] 342).

[13] Leumann (n. 12) 342.

Bonaria), the epithet is colloquial; however, this adjective was introduced into Roman poetry by Vergilius in an epic simile of Aeneas with an oak: "ac velut *annoso* validam cum robore quercum / Alpini Boreae nunc hinc nunc flatibus illinc / eruere inter se certant" (*Aen.* 4. 441–443). After Vergilius poets freely use 'annosus', but it is found in prose rather rarely until late antiquity. Speaking about 'annosus' I cannot help mentioning Horatius: 'annosa cornix' in *Od.* 3. 17. 13 ("aquae nisi fallit augur / *annosa* cornix") belongs to elevated style and 'annosum palatum' in *Sat.* 2. 3. 274 ("quid? cum balba feris *annoso* verba palato, / aedificante casas qui sanior?") to low.

Catullan words in *-osus*[14] are also stylistically different: e. g. 'ventosus' and 'frondosus' (*carm.* 64. 12, 59, 96) are elevated and 'febriculosus' (*carm.* 6. 4) ("verum nescioquid *febriculosi* / scorti diligis") is not.

A history of 'tenebricosus' can be a good illustration to the thesis proposed by Knox. This adjective is found in Roman literature 11 times: besides Catullus, Cic. *Vat.* 11; *De cons. prov.* 8; *Pis.* 18; *Luc.* 73; Varr. *RR* 3. 9. 19; *Ant. rer. divin.* fr. 57 Mirsch; Colum. 8. 14. 11; Hygin. *Fab.* 146. 1; Sen. *Ep. mor.* 50. 3; 86. 4. As for Ciceronian 'tenebricosa popina' (*Pis.* 18), that commentators of Catullus often cite, substandard connotations of 'popina' need not be shifted to the adjective: cf. 'tenebricosus specus' (Varr. *Ant. rer. divin.* fr. 57 Mirsch) concerning a cave of Sibylla that was deeply revered by Romans.[15]

On the other hand, in Cicero's *De provinciis consularibus* (8) 'tenebricosus' is used in a "lofty" stylistic context: "lateant libidines eius illae tenebricosae" (a clearly high-flown character of the passage is very important here). An example from Ciceronian *Lucullus* (Acad. II, 73 = 68 B 165 DK) should also be mentioned: "ille [sc. Democritus] esse verum plane negat, sensus quidem non obscuros dicit sed tenebricosos (sic enim appellat eos)". This fragment shows that for Cicero 'tenebricosus' was stronger than 'obscurus'.[16] H. Diels[17] correlated Cicero's passage with

[14] Catullan adjectives in *-osus* (asterisk marks words that are found in Catullan poetry for the first time, double asterisk marks hapaxes): 'aestuosus' (7. 5; 46. 5), 'araneosus'* (25. 3); 'cuniculosus'** (37. 18), 'curiosus' (7. 11), 'ebriosus' (27. 4 bis), 'febriculosus' (6. 4), 'formosus' (86. 1, 3, 5), 'frondosus' (64. 96), 'harundinosus'** (36. 13), 'imaginosus'** (41. 8); 'iocosus' (8. 6; 36. 10; 56. 1, 4), 'laboriosus' (1. 7; 38. 2), 'morbosus' (57. 6), 'muscosus' (68b. 58), 'nervosus' (67. 27), 'ostriosus'* (fr. 1. 4), 'otiosus' (10. 2; 50. 1), 'pilosus' (16. 10; 33. 7), 'spinosus' (64. 72), 'spumosus'* (64. 121), 'studiosus' (116. 1), 'sumptuosus' (44. 9), 'tenebricosus' (3. 11), 'ventosus' (64. 12), 'verbosus' (55. 20; 98. 2).

[15] Quinn writes that "*tenebricosum* seems hardly a more solemn word than *pipiabat* – Varro uses it of a henhouse (*R.* 3. 9. 19) and Cicero of a tavern (*Pis.* 18)" (Quinn [n. 7] 99), as if 'tenebricosus' would change its nature if used with a "high" noun.

[16] Cf.: Ch. Brittain (tr.), *Cicero on Academic Scepticism* (Indianapolis – Cambridge 2006) 43: "rather than saying that the senses are obscure, he calls them dark".

[17] H. Diels, W. Kranz (ed.), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* II[6] (Zürich 1952) 177.

Democritus’ one (68 B 11 DK) and concluded that Latin ‘tenebricosus’ is a translation of Greek ‘σκότιος’: “ἐν δὲ τοῖς Κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις· τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνησίην καλεῖ προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇι τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων *σκοτίην* ὀνομάζει ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἁπλανές”. In itself ‘σκότιος’ is a poetic word (it occurs in Homer (*Il.* 6. 24) and in lyrical parts in Euripides (*Alc.* 989; *Ion* 860) but is rare in prose); LSJ note its use in the Democritus’ fragment as metaphoric.[18] It is thus plausible, that Cicero uses accordingly not vulgar or colloquial but rather a lofty word to render stylistic aura of Democritus’ ‘σκότιος’.

In addition, there are several examples that look like containing quasi-scientific lexic. Varro says about a henhouse: “eas [gallinas] includunt in locum tepidum et angustum et tenebricosum” (*RR* 3. 9. 19); Columella about chickens: “sintque calido et tenebricoso loco” (8. 14. 11). Even example from Seneca’s *Epistulae*, where the words of a silly slave are given literally – she goes blind but does not understand it and says that “it’s darkish in the house” (“ait domum tenebricosam esse”; 50. 3), may be a mockery of her use of “technical language”: she can speak her masters’ language. So, these three fragments belong to the third, “prosaic”, group.

A passage from Hyginus is especially worth mentioning: “Iovis negavit Cererem passuram ut filia sua in Tartaro tenebricoso sit” (*Fab.* 146. 1). ‘Tenebricosus Tartarus’ is unexpected in a bare mythological textbook and looks like a quotation from a poet; anyway, it has no colloquial shade here. It is extremely significant that Hyginus, like Catullus, uses this epithet concerning the underworld.

Meanwhile, ‘tenebricus’ and ‘tenebrosus’, that are often used about Hades,[19] undoubtedly belong to “high” poetry (however, there is single “per tenebrosum et sordidum egressum” in Petronius [*Sat.* 91. 3], but it resembles the instance with ‘annosus’ in Horatius). ‘Tenebricus’ is found in Cicero in a poetic translation of a passage from Sophocles’ *Trachiniae* (1097–1099): “Haec e Tartarea tenebrica abstractum plaga / Tricipitem eduxit Hydra generatum canem?”[20] (*Tusc.* 2. 22) and in Pacuvius: “Nam te in tenebrica saepe lacerabo fame / Clausam et fatigans artus torto distraham” (fr. 158 Schierl). An editor of Pacuvius’ tragedies Petra Schierl notes that ‘tenebricus’ in contrast to ‘tenebrosus’ and ‘tenebricosus’ is

---

[18] LSJ s. v. I, 1.

[19] ‘Tenebrosus’ about Hades: Ovid. *Met.* 1. 113 (“tenebrosa in Tartara”); 5. 359 (“<…> tenebrosa sede tyrannus [sc. Pluto] / exierat”).

[20] It should be noted that in the original Hades has no attribute: “…τόν θ’ ὑπὸ χθονὸς / ῞Αιδου τρίκρανον σκύλακ’, ἀπρόσμαχον τέρας, / δεινῆς ᾽Εχίδνης θρέμμα…”

an artificial form,[21] but it contradicts *DELL* (s. above). In fact a question of what is primary – 'tenebricus' or 'tenebricosus' – does not have decisive force; apparently, 'tenebricus' is rarer than 'tenebrosus' and 'tenebricosus'. It is evident that both Pacuvius and Cicero use 'tenebricus' as an equivalent to 'tenebrosus', appropriate for iambi.

'Tenebricosus' is almost totally absent in poetry, but it does not mean that it is colloquial: it does not fit hexameters and distiches prosodically. For Catullus, 'tenebricosus' may be just an equivalent to 'tenebrosus', good for an ending of hendecasyllable (as 'tenebricus' in Cicero's and Pacuvius' iambi): in *carm.* 41. 8 there is 'imaginosus' invented by Catullus in the same position.

To sum up, there is no instance where 'tenebricosus' is indisputably colloquial or vulgar – all examples show either poetical or "scientific and technical" use. Moreover, it is significant that adjectives in *-osus* in principle have various semantics. Lastly, 'tenebricus' and 'tenebrosus' are ordinary epithets of Tartarus and there is no reason for finding in them any semantic or stylistic differences from 'tenebricosus' – a choice from 'tenebricosus', 'tenebricus' and 'tenebrosus', to my mind, depends to a large extent on prosody. These three points allow consideration that 'tenebricosus' in *carm.* 3 does not indicate, that the poem is of low stylistics (someone may suspect that it is "lofty" and adds parodic colour but it is another thesis that can hardly be proved).

Anastasia Kotova
anastakot@gmail.com
St Petersburg State University

В статье прослеживается история прилагательного 'tenebricosus' и рассматриваются его коннотации; на этой основе опровергается тезис Д. Ф. С. Томсона о том, что 'tenebricosus' в Catull. 3. 11 имеет разговорный оттенок и это придает всему стихотворению пародийный эффект.

The author investigates semantics of Latin tenebricosus and its various connotations. She argues against D. F. S. Thomson's assertion that *tenebricosus* in Cat. 3, 11 has colloquial character, which lends to the poem a degree of parody.

[21] P. Schierl (ed., comm., transl.), *Die Tragödien des Pacuvius* (Berlin – New York 2006) 256; Leumann and *OLD* consider that 'tenebricus' is a back-formation from 'tenebricosus', and the latter is derived by analogy with 'bellicosus' (Leumann [n. 12] 337; 341–342; *OLD* s. v. *tenebricus*).

BEMERKUNGEN ZU CATULL *C*. 34 UND 72

Catulls Hymnus auf Diana (*C*. 34) und die Doppelhymne des Horaz auf Diana und Apoll[1] (*C*. 1, 21) sind naturgemäß oft verglichen worden, sind doch Thema und Form verwandt. Aber es sollte eine längere Zeit vergehen, bis es zu genauerer Vergleichung kam. Richard Heinze[2] deutet eine solche an, doch kann seine Äußerung nicht überzeugen. Eduard Fraenkel hielt es dann offenbar für längst gesichert, dass es in Horazens Gedicht einige "reminiscences from Catullus XXXIV" gebe,[3] urteilte genauer aber nur über die Schlusszeilen beider Gedichte: "…we cannot fail to notice in Horace's sentence the greater breadth, intensity and seriousness", mehr sagte er nicht. Etwa ein Jahrzehnt später erschien dann der ausführliche Kommentar von R. G. M. Nisbet und M. Hubbard,[4] worin auf S. 254 die Ansicht geäußert wurde, Horaz sei von Catulls "frischem und fröhlichen" Gedicht ("fresh and joyful") beeinflusst gewesen, sei aber selbst "formal and involved", also komplizierter geblieben und sein Preis der Gottheiten provoziere keinerlei innere Anteilnahme; wir werden sehen, dass dies Urteil nicht unwidersprochen bleiben darf. Im Jahre darauf führte dann Francis Cairns in seinem gehaltvollen Aufsatz über "Five 'religious' Odes of Horace"[5] aus, dass Horaz aus den in griechischen Chorliedern üblichen Rezitationsanweisungen ein ganzes Gedicht gemacht habe, wenn er dem Chor gleichsam schon vorsagt, was er singen soll. Hier betont Francis Cairns einen deutlichen Strukturunterschied zu Catull, auf dessen Gedicht die Beobachtung von Cairns ja nicht zutrifft. Sie ist aber insofern interessant, als man aus ihr einen Anflug von Humor im

[1] Der hier vorgelegte Vergleich kann als Ergänzung zu meinem Aufsatz "Horaz, *Sat*. 1, 1: Tektonik und Ziel", *Hyperboreus* 15 (2009) 72 gelesen werden.

[2] Q. Horatius Flaccus, *Oden und Epoden*, erkl. von A. Kiessling, 8. Auflage, besorgt von R. Heinze (Berlin 1955) 98 zu v. 5 legt einen Bezug des Horaz auf Catull nahe: "… so heißt sie (Heinze meint Diana) auch bei Catull *domina ... amnium sonantum*", doch heißt sie bei Horaz gerade nicht *domina*, doch darüber später; einstweilen sei festgehalten, dass Heinze die beiden Texte in keinem nahen Bezug sah.

[3] *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 209 mit 202, Anm. 1; er nennt sie nicht im Einzelnen.

[4] *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book 1* (Oxford 1970).

[5] *AJPh* 92 (1971) 441 f.

Hymnus des Horaz herausspürt. Dann widmete endlich H. P. Syndikus[6] einer Vergleichung gewichtige Zeilen und meinte, dass "eine Reihe von Motivaufnahmen zeigt, dass Horaz ganz bewusst in den Wettbewerb mit dem 34. Gedicht seines Vorgängers treten wollte" und begründet das auf S. 215, Anm. 4 mit der Verwandtschaft des Rhythmus, mit der Tatsache, dass "der Name Diana in beiden Gedichten das erste Wort" bildet, dass Diana "auch bei Catull als Herrin der Berge … genannt" wird und dass beide Dichter ihre Lieder "mit einer Bitte für das römische Volk" enden lassen. Wenn man abrechnet, dass Diana bei Horaz keineswegs "Herrin" genannt wird, bleibt wenig Zwingendes. Erinnern wir uns kurz an die Texte.

Die sich im Schutze Dianas[7] wissenden Mädchen und Knaben schicken sich bei Cat. 34 an, die Göttin zu besingen, ihre Abstammung (*magna progenies Jovis* mit ennianischem Klang) und Bestimmung (*montium domina ut fores*, v. 9),[8] Herrin der Berge, Wälder, Wiesen und Flüsse zu sein: dann werden ihre Segnungen genannt, ihre Hilfe als Lucina beim Gebären, als zaubermächtige Trivia an den Weggabelungen, und als Luna leuchtet sie allen.[9] Catull würzt diese Zeilen mit einem auffallenden Gräzismus[10] und der populär-astronomischen Absonderlichkeit, dass Lunas Licht "geborgt" genannt wird.[11] Hässlich wirkt die Inkonzinnität der Genetivendungen in dieser Strophe: Nach dreimaligem *-ium* dann ohne Not – *um* in v. 12. Die 4. Strophe preist breit[12] Dianas Hilfe für die Landwirtschaft, allerdings mit nicht sehr nuancenreichen Beiwörtern[13]

---

[6] *Die Lyrik des Horaz* I (Darmstadt [3]2001) 214 f.

[7] Das Motiv des Schützens umgreift das ganze Gedicht (*fide* in v. 1 und *sospites* in v. 24). Eine weitere Einkreisung umgreift die 3. Strophe (*Lu-cina* und *Lu-na*).

[8] Zu der Seltsamkeit des *ut* s. H. P. Syndikus, *Catull. Eine Interpretation* I (Darmstadt 1984) 195 f. Sorgsam hat Catull die Wörter der 3. Strophe verteilt: Die Substantive stehen an der ersten Stelle der Zeilen, die Epitheta in v. 10–12 jeweils am Ende.

[9] *Lumine Luna*: Die Paronomasie gestaltet den Schlussvers reizvoll.

[10] *Deposivit* für "gebar" ist längst als solcher gewürdigt worden (Syndikus [Anm. 8] 195 Anm. 14).

[11] "Für einen Preis der Göttin ist die Tatsache eigentlich nicht geeignet", so W. Kroll, *C. Valerius Catullus* (Stuttgart [4]1922) 64 zu v. 16; Syndikus (Anm. 8) 197. Man wird nicht gern an ein "genuine prayer addressed to Diana" (G. Williams, *Figures of thought in Roman Poetry* [Yale UP 1980] 209) denken; schon U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Hellenistische Dichtung* II (Berlin 1924) 289 urteilte, das Gedicht sei "nur für das Buch bestimmt". Syndikus (Anm. 8): "Die Genauigkeit der Beschreibung des Mondlaufs" sei in einem Götterhymnus "verwunderlich".

[12] Der Lauf des Mondes wird gleich zwei Male benannt.

[13] Kroll (Anm. 11) z. St. nannte sie "leer".

und einem etymologischen Spiel,[14] bevor dann die 5. Strophe endlich die erwartbare Bitte äußert, die Catull mit einem offenbar äußerst seltenen Archaismus formuliert.[15]

Es hatte Catull also gereizt, eine alte griechische[16] Hymnenform ins Lateinische zu überführen, sie einerseits mit altlateinisch-ehrwürdigen Vokabeln zu verbrämen, anderseits sie mit spätgriechischen Einsprengseln anzureichern, auch auf die Gefahr der Pedanterie hin, sie mittels eines Wechsels der Strophenkomposition[17] und allerhand Sprachspielen zu einer interessanten Lektüre zu machen, und alles in allem ein verspieltes Kunstgebilde zu schaffen, und dies aus einer literarischen Interessenlage, die derjenigen in seinem berühmten Gedicht 51 nicht unähnlich scheint.[18]

Horaz nun dichtet einen Doppelhymnus, will sagen: Eine Anrufung sowohl der Diana als auch und besonders Apolls. Auch er ordnet, was ja nicht verwunderlich, überaus sorgfältig, aber nicht je nach Strophe verschiedenartig wie Catull, sondern die ersten drei in gleicher Manier: Auf ein oder zwei kürzere Glieder am Strophenbeginn folgt in den ersten drei Strophen ein längeres Stück. In der vierten erkennt man ein eher um die Mitte geballtes[19] Gebilde, was dem Ganzen ein eindrucksvolles Ende gibt. Horaz verleiht seinem Werk eine strukturelle Einheitlichkeit, welche Catulls Hymnus nicht hat, und er preist immer wieder ein innerlich wie äußerlich Schönes, was Catull nicht tat. Aber auch Horazens Text weist eine Inkonzinnität auf, Catulls Wechsel der Genetivendungen in Strophe 3 vergleichbar: Die Syntax zwischen v. 10 und 11 hat zu verschiedenen Auslegungen geführt, wie man besonders klar dem Kommentar von R. G. M. Nisbet und M. Hubbard[20] entnehmen kann;

---

[14] *Menstruo metiens*, so C. J. Fordyce, *Catullus* (Oxford 1961) zur Stelle, voraussetzend, dass Catull sich der Etymologie bewusst war.

[15] "*Antique* in der Bedeutung von *antiquitus* ist singulär", Kroll (Anm. 11) 64.

[16] *Ibid*. 62; G. Williams, *Tradition and Originality* (Oxford 1968) 154 ("all Greek").

[17] Es wechseln breit angelegte Strophen mit fast schon gehetzt wirkenden (so Str. 3 mit ihrer Häufung): Tempowechsel der Benennungen, vgl. Syndikus (Anm. 6) 215 oben.

[18] Vgl. Verf., "Zu Pindar fr. 75 und zu Catull 51", *Gymnasium* 105 (1998) 412–418.

[19] In der ersten Strophe aus drei Themennennungen bestehen die ersten beiden aus je vier Wörtern die dritte aus fünf; in der zweiten Strophe folgt auf die kurze Kennzeichnung der Göttin ein langer dreigliedriger Ausdruck, in der dritten Strophe folgt auf *Tempe* ohne Beiwort und auf Delos mit nur einem die breitere Schilderung der Schulter mit zwei Bestimmungen. Die 4. Strophe umschließen eine längere Bezeichnung der Plagen und der zweigliedrige Ausdruck *Persas atque Britannos* die zentralen Begriffe *populus* und *princeps*.

[20] In dem oben in Anm. 4 zitierten Werk S. 259.

doch dieser Sprung ist kompositorisch beabsichtigt, hebt der leichte Bruch vor *insignemque* doch die Schulter Apolls mit ihren so bedeutungsvollen Geräten heraus.[21] Das Lied soll nicht unruhig die Tempi der Nennungen, die "Stilhöhen und Satzfügungen" (so Syndikus [wie Anm. 6] 215) wechseln; ruhig führt es vielmehr von Dianas Lieblingsplätzen zu denen Apolls, dann zu seinem Wirken, das durch die Geräte an seiner Schulter angedeutet ist. Dann aber wird der Ton laut durch die bei Horaz seltene Anapher,[22] bevor sich die ernste Stimmung in einem freundlichen Scherz löst.[23] Das nun aber, was Horaz ganz besonders von Catull unterscheidet, ist etwas, das erstaunlicherweise nirgends – soweit ich sehe – gewürdigt worden ist, nämlich die Gestimmtheit. Catulls Gedicht soll doch wohl bei aller Verspieltheit von Form und Wortwahl den Eindruck einer ernst gemeinten Anrufung erwecken; Horaz dagegen preist allenthalben der Götter und Menschen innere Beteiligung und fordert eine solche des Hörers heraus: Ein Mädchen- und ein Knabenchor werden aufgefordert, Diana zu preisen, aber auch Apoll und beider Mutter Leto (v. 3 f.); Leto, so sagt nun der Text nicht ohne Empfindung, sei "tief geliebt" von Jupiter (v. 4). Und auch Diana ist nicht wie bei Catull "Herrin" der Flüsse und des Laubes der Wälder, sondern sie ist ihrer "froh" (*laeta*, v. 5); gepriesen wird Apolls Tempe-Tal, sein Geburtsort Delos und auch seine Schulter, die "ausge-zeich-net" ist (so könnte man *in-sign-em* gleichsam etymologisierend übersetzen, durch den Köcher (mit den tödlichen Pfeilen) und die "brüderliche" Lyra.[24] Dann wendet sich das

---

[21] Auch Horaz spielt mit den Wörtern: *pharetra* darf z. B. als *Pars pro Toto*, als Kunstgriff gelten. Diese Erwähnung des Köchers, damit der strafenden Geschosse, bereitet vor auf die der Plagen, insbesondere der *pestis*, denn Apoll ist ja auch Pestgott (W. Burkert, *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche* [Stuttgart 1977] 127). Im Wort *insignem* mag man auch die in *C*. 1, 2, 32 gepriesene Schönheit heraushören, wie Syndikus (Anm. 6) 217 es tat, vgl. Verg. *Buc*. IV, 57 (*formosus Apollo*); *Aen*. III, 119 (*pulcher Apollo*).

[22] Vgl. Verf., *Lateinische Dichtersprache* (Darmstadt [2]2006) 30, § 32.

[23] Man wird das Wegbitten am Gedichtende schwerlich ernst nehmen (zu einem weiteren humorvollen Zug in Horazens Gedicht vgl. oben das zu Francis Cairns' Aufsatz Gesagte).

[24] Angeregt wird hier das Empfinden landschaftlicher Schönheit (*Tempe*, s. die Kommentare zu *C*. 1, 7, 4) und das der Berühmtheit (*Delon*, s. Pind. *Pae*. 4, 12 Sn.), dazu die Scheu vor der Götterstrafe und die Freude an göttlichem Sang. Apolls Schulter wird auch in *C*. 1, 2, 31 *candentes… umeros* gepriesen, ihre Erwähnung lässt an des Gottes "herrliche Erscheinung" (Syndikus [Anm. 6] 217) denken. – Dass die Schulter mit der Lyra in Zusammenhang gebracht ist, kommt wohl daher, dass man die Lyra (genauer: die Kithara) in Schulterhöhe spielte, vgl. Euterpe auf dem römischen Sarkophag-Relief bei Bober-Rubinstein, *Renaissance Artists and Antique Sculpture* (Oxford 1986) Nr. 38 II oder den Sänger auf der Kasseler Vase T 675 (A 3624).

Kultlied vom Chor fort zu einer allgemeinen Verheißung, der nämlich des Schutzes vor „tränenreichem Krieg“ (*lacrimosum*, 13),[25] vor “elendem” (*miseram*, ebd.) Hunger und Pesttod: Verjagen werde Apoll solches Elend von Volk und Prinzeps zu Persern und Briten.[26]

Vergleicht man nun Catulls Lied mit diesem Gedicht des Horaz, so werden sofort die motivischen Übereinstimmungen deutlich; doch der Unterschied liegt einerseits darin, dass Catulls Gedicht eine verspielte Mischung aus traditionell Römischem und Griechisch-Hellenistischem darstellt, anderseits darin, dass es in Catulls Hymnus so gut wie keine emotionsträchtigen Ausdrücke gibt: *Magna progenies maximi Jovis* preist eher sachlich und wortverspielt, *dolentibus… puerperis* gedenkt zwar, wie üblich, der Schmerzen, letztlich auch der Todesnähe der Gebärenden, *bonis… frugibus* erhebt sich kaum über das Erwartbare, so auch *bona… ope*; bei Horaz dagegen erweckt bereits *tenerae virgines* Wohlgefallen, Jupiters “tiefe Liebe” belädt *dilecta* mit viel Empfindung; Diana “freut sich” im Unterschied zu Catulls Herrschen, und das Lob von Apolls “herrlicher Schulter” appelliert aufs deutlichste an das ästhetische Empfinden.[27] Alles Dunkle ist in diesem Götterpreis fortgelassen. Wohl aber wird der Not der Menschen in der Verheißung gedacht: “Tränenreich” ist der Krieg und der Hunger “elend”. Schaut man nun auf das Ganze des Gedichts, wird deutlich, dass sich überall Bilder und Begriffe finden, die sich ans Empfinden wenden, handele es sich nun um Schönes oder um Schlimmes. Es war also gewiss nicht richtig zu sagen, “Horace … is formal and involved; his praise of the deities evokes no definite feelings”.[28]

---

[25] Horaz “homerisiert”: *Ilias* V, 737.

[26] Hier wird nicht erörtert werden, ob Nisbet-Hubbard (Anm. 4) 260 zu Recht einige Erregung darüber verraten, wie Horaz mit *a populo et principe* den Senat übergeht (“frankly shocking” S. 254; “a constitutional enormity” S. 261). Wenn allerdings *C.* 1, 21 “wahrscheinlich 27/26 verfasst” ist, wie im Kommentar von A. Kiessling–R. Heinze [Anm. 2] 98 vermutet wurde, wäre diese Nichterwähnung des Senats im Lichte der Ausführungen von D. Kienast, *Augustus* (Darmstadt ^{3}1999) 153 ff. und 177 minder schockierend. Die Datierung des Horaz-Gedichtes ist allerdings nicht ohne Anzweiflung geblieben, s. Q. Orazio Flacco, *Le opere I: Le odi*, comm. di E. Romano II (Roma 1991) 566: Die Nennungen der Völkerschaften habe nur einen “valore emblematico”, was allerdings auch nicht zwingend ist.

[27] Fein nennt Horaz zunächst in v. 5–8 die Lieblingsaufenthalte der Göttin, legt aber mit den Namen dreier Gebirge nahe, dass sie außer an Fluss und Wald auch an den Bergen ihre Freude hat; s. zur Dreizahl die vorzügliche Bemerkung von Syndikus (Anm. 6) 218. Feinspürig betont U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Anm. 10) 290, dass Horaz im Unterschied zu Catull bestimmte Lieblingsörter nenne, nicht nur allgemein Bereiche.

[28] Nisbet–Hubbard (Anm. 4) 254.

Nun zu *C*. 72.[29] Offenbar war Eines dem Catull hier so wichtig, dass er es gleich zweimal sagte (v. 5–8): Die enttäuschende Erkenntnis, wie seine Partnerin wirklich ist, erzeugt im Menschen einen peinigenden inneren Widerstreit: Er "brennt" viel heißer, doch der bisher so geliebte Partner hat für ihn, wie er mit betonender Doppelung sagt, durch den Treubruch an Wert und Bedeutung verloren. Lesbia entgleitet dem Ich des Gedichts, darum das um so heftigere Besitzenwollen. Dann nochmals und genauer: Eine solche "Rechtsverletzung" (*iniuria*, v. 7)[30] zwingt (*cogit*, v. 8) heftiger zu begehren (*amare*), aber weniger wohl zu wollen,[31] womit die allein herzliche, gänzlich uneigennützige Liebe umschrieben ist. Kommentatoren lassen nun aber gemeinhin das *cogit* außer Acht, und doch verbirgt sich in ihm ein ebenso interessantes wie gemeingültiges Erleben: Bricht der Partner untreu die Liebesgemeinschaft, so bewirkt dies ein plötzliches und heftiges Umstoßen der bisherigen Partnerbewertung, einen "Stoß" oder "Stich",[32] d. h. eine Reaktion, über die der Verletzte selber nicht Herr ist[33] und welcher er bezwungen erliegen muss.

Es ist in diesem Zusammenhang auf zwei weitere Gedichte hinzuweisen, in denen diese Erfahrung, oft verkannt, aber doch deutlich genug aufscheint. In *C*. 8 erinnert sich das Ich des Genossenen, die Erinnerung gewinnt Macht über es, es sucht "sich dagegen zu härten" (*ob-duro* in

---

[29] Eine ausführliche Auseinandersetzung mit dem mängelreichen Buch von N. Holzberg (*Catull. Der Dichter und sein erotisches Werk* [München ^{3}2003]) wird dem Leser erspart; es vermag nicht den Eindruck zu erwecken, dass es wissenschaftlich ernst zu nehmen sei (vgl. unten Anm. 34, 39 und 41).

[30] Hierzu Syndikus (Anm. 8) 11, Anm. 17 und 18 mit einer Unterscheidung von Ter. *Eun*. 72. Diese Erfahrung des Überwältigtwerdens ist naturgemäß bei Catull nicht zum ersten Male erwähnt, vgl. Sappho frg. 137 Diehl, 130 Lobel-Page, wo Eros ein "unbezähmbares Tier" genannt ist (s. A. Braget, *Das Epitheton bei Sappho und Alkaios* [Innsbruck 1996] 123), und auch Soph. *Ant*. 781 und 800.

[31] Hierüber hat H. P. Syndikus (Anm. 8) 11 f. treffend geschrieben; man sollte auch auf Pindar, *Ol*. 7, 1–6 verweisen, wo der Schwiegervater sein Verhältnis zum Schwiegersohne schön darstellt. *Bene velle* ist ganz altruistisch und mit reiner Gebensfreude verbunden, vgl. Plaut. *Trin*. 438 f. und Cic. *Off*. 1, 49 und 54. Zu diesem Begriff besonders J. Granarolo, *L'oeuvre de Catulle* (Paris 1967) 217 f. und F. Bellandi, *Lepos e pathos. Studi su Catullo* (Bologna 2007) 373.

[32] Von *ictus animi* spricht Seneca (*De ira* 2, 2, 2) dort, wo er das Eindringen einer seelischen Verletzung in eine Seelenschicht beschreibt, welche der *ratio* nicht zugänglich ist (ebd. 2, 3, 4). Er lehrt, dass der *ictus* durch den Eindruck einer *iniuria* ausgelöst wird (ebd. 2, 1, 3); vgl. G. Maurach, *Seneca. Leben und Werk*. (Darmstadt ^{5}2007) 59 f.

[33] Darum die Wendung zu den Göttern in *C*. 76, 17.

v. 11 und auch 18).[34] Wogegen? Gegen sich selber, nämlich gegen den zerstörenden Jammer über das Verlorene und nicht minder gegen die Eifersucht, denn die Reihe der leidenschaftlichen Halbverse 15–18 meint ja ein Näher und Näher, äußerlich eines Anderen, eigentlich aber des schmerzhaft sich des selbst Erlebten erinnernden Ich. Den letzten Schritt solchen Näherkommens sich erinnernd auszusprechen, vermag der Gequälte allerdings nicht. Es wäre zu schlimm, das Besitzgewinnen eines Anderen sich vorzustellen, d. h. sich an das Stärkste des vom Ich selbst Erlebten zu erinnern. Statt dessen die erneute Forderung, hart zu sein. Dass dieses *obdurare*, dies Sich-Härten nicht gelingen wird, liegt im *inpotens* des v. 9. Mit diesem Wort ist wohl nicht gemeint, dass Catull sich als "Schwächling" empfindet;[35] man wird eher daran denken, dass die verletzte Seele in einer Schicht getroffen ist, gegenüber welcher die *ratio* und der verstandesgesteuerte Wille "unmächtig" ist. Ähnlich ungenau bezeichneten das von Catull Gemeinte Aem. Baehrens ("immoderatus")[36] und R. Ellis ("unaccustomed to control your feelings")[37], auch C. J. Fordyce[38] und andere. Das alles trifft die Erkenntnis, dass ein solcher "Stich" den Menschen bezwingt, nicht genau. Will man diese Erfahrung,von der Catull spricht, genauer fassen, könnte man so sagen: Er benennt mit *inpotens* die blitzartige Ablösung der Liebesgewissheit durch das Zwiegefühl des terenzischen *ardeo* und *taedet* in *C*. 72 und die Unfähigkeit, es mittels des Willens zu regulieren. Kurz gesagt: Catull begegnet dem Phänomen, das wir das "Unbewusste" nennen. Und um die Unbeeinflussbarkeit dieses Unwillkürlichen noch stärker zu verdeutlichen, bedient er sich des Oxymoron von *nolle* und *inpotens*, von Wille und Machtlosigkeit.[39] Was er tun müsste, sieht er, doch den Schritt zur Befreiung kann er – wenigstens in der Phase des Verletztseins – nicht tun.[40] Die Forderung nach

[34] Holzberg (Anm. 29) 91 meint, das Wort könne "Assoziationen von einer Erektion wecken", ein Blick in den *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, wo nicht ein einziger Beleg zu finden ist, hätte diesen Unfug vermeiden lassen.

[35] So Syndikus (Anm. 7) 109.

[36] *Catulli Veronensis Liber* (Leipzig 1876) 108.

[37] *A Commentary on Catullus* (Oxford 1889) 26.

[38] *Catullus. A Commentary* (Oxford 1961) 64.

[39] Ausdrücke wie "comic lover" und dergleichen (J. T. Dyson, in: M. B. Skinner (hrsg.), *A Companion to Catullus* [Oxford 2007] 166), deren sich auch Holzberg (Anm. 29) befleißigt (S. 13 f. und öfter), scheinen zu grob für die feine, schmerzhafte Selbstironie von *inpotens noli*.

[40] Die Befreiung ist in v. 2 angedeutet: Schulterzuckend sich sagen, es ist aus, also "zur Tagesordnung übergehen" (*perditum ducas*).

perfer obdura[41] ist durch die Reihung der Verse mit ihrer schrittweise zunehmenden Qual des Erinnerns als undurchführbar erwiesen.

Und eben dies sagt auch *C*. 85: Ekel und zugleich Begehren, und das "Wieso?" findet keine lösende Antwort, es bleibt allein die Qual, die *pestis* und *pernicies* (*C*. 76, 20). Was geschieht, kann der Catull des 85. Gedichts spüren und aussprechen, doch nicht verstehen. Dieses Verstehen, gelingt dann zwar in *C*. 72, doch dasselbe Gedicht sagt auch, dass ein Beherrschen solcher Regung unmöglich ist. Dieses innere Geschehen, der "Stich" wird von Catull somit als unausweichlich angesehen, als erzwungen ohne Chance einer Gegenwehr (*cogit*, *C*. 72, 8). Catull beschreibt damit ein Geschehen in einer Seelenschicht, die der *ratio* nicht zugänglich ist; er hat eine innere Reaktion angedeutet, *quae rationem transsilit*, wie Seneca es später ausdrücken wird. Er ist, so könnte man modern sagen, dem Unbewussten begegnet. Nimmt man das *cogit* in *C*. 72 also ernst, dringt man ein wenig tiefer in die Psychologie dieses Dichters vor.

Wenn man nun aber schon von Psychologie spricht, dürfte man mit aller gebotenen Vorsicht vielleicht folgenden Gedanken anknüpfen: Wenn es bei Seneca (s. Anm. 32) heißt, der von einem solchen Reiz Getroffene müsse nach dem *ictus* den *animus* und mit ihm die *ratio* einschalten, um ihm nicht zu verfallen, müsse also sich gleichsam selber gegenüber treten und sich Rechenschaft über den Reiz ablegen, dann könnte man die v. 1 f. und 9–12 im *C*. 8 des Catull als Versuch ansehen, eben dieses zu tun, nämlich eine "Strategie" zu finden, mit dem *ictus* "Alles vorbei" umzugehen. Dann aber wird aus der Ausmalung des Leides der Lesbia in allmählicher, schier unmerklicher Übertragung auf Catull selbst auf einmal die Gefahr einer Erneuerung jenes *ictus*, und jetzt erscheint eine Wiederholung jener "Strategie" fast schon aussichtslos. Aber meiden wir derlei Verfeinerungen und überlassen sie wirklichen Psychologen.

Gregor Maurach
Münster

[41] Ovid (*Trist*. 5, 11, 17) wiederholt diese Wörter, doch ohne die Wucht der Asyndese, die bei Catull selten anzutreffen ist und darum hier besondere Kraft hat (H. Tränkle, *Philologus* 111 [1967] 205, Anm. 1 zum seltenen Vorkommen solcher Fügungen). Nicht ernst zu nehmen ist der Einfall S. Kosters ("Catull beim Wort genommen", *WJA* N. F. 7 [1981] 127 f.), in *destinatus* (*C*. 8, 19) das Bestimmtsein einer Braut für einen Mann mitzuhören, woraus Holzberg (Anm. 29) 90 die absurde Berechtigung herleitet, in Catull "Lesbias 'Braut' zu sehen". Nichts zwingt, *destinatus* anders als im *Thes. Ling. Lat*. 9, 2; 242, 62 ff. als "fest entschlossen" zu verstehen; wer eine zweite, andere Bedeutung herein zieht, tut etwas zum Text hinzu, was dieser in keiner Weise verlangt.

Стихотворение 34 Катулла и оду I, 21 Горация часто сравнивают на основании сходства их темы: гимн Диане и гимн Диане и Аполлону соответственно; при этом без внимания остается различная степень вовлеченности поэта.

До настоящего времени исследователи не замечали, насколько близко Катулл подошел к открытию неконтролируемого бессознательного в стихотворении 72.

Catullus 34 and Horace, Odes 1, 21 have often been compared because of their thematic similarity (hymn to Diana resp. to Diana and Apollo), but the degree of inward participation has been overlooked.

In Catullus c. 72 it has been underestimated how near the poet had come to a discovery of the indomitable unconscious.

DE MARI AEGAEO AD SICILIAE LITORA SITO (LUC. *PHARS*. II, 665)

Lucanus in fine secundi *Pharsaliae* libri describit, quomodo Caesar, ut Pompeio obstaret, ne Brundisio cum exercitu proficisceretur, portus exitum molibus intersaepserit, quas in fretum detrudere iussit. Talem laborem omnino fuisse irritum hisce verbis poeta explicat (II, 663–668):

> Cedit in inmensum cassus labor; omnia pontus
> haurit saxa uorax montesque inmiscet harenis,
> ut, maris Aegaei medias si celsus in undas
> depellatur Eryx, nullae tamen aequore rupes
> emineant, uel si conuolso uertice Gaurus
> decidat in fundum penitus stagnantis Auerni.

Cum tamen Gaurum montem Campanum admodum propinquum lacui Averno esse constet, Erycis mentio, qui in occidentali parte Siciliae situs sit, in mare Aegaeum depellendi inepta videtur ideoque ad emendationem aliquam stimulat.

Multi editores, praesertim ante saeculum vicesimum, utramque lectionem, sc. et *Aegaei* et *Eryx* conservabant volebantque Aegaeum pro quolibet alto mari adhibitum esse.[1]

Haec nihilominus post mentionem Gauri Avernique, qui non solum geographice inter se congruunt, verum etiam insoliti in imaginibus poeticis sunt, ut iam supra diximus, mira et docto poeta vix digna videntur. Non insulse Bentleius hic notavit[2] verbum proiiciendi cum monte et mari tam longe distantibus quadrare magis quam depellendi; quod enim depelli dicimus, id plerumque haud procul a pristino situ cadit.

---

[1] M. Annaei Lucani *Pharsalia*, sive *De Bello Civili Caesaris et Pompeii* lib. X, ex emend. V. C. H. Grotii, cum eiusdem … notis. Accesserunt *Variarum Lectionum Libellus*, et rerum ac verborum *Index locupletissimus*, opera Th. Pulmanni et al. concinnati (Antverpiae 1614) 326; M. Annaei Lucani *Pharsalia* ed. with English Notes by C. E. Haskins (London 1887) ad loc.; M. Anneo Lucano, *La Guerra Civile (Farsaglia)* libri I–V. Testo critico, trad. e comm. a cura di G. Viansino (Milano 1995) ad loc.

[2] M. Annaei Lucani *Pharsalia* cum notis… integris et adauctis Rich. Bentleii … quibus varias lectiones … addidit C. F. Weber (Lipsiae 1821) ad loc.

Alii vero,[3] nihil emendantes, Lucanum ideo Erycem in litore maris Aegaei posuisse aiunt, quod illud Aeneidos memoria teneret (XII, 701): "Quantus Athos aut quantus Eryx…" Quam suspicionem Oudendorpio Athos paulo infra (v. 677) in alia imagine adhibitus confirmat. At vix credibile videtur Lucanum, etsi graviter in rebus geographicis interdum errat, situm Erycis ignorasse, Siciliae montis post Aetnam notissimi. Praeterea vidimus alibi (IX, 919) thapsum "Erycinam" appellari – quod gramen re vera, teste Nicandro (*Th*. 529), in Sicilia gignitur.

Quidam veteres editores[4] etiam "Athos" pro "Eryx" inserendum censebant. Saepe enim ille a poetis in huiusmodi imaginibus depingendis adhibetur: praeter Vergilium invenimus apud Ovidium (*Met*. XI, 554s.), qui una cum Atho Pindum in mare deicit, et Valerium Flaccum (*Arg*. IV, 322), ubi "pars Erycis vel totus Athos" decidit. Non esse "Eryx" in "Athos" mutandum iam Oudendorpius et Bentleius demonstrarunt: primo quia nequit scribae error explanari, secundo quia Athonis mentio post pauca iterum fiet.

Saepius autem "Aegaei" emendabatur. Alii alia proposuerunt: "Aetnaei", "Hennaei", "Ausonii", "Ionii", "Hadriaci". Omnibus tamen huiusmodi coniecturis sine dubio "Aeolii" praestat, a Bentleio inventa, cui Housman postea assensus est. Hic autem ita coniecturam explanavit:[5] falsum illud AEGAEI ex ambiguo AEGIII, quod scriba viderat, profluxit. Mare enim, quod Siciliae litora pulsat, Aeolium semel apud Silium Italicum appellatur (*Pun*. XIV, 232–234):

> Litora Thermarum, prisca dotata camena,
> armauere suos, qua mergitur Himera ponto
> Aeolio.

Hanc coniecturam, sc. Aeolii, plerique editores post Housman accipiunt, in quorum numero etiam Van Campen et Fantham sunt, qui uberrimis notis secundum librum Pharsaliae haud ita pridem instruxerunt.

Gottlieb Cortius primus fuisse videtur, cui in mentem venit nomen maris, quo Eryx depellendus est, cum insulis Aegatibus, Siciliae vicinis,

---

[3] M. Annaei Lucani Cordubensis *Pharsalia*, sive *Belli Civilis Libri Decem* … curante F. Oudendorpio (Lugduni Batavorum 1728) ad loc.; Haskins (supra n. 1) ad loc.

[4] "Sabellicus et alii", teste Farnabio: M. Annaei Lucani *Pharsalia*, sive *De Bello Civili Caesaris et Pompeii* lib. X. Additae sunt … notae… Th. Farnabii (Amstelodami 1643) ad loc.

[5] M. Annaei Lucani *Belli Civilis* Libri Decem editorum in usum ed. A. E. Housman (Oxonii 1926) ad loc.

coniungere.[6] Ideo voluit Aegatum pro Aegaeis ponere. Burmannus vero, quamquam illius coniecturae mentionem fecit, hoc ei opponit, non solere in lingua Latina maria genetivo casu nominis insularum, quas continent, designari. Ipse autem putat lectionem manuscriptorum servari posse, Lucanum tamen hoc modo de illa parte maris Mediterranei, quae insulis Aegatibus adiacet, loqui. Equidem credo haud exiguas esse causas hoc ipso modo locum intelligendi.

Primum omnium, multo propiores Eryci insulae Aegates sunt, quam Aeoliae, quas Bentleius et Housman indicant.

Praeterea Eryx et insulae Aegates in memoria hominis eruditi non solum geographicis, sed etiam historicis nexibus coniuncti erant. Recordemur duos Livii locos:

> Aegates insulas Erycemque ante oculos proponite, quae terra marique per quattuor et uiginti annos passi sitis (XXI, 10, 7).
>
> Experiri iuuat utrum alios repente Carthaginienses per uiginti annos terra ediderit an iidem sint qui ad Aegates pugnauerunt insulas et quos ab Eryce duodeuicenis denariis aestimatos emisistis (XXI, 41, 6).

His scilicet in locis de fine belli Punici primi agitur, cum classis Carthaginiensium, dum Hamilcari auxilium ferebat, qui tunc temporis ab Erycis arce Romanos arcebat, a Romanis oppressa est. Hamilcaris autem exercitus magna pecunia repensa Erycem relinquere coacta est. Apud Silium Italicum Aegates fere pro nomine appellativo adhibentur; Erycis autem cacumen Veneri locus fuit, unde pacem post bellum Punicum primum componendam contemplabatur (*Pun*. VI, 697).

Porro videamus aliam Pharsaliae partem, quae magni momenti in nostro loco tractando est. Nam in libro quinto iterum Aegaeum pro "mari insularum Aegatum" poni videtur (V, 608–614):

> Non Euri cessasse minas, non imbribus atrum
> Aeolii iacuisse Notum sub carcere saxi
> crediderim; cunctos solita de parte ruentis
> defendisse suas uiolento turbine terras,
> sic pelagus mansisse loco. nam parua procellis
> aequora rapta ferunt; Aegaeas transit in undas
> Tyrrhenum, sonat Ionio uagus Hadria ponto.

Omnes fere, qui hunc locum vel explanabant, vel alias in linguas vertebant, autumabant, cum hic insolita vi irruens procella describatur,

[6] M. Annaei Lucani *Pharsalia* cum comm. P. Burmanni (Leidae 1740) ad loc.

plane de illo mari, quod semper Aegaeum vocamus, agi. Cautioris, etsi aliquantulum mirae opinionis fuit Cortius:[7] Lucanum scilicet Aegaeum et Tyrrhenum tam propinqua putare, quam Ionium et Adriaticum. Consentit Cortio Cornelis Francken, cui mare Aegaeum hic usque ad Siciliam extensum esse videtur.[8]

At quid si et hic illud "mare insularum Aegatum" intelligi debet? Nam collisio eius cum mari Tyrrheno optime cum collisione inter Ionium et Adriaticum congruit; praeterea minus dubitandum erit pelagum – hoc est vel totum Oceanum vel totum mare Mediterraneum – mansisse loco, ut paulo supra (v. 612) Lucanus ait. Aegatum denique mentio priscam difficultatem, quam hic locus praebet, solvere possit: servandum enim est lectio "nam parva", quam codices recentiores plurimaeque editiones in "nec parva" mutant, Housman vero in "nam priva", quandoquidem omnia haec maria vix nomen "parvorum" patiantur. Sin autem "Aegaeas undas" de undis "maris insularum Aegatum" dici putemus, omnia maria confinia faciamus – quorum partes confines sine ullo scrupulo "parva aequora" appellare valemus.

Insolitum quidem videtur "mare insularum Aegatum" "Aegaeum mare" appellari. At revocemus in memoriam, quam libere (quin etiam neglegenter interdum) Lucanus nomina geographica usurpet. Ut exempla afferam, Seres apud eum Nili fontibus vicini sunt (X, 292); qui Dirrachium petit, modo Borea (II, 646), modo Austro (III, 1) propellitur. Pro nominibus quibusdam geographicis usitatissimis interdum consona eis adhibentur, vel lapsu vel consulto. Tertio in libro Massilienses a Caesare oppugnati lares suos e Phocide olim transtulisse aiunt (v. 340), quamquam Massiliam Phoceae coloniam fuisse constat.

Quem lapsum non esse consulto factum similes loci apud alios scriptores probant, sc. apud Senecam (*Dial*. XII, 7, 8), apud Gellium (X, 16, 4) et apud Sidonium (*Carm*. XXIII, 13). Animadvertamus tamen aliam occasionem: in sexto Pharsaliae libro (v. 449) Babylon non more solito Persica, sed Persea inscribitur; ante Lucanum hoc nomen adiectivum semper ad Perseum spectat, ad Persas vero spectans non nisi apud Statium invenitur (*Theb*. I, 719).

Persea illud pro Persica eo maioris nobis est momenti, quod Phocida pro Phocea lapsu posuisse, hic vero consulto licentiam commisisse poeta videtur – ita ut etiam cum illo Aegaeo rem se habere censeo.

---

[7] M. Annaei Lucani *Pharsalia* cum notis … Gottl. Cortii … aliorumque. Editionem morte Cortii interruptam absolvit C. F. Weber. Vol. I (Lipsiae 1828) 299.

[8] M. Annaei Lucani *Pharsalia*. Cum comm. critico ed. C. M. Francken (Lugduni Batavorum 1896) ad loc.

Interrogari denique id solum possit, quo modo Latine recte nomen adiectivum ab insulis Aegatibus derivatum sonat? De adiectivo illo haud illepidum quendam casum narrare velim. In scriptis quidem Latinis omnino illud abest (quo paulo magis probanda Burmanni coniectura videtur), Graece vero Αἰγουσαῖος apud Stephanum Byzantium (*Ethn*. s. v. Αἴγουσα) invenimus – a nomine scilicet insularum Aegatum, quae Graece Αἰγοῦσσαι appellantur. Burmannus[9] Stephanum ita laudat: "Stephanus de urbibus inde deducat Aegusaeum". Tum Lemaire ille in editione sua ait:[10] "Hoc autem Stephanus non Aegaeum, sed Aegusaeum vocat". At Bourgery, cum prave intellexisset, de quo Stephano ageretur, Aegusaei in apparatu critico posuit[11] et Roberti Stephani philologi praeclari, qui saeculo decimo sexto vixit, Thesaurum Linguae Latinae composuit et pater Henrici Stephani fuit, coniecturam nuncupavit. Idem scripsit in apparatu critico Georgius Luck,[12] eo tantum discrimine, quod, ut inconvenientiam metricam vitaret, Aegusae pro Aegusaei posuit. Ultimum autem incredibili huic confusioni Fantham tribuit, quae coniecturam *Aegatis* a Stephano excogitatam memorat,[13] quamquam Bourgery verus eius auctor fuit.

Putamus igitur in *Phars*. II, 665 et V, 613 mare Aegaeum de "mari insularum Aegatum" dici, primum quod cum contextu rerum optime congruit, deinde quod a Lucani modo scribendi huiusmodi res insolitae non prorsus abhorrent.

Arsenius Vetushko-Kalevich
avetushko@rambler.ru
Bibliotheca classica Petropolitana;
Universitas Petropolitana

Describing Caesar's attempts to keep Pompey from leaving Brundisium's harbour with the help of masonry and rocks, Lucan compares this useless work with throwing mount Eryx into the Aegean sea and Gaurus into the lake Avernus (2, 665–668). The former is most surprizing. Editors that retain the reading of the manuscripts either interpret *Aegei* as a designation of a deep sea in general or

[9] Supra n. 6.

[10] M. Annaei Lucani *Pharsalia* cum varietate lectionum argumentis et selectis variorum adnotationibus quibus suas addidit P.-A. Lemaire. Vol. I (Parisiis 1830) 211.

[11] Lucain, *La Guerre Civile (La Pharsale)* I : Livres I–V. Texte établi et traduit par A. Bourgery (Paris ^{5}1976) 60.

[12] Lukan, *Der Bürgerkrieg*. Lateinisch und Deutsch von G. Luck (Berlin ^{2}1989) 142.

[13] Lucan, *De Bello Civili. Book II*. Ed. by E. Fantham (Cambridge 1992) 210.

incriminate to Lucan a geographical error. The most popular emendation is Bentley's *Aegaei*, supported by Housman.

The author defends Burmann's proposal that the "Aegean sea" refers to a part of the Mediterranean near the Aegadian islands to the north of Sicily. In general, Lucan is rather bold in forming geographical epithets, cf. *Perseus* in the sense of *Persicus* in 6, 449. Moreover, there is another passage in the *Pharsalia*, where *mare Aegeum* arguably stands for the "Aegadian" sea, viz. 5, 612–614: thus the Tyrrhenian sea migrated to "Aegadian" would be geographically symmetrical to the following conflict of the Ionian and the Adriatic seas.

Описывая попытки Цезаря при помощи массивных глыб загородить Помпею выход из гавани Брундизия, Лукан сравнивает тщетность этого труда со сбрасыванием горы Эрика в Эгейское море, а Гаврского хребта – в Авернское озеро (II, 665–668). Последний образ с географической точки зрения представляется естественным, но мысль о сталкивании Эрика в Эгейское море вызывает недоумение. Издатели, сохраняющие текст, предлагают понимать *Aegaei* как обозначение любого глубокого моря или же видят здесь географическую ошибку. Из исправлений особенно популярно *Aeolii* (Бентли, Хаусмен).

Автор поддерживает предложение Бюрмана понимать под "Эгейским морем" участок Средиземного моря, прилегающий к Эгатским островам. В пользу этого говорит смелость Лукана в образовании географических названий: ср., например, Perseus вместо созвучного Persicus (о Вавилоне, VI, 449). Кроме того, в "Фарсалии" обнаруживается ещё одно место, где можно предположить, что "Эгейским" морем названо "Эгатское", – V, 612–614: идея о переходе Тирренского моря в воды "Эгатского" была бы географически симметрична последующим словам о столкновении Ионического и Адриатического морей.

THUNFISCHFANG: BEI DEN ERETRIERN UND NAXIERN ODER AUF? (AELIAN. *DE NAT. ANIM*. XV, 5)

Claudius Älian liefert eine ausführliche Beschreibung des Thunfischfangs im Marmormeerraum (*De nat. anim*. XV, 5).[1] Zuerst erzählt er über den Thunfischbeobachter (σκοπός), der auf dem speziellen am Ufer errichteten Turm stehend der Bewegung der Fische folgt und den Ruderern ein Zeichen gibt, wenn sie ins Meer auslaufen müssen. Dann tun sie das und werfen ein großes Netz hinaus, das zwischen fünf Schiffen verteilt wird.

Wir sehen von der technischen Seite des Ablaufs ab, der nicht ganz klar ist,[2] wenden uns aber dem Ende dieser Stelle zu:

> οἱ δὲ ἐρέται, ὡς ἁλούσης πόλεως, αἱροῦσιν ἰχθύων ποιητὴς ἂν εἴποι δῆμον. οὐκοὺν, ὦ φίλοι Ἕλληνες, καὶ Ἐρετριεῖς ἴσασι ταῦτα καὶ Νάξοι κατὰ κλέος, τῆς θήρας τῆς τοιαύτης παθόντες ὅσα Ἡρόδοτός τε καὶ ἄλλοι λέγουσι. τὰ δὲ ἔτι λοιπὰ τῆς θήρας ἀκούσεσθε ἄλλων.

E. Lytle deutet den Satz so: die Bewohner der Eretria und des Naxos benutzen diese Art des Fischfangs. Und "the mention of Herodotus is a clear allusion to the oracle given to Pisistratus by Amphylitus"[3] nach der Rückkehr des Pisistratus aus der Eretria in das Attika, nachdem er die

---

[1] Dieser Prozess ist auch von Oppian (*Hal.* III, 620–648) und Philostratus Major (*Imag.* I, 13), wenn auch nicht so eingehend, beschrieben.

[2] Über den Thunfischfang s.: E. Lytle, *Marine Fisheries and the Ancient Greek Economy* (Duke University 2006) 37–145; R. M. Roesti, "The Declining Economic Role of the Mediterranean Tuna Fishery", *American Journal of Economic and Sociology* 25, 1 (1966) 77–90; E. García Vargas, D. Florido del Corral, "The Origin and Development of Tuna Fishing Nets (Almadrabas)", T. Bekker-Nielsen, D. Bernal Casasola (eds.), *Ancient Nets and Fishing Gear: Proceedings of the International Workshop on "Nets and Fishing Gear in Classical Antiquity: A First Approach"* (Cádiz 2010) 205–227.

[3] Ἔρριπται δ᾽ ὁ βόλος, τὸ δὲ δίκτυον ἐκπεπέτασται, θύννοι δ᾽ οἰμήσουσι σεληναίης διὰ νυκτός (Hdt. I, 62).

Hilfe vom Einwohner des Naxos Lygdamis bekommen hatte.[4] Dagegen kann man einige wichtige Argumente anführen. Erstens, ist Amphylitus Akarnanier und es besteht keine unmittelbare Verbindung zwischen dem Orakel und dem Vorhandensein dieser Art des Fischfangs in der Erertia und auf dem Naxos. Zweitens, bringt der Satz ὅσα Ἡρόδοτός τε καὶ ἄλλοι λέγουσι den Leser auf den Gedanken, dass Älian darunter irgendein verbreitetes Sujet meint, der seinen Zeitgenossen vollkommen klar gewesen war. Aber weder Herodotus noch andere Autoren erwähnen den Thunfischfang von Eretriern und Naxiern.

In der Ausgabe von K. Gesner[5] wird derselbe Satz auf folgende Weise übersetzt: "Norunt haec, o amici Graeci, tum Eretrienses, tum Naxii, hac piscatione insignes, ut Herodotus et alii referunt" – und offensichtlich wird auch im eigentlichen Sinne verstanden. Die gleiche Interpretation finden wir in der Übersetzung von F. Jacobs ("Dieses, ihr lieben Hellenen, wissen die Eretrier und Naxier, wie der Ruf geht, indem sie, wie Herodotus und Andere erzählen, eine solche Jagd erfuhren")[6] und von A. Scholfield ("And so, my Grecian friends, the people of Eretria and Naxos know of these things by report, for they have learnt about this method of fishing all that Herodotus and others relate").[7] Beide Herausgeber verbinden diese Stelle mit der Herodotus' Nachricht über das Orakel von Amphylitus. In der ersten lateinischen Übersetzung *De nat. anim.*[8] ist diese Stelle überhaupt ausgelassen, was wahrscheinlich mit der Erklärungsschwierigkeit zusammenhängt. R. Hercher[9] schlug eine Konjektur μαθόντες statt der handschriftlichen Lesung παθόντες vor, die die wörtliche Auslegung des Textes erleichtert. Scholfield befürwortet diese Konjektur, dennoch wird in der letzten Älian-Ausgabe die handschriftliche Lesung zurückgebracht.[10]

Denkbarer scheint trotzdem die Verbindung der betrachteten Stelle mit der persischen Kriegstaktik, die auf griechischen Inseln angewandt und

---

[4] Lytle (n. 3) 56 n. 52.

[5] Aeliani *De natura animalium libri XVII*, cum animadversionibus Conradi Gesneri et Danielis Wilhelmi Trilleri, curante Abrahamo Gronovio… (Londres 1744).

[6] E. K. F. Wunderlich, F. Jacobs (Übers.). *Claudius Aelianus, Werke* I–IX (Stuttgart 1839–1842).

[7] A. F. Scholfield (ed., tr.), *Claudii Aeliani De natura animalium libri XVII*. I–III (London 1958–1959).

[8] P. Gillius (tr.), *Aeliani de Historia Animalium libri XVII…* (Lyon 1565).

[9] R. Hercher (ed.), *Claudius Aelianus, De natura animalium libri XVII* (Leipzig 1864–1866).

[10] M. García Valdés, L. A. Llera Fueyo, L. Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén (ed.), *Claudius Aelianus, De natura animalium* (Berlin 2009).

zum ersten Mal von Herodotus mit dem Verb σαγηνεύειν beschrieben wurde, das eine Ableitung von σαγήνη[11] ("das Ziehgarn") ist (Hdt. VI, 31):

> Ὅκως δὲ λάβοι τινὰ τῶν νήσων, ὡς ἑκάστην αἱρέοντες οἱ βάρβαροι ἐσαγήνευον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Σαγηνεύουσι δὲ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὸς ἁψάμενος τῆς χειρὸς ἐκ θαλάσσης τῆς βορηίης ἐπὶ τὴν νοτίην διήκουσι καὶ ἔπειτα διὰ πάσης τῆς νήσου διέρχονται ἐκθηρεύοντες τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.[12]

Herodotus gebraucht das Verb σαγηνεύειν bei der Beschreibung der Kampfhandlungen der persischen Armee auf Samos (III, 149), Chios, Lesbos und Tenedos (VI, 31); aber bei der Beschreibung persischer Handlungen in Eretria und auf Naxos benutzt er jedoch das Verbum ἀνδραποδίζειν ('versklaven') und nicht σαγηνεύειν (VI, 96. 101). Plato schreibt im *Menexenus* (240 b 5 – 240 c 1):

> ἐπὶ τὰ ὅρια ἐλθόντες τῆς Ἐρετρικῆς οἱ στρατιῶται αὐτοῦ, ἐκ θαλάττης εἰς θάλατταν διαστάντες, συνάψαντες τὰς χεῖρας διῆλθον ἅπασαν τὴν χώραν.

Es gibt eine ähnliche Episode in *Leges* (698 d 4–5):

> συνάψαντες γὰρ ἄρα τὰς χεῖρας σαγηνεύσαιεν πᾶσαν τὴν Ἐρετρικὴν οἱ στρατιῶται τοῦ Δάτιδος.

Wenn wir diese zwei Stellen mit der Stelle aus der Herodotus-Geschichte vergleichen, so können wir annehmen, dass Plato sich eben auf Herodotus gestützt hatte. Strabo weist auch auf Herodotus hin, indem er darüber erzählt, dass τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχαίαν πόλιν (sc. Ἐρέτριαν) κατέσκαψαν Πέρσαι, σαγηνεύσαντες, ὥς φησιν Ἡρόδοτος, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῷ πλήθει (Strab. X, 1, 10).

Außer den oben genannten Stellen kommt das Verb σαγηνεύειν in Anwendung des Eretria-Zuges bei folgenden Autoren vor: Polemon *Decl.* I, 30; II, 56–57 Hinck; Max. Tyr. 23 6 e; Philostr. *Vita Apoll.* I, 23, 26 Kayser; Sopater *Διαίρεσις ζητημάτων* VIII, 143, 20 Walz.

---

[11] Vgl. σαγήνη θυννευτική (Luc. *Saturn.* 24).

[12] Über diese Kriegstaktik s.: K. Meuli, "Ein altpersischer Kriegsbrauch", *Westöstliche Abhandlungen: Rudolf Tschudi zum 70. Geburtstag* (Wiesbaden 1954) 63–86 = K. Meuli, *Gesammelte Schriften* II (Basel – Stuttgart 1975) 699–729; G.C. Whittic, "Σαγηνεύουσιν δὲ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον: Herodotus VI. 31", *L'antiquité classique* 22 (1953) 27–31; P. Ceccarelli, "La fable des poissons de Cyrus (Hérodote, 1, 141)", *Mètis. Anthropologie des mondes grecs anciens* 8, 1–2 (1993) 29–57.

Polemo erwähnt außer Eretria auch Naxos (*Decl.* I, 30):

> Οὐ μόνους Ναξίους, οὐ μόνους Ἐρετριεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ Καλλίμαχον τοῖς βέλεσιν ἐσαγηνεύσαμεν.[13]

Also ist die betrachtete Stelle aus *De nat. anim.* im übertragenen Sinne und nicht buchstäblich zu verstehen: die heutigen Eretrier und Naxier hatten von ihren Ahnen gehört, was Herodotus und andere erzählen, und zwar über die Menschenjagden, die die Persier vorgenommen hatten.[14]

Lija Jermakova
erliya@yandex.ru
Universität St. Petersburg

Aelian in the detailed description of ancient tuna fishing (*De nat. anim.* XV, 5) mentions that Naxians and Eretrians knew about it according to Herodotus and others. Commonly it is understood in literal sense: inhabitants of Naxos and Eretria use this way of fishing, as Aelian alleges. But arguments, on which this interpretation is based, seem unreliable. More plausible is to see in Aelian's account an obvious hint at Persian tactics of depopulation, that Herodotus describes using the verb σαγηνεύειν.

Элиан в подробном описании ловли тунца (*De nat. anim.* XV, 5) пишет, что такой вид рыбной ловли, согласно Геродоту и другим авторам, известен наксосцам и эретрийцам. Обычно этот пассаж понимают в буквальном смысле: жители Наксоса и Эретрии применяют метод ловли тунца, описанный Элианом. Однако доводы, на которых основано такое толкование, кажутся недостаточно убедительными. Более вероятно, что Элиан намекает на персидскую военную тактику опустошения территории противника, которую впервые описывает Геродот при помощи глагола σαγηνεύειν.

---

[13] K. Meuli nimmt an, dass dieser "Lieblingstopos der späteren Lobredner" über die Verheerung der Eretria auf Plato zurückgeht, der auf Herodotus stützt und diese Taktik irrtümlich auf Eretria anwendet (*Ges. Schr.* [n. 12] 702 n. 5). Kl. Schöpsdau meint, dass Plato die herodotischen Ausdrücke ἐσαγήνευον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (Hdt. VI, 31) und τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἠνδραποδίσαντο (VI, 101), als ob sie dieselbe Bedeutung haben, versteht: Kl. Schöpsdau (Übers., Komm.), *Platon, Nomoi (Gesetze)* I–III (Göttingen 1994) 499.

[14] E. Ermolaeva und A. Verlinsky sage ich meinen aufrichtigsten Dank für die wertvollen Ratschläge und Hinweise.

О НЕКОТОРЫХ ОСОБЕННОСТЯХ ПОНИМАНИЯ “ПРОМЫСЛА” И “СУДЬБЫ” В ХРИСТИАНСКОЙ МЫСЛИ ПОЗДНЕЙ АНТИЧНОСТИ

Тема промысла – одна из ключевых в философии поздней античности, она была общей для языческих и христианских мыслителей. В этом отдавали себе отчет и сами христиане. Иустин Философ в разговоре с Трифоном-иудеем сходится со своим собеседником в том, что все рассуждения философов (речь идет о философах языческих), как и Закон и Пророки, имеют своим предметом единовластие (μοναρχία) Бога и Его промысл (πρόνοια),[1] хотя и уточняет, что отнюдь не все языческие философы придерживались по этому поводу верного учения. Климент Александрийский писал, что философия, которая согласна с христианской традицией, признает и утверждает промысл,[2] как, впрочем, и сама истинная философия была дана эллинам по промыслу Божию.[3] Таким образом, наличие учения о промысле оказывается общим знаменателем позднеантичной языческой философии (по крайней мере, некоторых ее важнейших школ) и христианской мысли. Вместе с тем, обычно считается, что, в отличие от языческих философов, христианские мыслители отвергли судьбу (εἱμαρμένη), которая играет большую роль и в античной, и в позднеантичной культуре и философии, так что при наличии общего знаменателя в учении о промысле эти два течения мысли поздней античности расходятся по данному вопросу именно в этом пункте.[4]

В самом деле, существуют многочисленные сочинения христианских авторов, направленные против учения о судьбе, то есть самого ее существования (особенно в контексте полемики с астрологией), и противопоставляющие ей промысл Божий.[5] Однако настоящая

---

[1] Iust. Mart. *Dial. cum Tryph.* 1, 3, 10 (ed. E. J. Goodspeed).

[2] Clem. Al. *Strom*. I, XI, 52, 2 (ed. O. Stählin, L. Früchtel, U. Treu).

[3] Clem. Al. *Strom*. VI, XVII, 159, 8.

[4] См., напр., А. А. Столяров. Судьба // *Античная философия. Энциклопедический словарь* (М. 2008) 720.

[5] Orig. *Philocalia* XXIII (ed. J. A. Robinson); Hippol. *Refutat*. 5, 3−4 (ed. M. Marcovich); Method. *Symp.* 8, 13−17 (ed. Janius); Euseb. *Praepar. Evang*. 6, 6 (ed. K. Mras); Basil. Caes. *Hexaemer*. 6, 5 sqq. (ed. S. Giet); Greg. Naz. *Carmina*

картина трансформации христианами парадигмы языческой философии, относящейся к проблематике промысла и судьбы, сложнее. Наряду с тенденцией отказа от учения о судьбе, можно заметить его переосмысление и творческую трансформацию. В настоящей статье я постараюсь показать на нескольких ключевых примерах, каким образом это переосмысление происходило. Вместе с тем, при такой постановке вопроса, я полагаю, понятней станут и некоторые особенности учений о промысле и судьбе в языческой философии, в первую очередь, в среднем платонизме и неоплатонизме, с которыми христианские философы соприкасались больше всего.

В самом деле, у апологетов можно заметить двойственное отношение к судьбе. Так, Иустин Философ, с одной стороны, отвергает детерминированность наших поступков судьбой (вводимую некоторыми на основании наличия пророчеств) и утверждает нашу свободу (иначе бессмысленны и награды и наказания Божии),[6] а с другой – тот же Иустин говорит о положительном смысле εἱμαρμένη: “Неизбежную же судьбу (εἱμαρμένην) мы допускаем в том, что избирающим доброе предлежит достойная награда, равно как и избирающим противоположное – сообразные наказания”.[7] В духе того же позитивного понимания судьбы латинский апологет Минуций Феликс говорит, что судьба (fatum) – это определение Божие о каждом из нас, которое делается на основании предвидения Божия относительно заслуг и нравственных свойств человека, исходя из которых выносится решение о судьбе (fatum) каждого.[8]

У Климента Александрийского, разработавшего, хотя и несистематически, самое обширное учение о промысле среди раннехристианских авторов,[9] понятие судьбы почти нигде не используется и не обсуждается.[10] Исключение представляет дошедшее в отрывках

---

dogmat. De Provident. *PG* 37, 424−438; Diod. Tars. *Contra fatum* (Phot. *Biblioth*. Cod. 223); Greg. Nyss. *Contra fatum* (ed. J. McDonough); Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 34−38 (ed. B. Einarson); Ioann. Chrys. *De fato et providentia*. *PG* 50, 749–774.

[6] Iust. Mart. *I Apol*. 43 (ed. E. J. Goodspeed), ср. idem. *II Apol*. 7, 3, 4 и далее, где Иустин вступает в полемику со стоиками, которые говорили, как он утверждает, что “все происходит по необходимости судьбы” (*ibid*. 7, 4, 2).

[7] Iust. Mart. *I Apol*. 43, пер. П. Преображенского с изменением цит. по: *Ранние отцы Церкви. Антология* (Брюссель 1988) 313.

[8] Minuc. Felix. *Octav*. 36, 1−2 (ed. Waltzing); *PL* 3, 350.

[9] J. D. Ewing. *The Christianization of Pronoia: Clement of Alexandria's Conception of Providence*. PhD diss. (Graduate Theological Union 2005).

[10] Впрочем, в *Увещевании к эллинам* он отрицает, что Судьба или Мойры являются богами (Clem. Al. *Protr.* 10, 102 [ed. C. Mondésert]), и противопоставляет им божественный промысл (*ibid*. 10, 103), но упоминание здесь Судьбы и Мойр можно счесть данью “диалогичности” в отношении языческой аудитории.

сочинение *Выписки из Феодота*, где нельзя с абсолютной уверенностью отличить слова Климента от цитат из христианского "гностика" Феодота. Особый интерес представляет свидетельство о вере в то, что "Господь, вождь человечества, сошел на землю с тем, чтобы верующие во Христе могли быть переведены из [мира] Судьбы в Его Промысл (ἀπὸ τῆς Εἱμαρμένης εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου Πρόνοιαν)".[11] Что эти слова принадлежат Клименту, сказать нельзя[12] хотя бы потому, что в других сочинениях он в собственном учении не пользуется понятием судьбы, то есть, вероятно, в нее не верит. Тем не менее, свидетельство о существовании в среде христианских "гностиков" валентиновского толка учения о Христе, спасающем из мира судьбы и переводящем в сферу своего промысла, весьма интересно. В том же сочинении судьба связывается с астрологией, то есть с подчиненностью человеческих судеб звездам – концепция широко распространенная в позднеантичном язычестве, как и в гностицизме. При этом влияние звезд на людей понималось не как их материальное воздействие, но как воздействие демонических сил (Clem. Al. *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 4, 69), знамениями которых служат звезды (*ibid*. 4, 70). В христианской среде первых веков противостояние демоническим силам понималось как серьезная задача, а у христианских "гностиков" валентиновского толка она ставилась и в контексте необходимости духовного выхода из мира судьбы. Очевидно, что этот мир, мир необходимых причинно-следственных связей и обусловленности (именно так его понимали и стоики), воспринимался в этой среде как то, из чего следует духовно выйти (у стоиков такой установки, конечно, не было), и в Христе видели спасителя из этого мира. Судьба считалась реальной для тех, кто не принял крещение, но переставала быть таковой для крестившихся во Христа. Впрочем, одного водного крещения было недостаточно, требовалось еще познание о своем происхождении, цели жизни и искуплении (*ibid*. 4, 78).

Вряд ли Климент разделял это учение: у него представления о существовании мира судьбы, который бы противостоял миру промысла, нет, хотя противопоставление промысла Божия Кере, Судьбе и Мойрам, за которыми он отрицает божественный статус, однажды встречается.[13] В целом же, в отличие от христианских гностиков первых

---

[11] Clem. Al. *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 4, 74, 2, 7 (ed. F. Sagnard).

[12] Эвинг, хотя и с оговорками, делает это слишком поспешно (Ewing [прим. 9] 150–151). Большинство исследователей приписывает этот отрывок Феодоту (см., напр.: É. Junod. Introduction // Origène. *Philocalie 21–27, Sur Le Libre Arbitre*, Éd. Éric Junod. Sources Chrétiennes, no. 226 [Paris 1976] 41–42).

[13] Clem. Al. *Protr*. 10, 102–103 и прим. 10.

веков, в мейнстриме церковной письменности реальность “судьбы” для кого бы то ни было, в конечном счете, вообще отвергается (хотя, как мы видели, у Иустина Философа εἱμαρμένη и у Минуция Феликса *fatum* употребляются и в позитивном контексте – в смысле суда Божия, а у Минуция Феликса еще и в смысле Божия (пред)определения земной участи человека, выносимого на основании Божия предведения о его моральном выборе). Если же говорить о христианской традиции в целом, то отрицание христианами реальности εἱμαρμένη[14] необходимо рассмотреть подробнее, имея в виду, что в языческом платонизме, современном христианству, как, впрочем, и у христианских “гностиков”, это понятие никуда не исчезает и играет существенную роль. В самом деле, ведь недостаточно констатировать, что христиане просто отказались от учения о судьбе языческой философии, – само это учение было призвано отвечать на определенные вопросы. Так, если у стоиков судьба имеет значение природной необходимости, то ведь само существование такой необходимости должно было и у христиан получить какое-то описание. Аналогично обстоит дело и с моральным аспектом судьбы – в среднем платонизме этот аспект существовал и выражался в учении об “условной судьбе” – судящем и наказывающем действии судьбы, происходящем в соответствии с моральным выбором человека.

Так, в приписываемом Алкиною *Учебнике платоновской философии* XXVI глава посвящена толкованию учения Платона о судьбе. Судьба (или рок) не предписывает то или иное действие, она распространяется на то, что последует из того или иного нашего выбора. Это и есть так называемая “условная судьба”. Изначальный выбор не определяется судьбой, но создает для судьбы определенные условия, то есть при определенном решении будут обязательно определенные последствия. Так в среднем платонизме благой (по определению) Бог выводится из-под обвинения в ответственности за зло, а также и за наказание (страдания, беды и т. п.), поскольку оно совершается объективно – за нарушение законов судьбы.[15] Итак, поскольку учение о таком “педагогическом” действии судьбы, исходящем из представления о справедливости богов (ср. Plat. *Leg*. X, 903−904), существовало, то и христиане, отказавшись от учения о судьбе, не могли оставить без ответа вопрос, которым это учение было вызвано.

---

[14] См. прим. 5, где приведены ссылки на многочисленные примеры из христианских авторов, отрицающих существование судьбы.

[15] Ср. Ps.-Plut. *De fato* 570 a–e и критику этого учения в Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 38, ниже мы к ней еще обратимся.

Что касается первого аспекта судьбы – понимания εἱμαρμένη как природной необходимости, – то в этом отношении характерно использование Евсевием Кесарийским сочинения Александра Афродисийского *О судьбе* в полемике с учением о судьбе. У Александра εἱμαρμένη практически отождествляется с тем, что происходит по природе; так, он писал: “Ведь ‘фатальное’ [происходит] по природе, а [происходящее] по природе – ‘фатально’ (τό τε γὰρ εἱμαρμένον κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν εἱμαρμένον)”.[16] Именно на эту мысль Александра ссылается Евсевий в полемике с учением о детерминизме в моральной сфере.[17] Судя по контексту, он счел такую интерпретацию судьбы единственно допустимой с христианской точки зрения, заменяющей ее понимание в смысле астрологического фатализма или иной системы детерминации нашей жизни судьбою. Сходное понимание судьбы, приемлемое для христиан, дает и Немесий Эмесский в трактате *О природе человека* (кон. IV в.). Остановимся на его учении подробнее.

В целом, Немесий, как и большинство церковных авторов его времени, предпочитает понятием судьбы не пользоваться, хотя, как мы увидим, он полемизирует не с самим словом и даже не с понятием как таковым, но с определенным его пониманием. Как и другие христианские авторы, он отвергает астрологический фатализм (Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 35), учение стоиков о судьбе (*ibid*. 34), но также и утверждение, что “выбор действий зависит от нас, а результат нашего выбора – от судьбы”,[18] а также полемизирует с концепцией, во многом напоминающей учение о судьбе средних платоников (Ps.-Plut. *De fato* 568 c – 570 e), в частности изложенной в трактате Пс.-Плутарха *О судьбе.*

Можно предположить, что интерес к этой теме подогревался в Немесии тем, что его собственное имя имело тот же корень, что и имя Немесиды (Νέμεσις), богини воздаяния и олицетворения судьбы,

---

[16] Alex. Aphr. *De fato* 169, 20.

[17] Euseb. *Praepar. Evang*. 6, 9, 18, 1–3 (ed. K. Mras). Ср. чуть более осторожное утверждение Евсевия: εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην (*ibid*. 6, 9, 19, 5).

[18] *Ibid*. 36, 3–4. Кого именно имеет в виду Немесий под “эллинами”, утверждающими это, сказать точно нельзя. Одни исследователи полагают, что речь идет о платонической концепции “условной судьбы”, но о ней Немесий эксплицитно говорит в следующей главе. Другое предположение – что речь идет о стоическом учении о вещах, которые последуют за выбором согласно судьбе (или: соохватываемых, соопределяемых судьбой [συνειμαρμένα]), см. примечание Шарплеса: Nemesius. *On the Nature of Man.* Tr. with intr. and notes by R. W. Sharples and P. J. Van der Eijk, Translated texts for historians 49 (Liverpool 2008) 188 n. 929.

одно из имен которой было Адрастея (Немесий упоминает ее, излагая учение средних платоников).[19] Именно этот аспект языческого учения о судьбе – ее роль в возмездии за неправедный выбор – критикуется Немесием ярче и оригинальнее всего (хотя он говорит и о том, что возмездие преступникам за сокрытые до времени преступления является доказательством существования *промысла*: Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 41, 36).

Острие полемики Немесия направлено против учения о том, что результат наших действий является следствием нашего выбора и *необходимости*, то есть против того, что действие судьбы носит неотвратимый характер “по причине неизбежности”. Речь, очевидно, идет о том, что в рамках этой концепции, после того как делается тот или иной выбор, он подпадает под неумолимый закон судьбы, и последствия наступают так же, если не более, неотвратимо, как кара закона за преступление. Именно с учением о судьбе в такой интерпретации Немесий, судя по всему, и не соглашается. Он понимает характер отношений человека с Богом иначе, настаивая на том, что “действия промысла происходят не от необходимости” (*ibid*. 37, 43). В качестве аргумента он приводит довод, который христиане обычно приводили в полемике с астрологическим фатализмом: если бы все было предопределено судьбой, то бессмысленны были бы молитвы богам, – но расширяет этот аргумент: ведь молиться Богу следует не только в начале какого-то дела (при выборе его), но и в течение его, то есть все время (*ibid*. 37, 45–50). Таким образом, речь идет о том, что между человеком и Богом существуют или, по крайней мере, могут и должны существовать отношения, в которых нет поступков или поведения, с необходимостью ведущих к неотвратимым последствиям как в положительном, так и в отрицательном смысле.

Иллюстрируя свой тезис, Немесий приводит “бытовой” пример: отправляясь в плавание, следует, чтобы не потерпеть кораблекрушение, молиться не только перед отплытием, но и в море, до самого конца плавания (*ibid*. 37, 49–50). Интересно отметить, что одно из немногих буквальных упоминаний в *Септуагинте* промысла Божия касается именно промысла в плавании: “промысл Твой, Отец, управляет кораблем, ибо Ты дал и путь в море, и безопасную стезю в волнах”

---

[19] “Платон двояко говорит о судьбе – по сущности и по действию (κατ᾽ οὐσίαν, … τὴν δὲ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν); по сущности это Мировая Душа (τοῦ παντὸς ψυχήν), а по действию это нерушимый божественный закон по причине неизбежности (ἀναπόδραστον). Называет же он это законом Адрастеи” (Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 37, 3–7). Немесий здесь излагает учение, встречающееся в Ps.-Plut. *De fato*. 564 b 4–5. Об Адрастее см. Plat. *Phaedr*. 248 c.

(*Прем*. 14, 3). Но еще важнее, в каком контексте встречается это упоминание о промысле. Речь в *Прем*. 13–14 идет о бессмысленности молитв перед рукотворными идолами, тем более это очевидно в плавании в море, где промысл Божий (а не искусное изделие художника, т. е. идол) может спасти даже и неопытных моряков. Немесий не ссылается в своем примере на Писание, но весьма вероятно, что он имеет это место в виду, развивая его мысль: если спасают не идолы, а Бог-Промыслитель, то и молиться (в течение всего плавания) нужно Ему. Интересно в этой связи отметить, что в среднем платонизме, например, у Максима Тирского (II в.) в сочинении *О том, следует ли молиться*, можно найти полное отрицание целесообразности молитв о бытовых нуждах, а порой и моления-прошения вообще о чем-либо. Немесий же приводит самый обыденный пример, суть которого, очевидно, состоит в том, чтобы подчеркнуть, что человеку в его повседневной жизни (этом житейском плавании) следует быть обращенным к Богу, что у человека нет ни гарантированного благого выбора, ни неотвратимого дурного. Да и вообще Бог открыт для обращенности к Нему без опосредования этого обращения законами судьбы.

В самом деле, отличие христианского учения от учения средних платоников пролегает не только в онтологической сфере (где заметным отличием является присутствие в платонизме учения о судьбе как особой сущности – Мировой Душе),[20] но и в сфере педагогической и духовной. Учение о разумности и справедливости законов судьбы, которыми управляется этот мир, как и подчеркивание их неумолимости, имеет, очевидно, педагогическую цель морального характера, а именно внушение ответственности за зависящее от нас, то есть за пороки и добродетели. В христианстве духовная установка несколько иная: еще более важной, чем ответственность за пороки и добродетели, у христиан считается установка на богообщение, которое, если оно прерывается грехами, необходимо восстановить (ср. *1Фес*. 5, 17). Именно в этом контексте аргумент Немесия о необходимости постоянной молитвы выглядит понятным. Жить, не нарушая неумолимые законы мироздания, пусть и установленные по воле Бога, – это одно, а жить, постоянно обращаясь к Богу, – нечто иное. Для первого существенно учение о судьбе, второе требует понятия о Божией воле, которая, в том числе и у средних платоников, именовалась промыслом. Этот промысл, понимаемый как Божия воля и непосредственно охватывавший в платонизме только высшую, “умную”, сферу (Ps.-Plut. *De fato*. 572 f − 573 a), Немесий “дотягивает” до земли.

---

[20] См. прим. 19.

Настаивая на том, что нежелание употреблять слово “судьба” вместо “промысла” имеет для него принципиальный характер, так как промысл он понимает иначе, чем неизбежность последствий выбора, то есть отказавшись от понимания судьбы в этическом смысле (то есть как возмездия согласно установленным Богом законам), Немесий замечает, что есть один смысл, в котором он готов это слово допустить. В самом деле, Бог не подвластен необходимости, поскольку Он Сам является ее Творцом (Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 37, 54). Поэтому Немесий отвергает господство “необходимости” в отношениях “Бог – человек” в этической сфере. Однако есть очевидные закономерности в физическом мире. Как видно из дальнейшего, под “необходимостью” в этой сфере Немесий понимает пределы и границы, которые положены тем или иным природам, “всеобщему и родовому (τοῖς καθόλου καὶ γενικοῖς)” (Nemes. *De nat. hom*. 37, 56). Речь идет не о законах природы в новоевропейском смысле,[21] а о границах, положенных тем или иным природам и вещам, как они наблюдаются человеком. Если понятие судьбы понимать в этом смысле (стоики и платоники зачастую так его и понимали), то, говорит Немесий, он не станет против его использования возражать (Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 37, 57). Итак, спор идет не о словах, неприемлемо для него не слово εἱμαρμένη, но концепция судьбы, которая вводит некое опосредующее в духовном и этическом смысле звено между Богом и человеком.

Этический пафос средних платоников очевиден. Их понимание судьбы и неизбежных последствий, наступающих после того или иного жизненного выбора, призвано воспитывать моральную ответственность, о которой они учили вслед за Платоном, говорившим в десятой книге *Законов* о вере в то, что богов легко склонить на свою сторону молитвами и приношениями, как об источнике нечестия.[22] Не следует думать, что богов *потом* удастся задобрить, отвечать за свой выбор следует сразу – таков, очевидно, пафос этого учения.

Позиция Немесия сложнее. С одной стороны, в полемике с “египетскими астрологами” (возможно, речь идет даже об учении Ямвлиха)[23] он указывает на противоречие в этом учении, которое принимает астрологический детерминизм и в то же время предполагает, что звезд-богов можно “умолить” и, стало быть, отменить

---

[21] То есть в понимании посленьютоновской науки.

[22] Наиболее твердо тема неумолимости судьбы проводится у Сенеки (Sen. *Nat. quaest.* II, 35).

[23] См. примечание Шарплеса: Nemesius. *On the Nature of Man* (прим. 18) 186 n. 924, где говорится, что, возможно, Немесий полемизирует с учением египетского жреца Абаммона из *О египетских мистериях* Ямвлиха.

неотвратимость судьбы. Немесий не признает, что человек способен манипулировать высшими силами посредством особых приношений и молитв. Вместе с тем, он видит опасность в противоположном крене, который усмотрел у платоников. Поэтому, очевидно, он и посчитал, что их понимание судьбы в этическом смысле чревато отчуждением человека от Бога и подчинением Бога необходимости.

Немесий предпочел отказаться от теории необходимости как в этической и духовной сферах, так и в сфере физической, придав судьбе исключительно смысл границ, положенных природам Творцом. Он сделал это посредством утверждения господства Творца и над этими законами, вводя, таким образом, языческое понятие о судьбе в пределы, лишающие его духовно-религиозного значения. Духовное значение в рамках данной проблематики имеют для Немесия не природные законы, а только Божий промысл. В той же главе он еще раз подчеркивает, что по отношению к природной необходимости установивший ее Бог всевластен и способен в какие-то моменты ее отменять, что видно по совершаемым Им и по Его воле Его святыми чудесам (здесь он ссылается на Писание: Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 37, 66–75). Вспомним, что у Александра Афродисийского судьба практически отождествляется с тем, что происходит по природе (Alex. Aphr. *De fato* 169, 20). Немесий для физического мира принимал близкое понятие о судьбе – как о пределах и границах природ, однако тут же уточнил, что над природной необходимостью существует власть промысла Творца, который волен ее отменять.

Интересно отметить, что в среднем платонизме тоже можно встретить утверждения о превосходстве силы промысла над судьбой, хотя примеры эти иного рода. Скажем, у Плутарха Херонейского, как замечает Д. Диллон, в качестве иллюстрации этого тезиса говорится, что Луна, имеющая земляную природу, должна была бы упасть в центр космоса (по законам природы), но, удерживаемая промыслом, не падает, а небесные тела, имеющие огненную природу, не поднимаются вверх, а двигаются по кругу.[24] Таким образом, Плутарх видит непосредственное действие промысла в чем-то наблюдаемом повседневно, а Немесий – в чудесах, когда материальные стихии и тела под действием силы Божией ведут себя иначе, чем обычно. Следовательно, в представлении Немесия четко различаются, с одной стороны, границы и пределы природ, установленные Богом, которые, за вычетом чудес, соблюдаются и самим Богом (это одно

[24] Д. Диллон. *Средние платоники. 80 г. до н. э. – 220 н. э.* (СПб. 2002) 215. Диллон имеет в виду: Plut. *De fac. in orbe lun.* 927 a.

из проявлений Его промысла), а с другой – чудесное, или сверхъестественное их “нарушение” (тоже по действию промысла). У Плутарха же в указанном месте планы “естественный” и “сверхъестественный” смешаны, поскольку некоторые природные (то есть наблюдаемое повседневно) феномены объясняются как имеющие место с нарушением имманентных природных законов. В христианской картине мира, напротив, потому и есть место чуду, что естественное мыслится существующим по установленным и соблюдаемым Богом “законам природ”.

Что касается учения о промысле, то следует сказать, что Немесий сформулировал, а крупнейшие христианские богословы от него восприняли понимание промысла, некоторые важные черты которого можно найти уже в среднем платонизме, например в трактате Пс.-Плутарха *О судьбе*, где читаем: “высший промысел (πρόνοια) – это мышление (νόησις) или же воля (βούλησις) первого Бога, являющаяся благотворительницей в отношении всего (εὐεργέτις ἁπάντων[25]). И в соответствии с ней, в первую очередь, устроены всяческие из божественных вещей наилучшим и прекраснейшим во всем образом” (Ps.-Plut. *De fato* 572 f–573 a). От этого понимания не сильно отличаются классические для христианской мысли определения Немесия: “Попечение (или забота) со стороны Бога о существующем (ἐκ θεοῦ εἰς τὰ ὄντα γινομένη ἐπιμέλεια)” (Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 41, 169. Это определение промысла повторяют потом слово в слово Максим Исповедник – причем дважды – и Иоанн Дамаскин).[26] Немесий дает и другое определение, которое тоже повторяют Максим (опять дважды) и Иоанн:[27] “Промысл Божий есть воля Божия, посредством которой все существующее получает подобающее устроение (πρόνοιά ἐστι βούλησις θεοῦ δι᾽ ἣν πάντα τὰ ὄντα τὴν πρόσφορον διεξαγωγὴν λαμβάνει)” (Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 41, 170–171). При этом следует отметить, что промысл, по Немесию, подразумевает уже не акт творения как таковой, но поддержание его, обеспечение тождественности родов и видов, рост и развитие, то есть всю динамику жизни и движения творения, которую он связывает с промыслом.[28]

---

[25] Ср. у Немесия (Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 41, 89–91): ἄλλως τε ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ θεός· ἀγαθὸς δὲ ὤν, εὐεργετικός ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ εὐεργετικός, καὶ προνοητικός (кроме того, Бог – благ, а будучи благим, Он благотворителен, если же благотворителен, то промыслителен).

[26] Max. *QD*. 1, 82, 1 (ed. Declerck); *Amb*. 10: *PG* 91, 1189 B; Ioan. Damas. *Exp. fid.* 43, 2 (ed. Kotter).

[27] Max. *QD*. 1, 82, 2; *Amb*. 10: *PG* 91, 1189 B; Ioan. Damas. *Exp. fid*. 43, 3.

[28] *Ibid*. 41, 121–124.

Итак, у Немесия этическое измерение судьбы, имеющееся в языческой философии, в частности у средних платоников, было отброшено; единственный смысл судьбы, который он признавал, сводился к границам и пределам природ. Остался, тем не менее, вопрос, как быть с понятием о функции суда и наказания, которая у философов поздней античности была закреплена за судьбой. У Немесия она отдельно не рассматривается, фактически все функции суда переданы у него промыслу, но подробно он об этом не говорит. Были, однако, у христианских авторов в конце IV в. и другие подходы к данной проблематике. На одном из них необходимо кратко остановиться.

Речь идет об идеях виднейшего философа монашеского делания Евагрия Понтийского (IV в.).[29] Евагрий находился под сильным влиянием Оригена и платонизма. Учение о промысле у него тесно связано с учением о распадении первоначального единства умов, наделении их телами и дальнейшем пути по возвращению к первоначальному единству, осуществляемому во Христе. Промысл описывается как Божественное попечение о том, что́ каждой разумной душе необходимо для возвращения к единству с Богом.[30] Гностику вменяется в обязанность созерцать логос (то есть божественный замысел, цель) промысла[31] о себе самом и других (в первую очередь тех, кто ему вверен в качестве учеников и пасомых). Все творение рассматривается с точки зрения движения к Богу, к которому оно предназначено. Промысл, по Евагрию, имеет два измерения, которые можно назвать онтологическим и онтодинамическим: “Двояк промысл Божий, одна сторона его, как говорится, охраняет состояние (σύστασις*) тел и нетелесных* [существ]; а другая – обращает разумные твари (λογικοί) от порока и неведения к добродетели и ведению”.[32]

Наряду с логосом промысла подвижник призывается созерцать логос суда (κρίσις).[33] Суд у Евагрия касается не наказания, но дара, который доставляет Бог разумной твари в виде тела и соответствующего мира, в котором человек находится. Эти тела и миры присуждаются в педагогических целях. Евагрий говорит гностику, созерцающему логосы суда и промысла: “ты откроешь логосы суда во множестве

---

[29] См. анализ его учения о промысле и суде: L. Dysinger. The *logoi* of Providence and Judgment in the Exegetical Writings of Evagrius Ponticus // *Studia Patristica* 37 (2001) 462−471; idem. *Psalmody and Prayer in the Writings of Evagrius Ponticus* (Oxford 2005) 171–198.

[30] Evagr. *Kephalaia Gnostica* IV, 89 (ed. Guillaumont).

[31] Evagr. *Gnosticus* 48 (ed. A. Guillaumont – C. Guillaumont).

[32] Evagr. *Kephalaia Gnostica* VI, 59 (ed. Guillaumont).

[33] Evagr. *Gnosticus* 48 (ed. Guillaumont).

тел и миров, а логосы промысла в способах, посредством которых мы возвращаемся от пороков и неведения к добродетели и ведению”.[34] Суд для Евагрия – распределение тел в соответствии с состоянием души. Он соответствует переходу от одного состояния к другому и наделению соответствующим телом и жизнью в соответствующем мире. Влияние платоновской философии и, в частности, мифа об Эре из *Государства* очевидно.

Суммируя понятие суда у Евагрия в *Kephalaia Gnostica*, Диссинджер пишет: “В этом сочинении Евагрий использует термин ‘суд’ для описания трех различных, но связанных событий. Во-первых, ‘суд’ может быть отнесен к первому промыслительному творению материального мира в ответ на κίνησις (движение), или падение умов (λογικοί). Во-вторых, ‘суд’ может описывать серии трансформаций, в которых каждая умная тварь (λογικός) получает новое тело и обстановку, подходящие для ее духовного состояния. Наконец, ‘суд’ может обозначать совершенное преображение, которое возвратит все в единство с Богом”.[35] При этом высшее состояние единства с Богом – это единение с Ним чистых, уже освободившихся от тел, умов. Таким образом, Бог у Евагрия становится Судией в ответ на падение тварей. Этот момент следует подчеркнуть, имея в виду иной подход к той же проблематике, который мы увидим у Максима Исповедника, для которого, в то же время, учение Евагрия о промысле и суде будет иметь существенное значение.

Однако, прежде чем мы обратимся к учению Максима, следует хотя бы кратко упомянуть о промысле и судьбе в учениях неоплатоников V в., сравнение с которыми позволят яснее понять и учение Максима. Наиболее интересен для нас Гиерокл Александрийский, который написал трактат *О промысле* в семи книгах, сохранившийся в пересказе в *Библиотеке* Фотия (Phot. *Biblioth.* Cod. 214; Cod. 251). Гиерокл, по словам Фотия, не приемлет понимания судьбы ни как “иррациональной необходимости составителей гороскопов (γενεθλιαλόγων)”, ни как “принуждения (βίαν) стоиков”, ни как судьбы (Александра Афродисийского) в смысле “природы платоновских тел” (под последним может иметься в виду учение, либо соотносящее судьбу с индивидуальной телесно-душевной природой,[36] либо с космическими телами,

---

[34] *Ibid*.

[35] Dysinger. *Psalmody and Prayer* (прим. 30) 178.

[36] Так понимает это место и Адо, мнение которой, основанное на толковании этого понятия у Прокла, кажется нам предпочтительным: I. Hadot. *Studies on The Neoplatonist Hierocles*, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 91 [I] (Philadelphia 2004) 109.

скажем, небесами, и их влиянием),[37] не принимает он и учения о возможности манипулировать рождением человека посредством жертвоприношений (имеется в виду, очевидно, магическое воздействие на богов, которое должно сделать благоприятным момент рождения: Phot. *Biblioth.* Cod. 214, 172 b 8–13).

Вместо всего этого он понимает судьбу преимущественно в этическом смысле как "праведное действие божества, которое направлено на преступников, согласно постановлению промысла" (*ibid*. Cod. 214. 172 b 15). Судьба, таким образом, у Гиерокла, как и у всех платоников, подчинена промыслу, в смысле праведного "суда" и "приговора".

Что касается промысла, то вслед за Плотином Гиерокл понимает его в первую очередь онтологически – как порядок, который придает миру Ум-Демиург.[38] Промысл распространяется на богов, демонов и людей, по ниспадающей; боги причастны промыслу в высшей мере. По мере снижения, в жизни демонов (героев) и, тем более, людей к промыслу примешивается судьба и случайность (см. *ibid*. 130), хотя случайность в жизни людей только кажется таковой, а на самом деле – это результат взаимодействия судьбы и нашей свободной воли (см. *ibid*. 136). Судьба является подчиненной формой промысла, проявляющегося в распределительной справедливости, когда промысл воздает существам низшего порядка то, что они заслужили. Поэтому судьба именуется "божественной волей и законом божественной справедливости" (Phot. *Biblioth*. Cod. 251. 462 b 2−3). Это судящее и исправляющее действие судьбы Гиерокл называет также "материальным промыслом" (*ibid.* 464 a 18−20).

Как замечает Ильсетро Адо, образ судьбы-справедливости, сопровождающей промысл, восходит к *Законам* Платона (*Leg*. IV, 176 a 2 или *Leg*. X, 904 c 6 sq.) и *Орфическим гимнам* (62), где Зевса сопровождает богиня справедливости и возмездия Дика.[39] Существенно то, что Демиург выступает как распределитель благ, чему соответствует промысл, а наказание (а значит, и "зло") оставляется на долю судьбы. Мотивы теодицеи здесь очевидны – Бог не должен быть ответственен за "зло" (ср. Plat. *Resp*. 617 e). Гиерокл называет судьбу: (1) божественной волей; (2) законом божественной справедливости и (3) божественным судом (Phot. *Biblioth*. Cod. 251. 462 b 2–3). Таким образом, это и закон, провозглашаемый Демиургом, и применение этого закона.

---

[37] Так понимает это место Шибли, допускающий, впрочем, и первое толкование: H. Schibli. *Hierocles of Alexandria* (Oxford 2002) 153.

[38] Schibli (прим. 38) 129. Как считает Шибли, выше Ума у Гиерокла стояло Единое (см. *ibid*. 53).

[39] Hadot (прим. 37) 103–105.

Следует обратить внимание на одно место, где, ссылаясь на Платона (*Leg*. IV, 709 b 7–8), у которого говорится, что Бог управляет миром не только промыслом, но и судьбой, случаем и подходящим моментом, Гиерокл пишет о том, что предшествующее (προηγουμένη) наделение благами и сохранение сущих в согласии с природой является делом чистого промысла (τῆς καθαρᾶς προνοίας), тогда как исправление тех, кто имеет противоприродное расположение, и наказание согрешений – дело промысла материального (ἐνύλου), который пользуется случайностью (τύχῃ) и подходящим моментом. Он добавляет, используя важное понятие, получившее свое развитие и в христианской мысли, что не согласно предшествующему принципу (или: “логосу” – προηγούμενον λόγον) божественный суд навлекает ужасное на одних и приносит благополучие другим, но на основе того, чего мы достойны, исходя из прошлых жизней (*ibid*. Cod. 251. 464 a 20). Здесь особенно интересно понятие о “предшествующем промысле”, от которого отличается Гиероклов “последующий” суд (последний уже не непосредственно осуществляется Богом, очевидно потому, что за Богом нужно сохранить абсолютную благость), но посредством судьбы или случая.

Интересно, как уже было отмечено Мишелем Лёкьеном (Michaelis Lequien) в комментариях к изданию Иоанна Дамаскина,[40] что параллельно Гиероклу и даже раньше него Иоанн Златоуст использует сходные понятия, говоря о двух волях Бога: одна из них предшествующая (τὸ προηγούμενον), первая, “чтобы не погибли те, которые грешат”, воля благоволения, но есть и другая воля, состоящая в том, “чтобы те, кто предался злу, наконец погибли”.[41] Учение о предшествующей и последовавшей воле Бога благодаря его использованию Иоанном Дамаскиным будет весьма распространено у христианских богословов, и восточных, и западных. От Дамаскина это учение попало в средневековое латинское богословие, в частности к Фоме Аквинскому.[42]

Отметим, что у Златоуста и у Гиерокла “предшествующая” воля – благоволящая, а последующая, или вторая, – судящая (Гиерокл припи-

---

[40] Воспроизведено в: *PG* 94, 967–969 n. 95.

[41] Ioan. Chrys. *In epistulam ad Ephesios*: *PG* 62, 13, 15–20. Ср. прим. III к гл. XXIX, кн. 2 А. Бронзова: *Творения иже во святых отца нашего Иоанна Дамаскина. Точное изложение православной веры* (М. 1992) 416–417.

[42] Thom. Aquin. *Summa Theol*. I a. 19. 6, ad 2. От Фомы, вероятнее всего, эту концепцию воспринял Геннадий Схоларий, для которого она была вдвойне убедительна, поскольку она же встречается у Дамаскина (J. A. Demetracopoulos. Georgios Gennadios II – Scholarios’ *Florilegium Thomisticum* II (*De fato*) and its anti-Plethonic Tenor // *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 74 [2007]: 2, 320).

сывает ей и награды, а Златоуст только наказания). Отличие состоит в том, что у Златоуста обе воли принадлежат непосредственно Богу, а у Гиерокла последующий суд, хотя в конечном счете тоже восходит к Богу, осуществляется согласно судьбе (как и у средних платоников). В целом же, вероятно, оба автора опираются на общую философскую традицию, восходящую к Платону и средним платоникам и стремящуюся как "оправдать Бога" (теодицея), так и утвердить свободу человека.

Соотношение промысла, судьбы и свободной воли, по Гиероклу, таково, что наш выбор создает условия для божественной справедливости, этого осуществления судьбы, в соответствии с которым на уровне человеческого бытия реализуется промысл. Это все та же теория "условной судьбы", что и у средних платоников. Справедливость осуществляется через демонов, стражей человеческих поступков. Для Гиерокла понятие свободной воли и зависящего от нас, то есть ответственности, подразумевает существование промысла, и существование промысла подразумевает наличие зависящего от нас. Ибо наша свобода выбора подтверждает справедливую судьбу, а последняя сохраняет свободу (см. Phot. *Biblioth*. Cod. 251, 465 a–b). Действие судьбы, понимаемой как суд, начинается с самого рождения, условия которого (родители, место и время рождения) и телесность, как и особенности характера, определяются выбором души в вечности перед вселением в тело (см. *ibid.* 466 a). Гиерокл говорит, что "для каждой души есть и промысл, и суд, и приговор (ἑκάστης ἐστὶ πρόνοια καὶ κρίσις καὶ δίκη), и очищение (κάθαρσις), и отсылание для [нового] рождения, и подобающая жизненная доля (λῆξις), и не сам собой наступающий конец [жизни], и после смерти путешествие в Аид с ведущим (ἡγεμόνος) демоном, которому по жребию была препоручена наша жизнь" (*ibid*. 466 b 2–7). Влияние мифа Платона об Эре очевидно.

При этом сфера судьбы не воспринимается Гиероклом как враждебная, из нее следует извлекать пользу, как больной извлекает пользу из горьких лекарств (*ibid.* 461 b; 464 a). "Порядок промыслительной судьбы (ἡ τῆς προνοητικῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξις) воспитывает то, что зависит от нас (τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) посредством страданий, которые не зависят от нас (οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν)" (*ibid*. 465 a 19–21). Нечто похожее мы найдем и у Максима Исповедника, который пишет, что существуют "Промысл[43] и Суд, которые тесно связаны с устремлениями наших произволений.

[43] Здесь и далее написание Промысла и Суда с прописной буквы соответствует пониманию их в качестве божественных энергий, соотносимых с соответствующими божественными именами (традиция *Ареопагитик*, которой наследует и Максим).

Они различными способами удерживают нас от дурного и мудро обращают к благому и искореняют в нас прошлое, настоящее и будущее зло, направляя то, что не зависит от нас, против того, что зависит от нас” (Max. *Amb.* 10/19: *PG* 91, 1136 A). Вряд ли речь может идти о заимствовании и даже влиянии, как и в случае отмеченных выше сходных мыслей Герокла и Златоуста, скорее – о существовании в общем контексте философской культуры поздней античности.

Перейдем теперь непосредственно к учению Максима Исповедника (VII в.) о Промысле и Суде. В системе Максима учение о промысле и суде Евагрия претерпело существенное изменение, хотя он и неоднократно повторяет наставление Евагрия о созерцании логосов промысла и суда, считая это созерцание важной частью богопознания.[44] В *Трудностях к Иоанну* (*Amb*. 10/19: *PG* 91, 1133 A − 1137 C) Максим излагает теорию пяти способов (тропосов) естественного созерцания. Посредством первых трех осуществляется познание Бога из творения, с помощью двух других – наставление в добродетели и усвоении Богу. В контексте трех тропосов познания Бога из творения Максим говорит о познании Бога как Творца, Промыслителя и Судии, проводя, таким образом, различие между этими тремя аспектами деятельности Бога в отношении творения. Что касается Бога как Творца, то в этом качестве Он познается из категории “сущности” при поиске не сводимой ни к одной сущности и не познаваемой по сущности Первопричины всего. Говоря о познании Бога как Промыслителя и Судии, Максим использует категории “движение” (κίνησις) и “различие” (διαφορά). Исходя из движения тварей, которое происходит в соответствии с природными логосами (разными у всех природ, но едиными для каждого из творений данной природы), можно познавать наличие Промысла:

> Движение указывает на Промысл о сущих: посредством него созерцаем неизменную тождественность каждого из пришедших в бытие по сущности и виду, а также безукоризненное управление, и постигаем Содержащего и Сохраняющего все вещи в неизреченном единстве в надлежащем порядке отдельно друг от друга согласно тем логосам, по которым каждая вещь возникла (Max. *Amb*. 10/19: *PG* 91, 1133 C).

При этом Максим подчеркивает, что он говорит не об обращающем Промысле, то есть не о его моральном аспекте (который он не

---

[44] См., например, в *Сотницах о любви*: Max. *Carit*. 1, 78; 1, 99; 1, 100; 2, 27; 2, 99; 3, 99.

отрицает, но в данном месте, так сказать, опускает, дистанцируясь, как считают исследователи, от Евагрия),[45] но лишь об его онтодинамическом аспекте:

> Я говорю (здесь) о Промысле Ума, не об обращающем (ἐπιστρεπτικήν) и как бы устраивающем [домостроительно] восстановление тех, о ком Промысл, из того, что не должно, в то, что должно. Но я говорю о Промысле, содержащем в себе все и сохраняющем [все] согласно логосам, по которым все изначально возникло (Max. *Amb*. 10/19: *PG* 91, 1133 D).

Такое понимание Промысла перекликается с учением о нем у Немесия, который, как было отмечено выше, подчеркивал в Боге-Промыслителе (в отличие от Творца) уже не акт творения как таковой, но обеспечение поддержания творения, тождественности родов и видов, рост и развитие, то есть всю динамику жизни и движения творения, которую он и связывает с Промыслом (Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 41, 121−124) (Максим излагает сходное понимание на языке учения о логосах, заимствованного им из *Ареопагитик*). Увлеченные темой полемики Максима с Евагрием, исследователи обычно не придают значения этой параллели с Немесием. Далее, также опуская моральный аспект (что принципиально), Максим говорит о Боге как Судии, познаваемом в этом качестве через категорию “различия”:

> Различие же указывает на Суд, посредством различия мы научаемся, что Бог – премудрый распределитель (διανομήν) соответствующих каждому логосов, (научаемся же этому,) исходя из природной способности, [имеющейся] в каждом из сущих, соразмерной по отношению к подлежащему сущности (Max. *Amb*. 10/19: *PG* 91, 1133 CD).

Моральный аспект Суда (то есть понимание его как наказывающего и воспитующего) здесь опускается, вероятно, не только потому, что Максим хочет отмежеваться от понимания суда Евагрием, но и потому, что моральный аспект уместен лишь в отношении разумных творений, а Максим хочет, очевидно, поднять понятие о Суде на всеобщий уровень, как он применительно ко всей твари говорил о Промысле. Лишенный морального аспекта Суд, постигаемый через “различие” (διαφορά), соответствует познанию Бога-Судии из самого факта существования строгих, отграничивающих отличий между существами, не только в природно-видовом отношении, но и на индиви-

---

[45] M. Törönen. *Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor* (Oxford 2007) 137.

дуальном уровне. В рамках этого ви́дения, каждая природа и каждая тварь существует согласно предвечному Суду и установлению Божию в отношении ее бытия, природы, способа существования и качества:

> И о Суде (я говорю), как о распределителе (διανομέα), не воспитующем (παιδευτικήν) и словно бы карающем согрешающих, но о сохраняющем и разграничивающем (или: “определяющем” – ἀφοριστικήν) сущие, по коему каждое тварное (сущее) в (неразрывной) связи с логосами, согласно которым оно появилось, имеет неизменное в природной тождественности узаконение (νομιμότητα) нерушимым, поскольку Создатель изначально вынес суд и установил относительно *бытия* каждого и того, *что́* оно должно быть, и *как*, и *каково* (оно) [должно быть] (ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ δημιουργὸς περὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τί εἶναι καὶ πῶς καὶ ὁποῖον ἕκαστον ἔκρινε τε καὶ ὑπεστήσατο) (Max. *Amb.* 10/19: *PG* 91, 1133 D − 1136 A).

В *Богословско-полемическом сочинении* 21[46] в контексте полемики с монофизитом Севиром Антиохийским Максим дал определение “различию” применительно к сущностям, что это “[нечто], составляющее (συστατικήν) и определяющее (ἀφοριστικήν) сущности”, и добавил, что понимает различие как то, что разграничивает сущее по сущности, и по природе, и по лицу, и по ипостаси и искореняет любое превращение и слияние (Max. *TP* 21: *PG* 91, 248 B).

Обычно, рассматривая пассаж из *Amb*. 10/19, посвященный Суду, в совокупности с предыдущим, посвященным Промыслу, исследователи подчеркивают отличие их понимания у Максима по сравнению с Евагрием.[47] Однако представляется, что далеко не только Евагрий (да и не столько Евагрий!) повлиял на мысль Максима. В самом деле, можно заметить, что в способе описания Суда Божия Максим близок к тому, как Пс.-Дионисий описывает Божие имя “Справедливость” (Δικαιοσύνη) и сходное с ним “Спасение” (Σωτηρία):

> Бог воспевается как Справедливость – как всех по достоинству наделяющий, и определяющий (ἀφορίζων) благомерность, и красоту, и благочиние, и устройство, и все распределения (διανομάς), и порядки каждому в соответствии с поистине сущим справедливейшим пределом, и для всех и каждого из них являющийся Причиной самостоятельности. … Эта божественная справедливость воспевается и

---

[46] Трактат написан либо примерно тогда же, когда сочинялись *Трудности*, либо позднее, во время полемики вокруг монофелитства.

[47] L. Thunberg. *Microcosm and Mediator. The Theological Anthropology of St Maximus the Confessor* (Lund 1965) 73–74.

> как Спасение всех, потому что она поддерживает и сохраняет особые у каждого и несмешанные с другими сущность и чин беспримесно, будучи причиной свойственных всем особенностей поведения.[48]

Из сопоставления обоих авторов видно, что в своем онтокосмологическом понимании Суда Максим подчеркивает те же моменты, что и Ареопагит, когда он говорит об именах Бога "Справедливость" и "Спасение", а именно – об устроении творения, в котором все получает подобающий ему чин, строго отграничивается друг от друга, существует "несмесно" и "неслиянно" с другим в пределах своей природы и своего образа существования. Можно вспомнить, что и Немесий, когда говорил о том значении судьбы, в котором это понятие приемлемо для христиан, писал о пределах и границах, положенных Богом природам (Nemes. *De nat. hom.* 37, 56). Однако непосредственное влияние на концепцию Суда Максима оказал, очевидно, все же Ареопагит. Тем более заслуживают внимания и некоторые отличия. В *Ареопагитиках* нет подчеркнутого различения онтологического и морального плана применительно к Божественной справедливости; приводя отрывки из них, я опустил посвященные моральному аспекту Справедливости, хотя Ареопагит специально подчеркивает правомерность весьма нетривиального онтологического понимания "Спасения" и "Избавления" (или: "Искупления" – Ἀπολύτρωσις) в смысле обеспечения границ и пределов природ и удержания их в соответствующем чине и порядке (Ps.-Dion. *DN* 8, 9) и показывает, что духовный или моральный аспект "спасения" неотделим от онтологического понимания подобного рода. С другой стороны, имена "Справедливость", "Спасение", "Избавление" для Ареопагита – одни из множества Божественных имен. У Максима же Суд (наряду с Промыслом) занимает особенное место, что, очевидно, следует объяснять и диалогом с Евагрием, у которого пара Промысл–Суд играет ключевую роль, и большим значением в Св. Писании и церковной традиции понятий Бога-Судии и судов Божиих.[49] Эти понятия, как правило, имеют моральный смысл, Максим же наполняет их особым, философским, онтологическим смыслом, что

---

[48] Ps.-Dion. *DN* 8, 7–9, рус. пер. с изменениями цит. по: Дионисий Ареопагит. *Сочинения*. Максим Исповедник. *Толкования* / Пер. под ред. Г. М. Прохорова (СПб. 2002) 481–487.

[49] Ср. многочисленные упоминания Божиих "судов" в Писании: 1 *Пар*. 16, 12–14; *Тов*. 3, 15: *Пс*. 9, 26; 18, 10; 104, 5–7; 118, 13, 30, 39, 43, 52, 62, 75, 106, 137, 164, 175; 147, 8; *Прем*. 17, 1; *Эккл*. 17, 10; 48, 7; *Ис*. 26, 9; *Иер*. 1, 16; *Дан*. 3, 27; *Откр*. 15, 4; 16, 7; 19, 2. Некоторые из этих мест упоминаются в различных контекстах у Максима.

лишний раз доказывает, что он был не только богословом, но и философом. Наконец, говоря о Суде, Ареопагит делает больший (если не исключительный) акцент на различии и разграничении *природ*, тогда как Максим, как видно из приведенной цитаты из *Богословско-полемического сочинения* 21, категорию “различия”, а значит и Суд, соотносит с различием не только природ, но и ипостасей. В целом же понятия Промысла и Суда в их онтокосмологическом аспекте у Максима тесно переплетены по своему содержанию и неотделимы друг от друга. В совокупности они описывают принципы тождественности и различия всего тварного так, что ни о тождестве (которое определяется и выявляется движением сущих согласно логосу природы каждого), ни об отличии, определяемом различием природных и ипостасных особенностей, друг без друга говорить нельзя.

Если сравнить концепцию Промысла и Суда Максима с учениями платоников-язычников, то можно заметить, что Суд у него в определенном смысле занял место, которое в языческих учениях занимала судьба, по крайней мере, в некоторых своих существенных моментах. Можно вспомнить, например, что у Гиерокла судьба – подчиненная форма промысла, проявляющегося в распределительной справедливости, когда промысл воздает разумным существам то, что они заслужили; поэтому судьба именуется “божественной волей и законом божественной справедливости” (Phot. *Biblioth*. Cod. 251. 9. 462 b 2–3. P. 194), и говорится о ней в контексте божественного суда. В целом же у неоплатоников-язычников судьба охватывает по преимуществу материальное творение, человека же – в той мере, в какой он ему принадлежит, а Суд у Максима распространяется на все тварное. Кроме того, Суд у него не является чем-то подчиненным Промыслу (как судьба у язычников), а, как и Промысл, принадлежит непосредственно Богу. При этом решение о бытии и индивидуальных особенностях тварей не является у Максима фатальным следствием из выбора души до ее вселения в тело или ее прошлых жизней, как у Платона и платоников-язычников, но исключительно решением Суда Божия.

У Евагрия, в отличие от языческого платонизма, уже нет понятия судьбы, но, как и у философов-язычников, есть предсуществование душ и наделение их соответствующими телами, совершаемое по логосу суда Божия. У Евагрия это является следствием отпадения умов от пребывания в единении с Богом, с которым и сообразуется Божий суд, зависящий, таким образом, от выбора тварей. В этом отношении система Евагрия находится на полпути от языческой философии к христианской. Что касается Максима, то он не просто, как большинство христианских философов, отказывается от понятия судьбы, но, синтезируя и творчески перерабатывая Евагрия, Немесия и Ареопа-

гита, христианизует судьбу, поднимает ее до суверенного Суда Божия. При этом, как справедливо отмечает Мелхиседек Торонен, Максим так формулирует концепцию Промысла и Суда (в их не-моральном смысле), что Бог оставался бы у него Промыслителем и Судией и без грехопадения, для Евагрия же эти действия Божии неразрывно связаны с мифом о распаде и собирании Энады.[50]

Возвращаясь к разбираемому тексту из *Amb*. 10/19, можно заметить, что, указав на онтодинамическое понимание Промысла и Суда, релевантное для всех тварей, Максим тут же отмечает, что, если говорить о нас, людях, имеющих по природе произволение, то к нам вполне относится и моральный аспект Промысла и Суда:

> Потому что ведь есть и по-другому сказываемые Промысл и Суд, которые тесно связаны с устремлениями наших произволений. Они различными способами удерживают нас от дурного и мудро обращают к благому и искореняют в нас прошлое, настоящее и будущее[51] зло, направляя то, что не зависит от нас, против того, что зависит от нас.[52]

Более того, применительно к людям нельзя говорить о двух разных типах Промысла и Суда, не-моральном и моральном, но те же самые Промысл и Суд являются по отношению к ним и онтодинамическими, и моральными, только проявляются по-разному:

> Я не говорю из-за этого о том, что существует [какой-то] один и другой промысл и суд. Ибо я знаю, что есть по силе [или: “в возможности”] один Промысл и Суд, имеющий разное и многообразное [по способам] действие на нас (Max. *Amb*. 10/19: *PG* 91, 1136 A).

Фактически это означает, что применительно к людям хранение и поддержание нашей природы в ее энергии и движении (онтодинамический аспект Промысла) сопровождается обращением и направлением к единой цели разумной твари (Ср. Max. *Thal.* 2, 10−12). Равно и Божий Суд в отношении нас действует не только наделяя нас соответствующими качествами и особенностями, отличающими одну ипостась от другой, но и воспитывая и наказывая уклоняющихся от Бога.

---

[50] Törönen (прим. 46) 136−137.

[51] То есть возможное в будущем.

[52] Max. *Amb*. 10/19: *PG* 91, 1136 A. Максим использует категории античной нравственной философии, воспринятые, скорее всего, от Немесия (см. Nem. *De nat. hom.* 38–39).

В одном месте *Трудностей* (*Amb*. 67: *PG* 91, 1400A–B) Максим говорит о тройственных логосах Суда и Промысла об умопостигаемом и чувственном. Каждое из сущих характеризуется сущностью (или природой), способностью (или силой) и действием (или энергией). Именно из-за этой тройственности тройственны и логосы Промысла и Суда относительно них. Тройственный логос Промысла, согласно Максиму, связывает бытие сущего с сущностью, способностью и действием, а логос Суда наказывает грехи (прошлые, настоящие и будущие)–уклонения от (или “порчи”) соответствующих логосов (то есть воли Божией) относительно сущности, способности и действия сущих. Таким образом, применительно к разумным тварям онтологический план у Максима всегда еще в возможности онтодинамический и моральный, то есть подразумевает и движение твари, и направленность этого движения, определяемую отношением нашего произволения к Божией воле. Нарушения этой воли влекут за собой действие Суда, который совершается в течение всей жизни человека, а не только после смерти.

При этом Промысл и Суд у Максима имеют божественный и надвременной характер.[53] Не случайно в *Amb*. 67: *PG* 91, 1400 B, как и в *Amb*. 10/19: *PG* 91, 1136 A, он говорит, что Суд Божий искореняет в нас не только прошлое и настоящее, но и *будущее* зло. Бог обладает

---

[53] Ср. о надвременном характере судьбы, которая выше не только людей, но и богов, в древнегреческой культуре: В. П. Гайденко. *Тема судьбы* и представление о времени в древнегреческом мировоззрении // *Вопросы философии* (1969): 9, 88–98. При всей условности такого сравнения и наличии существенных отличий, можно заметить, что в одном важном аспекте обнаруживается сходство между древнегреческим пониманием судьбы и учением Максима. Так, если, согласно Гайденко, героическое поведение у греков предполагает сознательное принятие героем своей судьбы, являющейся составной частью единого предвечного плана, то и Максим говорит, что не зависящее от нас посылается нам Богом и предвечно ведомо Ему, и должно быть принято в качестве такового. Это видно, например, из диалога между Максимом и посетившим его в заключении еп. Феодосием: “Говорит ему Феодосий епископ: ‘Как живешь, господин авва Максим?’ Ответил святой: ‘Как предопределил (προώρισεν) Бог прежде всех веков Свое промыслительное (προνοητικήν) обо мне решение (или: “устроение”–διεξαγωγήν), так и живу’. Феодосий говорит: ‘Что же ты говоришь? Но разве прежде всякого века о каждом из нас предопределил Бог?’ Максим сказал: ‘Если предуведал (προέγνω), то без сомнения и предопределил’ (ср. *Рим*. 8, 29). Феодосий: ‘Что значит это–“предуведал” и “предопределил”?’ Максим: ‘Предведение [касается] зависящих от нас мыслей и слов и дел, а предопределение касается не зависящих от нас событий’” (Диспут в Визии, пер. М. Д. Муретова с изменениями: *Максим Исповедник: полемика с оригенизмом и моноэнергизмом* / Сост. Г.И. Беневич, Д.С. Бирюков, А.М. Шуфрин [СПб. 2007] 176).

абсолютным знанием и предведением, и суды Божии, по которым совершается то, что не зависит от нас, происходят в соответствии с этим предведением, в том числе наших намерений, так что нельзя сказать, что человек вынуждает Бога выносить тот или иной суд, поскольку суды Божии лишь реализуются во времени, но принадлежат Божественной вневременной реальности и вытекают из Божественного предведения. У Евагрия, у которого суд Божий (по крайней мере, первый суд) выносился на основе выбора души до ее вселения в тело, дело обстояло иначе – как если бы тварь могла своим выбором влиять на Бога.

Подводя итог этому краткому рассмотрению "христианского ответа" на учения о промысле и судьбе языческой философии, можно сказать, что, вопреки наиболее распространенному мнению, что учение о судьбе было отброшено христианами и заменено учением о промысле, мы имеем дело с куда более сложной картиной. Действительно, подавляющее большинство христианских авторов III–VI вв. отказываются от употребления понятия судьбы. В то же время, уже у апологетов у Иустина Философа εἱμαρμένη и у Минуция Феликса fatum употреблялись и в позитивном контексте в смысле суда Божия. С другой стороны, Евсевий Кесарийский и Немесий Эмесский, отбросив моральный аспект судьбы, допустили его понимание в смысле границ и пределов, положенных Богом природам. Немесий разрабатывает учение о промысле, близкое среднеплатоническому, но промысл у него не ограничивается необходимостью и распространяется на все творение.

У Евагрия Понтийского в контексте философии монашеской жизни разрабатывается специфическое учение о Промысле и Суде, которое, с одной стороны, отмечено сильным влиянием языческого платонизма (усвоенного им через Оригена), а с другой – является попыткой христианизации этого учения. Наконец, у Максима Исповедника находим онтодинамическое понимание Промысла и Суда, в рамках которого Суд, в некотором роде занявший в его системе место "судьбы" языческой философии, наполнился не только моральным, но и в первую очередь онтологическим смыслом, не зависящим от факта грехопадения. Таким образом, Максиму удалось преодолеть детерминированность концепции судьбы моральной проблематикой и нуждами теодицеи, прослеживаемую начиная с Платона. Вместе с тем, он предложил свой ответ на вопрос о принципе упорядоченности космоса, существующего в нем разнообразия, различий и единства, что у средних платоников и неоплатоников описывалось в рамках их концепции судьбы, понимаемой как природа и Душа Мира. При этом, в отличие от учения платоников-язычников, учение о Суде Максима

Исповедника исключает иерархию между Промыслом и Судом, исходит из их равноизначальности и равной принадлежности единому Богу. В целом же у него проблематика промысла и судьбы, играющая столь важную роль в языческой философии, получает разработку, сравнимую по охвату вопросов с построениями таких языческих философов, как Гиерокл и Прокл. Материалы, представленные в настоящей статье, позволяют еще раз подтвердить наличие общего контекста языческой и христианской мысли в эпоху поздней античности, как и необходимость учета языческих философских учений для адекватного понимания христианских философов.

Г.И. Беневич
benevitch@mail.ru
Русская христианская гуманитарная академия,
Санкт-Петербург

This paper examines the way Christian thought of Late Antiquity transformed the theory of providence and fate found in pagan philosophy. It shows that the concept of fate was not rejected by Christian thinkers (as it is commonly believed), but that it underwent a long process of transformation. Several important Christian thinkers have been studied in this context, among them Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius of Caesarea, Nemesius of Emessa, Evagrius and Maximus the Confessor. Special attention is paid to Nemesius’s constructive criticism of the Middle Platonists’ teaching on fate and necessity.

It is shown that Maximus the Confessor’s theory of providence and judgment may be treated as a Christian alternative to theory of providence and fate found in pagan philosophy (especially in the Platonists). Maximus did receive his notions of God’s providence and judgment from Evagrius, but he modified his concepts, so they were no longer a variation of a common Platonic myth, which was typical of both Evagrius and Origen. From Nemesius, Maximus received his definition of providence elaborated in a dialogue with Middle Platonists. Unlike many other Christian authors, Maximus understood God’s judgment not only as a moral judgment and punishment or reward, but predominantly as an act of ontological differentiation and maintenance of individuals and species in their unique features and movement towards God.

Maximus’s theory of providence and judgment presupposed a dynamic view of a world order, which was a fulfillment of God’s plan. Unlike his pagan predecessors, particularly Hierocles (whose views are also discussed in the paper), Maximus did not make God’s judgment and justice some “lower” deity or force in comparison with providence. In Maximus, both God’s providential care for the world and for each human being and God’s judgment (understood in its ontological dimension) were equally and eternally belonging to One God, as were His two main forces directed towards His creation.

В статье рассматриваются пути трансформации в христианской мысли поздней античности учений о промысле и судьбе в языческой философии. Показывается, что понятие судьбы не было отвергнуто христианскими мыслителями (как обычно принято считать), но претерпело длительную трансформацию. В этом контексте изучается наследие Иустина Философа, Климента Александрийского, Немесия Эмесского, Евсевия Кесарийского, Евагрия Понтийского и Максима Исповедника. Особое внимание уделяется конструктивной критике Немесием учения средних платоников о судьбе и необходимости.

В статье показано, что учение Максима Исповедника о промысле и суде может рассматриваться в качестве христианской альтернативы учению о промысле и судьбе языческих философов (особенно неоплатоников). Максим воспринял понятия о Божественном промысле и суде от Евагрия, но он очистил эти понятия, так что они перестали быть одной из вариаций платонического мифа, как это было у Оригена и Евагрия. От Немесия Максим воспринял определение промысла, выработанное в диалоге со средними платониками. В отличие от многих других христианских авторов, Максим понимал Божественный суд не только как моральный суд и наказание или вознаграждение, но по преимуществу как акт онтологической дифференциации и поддержания индивидов и родов в уникальности их особенностей и движения к Богу. Учение Максима о промысле и суде предполагает динамическое видение мироустройства, являющегося исполнением Божественного замысла. В отличие от своих языческих предшественников, в частности Гиерокла (чьи взгляды также рассматриваются в статье), Максим не делает Божий суд и справедливость некими “низшими” божествами или силами по сравнению с промыслом. У Максима и Божественное промыслительное попечение о мире и каждом человеке, и Божественный суд (понимаемый в его онтологическом измерении) в равной степени извечно принадлежат Единому Богу как две Его главные силы, проявляющиеся в творении.

DISPUTATIONES

HORNBLOWER'S THUCYDIDES

Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*. Volume I: Books 1–3. Pp. xi+548 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1991); Volume II: Books 4–5.24. Pp. xvi+520 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1996); Volume III: Books 5.25–8.109. Pp. xix+1107 (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2008).

Today Herodotus is perhaps more generally appreciated, certainly more generally loved, than Thucydides. Thus Momigliano, in his Sather Classical Lectures delivered in the years 1961–1962 (posthumously published as *The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography*, Berkeley, 1990, p. 52). If indeed the twentieth century witnessed a resurgent Herodotus on both the historical and the literary fronts – a process of rehabilitation initiated by Felix Jacoby's seminal article for Pauly–Wissowa – it was also the age of Thucydides Deconstructed – a process of demolition already presaged at the beginning of last century by Cornford's *Thucydides Mythistoricus*. Yet barely half a century after Momigliano gave his Sather Lectures, we are beginning to learn to love Thucydides again. Anyone who wishes to know how this renewed love has come about, and what courses it is likely to take in the years to come, will never do without this book. Hornblower's *A Commentary on Thucydides*, in three volumes, is the first lemma-by-lemma commentary on the entire Greek text of Thucydides to appear, in any language to the present reviewer's knowledge, since A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (*HCT*), 5 vols. (Oxford 1945–1981).[1] H.'s now completed commentary is a truly monumental achievement, spanning over eighteen years for writing and covering over two thousand, two hundred and twenty pages, about a thousand pages more than Gomme's own 1262 pages and matching the 2298 pages of the entire *HCT*. Few, if any, in our current generation would be able to turn out so much with H.'s intensity, erudition and scholarship.

[1] Partial commentaries, such as J. S. Rusten, *Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War Book II* (Cambridge 1989) and P. J. Rhodes, *Thucydides: Book III* (Warminster 1994) did appear in the meantime, as did D. Cartwright, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides: Companion to Rex Warner's Penguin Translation* (Michigan 1997).

This may sound like an unabashed panegyric. Yet things did not begin that way. When the first volume of this commentary appeared in 1991, it generally attracted more disapproving voices than eulogies from reviewers. It was, of course, inevitable that any commentary that apparently aspired to succeed the work initiated by Gomme would be sternly measured against its predecessor. There were, however, two criticisms initially raised against H. which, in my view, were largely justifiable. These did not concern matters of detail or the work's overall academic standard in comparison with Gomme, but focussed rather on the question of what a commentary on one of the greatest classics of history should be like. This review will begin by assessing how H.'s subsequent volumes responded to those two particular criticisms (§ 1). Since much has already been commented by more qualified reviewers on each volume, especially on the earlier vols. I–II, I shall then look into the commentary's general character, its strengths, and its possible weaknesses (as the present reviewer perceives them to be after the completion of the entire work) in the format (§ 2), historical and literary interests (§ 3), arguments (§ 4), and treatment of modern literature (§ 5). In conclusion, some scope for improvement will be suggested (§§ 6–7).

§ 1

The first criticism that greeted the publication of vol. I centred on its apparent lack of any agenda, or rather any clear statement of one: it opened, Xenophon-like, with no introduction, bar half-page prefatory notes (replaced in the 1997 paperback edition by a Preface of two pages or so). In response to this charge, vol. II came out five years later with an impressive Introduction of some 145 pages divided into seven thematic sections: 1. The overall purpose and objectives of the commentary; 2. Thucydides' attitudes towards Herodotus; 3. The "heroic" presentation of Brasidas; 4. Thucydides' concern with inter-communal kinship; 5. Speeches and the question of authenticity; 6. Thucydides' relationship to the epigraphic evidence; and 7. The "completeness" and possible dates of composition of Bks. 4–5. 24. Of these, section 1 can properly be said to constitute a general introduction to the whole commentary. It engages extensively and exclusively in promoting its advantages over Gomme's share of *HCT*; these H. justifiably claims to be the translation of every Greek lemma, the use of digitalised databases, the consideration of religion, and the systematic analysis of literary and narratological aspects on the basis of unitarianism (on these see below). The remaining six sections, on the other hand, are more or less independent essays, dealing with issues that have generally characterised Thucydidean studies, both traditional and of the more recent kind. Yet they are also strongly angled to reflect

H.'s own concerns. Moreover, the practical aim of these essays is no more than "to pull together ideas scattered through my commentary on these 160 chapters" (II, p. 2); that is, not so much to provide an introduction but to draw up conclusions from his notes on the passages of Thucydides treated in vol. II – except for s. 2, which essentially consists of polemics against R. Stroud, "Thucydides and Corinth", *Chiron* 24 (1994) 267–304, and J. J. Kennelly's dissertation, *Thucydides' Knowledge of Herodotus* (Brown 1994), plus some material gleaned from vol. II supplementing H.'s own 1992 paper, "Thucydides' Use of Herodotus" (incorporated as Annex A in the same volume). Thus someone expecting to find in these 145 pages an introduction to Thucydides' work as a whole, or to major problems of Thucydidean scholarship, or even to H.'s own overall views on the historian, is sure to be baffled.

The third and final volume, published twelve years after vol. II, also begins with a General Introduction in eight sections: 1. Compositional questions of Bks. 5. 25 – 8; 2. The historical context of the Sicilian expedition; 3. The theatrical culture of Sicily; 4. Syracuse characterised as another Athens; 5. Thucydides' silence over the role and responsibility of the Athenian Βουλή; 6. The possibility of oral recitation; 7. Narrative functions of indirect speech; 8. Stylistic enactment (again more on these below). This introduction has above all the virtue of brevity, 36 pages in all, which was so sorely lacking in that of vol. II that one reviewer of the earlier volume, P. J. Rhodes, commented on the "substantial repetitions in the Introduction of material in the commentary" the relationship between which "might have benefited from a little more editing" (*BMCR* [1997]). One potential downside, on the other hand, is that, since some of the sections have developed straight out of H.'s lecture notes and conference papers, their immediate relevance to the commentary is at times less than obvious: this reviewer scrabbled in vain to find out any tangible links between s. 3 on the theatricality of Sicilian culture and the main text of the commentary. Moreover, this introduction, like that of vol. II, restricts itself to the books covered by that volume, and to a very specific set of issues. We are still left not quite sure what H. thinks of many "basic" interpretative questions like, say, what was Thucydides' general understanding of the Great War, of its "truest cause", of human nature, of political leadership, of reason, of power, of imperialism, or indeed of his own undertaking to record it ἐς αἰεί? All these are topics that remain scattered through the notes (esp. in the introduction-less vol. I) but ought to have been "pulled together" somewhere.

The best place, therefore, to look for a more comprehensive overview is not these two Introductions, but his *Thucydides* (London 1987, ²1994). Though published earlier and partly out of step with H.'s later intellectual

development, it remains useful both as an induction course for the *History* in its entirety and as a précis of H.'s various strategies to read it, many of them duly carried over into the present commentary. In addition, H. published a number of articles and a monograph on Thucydides during the eighteen years that intervened between the appearance of vol. I and vol. III. Some of these have been "extensively rewritten" and collected into a book, *Thucydidean Themes*, which came out from OUP in Nov. 2010 (yet to be seen by this reviewer) and which, according to the publisher, is to serve as "a companion volume" to the entire commentary. Its Introduction, as H. promises in the Preface to vol. III, will try to offer his "views on Th., as arrived at after the completion of the present commentary" (p. viii).

The second criticism that was as often aired as the first involved the total absence of maps in vol. I. Vol. II, on the other hand, had a single, rather rudimentary, map of Amphipolis. Still, this patently was not enough: given the geographical extension of the theatres of war treated in the relevant part of the *History*, at least maps of Pylos-Sphacteria and the Chalcidian districts would also have been desirable. This cartographic deficit has finally been rectified in vol. III, by the addition of eight maps, including (belatedly) those of Greece and the Aegaean, South Italy and Sicily, and Asia Minor, all in clear drawings and just about full enough to serve their purpose.

§ 2

The main body of the commentary arranges Thucydides' text by episodic units ("The Pylos Episode"), which are in turn further divided into sub-sections (e. g. "The Athenians occupy Pylos"), all prefixed with subject headings. The beginning of each year is also flagged in the text. This format follows that of *HCT*, except that the latter signalled only years and seasons in the running heads. Under each sub-section come the Greek lemmata and the notes. Unlike *HCT*, H. provides each lemma with the corresponding passage taken from B. Jowett's Victorian translation of Thucydides in *Oxford World's Classics*, revised and updated by himself. These translations, intended for the Greekless, reflect the "democratisation" of classical studies in the English-speaking world that took place after the appearance of Gomme's first volumes. The long-promised separate publication of a revision of Jowett's whole translation has now been abandoned, as we learn from the Preface to vol. III (and in the meantime OUP published a fresh translation of Thucydides by J. M. Hammond for its *World's Classics* series in 2009).

Another useful feature in the economy of the commentary is the "introductory notes", which preface many of H.'s sections and sub-

sections, as well as speeches. *HCT*, especially that of Dover, occasionally had such explanatory notes. But while *HCT*'s were sporadic and sparing, H. deploys them in a far more extensive and systematic manner. They are most noticeable in vol. III – and so are their positive effects. In their reviews of vol. II, D. Lateiner (*Histos* 2 [1998]), and to a lesser extent C. J. Smith (*CR* 49 [1999] 19), have both questioned the very point of wrapping the thematic and structural approaches adopted by H. in the "atomistic" format intrinsic to a line-by-line commentary. However, the use of longer introductory notes in vol. III than in the previous volumes has enabled H. to develop sustained arguments uninterrupted over large blocks of Thucydides' text, and thus helps alleviate if not completely work out the conflict between his working methods and his chosen medium. Furthermore, the detailed introductory notes in vol. III compensate for its brief Introduction, and by so doing, also avoid those "substantial repetitions" that created a sense of redundancy in vol. II.

§ 3

In his recently published collection of Thucydidean studies, J. S. Rusten, referring back to the early 80s, has summed up H.'s programme thus: "Dover had just completed the last volume of *HCT* […], Connor was about to write the sort of 'literary commentary' that Dover […] could not envision. And Hornblower was to write one that would take account of both".[2] In retrospect, this is not an inaccurate description of the work and its place in the scholarship as it has finally emerged in its entirety. However, when it was first conceived, this project, like Gomme's (but unlike H.'s own earlier *Thucydides*), clearly seems to have started from the historical. And it remains deeply engaged in historical issues throughout. In this exercise, H. tries hard to "improve on" Gomme as much as update him. In order to effect that improvement, he digs deep into subjects seldom addressed by Gomme, including one that has not been deemed by many to have been a factor in Thucydides' historical explanations – not, at least, in the way it might have been in Herodotus or some other historians: namely religion, in both the narrower and the broader senses of the word. Narrower, in that its manifestations took the specific forms of sanctuaries, sacrifices, oaths, oracles, purifications, divination etc.; and broader, because under the same heading will have fallen a very wide variety of aspects of Greek life, including festivals, theatres, athletics, battle

[2] J. S. Rusten (ed.), *Thucydides*, Oxford Readings in Classical Studies (Oxford 2009) 17.

preparations, amphictiony, and those often mythically explained kinship ties, συγγένεια, between communities. All of which are themes that are central to H.'s enquiry. And in order to bring matters up to date, he draws on epigraphic and archaeological discoveries that have come to light since the mid-twentieth century, plus non-Attic inscriptions overlooked by Gomme, as well as the latest works of reference including *IACP* and the still ongoing *LGPN*; this evidence is then set against the text, in order to re-examine old financial problems arising from it or to expound on personal and place names, where his expertise shines.

H. is rightly wary of "marrying epigraphy and Thucydides" "at every turn", however (II, pp. 6–7). Nor is he unaware of the similarly circular risk of "correcting Thucydides out of Thucydides" (II, p. 110). And yet the historian in H. is nonetheless quick, when he chooses, to challenge the perceived shortcomings of his ancient Greek master: Thucydides' omission of key events in the 430s leading to "serious distortions" in the picture of the causes of the Ten Years War (I, pp. 66 f.; 97–99; 110–112; 133; 187 f.; 382 f.); a "most serious" misjudgement on Pericles' optimistic assessment of the war finances (I, pp. 341 f.); Thucydides' earlier failure to take in the Persian factor (I, pp. 181; 415; II, pp. 423 f.; III, pp. 765; 769–771); exaggeration of the significance of the Pylos affair (II, p. 113); misplaced blame for the Athenian failure at Delium (II, pp. 286 f.); general blackening of the Athenian assembly and its susceptibility to passion (III, pp. 30; 568); downplaying of the long-term relationships between Athens and south Italian cities, and comparable overplaying of the latter's bleak reception of the Athenian fleet in 415 BC (III, pp. 5 f.; 34; 419; 421 f.; 461; 608 f.); a "dramatically" inflated number of the Athenian and allied troops retreating from Syracuse (III, pp. 619 f.; 713 f.; Appendix 2); poor coverage of Pharnabazus' sphere of control in northern Asia Minor in "the Ionian War" (III, pp. 760; 773; 987), and so on. H. is particularly impatient with Thucydides' general tendency to speak only in terms of personified collectivities (e. g. rash Athens versus dithering Sparta) and to let a part stand for the whole – a group of citizens or a political organ for "the Athenians"; the Spartans, the Corinthians etc. for "the Peloponnesians"; "the Athenian army" for the ethnically mixed collection of citizens and allies; some of the federation's constituent πόλεις for "the Boeotians" (perhaps very much like our "Russians" for the old USSR or "the English" for UK) – and, related to Thucydides' talk of "the Athenians", his near-universal silence over the role played by the Council (βουλή) in Athenian decision-making. And he is quick to point out Thucydides' biases for, or against, Alcidas, Cleon, Brasidas, Alcibiades, Phrynichus *et al.* in his character portraits, where the historian postures as the omniscient narrator who can read into his characters' minds.

This last point touches on a banal and yet crucial truth: where written histories are concerned, any "historical" issues such as those above soon become just as literary, or historiographical. Gomme and the two continuators of a "historical commentary" had all purposefully, but not always successfully, tried to stay within an artificial boundary separating Thucydides the Historian, i. e. the external referentiality of his text, from the so-called "Thucydides the Artist", i. e. its internal representation. H., on the other hand, by not placing any qualifier such as "historical" or "literary" on the title of his own, seems from the start to have been set to stride over that boundary. A typical example of this attempt at synthesis is his engaged examination in vol. II of the "epic" presentation of Brasidas, where he combines literary analysis inspired by J. G. Howie's "Η αριστεία από τον Όμηρο έως τον Ξενοφώντα" (*Parnassos* 34 [1992] 425–448)[3] with historical questions, or rather the historical question, which this literally exceptional presentation entails: Who really was the Spartan? Although H.'s observations on Thucydides' historical "failings" may strike us as not so much ground-breaking discoveries as a restatement of old charges against the historian, what marks H.'s commentary out from previous ones is this close engagement with the literary, and above all his application of the specialised vocabulary of narratology for systematically identifying and conceptualising familiar issues (cf. II, pp. 18 f.).

In fact, as the commentary proceeds from the first volume to the last, H. is more and more strongly drawn to the representational end of the historical-literary spectrum. One may observe this, for example, in his increasing concentration on Thucydides' narrative techniques. In vol. I, H.'s interest in such literary devices was limited to ring composition and anachrony (the latter being variously rendered as "narrative misplacement" or "narrative displacement" in vol. I and "narrative dislocation" or "anachrony" in vols. II–III). From vol. II onwards, however, it expands to take in many more classic concepts of narratology originally developed by Genette and other theorists, and adopted and adapted by classical scholars like Irene de Jong to poetic studies. A few specimens include: focalisation, or the point of view from which the narration of an event, a speech, or a statement within it ("embedded focalisation"), is made; narrative rhythm or pace (e. g. a slower rhythm in order to mark an incident as paradigmatic: the extended account of the great Corcyraean στάσις versus the briefer notes on other στάσεις, the detailed coverage of the

[3] A later more focussed English treatment is available as "The Aristeia of Brasidas: Thucydides' Presentation of Events at Pylos and Amphipolis", *PLLS* 12 (2005) 207–284.

first land-battle on Sicilian soil before all other battles, etc.); iterative presentation (e. g. Th. 7, 8, 1: "[Nicias] had often sent [such messages] before", which is strictly an iteration and analepsis combined [πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε … μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τότε]); linearisation, or the way of structuring a set of synchronous events into an ordered linear sequence; what de Jong calls "presentation through negation", a device for engaging in an emotional and intellectual discourse with the reader (Th. 7, 28, 3: "even so they did not withdraw from Sicily"); counter-factual (the "if X had not happened" formula, like "if the ships [commanded by Th.] had not come to the rescue at top speed, Eion would have fallen to Brasidas at daybreak" at Th. 4, 106, 4); and closure (Th. 7, 87, 6: "These were the events in Sicily"). At the same time, H. veers more towards specialised language, as for example he switches to "prolepsis" where in vol. I he had simple "anticipation": compare the cross-references at I, p. 463 ad Th. 3, 68, 3: "This *anticipates* [Th.] iv, 66" and II, p. 231 ad Th. 4, 66, 1: "See the *prolepsis* or anticipation of this at [Th.] iii, 68, 3" (my italics). As with many other matters, however, nowhere in the present commentary does H. set out systematically to expound on these narrative devices, nor does he bother to provide much in the way of a general introduction to narratologists' terms. Most of them just come in piecemeal. Again, for the uninitiated the best starting-point would not be this commentary, but his "Narratology and Narrative Techniques in Thucydides", in id. (ed.), *Greek Historiography* (Oxford 1994) 131–166.

H.'s discussions of textual and linguistic matters are on the whole as restrained as Gomme's. A long-promised "textual appendix" has eventually failed to appear; as he now believes (III, p. vii) it has been made largely unnecessary thanks to G. B. Alberti's new edition of Thucydides with its most up-to-date critical apparatus. Yet here, too, the pull of the text seems to become ever stronger as the commentary progresses: e. g. observe the long notes ad Th. 4, 120, 1 and 121, 1: ἐπήρχοντο, προσήρχοντο; 6, 6, 2: ὥστε τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ Λάχητος…; 6, 31, 4: εἰκασθῆναι; 8, 38, 3: ἐς ὀλίγον (although it must be noted that H. tends to stop and dwell on the text where a reading has some additional bearing on historical problems). However, what characterises H.'s exegesis most in this respect is his diligent comparisons of various translations. We are all aware, while rarely explicitly stating so, that translation is part of a critical and/or interpretative process that is tacitly applied and usually left unexplained by the translator. But some elucidations would certainly be called for of how seemingly innocent ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται (Th. 8, 63, 3) has resulted in renderings (and meanings) as widely divergent as "an insurrection […] against the oligarchy" (Hobbes), "in order to put down oligarchy" (Jowett) and "had just had an anti-oligarchical revolution" (Warner), on the one

hand, and "…an oligarchy […] which a party of them had lately risen to avoid" (Crawley) and "in order to avoid being governed by an oligarchy" (Smith) on the other – so had these Samians been fighting against the real thing, or in fear of the possibility? H.'s comparisons not only have the value of shedding light on such arcane procedures; they also make a kind of reception history, yielding at times some unexpected findings, like the modern western failure to appreciate units of ten thousand (μυριάδες): it draws a discreet smile to learn that, already in the seventeenth century, the great Hobbes mistranslated δέκα μυριάδες as "10 000" (III, p. 167). Again, after being relatively few in vol. I, these comparisons become markedly more ample from vol. II, and vol. III extensively takes account of Valla's fifteenth-century Latin translation as well.

§ 4

H.'s literary approach to his text, like many of our contemporaries', tends strongly towards unitarianism, a position first articulated in vol. II but already implicit in vol. I. Hence his close attention to the text's overall structures, strategies and inter-connectedness: patterns and progressions in the narrative and speeches; neat narrative rings; narrative "seeds" whose true significance emerges only later; expectations fulfilled or belied, and predictions borne out or falsified by the subsequent narrative; responsions, or what M. I. Finley once aptly called "telepathy", between speakers wildly separated by space (though H. is generally more cautious than some of the "Thucydides-the-Artist" school in regarding all these speeches as pure literary inventions, and readier to leave room for their "authenticity"); and other internal cross-references and echoes, both explicit and implicit, which cut across books and sections. The single greatest model for H. in this respect will no doubt have been W. R. Connor's influential book-by-book reading, *Thucydides* (Princeton 1984). One might almost say that what we have here is a Connor expanded and recast in narratology, while retaining all his sensibility to eschew reductionism.[4] At the same time, in later volumes H. becomes ever more emphatic in his rejection of an analytical approach, or separatism, "even in the moderate form represented by Andrewes in *HCT* 5" (III, p. 1). Yet, in praising his hero Connor, H. can at times sound too harsh towards the still useful contributions by the continuator of *HCT*, who is almost singled out as the villain that revived the separatist bogeyman (e. g. III, pp. 885 f.).

[4] Cf. Connor's remarks on what he then called "post-modernist tendencies" in Thucydidean studies, in id., "A Post-Modernist Thucydides?", *CJ* 72 (1977) 289–298.

Thus H. finds nothing unusually problematic or exceptional even in those portions of the *History* that have often been made to appear so, i. e. parts of Bk. 5 and the entire Bk. 8, by separatist critics, and Bks. 6–7 by literary scholars. Most of these portions are covered by vol. III, a tome bigger than vols. I and II put together. For the same reason, H. just carries on without fuss or pomp with his familiar themes in this volume: narratology, intertextuality, religion, onomastics. Some of his earlier interests are pursued with increased vigour: the Greek historian's concern with colonisation and kinship (esp. for the Sicilian books), use of indirect speech (most notoriously in Bk. 8) as part of his narrative strategies, and that of patronymics for particular rhetorical effects (e. g. as a form of attributive discourse or denomination, like my own "the Greek historian" earlier in this sentence). However, H. also introduces his reader in vol. III to two new topics: what he calls "stylistic enactment" (not many examples of it however, other than the paradigmatic case of the Syracusan counter-wall building at pp. 551–554 ad Th. 7, 6, 3–4); and the literary affinity as well as the historical complementarity between Thucydides and the fifth-century epinician poetry, notably Pindar and, to a lesser extent, Bacchylides, Simonides *et al.* The latter topic incorporates many of the major themes explored, and the insights gained, in his 2004 monograph, *Thucydides and Pindar: Historical Narrative and the World of Epinikian Poetry*, Oxford, a standalone study of the cultural and literary history of fifth-century Greece.

Armed with these new literary tools, vol. III further advances another of H.'s favourite themes since vol. I and his earlier *Thucydides* (p. 29): the possibility of oral delivery by the historian. And this is the one proposition of H.'s that labours most under the lack of serious proof. It is one thing to identify Homeric or Pindaric echoes in Thucydides at his most excited and exciting moments, for we have the textual evidence, something with which to support or refute an argument. It is another to assert from this, as H. is prepared to do, that "We can almost hear the burst of applause at a symposium or Olympia, when Th. reached the words ἠπείγοντο ἀφίκεσθαι" (III, p. 390). This disturbingly looks like a reduplication of the notorious story that Herodotus charmed his audience at the Olympic games by reciting his λόγοι (Luc., *Herod*. 1–2), or an inversion of the legend that Thucydides wept upon hearing his ἐπίδειξις (Marcel., *Comm*. 54). On the one hand, in criticising Stroud, H. has rightly warned against "making a conjecture about Thucydides' life based on Thucydides' writings" (II, p. 22). On the other, in pressing his case so far for recitation, it looks as if H. is here doing exactly that. We know that Tacitus, the Roman historian with whom H. often likes to draw comparisons, began his *Annales* with a hexameter line, and public readings of one's work

were still being practised among the Hellenised Romans of that later age. That is no proof, however, that *he* recited like a bard at Trajan's court or Pliny the Younger's villa. Thucydides' text, it is true, does suggest his intended "audience" (not in the radical sense of the word, of course) – and that is a highly literate one willing to struggle with his generally difficult style, which defies, and surely defied, instant comprehension, μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν. At any rate, even those passages that are specifically in H.'s mind (notably on the Corcyraean incident and the Sicilian expedition), however oral-sounding, do not by themselves point to any particular circumstances under which, or by means of which, they were "displayed" and disseminated.

H.'s brand of unitarianism, however, by no means entails his seeing the *History* as "the product of one sitting" (III, p. 3). Instead, he adopts a developmental model drawn from C. Dewald's 1975 thesis,[5] suggesting that from Bks. 1–5 to Bks. 6–8 the historian gradually developed different, more flexible narrative techniques "over an extended period of time", the results of which are those last three books of the *History* as we have them. This represents both a mild departure from unmodified unitarianism and, incidentally, a single significant turnaround from his own earlier view of the Sicilian books as composed soon after the events (id., *Thucydides*, 146–151; 153), as well as from his "Andrewsian" position on the nature of Bk. 8 (*ibid*., 141–143; 148 f.; 155 f.; 161). At the same time, he allows that there are indeed some gaps left unfilled and some details not wholly revised, especially in Bk. 5.

Furthermore, H. does not entirely shrug off the old question of the dates of composition either; he is too much of a historian to do just that. For Bk. 1, he seems to presume that much of it was composed early in Thucydides' writing career (cf. I, pp. 134; 206), while explicitly accepting that parts of the Pentecontaetia were inserted after 404 BC (I, pp. 148; 195; 210 f.), as were some other bits of Bks. 1–3 (I, pp. 246; 342 f.). For the rest of the books, covered in vols. II–III, H. sketches out their possible dates with characteristic caution, and only in the broadest terms (e. g. III, p. 602: "a latish composition date"), concluding Bks. 4 – 5, 24 as "innovatory and exciting and late" (II, p. 122), and Bks. 5, 25–28 as "written relatively late, with a few rough edges, especially in bk. 5" (III, p. 1). Finally, he suggests at various points that Thucydides was probably still working in the early 390s (I, pp. 113; 123; 376; 505; 536; III, pp. 602; 890; 995; cf. id., *Thucydides*, 143 f.; 151–154). Whether or not one agrees with each of these propositions, the fact that H. grapples with the "Thucydidean

[5] Published as *Thucydides' War Narrative: A Structural Study* (Berkeley 2005).

question"–a horror phrase–at all is to be welcomed. This is a salutary traditionalism, not a deplorable reversion to bad old days. For it would risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater to concentrate on the inner unity and static structure of a text, be it the Thucydidean συγγραφή or (for that matter) the Herodotean ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις, while ignoring its internal development and chronology. Such extreme unitarianism, this reviewer believes, is likely to fail to capture the most critical moments in the genesis of a literary genre, the one which we now understand as "history".

The question of genre evokes yet another important issue that informs many of H.'s notes, an issue which also has attracted the attention of some ancient critics like Dionysius and many of his modern counterparts since Cornford: namely, possible connections or intertextuality between Thucydides and other literature from which history was later to emerge as a distinct genre in its own right. The use of IT such as text searches, which H. must have considerably exploited for this purpose, may have become old hat in the two decades since vol. I; but the substantial body of comparative material he has garnered from epic, epinician poetry, geography and ethnography, tragedy, comedy, medical writings etc., will remain an essential sourcebook for those keen to read "Thucydides in context". The one area in which H. has apparently lost his earlier interest, however, is the relationship (either in the affirmative or in the negative) between Thucydides and the then nascent theory of rhetoric. That interest was much in evidence in his 1987 *Thucydides* and vol. I of the commentary, but has somehow petered out after vol. II outside the obvious cases of speeches (notably the Melian dialogue, the Sicilian debate, and the series of speeches in and around Syracuse); and the sophists, both as a category and individually, are given surprisingly short shrift: it is telling that the far slimmer *Thucydides* had more references to "sophists" than any volume of the commentary. Or, perhaps, it may be that H. is now reacting against the prominence given them in earlier Thucydidean scholarship by deliberately playing down the putative influences of their putative theories on the historian (cf. *Thucydides*, 60 f.; 112; 120; 127 f.; 184 f.; III, 223 f.; 954 f.).

H.'s style of argument throughout the commentary is (so to speak) un-Thucydidean, in that he tends to prefer to cite a variety of different views and readings from past scholarship, often adding his own to the list, rather than to pronounce any final authoritative verdict upon a given issue. That tendency is most striking where a problem involves questions like why Thucydides says X or fails to mention Y, why he reports something at *that* point rather than another, or who is the focaliser expressing this or that view (all difficult questions indeed): see, typically, his long introductory note on the notorious analeptic excursus on the fall of the Pisistratids (III,

pp. 433–440). Furthermore, because of, rather than despite, his unitarian approach, H. denies homogeneity in the text, and like Connor before him refuses to impose uniform interpretations, let alone establish rules, on the historian's views, thoughts, preferences and writing habits, "exceptions" to which have often been presumed since Ullrich to be "indications of incompleteness" – a phrase taken from the title of an appendix in Andrewes' *HCT* 5 (pp. 361–383) – which would have been expunged in a hypothetical final version. This whole tendency on H.'s part to leave important questions wide open might be seen in some impatient eyes as side-stepping. A more favourable view, however, would be that it reflects the stated aim of H.'s commentary to be the groundwork, "something on which to construct general propositions" (II, pp. 2 f.). At any rate, his handling of complex nexuses of historical, literary, and religious, as well as textual issues is on the whole clear, in language that is plain and expansive enough; only occasionally might one quibble with some unnecessary jargon (why use notoriously ambiguous "intertext" to describe the relationship between Thucydides and Herodotus when a simple "allusion" or "influence" – H. only admits Thucydides' awareness of Herodotus and never vice versa – would do better for clarity) or uncharacteristically meandering arguments that seem to lead to nowhere.

§ 5

It has frequently, and justly, been noted that one of the commentary's greatest strengths lies in the dazzling array of modern literature that adorns H.'s learned arguments, mostly newer than Gomme but some earlier. This is drawn from a very wide range of works, from military analyses of the hoplite "shoving" (ὠθισμός) to a hair-raising introduction to the Pacific tsunamis (although the less specialised sources inevitably tend to be almost exclusively anglophone). It is therefore all the more unfortunate that the great virtue of bringing all this reading into the discussion is considerably offset by the equally great vice of a lack of organisation. To begin with, the commentary as a whole has no comprehensive bibliography listing the works cited such as one usually expects to find somewhere near the end of a book – a failing inevitably shared by the older *HCT* – other than the fraction of them listed in the Abbreviations sections. It need not be added that all the other unlisted works are abbreviated in one way or another.

This unhelpfulness is further aggravated by H.'s somewhat arbitrary methods of citation in the notes, which force us to search other pages and volumes for fuller references. For example, he draws much on "Rutter 56" for his literary analysis of the great sea-battle at Syracuse (III, p. 694); this

is followed a few lines later by the same, yet slightly more informative, "Rutter 1989, 56". But it would take a most watchful, determined reader with a Plutarchean good memory to locate a full reference, N. K. Rutter, *Thucydides VI and VII: A Companion to the Penguin Translation of Rex Warner* (Bristol 1989), which appears more than three hundred pages earlier (*ibid*., p. 381), with another work of the same author (p. 650) cited in between. Or take the cross-reference at II, p. 233, "see [Th.] I, 63, 2 n. and Bauslaugh there cited; Bauslaugh (6) reckons that…", where we are instructed to reach to the shelf for vol. I (provided it is there) in order to find out in what paper or book Bauslaugh reckons so – only to discover instead yet another abbreviation, "R. A. Bauslaugh, *JHS* 99 (1979)" (I, p. 106). This is already tiresome enough. But we go mad when we find, about a hundred pages later (II, pp. 325; 350), "Bauslaugh, *JHS* 1979 ([Th. 4.] 8.6 n)", and realise that the full citation, R. A. Bauslaugh, "Thucydides IV 8.6 and the South Channel at Pylos", *JHS* 99 (1979), had been lurking in the same volume all the time, about a hundred pages earlier, at II, p. 159. Some more sensible tidying-up would certainly have eliminated this and other such oddities. The particular problem addressed in the above-cited paper is no doubt one well-known to ardent students of Thucydides, but H. intends his commentary for "a historian or literary scholar who merely wants to make casual use of just one passage" (II, p. 3). This is indeed the likeliest use of any lemma-based commentary, and the greatest advantage of its "atomistic" arrangement. But contrary to his best intentions, the way H. cites modern works all too often appears to presume sustained reading of his text, or expertise in the literature on (say) Greek stades, or maybe the Google search engine always at hand, as the above examples show. That will surely frustrate if not deter such "casual" users who might well have wished to avail themselves of a proper bibliography that made H.'s awesome range of reading more accessible.

§ 6

H. repeatedly reminds his reader that it is as important to look at what Thucydides does not tell us as to go over what he does. This reviewer has taken that injunction to heart and would like to raise one issue that H. himself only rarely addresses in his commentary: that of reception. In contrast to the great attention he pays to Thucydides' debt to his literary predecessors (both declared and suspected), especially Homer, Pindar, Herodotus and Hellanicus, he is markedly reticent about how Thucydides himself was received by posterity. Not that he is uninterested in this topic. Between vol. I and vol. II, he wrote a paper on Thucydides' reception in the late Classical and the Hellenistic periods, with particular emphasis on

his probable influences on the methodology of Polybius;[6] and as recently as 2006 he also contributed a chapter on Herodotus' reception in antiquity to C. Dewald and J. Marincola.[7] However, in the present commentary as in the above treatises, H.'s scope is mostly limited to the Hellenistic period and the early to high Roman Empire (I, pp. 75 f.; 240; II, pp. 21; 83 f.; 171; 220; 442; 444; 464 f.; III, pp. 208; 239; 244 f.; 285; 356; 696; 698). Anything that comes after the Second Sophistic gets no mention with respect to reception history. And the Byzantines? Forget them. As for the modern reception of Thucydides, all H. has to offer is a handful of isolated vignettes: a possible relevance (or irrelevance) of the Thucydidean οἷον τε ἐγίγνετο to the Rankean "wie es eigentlich gewesen" (I, pp. 320 f. ad Th. 2, 48, 3); a quotation from Alcibiades' speech at Sparta in a letter of Grotius (III, pp. 511; 513 f. ad Th. 6, 89, 6); the narrative of the Athenian catastrophe at the River Assinarus excerpted in a novel of Iris Murdoch, or giving inspiration to the Nobel laureate Giorgos Seferis (III, pp. 733 f. ad Th. 7, 84); the story of Harmodius and Aristogiton taken as a model by Mary Renault (III, pp. 434 f. ad Th. 6, 54–59); and Colin Powell haplessly ridiculed for allegedly attributing his made-up quote to Thucydides (III, p. 331 ad Th. 6, 11, 6).

H. could surely have knitted together a more cohesive picture than this patchy collage – of the not-always-straightforward attitudes, for example, to our historian among later critics such as Dionysius and Lucian;[8] of his overriding influence on western political science and education from the seventeenth century to the twenty-first (Thomas Hobbes did not make his name just as a good translator of Thucydides, and Donald Kagan is as much a neo-conservative ideologue as an acclaimed historian of the Peloponnesian War); or of the Thucydides who has very recently undergone a kind of περιπέτεια, having been transformed from the paragon of objectivity to the master playwright of tragedy, from the hard-nosed social Darwinist to the indignant moralist of the old school, or from the father of what David Hume called real history to the father of what Collingwood disparaged as psychological history. One could easily cite many more examples. For the possible scope of such research, we only need to glance over the good

[6] "The Fourth-century and Hellenistic Reception of Thucydides", *JHS* 115 (1995) 48–68; cf. id., *Greek Historiography*, 60 f.

[7] C. Dewald, J. Marincola (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Herodotus* (Cambridge 2006) 306–318.

[8] On which see, most recently, G. Weaire, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus' Professional Situation and the *De Thucydide*", *Phoenix* 59 (2005) 246–266, and E. Greenwood, "Reading Thucydides with Lucian", in id., *Thucydides and the Shaping of History* (London 2006) 109–129.

range of modern works registered under the headings "Ancient Reception" and "Later Reception" in the bibliography section of Rusten's collection of Thucydidean papers (*Thucydides* [Oxford 2009] 496–500), most of which were published after vol. I of the present commentary. These, in addition to the four contributions to the same anthology (a new one by the editor and three other reprints) as well as the forthcoming multi-authored compendia, K. Harloe and N. Morley (eds.), *Thucydides: Reception, Reinterpretation and Influence*, and *Handbook to the Reception of Thucydides*, show how much H. has graciously left for others to explore in this relatively untrodden field, and how much he himself could further work on if he chose to. In this regard I daresay the commentary, for all its thoroughness, still falls short of full justice to its subject-matter. It is not so much because reception is a vital, almost mandatory, component of any comprehensive study of an author these days; rather, because posterity was, after all, what Thucydides cared about most.

§ 7

H. had earlier cautioned that his commentary was to supplement and update, not to supplant, *HCT* (II, pp. 3 ff.). It is probably now fair to say that the final product has surpassed that modest aim. But a final question arises: will H. supplement and update his own? Fully twenty years have passed since the appearance of vol. I, twice as long as the decade that lay between that volume and the last vol. of *HCT*. Moreover, unlike Gomme, and indeed unlike Thucydides, H. has managed to see his enormous project to completion while still in his prime. He will thus have the chance, again if he wishes, to revise earlier sections of his commentary in the light of the later, more mature part. Vol. III does contain a short Appendix to the earlier vols. (pp. 1055–1060), and all paperback editions have corrections and additions as well as a new Preface to vol. I. But they do little to bridge the gulfs between the volumes in approach and priorities and, according to this reviewer's overall impression, the gulf between vols. I and II appears larger than that between vols. II and III, despite the lapse of twelve years that preceded the latter; it looks as though the more drastic shifts in H.'s intellectual outlook, or at least in the direction of the project, took place after the conception of vol. I.

The same passage of time has also left some inevitable bumps and holes on the shape of the commentary. As it stands, a general introduction that first appears halfway, in vol. II, is at best an awkward analepsis, so to speak. In any case vol. I remains in need of some sort of briefing on the books it covers, not least because the main text offers rather paltry notes on some pivotal passages: e. g. two pages or so each for Thucydides' "methodology"

at 1, 22 (pp. 59–62) and his declaration of the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις at 1, 22, 6 (pp. 64–66). Those left yearning for further enlightenment will have to rummage through his other writings, such as his 1987 *Thucydides*. That, again, might cause no problem for the zealous and the informed, but is rather a tall order for many other, "casual", readers. Also, inconsistencies in Greek spelling will need to be smoothed out: in vols. I–II Greek names are half hellenised and half latinised (hence Dekeleia but Corcyra), while in vol. III they are mostly hellenised (hence Kerkyra), with some amusing anglo-hellenic amalgams such as Korinth and the Korinthians (but not Syrakuse or the Syrakusans). These are still there in the latest paperback "box-set" edition, issued in Jan. 2011.

That said, it is perhaps idle to insist on unity (uniformity or homogeneity might be a better word; H. sees Thucydides' text as a unity but not as homogeneous) in a work written over a period of eighteen years, and one which looks more like a trilogy than a tripartite opus. Every text is bound to leave some marks of its internal history. If a classic as great as Thucydides can betray signs of "a labour of years" (III, p. 3), then surely a commentary of this scale and length need not, or ought not, to try to blot out the traces of the intellectual development within it. And if these signs show that Thucydides remains "innovatory and exciting" throughout his *History*, H.'s commentary on it also reveals comparable qualities in its author. Indeed, just like his Thucydides, H. continues to try to be wide-ranging and refuses to be static down to the last pages of his commentary, ever ready (to borrow a phrase from the very beginning of his first monograph on Thucydides) for "making incursions into areas […] new to [him]". And just as Thucydides continues to challenge his readers with his text, H. challenges his. The task is left to us to take up both challenges.

Toshibumi Matsubara
toshi@aoni.waseda.jp
Waseda University

KEY WORDS

PANCHENKO
cosmography, Greek poetry, Bronze Age Scandinavia
космография, греческая поэзия, Скандинавия бронзового века

CORSO
artists, painters, sculptors, schools, education, workshop, Greece
художники, живописцы, скульпторы, школы, обучение, мастерская, Греция

ALMAZOVA
лира, парфений, вазовая живопись, иконография
chelys-lyre, partheneion, vase-painting, iconography

PONTANI
Homeric philology, Homeric politics, Aristotle, Aristarchus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus
критика гомеровского текста, политика у Гомера, Аристотель, Аристарх, Дионисий Галикарнасский

DUNSCH
Cicero, jesting, decorum, homo, libertas, M. Antonius, Cn. Pompeius
Цицерон, шутка, decorum, homo, libertas, Марк Антоний, Гней Помпей

POLITO
Caesar, Germani, agriculture, war, army, politics, property
Цезарь, германцы, земледелие, война, армия, политика, собственность

KOTOVA
Catullus, carmen 3, tenebricosus, irony
Катулл, carmen 3, tenebricosus, ирония

MAURACH
Catullus and Horace, playful imperfection and formal neatness, discovery of the unconscious by Catullus
Катулл и Гораций, игривое несовершенство и изящество формы, открытие бессознательного у Катулла

Vetushko-Kalevich
Lucan, Aegean Sea, Aegadian Islands, P. Burmann the Elder, R. Bentley, A. E. Housman
Лукан, Эгейское море, Эгатские острова, П. Бюрман Старший, Р. Бэнтли, А. Э. Хаусмен

Jermakova
tunny, fishing, seine, Persian tactics
тунец, рыбная ловля, рыболовная сеть, персидская тактика

Беневич
providence, fate, judgment, Christianity, Late antiquity, Middle Platonism, ontological differentiation
промысл, судьба, суд, христианство, поздняя античность, средний платонизм, онтологическая дифференциация

Corrigenda ad vol. 16–17

	***legendum*:**
p. 17, *l.* 20	Pleşu
p. 23, *l.*14	ὅσιος
p. 27, *l.* 1	teilen
p. 28, *l.* 10	holzernen
p. 29, *n.* 20, *l.* 1	éducation
p. 30, *n.* 24, *l.* 10	Kelch-Krater
p. 103, *n.* 20	Minyer
p. 120, *l.* 10	not conclusive
p. 124, *n.* 11, *l.* 2	erotisches
p. 126, *n.* 17, *l.* 1	Liuzzi
p. 126, *n.* 17, *l.* 2	Galatina
p. 127, *n.* 22, *l.* 1	and H. G. Gundel
p. 202, *l.* 15	αἵματος
p. 273, *l.* 2	dialogue
p. 275, *l.* 6	Aristophanes
p. 278, *l.* 4	dialogue
p. 329, *l.* 9	the triad *Theaetetus – Sophist – Statesman*
p. 348, *l.* 1 *a fine*	Instituts
p. 351, *l.* 5	permanenza
p. 353, *l.* 4	Pohlenz
p. 356, *ll.* 16–17	confermata
p. 362, *l.* 22	Hellmut
p. 369, *l.* 1	sprach
p. 369, *l.* 7	Graffito
p. 377, *l.* 10	θαρρεῖν
p. 377, *l.* 12 *a fine*	is not

p. 380, *n*. 19, *l*. 4 *a fine*	Glaucon
p. 384, *l*. 1 *a fine*	fondamentalmente
p. 384, *n*. 26, *l*. 4 *a fine*	une
p. 420, *l*. 8 *a fine*	Девтерономий
p. 424 *l*. 10 *a fine*	будущим
p. 442, *n*. 9, *l*. 2	*Бина*
p. 476, *l*. 1 *a fine*	compiled
p. 512, *l*. 2	Ariadne
p. 518, *n*. 12, *l*. 2	*Звучащее*

Научное издание

HYPERBOREUS:
Классическая филология и история
Vol. 18 2012 Fasc. 1

Ответственный редактор выпуска *Н. А. Алмазова*
Редакция графических материалов *К. Б. Катенин*
Компьютерная верстка *А. Б. Левкина*

Учредители журнала *А. К. Гаврилов, Д. В. Панченко*
Регистрационное свидетельство № 0111029 от 27 августа 1993 года

Подписано в печать 28.05.2013. Формат $70 \times 100\,{}^{1}/_{16}$. Офсетная печать.
Усл. печ. л. 16,2. Тираж 300 экз. Заказ №

Отпечатано в типографии ООО «Издательство “Нестор-История”»
СПб., ул. Розенштейна, д. 21
Тел. (812) 622-01-23